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AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN LAW INITIATIVE
2004 SUMMER CONFERENCE OVERVIEW
Jane E. Cross*
In Ocho Rios, on July 23-24, 2004, the American and Caribbean Law
Initiative ("ACLI")' held a conference entitled "Caribbean Market Forces:
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law." The conference
theme covered these trends from two overlapping perspectives-the teaching
of international and comparative law, and international trade developments.
Presenting seven engaging panels, the ACLI conference welcomed eighty-five
participants from five Caribbean countries2 and the United States. Norman
Manley Law School hosted this conference, the first in a series of annual
conferences to be sponsored by ACLI.
The conference theme emerged out of the current process of regionaliza-
tion in the Caribbean with respect to its judicial institutions and its trade
regulation. With the impending establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice
(CCJ) and the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), the conference
sought to provide practitioners and academicians within and without the region
with information about how these developments will affect legal practice and
legal education within the region. As such, the first conference of the ACLI
undertook the task of providing a forum for discourse on important and timely
topics.3
In opening the conference, John Knechtle, President of the ACLI, remarked
that this conference is the first in an anticipated series of conferences on legal
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Carribean Law Program, Nova Southeastern
University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A., 1982, University of California, Davis; J.D., 1985, University
of Michigan. The author is also Secretary, Executive Committee Member, and Advisory Board Member of
the American and Caribbean Law Initiative.
1. Founded in 2000, the ACLI is a collaborative project of four Caribbean and four American law
schools. In the Caribbean, the participating institutions are Norman Manley Law School in Jamaica, Eugene
Dupuch Law School in the Bahamas, and Hugh Wooding Law School in Trinidad. In the United States, the
participating law schools are Florida Coastal University School of Law in Jacksonville, Florida, Howard
University School of Law in Washington, D.C., Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Texas Southern University Thurgood Marshall Law School in Houston,
Texas, and Stetson University College of Law in St. Petersburg, Florida.
2. The participants attended from the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, and Trinidad
& Tobago.
3. Petre Williams, CSME on the Agenda at International Law Conference, THE JAMAICA
OBSERVER, July 24, 2004, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/htmi/20040723t220000-
0500_63349_obs csme on theagenda at int i law conference.asp.
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topics relevant to the U.S. and the Caribbean.4 His opening remarks preceded
two inaugural addresses. First, C. Dennis Morrison, chairman of the Council
of Legal Education and a partner at DunnCox law firm in Kingston, delivered
the welcoming address. He was followed by A.J. Nicholson, Attorney General
and Minister of Justice of Jamaica. In his presentation, Attorney General
Nicholson discussed the Anti-Terrorism Bill in Jamaica. He noted that in
drafting this legislation the government remained cognizant of potential human
rights concerns. In particular, he asserted that the new legislation would not
erode the rights of Jamaica under that nation's constitution. 5
In its first day, the ACLI conference addressed the teaching of international
and comparative law with three panel discussions: The Globalisation of Legal
Education and Practice; Comparative Law; and International Law. The first
panel, Globalisation of Legal Education and Practice, consisted of two
presentations moderated by Mr. Ronnie Boodoosingh, Course Director, Hugh
Wooding Law School. The first presentation by Professor Harold MacDougall,
Director, Caribbean Law Program in Jamaica, Howard University School of
Law presented an overview of a law program in Port Antonio, Jamaica. The
speaker for the second presentation was Professor Winston Nagan, Fellow,
Royal Society of the Arts, Samuel T. Dell Research Scholar Professor of Law,
Affiliate Professor of Anthropology, and Founding Director, Institute for
Human Rights and Peace Development at the University of Florida.
Professor McDougall provided an overview and discussion of the summer
law program that he established in Jamaica. In the June 2003 summer program,
Professor McDougall instructed sixteen students from the Howard University
School of Law, five other U.S. Law Schools, and Norman Manley Law School.
By means of clinical study and research, the students conducted a feasibility
study concerning the possibility of declaring Portland Parish, Jamaica, an
"Environmental Protection Area" pursuant to the Natural Resources and
Conservation Act of 1991. The Caribbean Law Program conducted this study
as commissioned by National and Environmental Planning Agency of Jamaica
("NEPA") and the Portland Environmental Protection Association ("PEPA").
The second presentation by Professor Nagan of the University of Florida
focused how legal education can engage with the complexities of globalization.
His article for this presentation entitled "The Global Challenge to Legal
Education: Training Lawyers for a New Paradigm of Economic, Political and
Legal-Cultural Expectations In the 21st Century" is published in this volume of
4. Id.
5. Reporter, Nicholson Says Anti-Terror Bill Will Not Erode Human Rights of Jamaicans, THE
JAMAICA OBSERVER, July 31, 2004, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040730t
210000-0500_63722_obs nicholsonsays antiterror bill will not erodehuman-rightsof j_cans.asp.
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article, Professor Nagan highlighted the ever-expanding role of lawyers to
manage conflicts in international society. Ultimately, Professor Nagan advo-
cates for the interdisciplinary training of lawyers in the growing paradigm of
global law. He also advocates for the integration and harmonization of private
law in the Caribbean region. These efforts would further instill equity and
fairness as foundational forces in private law regimes.
The second panel of the first day focused on comparative law from the
perspective of the death penalty in the Caribbean. Ms. Carol Aina, Course
Director, Norman Manley Law School moderated a panel that included: Dr.
David Berry, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill
Campus; Dr. Stephen Vascianne, Professor of Government, University of the
West Indies, Mona Campus; and Professor Jim Wilets, Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad Law Center. Dr. David Berry first discussed the
recent Privy Council mandatory death penalty trilogy of cases (Boyce, Matthew
and Watson).6 In particular, he examined the three cases to explore the issues
underlying the use of international legal authorities before a domestic tribunal.
In these cases, he observed that the Privy Council has returned to a traditional
approach regarding the use of international law and has departed from its earlier,
more permissive approach.
Professor Stephen Vascianne provided a lively, thoughtful discussion of
the impact of the three recent Privy Council Decisions on the death penalty.7
In particular, he focused on the split of opinion among the Privy Council
justices and the impact of divided panels on the outcome of death penalty cases.
He commented on the problems with having a discretionary death. He also
criticized the recent Privy Council decision that ruled Jamaica's death penalty
to be unconstitutional. Ironically, Jamaica, in response to growing concerns
about its mandatory death penalty, made a move in 1992 to distinguish in the
sentencing of capital and non-capital murders. That distinction was used by the
Privy Council as a basis for finding unconstitutional a mandatory death penalty
for certain categories of murder in Jamaica
6. Boyce v. The Queen, [2004] UKPC 32 (P.C. 2004)(appeal taken from Barb.), available at
http://www.privy-council.org.uk/files/other/boyce.jud.rtf, Matthews v. The State [2004] UKPC 33 (P.C.
2004)(appeal taken from Trin. and Tobago), available athttp://www.privy-counci.org.uklfiles/other/chares%
20matthews.jud.rtf; and Watson v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 34 (P.C. 2004)(appeal taken from Jam.),
available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/files/other/lamber/o2Owatson.jud.rtf.
7. Boyce, [2004] UKPC 32; Matthews, [2004] UKPC 33; and Watson, [2004] UKPC 34.
8. Watson, [2004] UKPC 34; Petre Williams, No Way to Administer a Criminal Justice System!:
Vascianne Worried about Recent Privy Council Decisions, THE JAMAICA OBSERvER, July 25, 2004, available
at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040725t060000-0500_63375 obs nowaytoadminister
a_justicesystem_.asp.
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Finally, Professor Jim Wilets explored how comparative law provides
additional legal arguments in domestic law. On that basis, he addressed the
application of comparative law, including U.S. Supreme Court decisions, to the
death penalty. While he observed the parallel use of comparative law in the
Caribbean courts, he focused on the comparative law trend against the death
penalty in other parts of the world. He examined how this trend has been
critical in teaching death penalty domestic law due to the increasing influence
of comparative norms.
International law was the topic for the final panel on the first day of the
conference. Moderated by Ms. Fara Brown, Attorney-at-Law, Legal Aid Clinic,
Norman Manley Law School, this panel provided two diverse presenters. Mr.
David S. Willig, Attorney-at-Law, Florida and France, Immediate Past Chair of
the International Law Section of the Florida Bar, provided the practitioners
approach to the topic of International Law. Professor Leonard Baynes, St.
John's University Law School, discussed changes in the stereotyping of Asian-
Americans and the resulting racial profiling after the attacks of September 11,
2001.
The topic of the second day of the conference was "International Trade
Developments: Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Caribbean Single
Market and Economy (CSME)." Three separate panels tackled this compelling
topic. The first panel, moderated by Professor Tim Canova, Chapman School
of Law, addressed the question of whether NAFTA9 is a possible blueprint for
the FTAA. This panel featured presentations from three law professors: Pro-
fessor Ari Afilalo, Rutgers School of Law-Camden; Professor Carmen
Gonzalez, Seattle University School of Law; and Professor Alan Swan,
University of Miami School of Law. Professor Afilalo focused on the invest-
ment chapter (Chapter 11) of NAFTA. He asserted that the dispute resolution
mechanism in that chapter illegitimately transferred to international panels the
authority to resolve potentially sensitive investments issued without instilling
the requisite institutional legitimacy enjoyed by national tribunals. Professor
Swan made similar observations concerning Chapter 11 and presented a
theoretical paradigm for examining its function in NAFTA. Finally Professor
Gonzalez discussed how the WTO has perpetuated inequalities between
developed and developing countries. In making this observation, she noted that
the prohibition on trade distorting subsidies had the result of eliminating those
subsidies in developing nations while allowing them to continue in developed
nations. She observed that the resulting imbalances have threatened agricultural
markets in developing countries such as Haiti, Jamaica and Mexico."°
9. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605.
10. Petre Williams, Jamaica Farm Interest Not Served by WTO, Says US Law Professor, THE
JAMAICA OBSERVER, July 28, 2004, available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/magazines/business/
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The second panel discussed the Legal Framework for the CSME. Keith
Sobion, Principal of Norman Manley Law School and Adjunct Professor at
Florida Coastal School of Law, moderated the discussion of the three panelists
for this topic. Ms. Andrea Ewart, Attorney-at-Law and Consultant on Trade and
Regulatory/Legislative Reform in Washington D.C., in her presentation entitled
"Caribbean Single Market & Economy: What Is It and Can It Deliver?"
addressed the question of whether the CSME can accomplish for the Caribbean
what the European Union has achieved for Europe. As discussed at length in
her article published herein, Ms. Ewart observed the challenges to the CSME
as the first step in a longer process of economic union. To provide a govern-
mental perspective, Ms. Michelle Walker, Head, Legal Unit, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Jamaica, focused on the governmental
regulations and initiatives necessary to carry out the CSME. Her paper for this
conference is scheduled to be published by Norman Manley Law School in the
West Indian Law Journal. The final panelist, Mr. Ezra Alleyne, Attorney-at-
Law and Legal Consultant to the Cabinet, Barbados, discussed the topic of "The
Developing Framework of the CSME: Two Legal Issues Considered." In his
article, Mr. Alleyne discussed the historic development of CSME and the juris-
diction of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) to resolve CSME disputes. He
also outlines the establishment of the CCJ and contemplates the implications of
freedom of movement under the CSME.
The final conference panel on "FTAA-Trade and Investment in the
Caribbean" was moderated by Dr. Rosalea Hamilton, Chief Executive Officer,
Institute of Law and Economics, Jamaica. The panelists included Mr. Vasheist
Kokaram, Attorney-at-Law and Trade Law Specialist, M.G. Daly & Partners,
Trinidad and Tobago and Mr. Milton Samuda, Attorney-at-Law, Jamaica. Mr.
Kokaram delivered a presentation on "The FTAA-Trade and Investment
Applying International Trade Remedy Laws in the Caribbean-A Framework
for Protection." In the article published in this journal, Mr. Kokaram argued
that the utilization of anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard actions
afforded under the WTO system enhance liberalization and competitiveness.
He examined the extent to which these actions have been used in the Caribbean
and whether these mechanisms provide an adequate framework for international
trade protection under the FTAA and the CSME.
This conference required the collaboration of a number of individuals and
organizations in the U.S. and the Caribbean. Principal Keith Sobion of Norman
Manley Law School and Professor Jane E. Cross, Nova Southeastern University
(NSU) Law Center undertook the direction of this first conference with the
capable assistance of many dedicated individuals. In his foreword to the
html/20040727t220000-0500 63540 obsja sfarminterest not servedbywto saysus_professor.asp
2004] Cross
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articles, Principal Sobion highlights the purpose and significance of this first
ACLI Conference.
As always, the success of a conference, particularly an international one,
requires the support and dedication of key persons. At Norman Manley Law
School, the outstanding conference secretariat included Maureen Lindo; Mrs.
Yvonne Lawrence; Beverley Phillips; Georgette Johnson; and Deiroy Pinto. At
Nova Southeastern Law Center, Linda Lahey, Michelle Hurley and Jason
Rosenberg provided able assistance.
Various members of the ACLI provided additional assistance and support.
These individuals included: Dean Bill Adams, NSU Law Center; Carol Aina,
Norman Manley Law School; Victoria Dawson, Thurgood Marshall School of
Law; John Knechtle, Florida Coastal School of Law; Dean Joseph Harbaugh,
NSU Law Center; Harold McDougall, Howard University School of Law;
Principal Miriam Samaru, Eugene Dupuch School of Law; and Principal
Annestine Sealey, Hugh Wooding Law School. In addition, all of the speakers,
moderators and panelists participated at their own expense in this successful
conference and deserve recognition for their significant contributions. Finally,
the conference participants provided a collegial and energetic environment for
discussion and debate on the conference topics.
The conference benefited from the co-sponsorship of the International
Section of the Florida Bar, the Teaching International Law Interest Group of the
American Society of International Law, the Jamaican Bar Association and the
Caribbean Bar Association. Moreover, the following business provided contri-
butions for the conference: Acorn Bookstore; Air Jamaica (1968) Ltd.; Creative
Craft Plus; Lascelles Wines & Spirits; Pickapeppa Co. Ltd.; Standard Products
Co. Ltd.; Walkerswood Co. Ltd.; and Wentworth Charles & Co.
[Vol. 11:3
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I. PROLOGUE
Enormous developments are taking place in the global economy. Initia-
tives are being taken from the top down, and quite literally, from the bottom up.
Changes in economic foundations of the world political economy are already
evident. The emergence of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa as major
players in the South-South discourse is being complemented by dramatic
initiatives on the part of the United States and the European Union to radically
expand the structure of global neo-liberal political economy. It may as well be
parenthetically noted that while the formula of the neo-liberal political ideology
for global economic development is being aggressively promoted, serious
problems with the model have emerged within the United States itself, in the
light of excessive corporate malfeasance and criminality. In the words of the
New York Times, [Sunday, July 18, 2004, Masters of the Universe, Leashed
[for Now]: "It has been a humbling summer for the power players of Wall
Street, once celebrated as Masters of the Universe."'
In a significant understatement, the Wall Street Guru, Felix Rohatyn stated
the following: "Therejust have been to many aspects of business where people
were kind of giving out self-interested advice, or got involved in transactions
they shouldn't have been involved in."2 Perhaps the most dramatic of the
concerns with the corporate management of the market was the way in which
Enron is alleged to have fleeced the State of California of billions of dollars
sufficient to create both a fiscal and energy crisis in the state. If corporate
power could achieve such dominance over a powerful state like California, one
can only imagine the apprehension that must be felt by small states who might
easily succumb to the dominance of private, corporate economic power.
I. Patrick McGeehan, Masters of the Universe, Leashed (for Now), N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at
§ 4, p. 3.
2. Id.
[Vol. 11:9
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The list of corporate stars whose luster now illuminates American prison
cells or might soon do so includes former Enron Chairman Kenneth L. Lay who
has been indicted on conspiracy and securities crimes as well as wire fraud.3
Jeffrey K. Skilling, has been indicted on conspiracy, securities fraud, and insider
trading.4 They are awaiting trial. Samuel D. Waksal of Inclone Systems is
currently serving 7 years for securities fraud and insider trading.' Martin L.
Grass of Rite Aid is serving 8 years for conspiracy and obstruction of justice.6
Scott D. Sullivan of WorldCom has pled guilty to accounting fraud.7 Andrew
S. Fastow of Enron has pled guilty to fraud.8 Frank Quattrone of Credit Suisse
has been convicted of obstruction ofjustice.9 The list is depressingly extensive.
But the deep implications for the global neo-liberal economy are the problem
and ubiquity of crony capitalism and the problem of how capitalist institutions
might be controlled and regulated in the global public interest. This is the
backdrop within which critical developments are taking place for the marginal
economies of global society.
On May 18, 2000, President Clinton appended his signature to the Trade
and Development Act of 2000.'° The Act included two important components:
the United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000 (CBPTA), "
the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000 (AGOA).' 2 The fundamental
United States interests, from the United States perspective, are the strengthening
of United States security interests and the United States interest in economic
development and political reform, especially in the Caribbean Basin and
3. Mary Flood, Barge Trial Final Arguments at Hand; Jury Might Not Begin Deliberating Until
Wednesday, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 26, 2004, at BI.
4. Indictment of Jeffrey K. Skilling, U.S. v. Causey (S.D. Tex. 2004) (No. 4:04-cr-00025); see also
18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343 (2004).
5. Quattrone Sentenced to 18 Months; Ex-banking Star Plans to Appeal, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 9,
2004, at C3.
6. Ex-Rite Aid CEO Agrees to Plea Deal, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 14, 2004, at C9.
7. Simon Bowers, Business Roundup: Telecoms: WorldCom Sues Ebbers for $300M, THE
GUARDIAN (LONDON), July 10, 2004, at 30.
8. Greg Farrell, Enron Figure Pleads Guilty, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2004, at 6B.
9. CREDIT SUISSE FIRSTBOSTON: Quattrone Seeks New Trial On Jury Orders, CHICAGO TRmI.,
May 26, 2004, at C2.
10. Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Trade & Dev. Act].
11. Id. at §211-213. The United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBPTA) was
implemented by Proclamation No. 7351, 3 C.F.R. Proc. 7351 (2000) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §
2703) [hereinafter Proclamation 7351 ].
12. Trade& Dev. Act, supra note 10, §101-107. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
was implemented by Proclamation No. 7350, 3 C.F.R. Proc. 7350 (2000) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
3701) [hereinafter AGOA].
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Africa. 13 From the point of view of the Caribbean Basin, it is the sixth largest
export market for United States goods. 14 It accounts for 2.7 of United States
exports in 1999.15 Hurricanes Mitch and George significantly impacted these
figures in 1998.16 Evidently, the weather provided an incentive for the CBTPA.
The CBTPA provides certain countries of the Caribbean with important
preferential tariff treatment.' 7 Under Presidential Proclamation 7351, Jamaica
is among the states included as a beneficiary country. 18 The CBTPA has been
an important marker for a still more ambitious initiative, which is including the
Caribbean community (CARICON) into a possible integration into a Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA). This United States initiative targets the 34
democracies of the Western Hemisphere. 9 The region includes 800 million
consumers and has a gross domestic product of some 14 trillion dollars. 20 This
is the relevant context including the rapidly changing environment of political
economy, trade, and investment and more within which legal educators and
legal practitioners will have to work. These are critical challenges for the future
of the Caribbean Basin, the Western Hemisphere, and in a larger sense, the legal
profession as a global force for providing structure and process for the complex
world of tomorrow.
I1. INTRODUCTION
We have survived the last millennium. The last century of the last
millennium was one of the worst in recorded history from the standpoint of war,
human rights and humanitarian deprivations. On the other hand, the last century
of the last millennium has also generated the promise of improvement.
Indicators include improvements in science, technology, and communications,
improved understandings of law, as well as economic social, ecological and
political arrangements, which hold the promise of a better future. Nothing is
assured. Everything is a challenge and fundamental human values in the most
inclusive sense of the terms, are at the heart of the challenge. There is the
paradigm of increased development and privilege for the "haves" of the planet
13. U.S. DEP'T OF COM, CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE: U.S.-CARIBBEAN BASIN TRADE
PARTNERSHIP ACT OF 2000, at http://www.mac.doc.gov/CBI/webmain/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004)
[hereinafter CBI].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(3).
18. Proclamation 7351, supra note 11.
19. Diego Arria, Terrorism, Globalization and the Post 9/11 Period, ANALITICA.COM VENEZUELA,
Feb. 9, 2003, at http://www.anaitica.com/vaittimi/international/5678593.asp.
20. Id,
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and there is the prospect of accelerating poverty and exclusion for the "have
nots."
There is, as M.K. Gandhi is reported to have said, more than enough to
satisfy all global needs. There is simply not enough to satisfy all global greed.
The specific challenges generated by perceived threats to cultural and economic
dignity, are reflected in such extreme reactions as the apocalyptic version of
terrorism associated with Bin Laden and those who sympathize or identify with
him. They seem to fear the process of globalism that they see as a threat to their
fundamental identity, political autonomy and religious outlook. On the other
hand, there are those who see the war on terror as an important opportunity to
extend, however articulated, a peculiar version of old style imperialism. Thus
the war in Iraq is simultaneously claimed to be a war against terrorism and by
its detractors as a war for an imperialistic agenda by others. Whatever the exact
truth, one fact is clear, a vast number of complex, vital and challenging legal
issues have confronted the international legal community. If lawyers could not
stop or contain the current conflicts in the world community, they still have a
critical role in seeking to constrain conflict and often to provide a framework in
which order might be generated from the chaos of violent conflict and war.
Although this war may seem remote from the central issues confronting the
nations and peoples of the Caribbean, we note that the United States base in
Cuba serves as a territorial haven in which the United States might safely
deposit suspected terrorists and hold them indefinitely without effective
recourse to the courts of the United States. In short, a complex legal issue has
been generated in the Caribbean about whether territory located in the
Caribbean may be used to avoid the rule of law of the United States and the rule
of law of the world community. Is Guantanamo a sui generis territory outside
of the strictures of any rule of law? Since it is claimed that the treaty that gives
the United States occupancy of Guantamano is an occupancy that is indefinite,
are there implicit standards of treaty construction and interpretation that may
suggest that the treaty is only valid so long as it does not violate explicit rules
of international law.2" In short, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not a
construction that is absolute but assumes that the binding force of the treaty
continues so long as the treaty performance remains faithful to international
legal obligations.22 If those obligations are intentionally breached, does this
invoke the principle rebus sic stantibus?23 If there are changed circumstances
or conditions and if these factors constitute a violation of international law,
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
22. Id. art. 26.
23. Walter Gehr, The Principles of International Treaty Law, at
http://www.walter.gehr.net/rebusstantibus.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
2004]
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would this principle become relevant to the continued viability of the treaty
itself? Thus, remote as the Caribbean seems to be from the war on terrorism,
its territories are currently used as an important part of the effort to prosecute
that war.
Even more importantly, the Guantanamo problem simply raises the larger
problem of the status of Cuba within the community and the approach of the
United States to both Cuba and the larger Caribbean community. The United
States maintains a regime of economic coercion against Cuba. It also seeks
aggressive economic development for the Caribbean region. The complexity
posed by political decisions of the United States will have practical
consequences of significance for the Caribbean region as a whole. To square
the circle of United States policy will require enormous legal dexterity working
under the shadow of powerful political forces, forces often antagonistic to each
other.
The countries of the Caribbean are small and even if they pool their
resources they confront a dilemma. The United States is their most important
political and economic neighbor. They cannot function effectively without a
cooperative relationship with the United States. If they cooperate fully with the
United States, they will clearly gain. But what exactly will they gain? If they
do not cooperate with the United States, they will be disadvantaged, but what
exactly are the disadvantages? It is between these two possibilities that the
Caribbean nations will have to develop their strategies for political, economic
and social development. But they stand to be mightily disadvantaged if they do
not engage in the challenge. If they engage in the challenge, the question is how
effectively can they secure their interests? Here the role of the law and lawyers
it seems to me is going to be critical. For example, if effective progress is made
towards a free trade relationship with the United States, there is no question that
the United States will penetrate and dominate the Caribbean. On the other hand,
if the fine print is taken care of, perhaps there is the possibility of a form of
reverse penetration. This requires knowing how to exploit the United States
market. One of the first principles in positioning oneself strategically is to have
a significant understanding of the legal foundations of the United States system
itself. This does not mean that doing business with the United States under a
relatively free trade scheme is simple for the practical businessman in the
Caribbean. But the overall benefits can be achieved if sound business practice
is accompanied by competent and forceful legal advice and advocacy.
Let me give you a simple illustration, drawn from a practical problem of
a state that has taken advantage of trade preferences given it by the United
States. A small empowerment corporation in state X (a developing country)
determines that an American computer product in the process of moving from
concept to application would be extremely useful in terms of its ability to
compete in the communications market of X and the larger regional
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environment. They send a delegation to Washington, review the product with
their experts and are given a fairly summarized version of the timing for the
practical application of the product in the market. Everything looks great. They
will have an exclusive license in their country and a whole chunk of the
continent. However, the contract that is to be drawn up is to be drawn by the
lawyers of the United States corporation. The third world corporation is to be
pay a quarter of a million dollars up front followed by two further payments in
the same amount. The initial amount is paid and the contract is signed. There
is great pressure on them to sign the contract and pay the money or they will
forfeit a lost opportunity. The CEO of the corporation makes it clear that he is
doing a favor to a group of unsophisticated third world bums. It more or less
goes like this: I understand your lack of sophistication in the real world, of high
finance so I will make it simple. If you want to be rich, pay now and sign the
contract. The parties sign the take it or leave it deal. The contract turns out to
be a one-sided arrangement. The American lawyers draft the contract selecting
the forms of dispute resolution, including choice of venue, choice of
jurisdiction, and choice of law; the agreement also includes a provision that
seeks to exclude the United Nations Convention on the Sale of Goods. 4 After
the money is paid, communication deteriorates and becomes non-existent.
The third world corporation receives a contact from the chief of technology
of the firm indicating that he is leaving and that he can provide them with a
different product that would meet their needs if they are interested. He is also
willing to sell them all his shares. The third world firm, smelling a rat, declines
to have any further conversations with this person. Since they have received no
further information from the corporation, they ask for their funds to be refunded.
The American firm agrees. They subsequently receive a response from a lawyer
in the United States indicating that there is reason to believe they may be
implicated in a plot to appropriate the patent of the United States company.
Their money will not be returned and they have been reported to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. This is a fairly practical problem and indeed is drawn
from real life experience.
The central point for our purpose is that law can be used as an instrument
of power. The imperial state does not have to use gunboat diplomacy if it can
achieve its objectives by the use of the power appropriated by law. Weak states
cannot protect their nationals effectively in a world of gunboat diplomacy.
They will have to play the legal game and play it with a lot of skill to develop
a relatively level playing field within which constructive developments can
happen. Expertise in local and international law is simply not enough.
Expertise in narrow legalism is necessary but not sufficient for effective
24. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 59 [hereinafter CISG].
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protection of the range of interests of a small state. The most important asset
of a small state will be the extent to which its lawyers are incredibly well trained
in local, regional, comparative and international law.
Let me give another illustration of the importance of this matter. A third
world country rewrote its Medicines Act to give its Minister more powers with
regard to the protection in the context of national health emergencies. The
government of the United States challenged the legislation of the country. The
basis of the United States claim was to get that country to repeal its legislation
on the basis that it violated international intellectual property treaties protecting
intellectual property rights to which both states were parties. A significant and
escalating conflict developed between the Unites States and that country with
the United States threatening to impose economic sanctions on it. The United
States assumed that had an unassailable position on treaty interpretation.
Initially no one in that third world country challenged this position. However,
the NGOs associated with AIDS issues got into the matter and a careful reading
of the treaties and United States practice disclosed that the United States
position taken in this context, would in itself make the United States a major
violator of the treaties because of its extensive use of compulsory licensing and
the acceptance of the principle of parallel imports. This technical reading of
Trips and its interpretation in the light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 5 as well as the understanding of Trips on the light of general
international law, including human rights law has significantly changed the
fulcrum of power over these matters. In short, one side sought to use law of the
legal bulldozer and the other side was sufficiently skilled so as to limit the
power of economic hegemony by law. These two illustrations demonstrate that
if the trend toward a far greater intense level of integration is to take place, that
is to say, if global forces which conspired to erode territorial boundaries in the
traditional sense and reproduce the framework of interdependence and inter-
determination, lawyers will have the critical role in ensuring that these facts of
global social organization do not degenerate into global domination and archaic
imperialism.
III. LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL LAW
I have used these two bullets as lead in to the question of how lawyers are
trained to meet the new challenges of the international or global environment.
As preliminary matter, the first issue that has to be confronted is that behind the
practice of law is the brooding omnipresence of the theory of law. And behind
both the practice and the theory of law is the theory and practice of legal
education as well as continuing legal education of active professionals. It
25. Vienna Convention, supra note 21.
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believe it was Dicey or Holmes who said that jurisprudence stinks in the nostrils
of the practitioner. Please forgive me if I provide a modest reference to some
critical aspects of theory that impact on legal education and ultimately on the
practical orientation of real world lawyers. The central traditional feature of
legal education was and remains largely influenced by legal positivism. And
legal positivism posits the creation of all law as a product of the sovereign.26
The precise impact of this on legal education has in effect been to make it
parochial-to train lawyers in a system in which there is a sovereign that
monopolizes the making, application and enforcement of law. As a model, this
is of course a hierarchical model, a model of law coming down from the top to
the herd at the bottom.
In Austin's famous formulation, law is the command of a sovereign
imposed by a sanction.27 The obvious concern with this model would be the
status of law made beyond the boundaries of the sovereign, such as international
law. According to Holland, international law is the vanishing point of legal
theory.28 And according to Austin, international law is positive morality and not
law.29 The practitioner will at once see that this model is unhelpful as a means
of training practitioners under current global conditions. [I note that this
reference to theory is deliberately simplified. There are of course much more
refined versions of modem positivism]. Any statistical indication of the scope
of human problems implicating legal institutions which cut across state and
national lines, will immediately disclose that this vertical model of law making
has great difficulty in accounting for what we might loosely call a horizontal
model of law making.
In short, the legal problems that cut across state and national lines from war
and peace, to ordinary business transactions, to concessionary agreements, to
marriage, divorce and the management of estates and international trusts and a
great deal more suggests that the trajectories of law which confront the
contemporary practitioner are not simply vertical or horizontal, but indeed, law
making application and enforcement come in a range of bewildering trajectories
challenging traditional ways of doing law. So our first problem is the problem
of whether we can construct a framework and a model of law that is not
confined to a single state but includes clusters of states, and multiple clusters of
states constituting the larger universe of states within the international
community. More than that, there are other players besides states in the world
community whose role must be understood and given appropriate legal
26. See generally LEGAL POSITIVISM (Mario Jori ed., 1992).
27. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF PosrrvE LAw (Scholarly
Press 1977).
28. THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1924).
29. AUSTIN, supra note 26.
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relevance: international organizations, international corporations, international
criminal syndicates, international political parties and pressure groups,
international terrorist groups and, in addition, individuals and groups which
constitute the civil society.
Let us explore the implications of modeling global law more fully. The
problems of traditional law models manifested themselves in the theory and
practice of both international law and constitutional law. In international law
positivism influenced the generation of elaborate, alternative or modified struc-
tures of international law itself. Two dominant, and indeed elegant, structural
models emerged that deeply divided as well as influenced the development of
international law. The models were economically styled "monist" and
"dualist."3 The monist model seemed to postulate a "criterion" of validation
in a conceptual construct that was "meta-statal." The assumption was that there
"existed" a meta-statal "imperative" that determined when, for example, a state
was a state, and thus the monist theory had some constitutive properties built
into it.3' The dualist version provided a more anarchic structure for international
law by rooting all law making competence in the nation-state (sovereign). Since
the sovereign might consent to some limitations, withhold consent or withdraw
consent already given, international law could be predicated upon formal and
informal agreements and understandings.32
How does globalism change these models? How do these models limit the
empirical and normative challenges of globalism? If we conceive of legal
theory as in part an inquiring system, do these models limit or enhance legal
inquiry? It is obvious that the very large and complex social process mosaic of
world order includes not only states, but international and regional organiza-
tions, private armies of various levels of competence and capacity, vast corpor-
ate enterprises and an even vaster complex of non-governmental civil society
associations as well as the individuals who constitute the larger global com-
munity. These social facts may require that the implicit state-centered view we
30. Theories of "monism" and "dualism" have been a critical part of the evolving "constitutional"
discourse of modem international law. In the United Kingdom, the theories of monism and dualism have been
loosely identified with the theories of "transformation" or incorporation relationship between domestic law
and international law. The "transformation" theory holds that international law transforms domestic law, but
they are two separate and distinct systems. On the other hand, the "incorporation" theory holds that inter-
national law is part of domestic law without a ratifying procedure. See generally LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1990); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw (3d ed. 1991).
See also George Slyz, International Law in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U.J. INT'LL. &POL. 65 (1997); Trendtex
Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria I Lloyd's Rep. 581 (1997) (Eng.); Maclaine Watson & Co., Ltd. v.
Dep't of Trade & Indus., 3 All E.R. 523 (1989) (Eng.) (accepting the incorporation doctrine). Human rights
litigation has added to the force of the incorporation doctrine. See MURRAY HUNT, USING HUMAN RIGHTS
LAw IN ENGLISH COURTS 25 (1998).
31. See Slyz, supra note 30.
32. Id.
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hold of law be transformed into a global law whose boundaries and structures
are still in the unfolding stage."
Multi-state/transnational law may indeed be structurally more horizontal
than vertical. More realistically, there are simply multiple trajectories of law
making, law applying and law-enforcing processes. In loose but convenient for-
mulation, we are dealing with the so-called global to local to global nexus.
These connections have horizontal, vertical, and other trajectories. This kind
of structural complexity will have a critical impact upon conventional methods
of both teaching and inquiry about law and law-conditioned processes. In this
context, the good news is that the one-dimensional paradigm of top-down,
hierarchical law is no longer as professionally interesting as it apparently once
was. Law operating in planes of multiple intersecting trajectories does represent
an impressive challenge to professional competence in theory and practice. The
distinguished legal anthropologist, Leopold Pospisi 34 who showed that multiple
law-generating processes might exist in the same state or body politic, indicates
an important insight into the structure of the law. Each of these processes
would have distinctive criteria that make them relatively discrete. Simultane-
ously they have points of important intersection and interaction with each other.
What therefore seems to be an ostensibly single legal system upon proper in-
vestigation may in fact disclose multiple spheres and levels of legal systematics.
This practical gloss on the relevant context of the global community which
now generates problems of global, regional, national and local relevance re-
quires us to do a lot of rethinking about legal education and how it can be rele-
vant to the practical realties lawyers must confront in the new millennium. In
short, a central challenge for legal education is to discard parochialism while at
the same time recognizing that the outcomes of legal interventions are invari-
ably grounded in some local contexts. On the other hand, the perspective must
be broadened to understand the impact of global conditions on regional and
local situations as well as the impact and regional situations on global condi-
tions. These are critical challenges in the teaching of law and I now look more
specifically at challenges in the structure of the curriculum of a law school
sensitive to the new challenges of international environment.
33. International law has been the primitive law of an unsocial international society. Itself a by-
product of that unsocialization, it has contributed to holding back the development of international society as
society. Failing to recognize itself as a society, international society has not known that it has a constitution.
Not knowing its own constitution, it has ignored the generic principles of a constitution. See PHILIP ALLOTr,
EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 418 (1990).
34. See LEOPOLD J. POSPISIL. ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY (1971).
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A. The Curriculum and Globalism
One of the central issues of legal education in the law schools as well as
matter of continuing professional obligation is the globalization of the curri-
culum. W. Michael Reisman states that many of the social arrangements we
think of as quintessentially domestic in this country are inextricably interwoven
with complex process in other countries and regions of the globe.35 Consider
our security system, our political-economic system to search, fund, and retain
external markets for our products, and our dependence on the national resources
without which an advanced industrial, science-based civilization cannot survive.
Also consider our health system, and our conceptions of fundamental morality.
Even "domestic law" courses can no longer be understood adequately, whether
for descriptive or practical professional purposes, without an understanding of
the organization and dynamics of the international system. There are large-scale
implications in this challenge. For example, there is the challenge of "trans-
national comprehensiveness" in the teaching of the law. Do we need more
"international law courses"? Should all our existing courses be subject to
revisions that account for the complexities of multi- state law or law on a
"horizontal plane"? In other words, must we radically revise, for example, how
we teach the law of sales to account for the International Convention on the Sale
of Goods, or must we create a new course based on this latter instrument? How
much specific international or transnational content should be added to a
traditional (state-centered) private international course? The short but precise
answer is that almost every course in the curriculum of any law school to a
greater of lesser degree has a trans-state multi-state, transnational dimension to
it. Globalization may have to be given a critical curriculum presence by the
willingness of "domestic" law teachers to revise their domestic law courses with
a sensitivity to the law of multi-state problems.
If realism demands that law school curriculum be more global, it must
confront powerfully received ideas, often a part of the implicit jurisprudence of
both scholars and practitioners that law and the state are essentially identical.
The identification of law with the state has always had technical difficulties with
the law of multiple states (both public and private international law). Indeed a
distinguished jurist once suggested that if international law really were law, it
would also be the vanishing point of legal theory.36 Of course, an emerging
paradigm of global law may be unclear and not intuitively as appealing as the
Westphalian/Austinian model of law and state.37 However, literature in World
35. See Michael Reisman, Designing Curricula: Making Legal Education Continuously Effective
and Relevant for the 21st Century, 17 CMB. L. REV. 831 (1986-1987).
36. HOLLAND, supra note 28.
37. See generally Richard Fallk A New Paradigm for InternationalLegal Studies, 84 YALE L. J. 969,
999-1015 (1975-1975).
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Order studies moves significantly in the direction of global law, building on
Judge Jessup's idea of "transnational law" as distinct from state centered
international law.38 The author's own work on the interrelations of public and
private international law suggests that they are indispensable and complimentary
components of world public order or global law.39 A practical gloss on these
ideas is the recognition that in general the sources of state law rest largely on
statute and precedent. The sources of international law, as indicated in Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, are much broader, and
correspondingly subject to controversy.40
The sources of international global law, which includes international law
and their relative weight in legal discourse or decision- making contexts, may
be a fertile source of broadening the "authority" basis for the interpretation of
the law in general. It may also be an important challenge to juridical creativity
and innovation in the use of extensive sources of authority not always found in
conventional state law sources.
From the practical lawyers' perspective, developments through United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law represent developments that are more
congruent with specialized areas of law than the general categories of inter-
national or comparative law.4' To illustrate, the legal instruments developed
through the Hague Conference include conventions covering areas such as the
form of testimony dispositions (1961), recognition of adoption decrees (1965),
foreign service of documents in civil and commercial issues (1965), recognition
of foreign judgments (1971), taking evidence abroad (1970), recognition of
divorces (1970), traffic accidents (1971), products liability (1973), recognition
of marriages (1978), marital property (1978), trusts (1985), child abductions
(1980) agency (1978) and much more. Further examples include, UNCITRALs
conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods
by Sea (1978), the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Sale of
Goods (1980), the United Nations Convention on International Bills of
Exchange and International Promissory Notes (1994), the United Nations
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International
Trade (1991), the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and
Standby Letters of Credit (1998). In addition, UNCITRALs model codes
38. See PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 1- 16 (1956).
39. See Winston P. Nagan, Conflicts Theory in Conflict: A Systematic Appraisal of Traditional and
Contemporary Theory, 3, No. 3 N.Y. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343 (1982).
40. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 33
U.N.T.S. 993, [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
41. See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Collection of Conventions (1951-
1988) (1988), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index-en.php.
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covering International Commercial Arbitration (1985), International Credit
Transfers (1992), Procurement of Goods, Construction Services, etc. (1995),
Cross Border Insolvency (1999) and Electronic Commerce (1991) are but an
indication of the specific challenges globalism represents for curriculum
development, continuing legal- education and the basic issues of enhanced
lawyer competency in an age of globalism.42
B. Globalism: Making Context and Interpretation Relevant to Lawyers
The importance of context to law is both simple and complex. Theories of
law in general have sought to make law a discrete discipline. Modem theories
have sought to make their discipline more amenable to scientific logical
analysis. To do this the trend has been to isolate law from the unruly world of
contextual reality. Exclusion comes at a price. That price may sacrifice realism
and relevancy. The issueof context is often critical to the practice of law. Con-
text influences interpretation. The less interpretation admits context, the more
formulaic the process of a legal decision may be. At the same time, that
decision may distance itself from realism and relevancy. On the other hand,
formalism may perform an important function in times of crisis of protecting the
legal profession from repressive politics. However, it is the case that the exclu-
sion of context also results in the exclusion of the just claims of the margin-
alized classes. From the perspective of this paper, the exclusion of the global
context runs the risk of making the profession itself marginal or irrelevant.
The perspective of"globalism" which implies a new and important context
necessarily expands the definition of law. This will influence how law is
interpreted. Thus, the methods of construction, interpretation, as well as the
authoritative sources of the "law," all conspire to produce challenges to the
appropriate boundaries of our discipline. This could inspire us to rethink the
very empirical and normative foundations of domestic law from a global pers-
pective. For example, global law could influence a trend that requires "inter-
pretation" in terms of what is usefully knowable about communications theory,
which considerably broadens the theory and method of law, based communi-
cations. This in turn may influence what is conventionally labeled "interpreta-
tion." It may also stress an approach to law that is more horizontal than hier-
archal, making more complex the weight to be given to different sources of
authority in particular cases. Globalism also broadens the context of law. If
that context is socially constructed, it may stress interdisciplinary skills in our
efforts to improve, as responsibly as possible, the "narrative" of global law.
42. Id.
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IV. MANAGING THE SOURCES OF GLOBAL LAW: THE RELEVANCE OF
COMMUNICATIONS THEORY
International lawyers have long grappled with the problems of so called
"hard" and "soft" sources of law. The phenomenon has in part been triggered
by the communications revolution itself. Resolutions, declarations, and direc-
tives flow from a vast aggregate of national, regional and global institutions.
To some extent they are expectation-creating communications. Some are for-
mulated with the precision of legal precepts and generate authoritative support
in preexisting legal precepts or in the weight and seriousness with which they
are received in authoritative fora, or more generally in public opinion. These
kinds of signs and symbols may gravitate to general acceptance in the relevant
professional and specialist discourses. Sometimes these precepts backed by
some form of "authority" and "acceptance" may find confirmation in formal
institutions of law making or in informal but effective fora. Sometimes the
acceptance of such communications that are policy-specific supported by an
authority-signal and by some form of controlling animus, has the capacity to
create law in a functional sense. This kind of insight suggests that, however
useful the typologies of hard and soft law are, or however broad the boundaries
of Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute43 are, we could benefit
from a mpre coherent perspective about the relationship of communications
theory to the process of global law making and application.
Lawyers in the international law arena have been keenly aware that we are
no longer dealing with the sources of international law, but the sources of a
(local to global) global law paradigm. This has been expressed as a form of
disenchantment even with the "traditional" sources of international law as being
perhaps too narrow a basis for marshaling the sources of authority of global or
transnational law. However, as has been earlier indicated, a return to the basis
of general communications theory might provide a better multi-level, multi-
disciplinary framework for meeting this challenge in both theory and practice. 44
The general model of communications theory asks a series of sequential
questions:
43. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 40, art. 38.
44. See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (ADVANCES IN
COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS) (1994); Winston P. Nagan, Law and Post-Apartheid South Africa, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 399 (1988-1989).
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Who?
Communicates what?
About what?
Through what channel?
To whom?
With what result?
With what effect?45
As applied to global law the model may be graphically illustrated as
follows:
Communicators } Prescriptive Content } Target Audience in
From Global Community } Authority Signal } Global Community
} Controlling Intention }
This general model has been applied to the interpretation of agreements
and world order, as well as to add insight to the question of how global law is
functionally made and applied. In the author's article, "Law and Post-Apartheid
South Africa,"'46 this approach was used to provide some coherence to the flow
of communications relating to black expectations of change as found in the
Petition of Right, the Freedom Charter, the UDF Declaration, etc. This model
provides a good fit for understanding the impact of the modem communications
revolution (the intemet for example) on global law. This approach, however,
implies a greater appreciation of law in context and the interdisciplinary aspect
it implies.
This kind of perspective about law as a process of communication has vast
implications for how one describes and uses all possible "sources" of law at any
level of inquiry. Indeed, the model throws light upon a neglected aspect of
human interaction, viz., that interaction is in substantial measure a communica-
tive enterprise. These communications often involve normative or prescriptive
elements, they include value-variables and they contain coded signs and
symbols of both authority and expectations of coercion. It is perhaps this core
45. The revolution in human communications technologies is of central importance to lawyer roles,
identities and emerging standards of professionalism. See generally HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY & RHONDA J.
CRANE, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (1992); ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL & ELI M. NOAM, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A GLOBAL AGE
(Eli M. Noam ed. 1990); FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: HOW THE COMMUNICATIONS
REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES (1997). A recent paper Lloyd S. Etheredge presented at Columbia
University provides a specific overview of developments relating to the Internet and globalism. See LLOYD
S. ETHERIDGE, THE INTERNET AND WORLD POLITICS: UNLEASHING A POTENTIAL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (May
10, 1999).
46. See generally Nagan, supra note 44.
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insight that has influenced legal anthropologists to explore the empirical
foundations of small group law or the "law" of micro social relationships.47 But
the global perspective also is replete with complex communicative processes
which have normative or prescriptive force of some sort, designate communi-
cations about desired goods, services, honors and indeed basic "values;" and
contain coded symbols of authority and control to define expectations of con-
servation and change. The micro and macro implications, therefore, of a more
functional design for a contextualized vision of law-making as a process of
communication collaboration and conflict has an immense potential impact on
how we reconstruct law in an age of globalism.
V. FROM STRUCTURE TO CONTEXT AND FUNCTION
When we refocus our lens about the future of professional responsibility
from structure to function, we encounter several important matters of substance.
First, the "pre" structural context of law encounters the unruly world of global
fact, and the problems generated by that world, some of which demand legal
responses of some sort. The systematic articulation and understanding of the
legal problems of global reach, which demand the Practitioner's attention, will
require a refined and sophisticated form of interdisciplinary theory and method.
The focus on decision-making and policy in an era of globalism permits a
sharper emphasis on such issues as the relevance of context and more
specifically the contextual location or mapping of problems that require some
sort of legal intervention. The problem of what a legal or potential problem is
a major issue for theory and practice and it is also a critical component of the
multi disciplinary dimension of the delineation of context and the outcomes of
context, which are the problems to which law must respond.
The discipline of focusing on the problems, which demand or require
authoritative and controlling decision-making interventions, serves to place
important limitations and potentials to enhance both scholarship and pro-
fessionalism. Probably the most important element that problems provide to
legal culture from a theoretical point of view is the principle of realism and
relevancy. When the clich6 "relevancy" is invoked, it is usually invoked as an
anti-intellectual, crude limitation on inquiry. But in fact, when we tie realism
to problems we find that we know very little about problems or indeed the
problem of how one determines what a problem is. Even more important, the
47. See DAVID A. FUNK, GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: ExPOsITION AND PRACTICE, A SYMPOSIUM HELD
NOVEMBER 8, 1986 1 (1988); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999); see also Walter 0.
Weyrauch, Unwritten Constitutions, Unwritten Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1211 (1999); Calum
Carmichael, Gypsy Law and Jewish Law, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 269 (1997); Walter 0. Weyrauch, The "Basic
Law" of "Constitution" of a Small Group, 27, No. 2 J. SOc. ISSUES 49 (1971); Walter 0. Weyrauch &
Maureen Bell, Autonomous Law Making: The Case of the "Gypsies ", 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993).
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idea of being able to anticipate or predict problems before they happen could be
one of the most important components of thoughtful scholarly inquiry that is
informed by high intellectual standards of professionalism. The particular slant
that realism and relevancy in terms of orientation give to law in a global sense
is that it focuses on the unsettling dynamic aspect of law, that is to say, that law
as decision is a response to problems that actually arise or maybe reasonably
anticipated will arise out of the relevant community context.
No less important to the task of lawyering may be the focus on the indices
of decision-making interventions, in particular the "conditions" of decision-
making. This too may expand our focus from legalism's reliance on logical
syntactical modes of expression and appraisal, to those that focus cross-
culturally on such factors as social and professional class, cultural orientation,
personality predispositions and conditions of crises which may require inter-
disciplinary skills to meaningfully appreciate the conditions that shape lawyer
roles and lawyer conditioned interventions. A still further concern or interest
that may implicate the role of lawyers in this context is the effort to understand
the consequences for public order of lawyer interventions. These understand-
ings, imperfect as they may indeed be, cry out for tools and skills of appraisal
that are in part interdisciplinary.
VI. CONTEXT: LAW AND...
One of the important problems posed by partial "law-and" models is that
by taking in a selective slice of social organization the consequences of legal or
policy decision-making interventions may in fact be astigmatic or myopic since
these partial, cognitive and methodological procedures are faced with the
disciplinary dilemma of too much exclusion, or if they become too inclusive it
is because they take in too much and therefore eviscerate the coherence their
approach brings to legal analysis or legal inquiry. Managing a legal context for
legal inquiry is therefore a complex business.
Those who emphasize a law and economics approach may have to confront
this dilemma. One of the key concerns is the issue of how much economic
reductionism law can absorb without significant distortion. This issue has
emerged in the form of whether a law and economics approach can digest
certain non-economic "values." I am uncertain whether at the back of the
economic foundations of the law model there is no testable generalized model
of social organization. Possibly this model is well expressed somewhere. If it
is there, perhaps it might look something like this: "Human beings purposefully
seek to maximize wealth through institutions based on material and technolo-
gical resources." The basic thrust of this model might be that people maximize
wealth to make more wealth. It is of course possible that they maximize wealth
for other reasons. Perhaps they want power. Perhaps they want to maximize
[Vol. 11:9
Nagan & Visser
their "affective" experiences or improve their professional or educational
opportunities, health and wellbeing. Maybe they need wealth to promote God.
These and other objectives might deeply influence what wealth they seek
to maximize, how to maximize it, and where to draw the line. Of course, it may
also be suggested, just to complicate matters, that these other non-economic
values may be used to generate wealth. That is to say, we may use power to
leverage wealth, or skill or education or social position or even religion. In
other words, the conception of "values," i.e., what is desired may be much
broader then the scheme of value assumptions implicit in the model of the social
process implied in some forms of legal economic inquiry. Thus, values and the
processes they include suggest that the foundations of "political/social
economy" are immeasurably more complex than implied in this model. This
insight hopefully suggests that the very idea of contextuality, its inclusivity, its
systematics, its amenability to effective mapping onto legal/policy processes
remain both vital and controverted. It is an important challenge to how lawyers
are educated and how effectively a sense of social/economic realism may be
successfully brought into the processes of legal inquiry and legal intervention.48
VII. GLOBALISM, NEW FORMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING
Probably the most central impact represented by the concept of globalism
has been the development of the legal expectations imbedded in the United
Nations Charter as reflective of a constitution of the world community. But this
constitution is different from the traditional concept of a constitution, which
seeks to separate the law from basic values. The United Nations Charter is not
value free or value neutral. As a constitution, it makes an important contribu-
tion to a much more challenging concept of the law imbedded in the idea of
constitutionalism itself. The Charter as a constitution is an instrument for
promoting peace, human rights, social progress and universal respect for the rule
of law. Its importance to global constitution law is its profound influence on the
development of regional constitutions, or constitutional-like arrangements or
compacts in Europe, the Americas and Africa. Its footprint is also deeply
48. This is an issue that has an interesting parallel in human rights law. Article 17(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights holds that, "Everyone has a right to own property." See G.A. Res.
217 (111), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Is this an unlimited universal right? Of course not. Article 17(2)
holds that "no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Id. What does this mean? Does the term
"arbitrarily" refer to all the other rights in the Declaration in the sense that property can be limited if limitation
is to preserve the other rights in the instrument? Can we know what property means without knowing the
content and structure of its limitation? Does the same principle apply to "wealth maximization?" There is
a great deal of acceptance of interdisciplinary perspectives in law and practice. But I would suggest that the
systematic employment of these perspectives in both education and practice is not a goal that is presently
realized. The methodological objective here is, of course, to move from "law and" to an inclusive
interdisciplinary, "law is" paradigm.
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imbedded in new forms of national constitutional development as well as its
imprint upon the legal complexity of transitions to democracy. The fact that the
United Nations Charter is a peace document, a document that articulates the
centrality of human dignity and social progress, means that it does confront
forces of reaction in the world community. The United Nations Charter as a
constitution is under pressure to secure its destruction as it is equally under
pressure to affirm its noble promise. The Charter will continue to be critically
relevant when its prescriptions provide explicit normative guidance in domestic
fora including domestic courts. The normative foundations of modern constitu-
tional law, which are beginning to take root globally and locally, are included
in at least keynote principles rooted in the Charter. These are:
1) The opening of the preamble expresses the first standard-that
the Charter's authority is rooted in the perspectives of all
members of the global community, i.e., the peoples. This is
indicated by the words, "[w]e the peoples of the United
Nations."49 Thus, the authority for the international rule of law,
and its power to review and supervise the nuclear weapons
problem is an authority not rooted in abstractions like "sove-
reignty," "elite," or "ruling class," but in the actual perspectives
of the people of the world community. This means that the
peoples' goals, expressed through appropriate fora, including
the United Nations, governments, as well as public opinion, are
critical indicators of the "principle of humanity" and the
"dictates of public conscience" as they relate to the conditions
of war (methods and means).
2) The Charter's second key concept embraces the high purpose of
saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war." The
drafters clearly did not envision nuclear war in reference to the
concept of war here. Nonetheless, as the passage contemplates
the destructiveness of war, an enhanced technological capacity
for destructive weapons would enhance the relevance of this
provision, not restrict its scope. This reflects a reasonable legal
interpretation.
3) The third keynote concept is the reference to the "dignity and
worth of the human person."'" In blunt terms, the eradication of
millions of human beings with a single weapon hardly values
the dignity or worth of the person. What is of cardinal legal,
political, and moral import is the idea that international law
based on the law of the Charter be interpreted to enhance the
49. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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dignity and worth of all peoples and individuals, rather than be
complicit in the destruction of the core values of human dignity.
4) The fourth keynote concept in the preamble is emphatically
anti-imperialist. It holds that the equal rights of all nations must
be respected.
5) The fifth keynote in the Charter preamble refers to the
obligation to respect international law based not only on treaty
commitments, but also on "other sources of international law."52
6) The sixth keynote point in the preamble of the Charter contains
a deeply rooted expectation of progress, improved standards of
living, and enhanced domains of freedom. 3 In short, to the
extent that we see "legalism" as still a vital part of law as a dis-
cipline, its influence will be moderated by the recourse to law
as "fundamental policy," and the functional idea of law as a
process of authoritative and controlling "decision-making;"
guided by a complex but articulate normative agenda.
The normative foundations of the international constitutional system have
as earlier indicated, influenced the development of modem constitutional and
administrative law in both national and hemispheric arenas. One of the impor-
tant themes that these norms imply is that the creation and maintenance of the
institutions of governance must meet certain general normative criteria: respon-
sibility, accountability and transparency. Stated differently, modern forms of
governance must essentially be rooted in indicators of authority deriving from
the keynote values of the United Nations Charter. But specifically, they should
reflect the principles that touch on questions of openness, participatory access,
accountability as well as effectiveness and coherence. These principles
obviously require progress and participation, improvements in the quality of
policy-making and regulation; a commitment to the rule of law and the realiza-
tion of the principles of justice, as well as a commitment to effectiveness,
efficiency, subsidiary and proportionality, etc. Teaching the law of governance
now must take into account a must broader framework of transnational govern-
ing competence as well as administrative policy and practice which cuts across
state and national lines. These practices today are infused with normative
sensitivity.
52. Id.
53. These are abstracted from the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry. See Legality of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (Weeramantry J., dissenting). The specific summary is taken from
Winston P. Nagan, NuclearArsenals, InternationalLawyers and the Challenge of Millennium, 24, No. 2 YALE
J. INT'L L. 485, 533-35 (1999).
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VIII. THE INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION OF REGIONAL PRIVATE LAW
One of the under appreciated components of any kind of rational
development paradigm, but particularly one that builds on capitalist principles,
is the crucial relevance of the system of private law. It is difficult to imagine
how a capitalist system can function with an underdeveloped framework of legal
obligations (contract and delict) as well as the institutions which make private
relations work reasonably effectively such as agency, partnership, joint ven-
tures, franchises, forms of corporate organization and more. Since enterprise
requires a degree of predictability, the reasonable stability of private law institu-
tions provide an important structure of stability for planning and predicting
relevant matters of economic enterprise and ordering. In short, private law is
the essential deep structure of a working capitalist system. Weak private law
means a weak capitalist system. Strong private law institutions will seem to
strengthen the capitalist system. Private law largely means private ordering.
Private ordering does not mean private license. It means respect for the
fundamental rules of give and take, of fairness and equity, which underlie the
fundamental policies behind all private law systems. When the private law is
strong and effective, we are at the same time giving a genuine meaning to the
concept of civil society and civil ordering. Thus the institutions of private law
have compelling social functions. It is perhaps for this reason the European
theorists today talk in terms of civil society being ineluctably tied to the concept
of a private law society. The challenge runs deeper. When we look at economic
harmonization of many countries, we are in effect harmonizing critical sectors
including the economic sector. It is difficult to imagine effective economic
integration without also harmonizing the private law, which must effectively
govern and regulate their activities. How do these thoughts apply to the
Caribbean and to the development of an integrated regional political economy?
The countries of the Caribbean if they are to buy into a free trade zone with
the United States, might be advised to commence if they have already not done
so, a process of harmonizing their commercial laws. I have worked on a
proposal for the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This
proposal envisages the development of a common market and, to secure the
expeditious attainment of this objective, it is vital that an effective infrastructure
of harmonized commercial law and practices be established. The harmonization
of private law will take place on essentially three levels, i.e., 1) domestic law
reform; 2) rules facilitating intra-regional commerce and regional economic co-
operation or integration, and, 3) rules facilitating worldwide commercial
transactions. In the absence of such an initiative, there is no doubt that the
development of inter-state trade in goods, services and investment will be
retarded. Furthermore, the broad policy objectives of the Caribbean interests
could include improved economic performance of the national economies in the
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region, and this initiative is also aimed at supporting this aspect of the regional
agenda for development. This would be a promising approach to an effective
free trade arrangement.
There would have to be discussions with potential multi-party stakeholders
and the generation of a consensus that the Caribbean is ready for higher and
more sustained levels of co-operation and economic integration. This could
create employment, which will enhance the standard of living and provide a
broader tax base for the states to create the necessary commercial infrastructure
that is an indispensable condition of sustainable development. Modem, rational,
and efficient rules for international commercial contracts and financing will
contribute to giving all countries in the region equal opportunities to attract both
manufacturing and service providing businesses. Moreover, harmonized regula-
tions will promote foreign direct investment, e.g. industry, tourism, etc., that
will generate jobs. A free trade regime that enhances joblessness seems to me
to be a non-starter.
I have not been privy to the discourse internal to the Caribbean on what
areas and what priorities should be given to the harmonization process. As an
outsider, I would suggest that consideration be given to the following general
principles which might guide a process of harmonization:
1) The body of commercial law that should be the focus of har-
monization must be broadly conceived because a commercial
law system for the whole region will ultimately only be as
strong as its weakest link. Any part of the whole can frustrate
the smooth and effective workings of enterprisal freedoms. It
is therefore our proposal that commercial law for the purpose of
regional economic integration should include not only all these
branches of law, the approximation of which would remove
obstacles to the free flow of goods, services and investment
opportunities, but also those that would positively encourage
inter-state trade, and foreign direct investment.
2) It is imperative that the rules and policies codified in this way
must not reflect national, parochial or special interest concerns,
but be rules and principles grounded in sound principles of con-
temporary commercial practice.
3) There must be acceptance of cross state and regional lines, and
a solid majority of stakeholders interested in regional commer-
cial development must support the initiative. Such stakeholders
include not only governmental entities, but the private sector
(both domestic and foreign) and civil society (universities,
research institutes, and NGOs as well).
4) It is of the utmost importance that participating Governments
approach this task on an equal footing and that both the
experience of interested commercial circles and the most
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advanced scholarly expertise available be involved from the
outset, The International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT), Rome, would appear to be the appropriate
vehicle for reaching all three objectives.
IX. VALUE AND PROCESS IN HARMONIZATION
The value of regionally harmonized modernization of commercial law,
through the development of both 'hard' and 'soft'-law instruments and the
identification of the proper approach on a case-by-case basis permits to limit the
cumbersome process of diplomatic negotiations to those areas where binding
international treaties are inevitable.
This kind of intergovernmental, but at the same time commercially oriented
and scholarly supported/driven initiative will have the flexibility in its process
to produce appropriate instruments in a representative but politically neutral
manner, stressing the technical and professional aspects of harmonization. In
short, the process will be efficacious, cost efficient, cost efficient and its
legitimacy will rest on the professionalism of its product and its collaboration
throughout the project with multiparty stakeholders.
The program has a further objective: viz., the training of a new generation
Caribbean lawyers and academics in the law and practices relating to the
commercial and economic integration of the Caribbean.
X. POSSIBLE KEY AREAS OF INVESTIGATION
The key areas for which the regional model codes could be developed as
follows:
A. Company Law
The primary objective in regard to company law is to facilitate the mobility
of companies in the region by ensuring the mutual recognition of the legal
personality of companies throughout member states. For example, a Jamaican
company would, in terms of this initiative, enjoy legal personality in another
Caribbean country and thus the inconvenience of re-incorporation would be
eliminated and so facilitate investment. However, mutual recognition of
companies requires the establishment of confidence in companies incorporated
in other states, and a crucial aspect of bringing about this confidence is the
creation of certain common rules relating to the operation of companies. That,
in turn, means harmonization of parts of company law such as reporting,
accounting and the rules relating to transparency. In this area, as in many other
areas, there are harmonization initiatives in progress and this project will take
note of work already done.
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B. Insolvency
Inter-state trade can be facilitated in a significant way by reducing legal
insecurity as far as possible. One of the most important areas in which legal
confidence should be sought, is the law relating to insolvency. The possible
insolvency of a debtor in a foreign jurisdiction could clearly be a disincentive
to cross-border trade and the harmonization of insolvency laws would provide
foreign creditors with a single regime throughout the region in regard to the
proof of claims in insolvency as well as the order of their claims in relation to
local creditors.
C. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Transnational Civil
Procedure, Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution.
The necessity to sue on a foreign judgment could also be a disincentive to
cross-border trade. One of the first harmonization projects which should
attempted should therefore concern the mutual recognition and enforcement of
civil judgments, which would further reinforce the security of creditors in trans-
border transactions. The development of principles of transnational civil proce-
dure based on a common core of shared values may facilitate mutual recognition
and enforcement. Moreover, the harmonization of the law relating to alternative
forms of dispute resolution such as mediation and arbitration should be pursued
in order to create a comprehensive envelope of standardized procedure for
resolving disputes in the region.
D. Conflict of Laws
To facilitate trans-border contracts it is vital that there should be clarity as
to which country's law will apply to a transaction. A common system relating
to the conflict of laws, especially the conflict of laws in the area of contract,
would have the advantage of preventing forum shopping, and it would also
avoid time-consuming litigation to determine the applicable law in any given
dispute.
E. Industrial Property Rights
If inter-state trade is to be fair and investment facilitated then patents,
trademarks and copyright should be protected in a way that corresponds to the
norm at international level. It is suggested that the aim of harmonization here
should be the elimination of any national and regional peculiarities that would
tend to weaken the internationally accepted standards of protection of
intellectual property rights.
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F. Banking Law
To stimulate cross-border trade in banking services and to promote invest-
ment, banks established in a particular country should be able to operate in other
countries in the region. Harmonization here would aim at mutual recognition
of the status of banks. However, as in the case of companies, further harmoni-
zation would be necessary to create confidence in the banks. Aspects of
banking law would therefore need to be harmonized, and in this respect the most
important areas of concern would be control, capital, liquidity, investment and
holdings in subsidiaries. The question of the liability of banks for negligent acts
would also need to receive attention.
G. Contracts
Although the harmonization of the substantive rules of contract would not
be a priority, because the important thing is to know which system of contract
applies to any transaction and harmonization of the conflict of law rules would
achieve this it can also be argued that common rules in a few key areas of
contract would created familiarity amongst traders and thus facilitate certain
transactions such as sale and agency. Work has however been done at the
global level here and in later phases of this project the harmonization of the
relevant area of contract should be investigated, taking as a basis the models that
have been developed in other parts of the world. The important developments
of harmonization of contract law are happening in Europe. Although a missed
opportunity in these discourses is the model of international treaty law, as a
model form of general agreement law in the private sphere.
An area where the right choice of approach (type of instrument) can be
illustrated and where useful models of the highest quality are already available.
One example is the 1980 United Nations Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (CISG).54 This binding treaty is currently in force in sixty states,
including six African and two member States of the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC)." Another example is the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (Part 11994, Part II forthcoming).56 This
innovative, non-binding international "restatement/ pre-statement" of widely
acceptable best solutions is currently used both as a model for domestic law
reform and in international commercial arbitration.
54. CISG, supra note 24.
55. Id.
56. INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT), UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 2004, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.html.
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The investigation would focus on the acceptability of these two instru-
ments, including the need, if any, for adaptation, in the region.
H. Consumer Protection
Many of the investigations mentioned above would envisage heightened
consumer protection, e.g., harmonization of company law and banking law.
However, the harmonization of consumer credit law should also be considered
as this would create consumer confidence in the laws governing lenders in the
area as a whole and would thus facilitate the opening of the 'credit' market.
I. Labor
The purpose of harmonizing labor laws would be to create a level playing
field for employers in the different states to create minimum standards for
workers. It may be asked whether the time is ripe for such harmonization in the
Caribbean. A primary objective should be the stimulation of inter-state invest-
ment, particularly in poorer members of the Caribbean community. One of the
present advantages that these states may have is a lower labor cost structure.
Harmonization of minimum labor conditions could interfere with this advantage
and discourage investment.
J Shipping Law
The same remarks apply here as to "contracts." It might be advantageous
to have common and familiar rules on certain topics to stimulate business, e.g.,
carriage and insurance.
K. Environmental Law
Strictly, this is public law rather than private law but it is again very rele-
vant in relation to the objectives of promoting inter-state trade and investment.
Unduly severe environmental law can discourage investment in the state which
has them and impose an unfair burden on operations vis-i-vis their competitors
in other states. On the other hand, lax or non-existent environmental standards
can unfairly distort not only investment patterns by attracting investment, which
might not otherwise be placed, but also competition by placing operators at an
advantage because of their minimal or non-existent environmental obligations.
It is suggested that harmonization should contribute to solving these problems.
The harmonization should aim at a reasonable environmental standard that will
level the playing field between operators and at the same time establish a
reasonable level of environmental protection. The harmonization should be also
aimed at areas where industrial investment involves or may involve substantial
pollution problems.
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L. Taxation
To create a climate conducive to attracting investors to the region would
require that the national tax laws of each country be coaxed in a direction that
would facilitate rather than impede business opportunities. The issues that
present themselves for resolution in this regard include:
1) Source versus residence basis for taxation;
2) The taxation of controlled foreign entities;
3) The fiscal implications of financing subsidiary companies by
means of debt or equity;
4) The taxation of corporations (including tax attributable to
dividends declared); and
5) The exempt status of interest income in the hands of no-resident
individuals and foreign corporations.
It is probable that these practical suggestions are already part of the
evolving legal culture of this region. The central thought that animates this
addendum to the paper is that the training and emersion in the legal culture of
harmonization is a critical part of what I believe must happen in legal education.
An exposure to harmonization, its methods, theories and procedures, must also
continue as part of the educational process of those already in practice. The
harmonization process could be critical lever for combating an impulse to legal
parochialism. It is also critical as an initial step in coming to grips with the
forces and impact of globalism on the practice of law.
XI. GLOBALISM, LEGAL SKILLS: FROM RULES TO DECISION
During the war two American theorists Harold Lasswell and Myres
McDougal wrote a famous article titled "Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest [ 1943].,,57 A central theme of the
article was the choice of values included in the terms professional training and
public interest.5 8 During the fight against racism and Nazi fascism, it was
obvious that the choice of values would not be the dream of Nazi herenvolkisn.
It would be the dream of a free person's commonwealth of democratic states
committed to the rule of law and to the political and economic security of their
people.
It was the McDougal/Lasswell view that the challenges to professional
training required the use of skills more ambitious than those associated with
57. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52, No. 2 YALE L.J. 203 (1942-1943).
58. Id.
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what they called arid positivism, with its focus exclusively on rules. To
McDougal and Lasswell, professional legal training in the public interest requir-
ed a broader range of thought skills. These thought skills included goal think-
ing, trend thinking, scientific thinking, technical analytical thinking as well as
predictive and alternative or creative thinking. To give operational effect to
these forms of thinking, lawyers need to be more broadly educated in the skills
of problem identification and definition as well as the skills of advocacy and
decision-making in responding to problems of legal importance.
Today, it is commonplace that lawyers, working in their offices or for
economically or politically important organizations, require precisely these
skills in order to settle disputes within the framework within which they work.
While adjudication is important and critical, lawyers are required to master
many techniques other than the judicial settlement of disputes. Article 33 of the
United Nations Charter mentions, apart from adjudication, negotiation, arbitra-
tion, mediation, conciliation, good offices, and enquiry, a good deal more.59
These are all forms of decision-making and require many skills in order to make
them work effectively. We would submit that this broadened concept of the
lawyer as a critical, indeed indispensable decision-maker in the complexity of
the new international environment remains the most central challenge and a
critical indicator of the success or failure of the international rule of law. The
small countries of the Caribbean have a great deal at stake in the integrity of the
rule of law. They will confront a great challenge in the near future and I am
certain that their lawyers and their talent bank of able professionals will be
ready for the challenges they shall confront.
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Chaguaramas, as amended by the Grand Anse Declaration
and other documents pertinent to the creation of the Caribbean Single Market
& Ecorjomy (CSME)', outlines the establishment of a Common Market and
eventual creation of an Economic Union. What is an economic union? What
benefits can it deliver for the Caribbean?
There is, today, only one economic union in existence--the European
Union (EU). The signatories of the Treaty on Economic Union pledged "to
achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies and to
establish an economic and monetary union."2 The economic space that com-
prises the European Community3 emerged as a powerful trade bloc to which
countries aspire to access at the same time that they close ranks against its
perceived threat to their own economies. The increasing number of regional
* Attorney-at-Law and Consultant on Trade and Regulatory/Legislative Reform in Washington
D.C. This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the American and Caribbean Law
Initiative conference entitled "Caribbean Market Forces: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative
Law," held at the Norman Manley Law School in Ocho Rios, from July 23 to 24, 2004.
1. See Duke Pollard, The Caricom System, Basic Instruments, The Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas, 472-521 (The Caribbean Law Pub. Co.) (2003) [hereinafter Treaty of Chaguaramas].
2. Treaty on European Union, Together with the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Feb. 7, 1992, Introduction of Signatories, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter TEU].
3. The European Community (EC) can be viewed as the political vehicle that underlies the
economic integration process in Europe and emergence of the European Union (EU). The theories and
processes of political and of economic integration are quite distinct, however, and it must be made clear that
Europe has not embarked on the path of political integration. Rather, the region has created the necessary
political vehicles to foster the economic integration process.
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trade blocs is typically viewed, at least in part, as countries' response to the
growing strength and breadth of the European unified market.
On the one hand, there is a reactive, protectionist trend which anticipates
closure or decreased access to the European market with a resultant need to
create alternative regional economic space as counterweight.4 There is also the
impetus promoted by the belief that regionalization offers several advantages
in the pursuit of economic development First, regional trading blocs can create
a wider regional market for trade. They also create the potential to achieve
regional economies of scale which in turn can spur economic growth and
income generation. This is the evolution in the EU that has been most marked.'
Secondly, the regional integration process can spur and consolidate internal
economic reforms. The EU, for instance, insists that aspiring members accom-
plish a variety of fiscal and economic reforms in order to be eligible for
membership. On the other side of the world, Mexico used its membership in the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to introduce economic reforms.6
A third perceived benefit is the enhancement of negotiating capacity with third
countries and on the multilateral arena. Yet again, the EUs dominant position
in multilateral negotiations is evidence of this benefit.7
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) governments have been propelled
toward regionalization by the vision of regionalization as a solution to external
and internal threats to the countries' economic security and well-being. The
region's expectations for the CSME can best be stated in the words of one of its
leading architects and proponents, the Prime Minister of Barbados, the
Honorable Owen Arthur, asserts
[CSME] offers the societies of the region, individually and
collectively, the only realistic and viable option by which to achieve
sustainable development, and in the process the prospect of erasing
the two great economic deficits which confront the region at the start
of this new century. The first is the wide gap between the material
progress which our region can, with effective resource use, attain as
compared to what has so far been achieved; the second is the gap
4. For example, the literature repeatedly cites the emergence of the European Common Market as
a major factor in the U.S. impetus to create first NAFTA, and now the FTAA. See e.g. Richard Bernal,
Regional Trade Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U.J. INT7L L & POL'Y 683, 691-97, 688-
89, 707 (1993).
5. The economic emergence of Ireland is testament to the success of the mechanisms the EC uses
to pull with them their less advanced members.
6. Whalley, John, "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?" in The Regionalization
of the World Economy, 71-72 (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1998).
7. See Maurice Schiff and L Alan Winters, Regional Integration and Development, pp. 6-10
(2003). (Discussing the reasons fueling the recent spurt in regionalism).
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between the material expectations and needs of our people and our
capacity thus far to meet them. The CSME also represents the most
effective means by which the individual economies of the region can
be successfully integrated into the proposed new Hemispheric
economy and the evolving global economic system on terms that will
enable them to minimize the costs and dislocations that ensue from
that integration, while maximizing the potential benefits.8
Can the CSME accomplish for the Caribbean what the EU has for Europe?
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ECONOMIC UNION AS A MODEL
FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The 1992 Treaty on Economic Union established "a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe," and
outlined several objectives toward that end.9 The first stated objective is "to
promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in
particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the
strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment
of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency...." 10
The Treaty clearly states the goal of "establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union" in order
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced
development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of
economic performance, a high level of employment and of social
protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.l"
The above language very clearly reflects the strong development thrust of
the economic integration process in Europe. A primary tool was to be the
creation of the European common market which abolished barriers to the free
flow of goods, services, and people and remove restrictive practices that divide
markets or otherwise interfere with economic integration. A necessary com-
ponent was the formulation of common policies and harmonized regulations in
8. Owen Arthurs, Remarks at American Business and Consulting Group Special Symposium (April
2, 2004), (transcript available at www.caricom.org).
9. TEU, supra note 2, at Common Provisions, art. A.
10. Id. art. B.
11. TEU, Together with the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Title II Treaty
Establishing the European Community pt. 1, art. 2, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1.
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a wide range of economic, social and other sectors. The ultimate goal was to
reach the stage where the flow of goods, capital, services, and capital among the
EU member states was similar to that which takes place within the confines of
a national territory.' 2 In 1995, the states declared that they had successfully
established the harmonization necessary to introduce a common currency, the
euro, signaling their arrival at the stage of the economic union.
An economic union has four essential characteristics that reflect its position
as the last stage in the economic integration process. Each of the following four
characteristics exists as a step or stage at which a group of countries can choose
to stay, or use as a step toward deeper integration and Economic Union. The
characteristics/stages are:
1) Removal of tariffs and other restrictions against the goods (and/or
services) of member states, otherwise known as a Free Trade Area;
2) Imposition of a common customs tariff or Common External
Tariff (CET) on the goods of non-members entering the free trade
area. At this stage, a Customs Union is created in which the CET co-
exists with a free trade area;
3) Extension of the right of free movement to all the factors of
production, e.g. labor and capital to the members of a Customs
Union. This stage is known as a Common Market; and,
4) Harmonization of monetary and fiscal policy with the introduction
of one currency into the common market, at which stage Economic
Union has been achieved. 13
Each stage requires increasing degrees of cooperation. The latter two
forms require a certain indispensable degree of co-ordination and harmonization
of national economic policies.' 4 To illustrate, the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) currently being negotiated envisions only the removal of
tariffs and other trade barriers with no plans to advance beyond this first stage.
This is true of most regional economic blocs today. On the other hand, the EU
began at an even earlier stage-sectoral cooperation with the European Coal and
Steel Community-and slowly advanced along various stages until the
introduction of the euro signaled its arrival at an Economic Union. At what
stage of this continuum does the CSME lie?
12. Paulo Borba Casella, The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR): Models and Qualitative
Mutations for Consolidating an Integrated Economic Area, 9 Ann. Surv. Int'7 & Comp. L. 1, 11 (2003).
13. Richard Gibb, Regionalism in the World Economy, in Continental Trading Blocs: The Growth
of Regionalism in the World Economy (Richard Gibb and Wieslaw Michalak eds., 1994).
14. Casella, supra note 12, at 8-9.
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III. INITIAL ATTEMPTS BY CARICOM AT ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The goal of economic integration was envisaged at the initiation of
CARICOM with the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973. It anticipated the creation
of a common market through the removal of trade restrictions and the abolition
of migratory constraints among CARICOM countries. 5 The Treaty Annexes
provided for five areas of activities toward the creation of the Common Market:
1) Trade liberalization;
2) Establishment of the Common External Tariff;
3) Common Protective Policy;
4) Providing for free movement of factors of production, and;
5) Coordination of economic policies and production integration. 6
This initial movement was spectacularly unsuccessful, for several reasons.
Externally, almost immediately the countries were catapulted into the
world economic crisis triggered by the substantial increase in the price of
petroleum and its related products in the early seventies. 7 In the continued
climate of dependence, this led to escalation of debt and eventual debt crisis.
Most of the countries became distracted from questions concerning intra-
regional trade and focused on their survival.'
Looking inside the region for reasons for the failure of earlier attempts at
economic integration, one finds a lack of political will and misdirected efforts.
For example, countries were motivated to develop regional production capacity,
for example in the smelting of aluminum and food production to relieve the
reliance on food imports. A Regional Food Plan was announced in 1975 under
which the countries agreed to develop a livestock complex for milk and dairy
products, mutton and lamb, pork, poultry, and hatching eggs. 9 However,
efforts focused on state-driven endeavors. At the same time, left intact were the
existing barriers to the movement of people, capital, etc. that would have created
incentives for a private sector-led approach to this worthwhile endeavor. In
sum, the region's early attempts to establish a successfully-operating common
market failed.2"
15. Kenneth Hall, Re-Inventing CARICOM The Road to a New Integration (Ian Randle Publishers
2000).
16. Id. at xvi.
17. Id.
18. In fact, for seven years CARICOM was for all intents and purposes, defunct as none of its
organisms, including the annual meeting of the Heads of States, functioned. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at xix.
20. Richard Bernal outlines the combination of internal and external factors that led to the failure
of regional integration movements in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s. See Beral, supra note
4, at 683, 688-89.
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At the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the
Caribbean Community in Grenada, July 3-7, 1989, the region revived the
economic integration movement Governments adopted the Grand Anse
Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of the Integration
Movement. This declaration started the long, and often hesitant, road to the
formation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy.
IV. TRADE LIBERALIZATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CSME
A regional market of six to fourteen million people, and free movement
within this market of people, goods, services, and capital are the promised
benefits of the CSME. One of the first promised benefits is for the revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas to create a free trade area through the removal of tariff
and non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods that originate in a CSME
member state. Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago have already enacted
the implementing legislation and other CSME signatories have pledged to
implement by the end of 2005. The second promised benefit is the imposition
of a CET on goods that are not of CSME origin. Together, these two benefits
aim to create one regional market with preferential access for goods that
originate in a CSME member state. In addition, the third promised benefit is the
right of free movement. The right of free movement of the factors of production
envisages lifting of restrictions on work within the region on certain categories
of workers and service providers and lifting restrictions on movement of capital.
By the end of 2005 members have committed to lifting restrictions against the
nationals of other CSME countries that prevent access to loans or only on terms
less favorable to those afforded to nationals, investment and development
incentives that are made available only to nationals; and exchange control
restrictions that add to the cost of doing business across CARICOM borders.
Finally, the states contemplate fiscal harmonization with a more long-term goal
of establishing one currency for the CSME.2 1
In sum, CARICOM has enunciated the goal of establishing by the end of
2005 a common market for the free movement of goods, services, certain
categories of labor, and capital within the region. Successful establishment of
a common market is a necessary first step toward the longer-term goal of
creating an economic union with the eventual introduction of one regional
currency. The gap between the two phases can be quite long. Successful
operation of the Common External Tariff, something with which the region
continues to struggle, is an essential prerequisite to this phase.
21. Hall, supra note 15, at 52-61 (documenting the progress through excerpts from meetings of the
Conference of Heads of Government up through the present)..
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V. ROLE OF THE CET IN THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF
THE COMMON MARKET
A common external tariff, which applies one uniform tariff scheme to all
imports into the region from other countries, is essential to the successful
operation of a common market The CET performs two main functions to allow
the common market to yield the anticipated benefits. The first function of the
CET is to maintain privileges only for those that can claim origin as a CSME
member state. This eliminates the incentive for non-CSME goods to enter into
the member country with the lowest tariff and non-tariff barriers for non-CSME
goods. It also removes the even greater concern that goods will be trans-
shipped from those countries to the rest of the region on a tariff-free basis. The
CET also functions to attract investors who wish to take advantage of the
privileges of membership. In a small region like the Caribbean the similarity
in geographic and other conditions means that countries often produce the same
products.2 With the CET in place, investors wishing access to the regional
market on the most advantageous terms will be motivated to establish operations
within the region to qualify for the benefits of membership.
One common motive for foreign direct investment is to boost local sales
and market access.23 The removal of barriers to the intra-regional movement of
goods, capital, and services creates a regional, as opposed to a national, base of
potential consumers. Additionally, the CET provides a mechanism by which to
ensure that access on the most preferential basis to that increased potential
market is available only to those who invest directly through the establishment
of operations with the region. Of course, the use of rules of origin can serve the
same purpose. However, rules of origin pose governance problems for develo-
ping countries; they are opaque, difficult to negotiate and complex to operate.24
Furthermore, rules of origin do not prevent members from meeting their own
requirement for a product from the rest of the world and then transferring its
own production to its partners.25  Thus, successful operation of a CET can
reduce the costs of operating the trade system, while attracting the investments
that offer opportunities for diversified economies, increased employment,
greater income generation, and the development of the region.
Unfortunately, it is this aspect of the CSME that remains most problematic.
The original, and revised, Treaty of Chaguaramas called for the establishment
22. Bernal, supra note 4, at 717 (discussing the limitations of regional integration in small areas like
the Caribbean where the same products are produced primarily for export outside the region).
23. Schiff, supra note 7, at 117.
24. Id. at 80. Schiff further notes that rules of origin allow customs authorities, and individual
customs officers, a good deal of discretion, and that the administrative cost of ensuring that this discretion is
not abused is high while the cost of failing to do so is even higher.
25. Id. at81.
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of a CET, but further allowed the alteration or suspension of the CET by any
member where the product is not being produced in the region or the quantity
or quality of the CSME good does not satisfy the member applying for the
waiver.26 This provision may be necessary in recognition of the limitations of
Caribbean economies as well as the sovereign right of countries to determine
their own trade policy. However, the problem is that the CET has never been
operational. CARICOM meetings of Heads of Government, the highest organ
of the Community, are rife with discussions of the need to implement the CET.27
Those members that have implemented the CET use the waiver provisions
indiscriminately. As of April 2004, six CSME member states continued to
impose tariffs on Caribbean origin goods. It is difficult not to hold the suspicion
that one underlying factor behind this slow pace and the countries' requests for
suspension or alteration of the CET is that there is a greater commitment to a
bilateral partner than to the regional integration process. However, for
CARICOM to realize the benefits of regionalization, the CSME must do more
than create opportunities for freer movement within the region. It needs strong
investment vehicles and incentives. The CET is a vehicle that can be used to
attract to the region investors wishing to enjoy the benefits of membership in the
bloc.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like the EU, the states of the Caribbean Community, have set on the road
to creating an economic union in the form of the Caribbean Single Market and
Economy. Like the EU, where the process took at least ten years longer than
originally envisioned, the road to the establishment of the CSME is prolonged
and full of stops and turns. Nevertheless, CARICOM governments remain
committed to the process. "The creation of a Caribbean Single Market and
Economy is a historic necessity which must be brought to full fruition, no matter
how arduous the task may at times appear, how negligible the immediate
returns, or how vast the pitfalls and obstacles that threaten to ensnarl it. ' 28
Some immediate benefits are already apparent Operation as a region on
the multilateral trade arena has raised the visibility and bargaining power of the
region. A key question is toward what end and how is it being used? While
more work remains to be done to give the concept some specific content, special
and differential treatment for small nation states is a primary push and the
region has gained support in principle for this approach.
26. Treaty of Chaguaranas, supra note 1, art. 83.
27. See Hall, supra note 15, at 52-54.
28. Arthur, supra note 8.
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Additionally, CSME has been a vehicle for internal economic reform
within the region. The region has been closed off even to itself The regulatory
costs of doing business have remained high, and barriers have made it difficult
to operate in another country. The removal of legislative and regulatory barriers
necessary to create this wider regional market has, to date, been one of the most
positive outcomes of the economic integration process in the Caribbean.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CMSE) is a work in progress.
It represents the latest and perhaps the most major advance towards regional
integration of Caribbean countries.'
These countries, which for the greater part are former colonies of the
United Kingdom, are small open economies. Their earlier efforts at regional
integration floundered on the ragged rocks of a still existent insularity and
perhaps a certain selfishness when two of the bigger members of the then ten
member federation. Jamaica and Trinidad withdrew from the Federation.'
Jamaica's withdrawal was conditioned and mandated by a critical referendum
on whether to remain in or opt out. Trinidad, whose brilliantly irascible but
sharp-witted leader, Dr. Eric Williams3, declared as a mathematical certainty
* LL.M Queen Mary College University of London, Barrister-at-Law of the Middle Temple,
England; Attorney-at-Law Barbados; Former Deputy Speaker of the Barbados Parliament and former Lecturer
and Tutor in the Law Faculty of the University of the West Indies. This article is a revised reproduction of
oral remarks presented at the American and Caribbean Law Initiative conference entitled "Caribbean Market
Forces: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law," held at the Norman Manley Law School
in Ocho Rios, from July 23 to 24, 2004.
1. The member states of the CSME are Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent the Grenadines, Suriname, and
Trinidad & Tobago. With the exception of Suriname and Haiti, who are associate members, they are all
former colonies of the United Kingdom. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean
Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, July 5, 2001, art. 3,
http://www.caricom.org/archives/revisedtreaty.pdf [hereinafter Revised Chaguaramas Treaty].
2. For a general survey on the failure of the Federation, see HUGH W. SPRINGER, REFLECTIONS ON
THE FAILURE OF THE WEST INDIAN FEDERATION (1962).
3. Dr. Williams earned his Ph.D. at Oxford University. ERIC WILLIAMS, INWARD HUNGER: THE
EDUCATION OF A PRIME MINISTER (1969). His dissertation, Capitalism and Slavery, broke new ground
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that "one from ten leaves nought," took Trinidad, thereafter, out of the Federa-
tion. Perhaps Dr. Williams understood better than most of us that any realistic
chance of regional integration would succeed only if the push came from the
region itself. Further it needed to be rooted in economic integration with the
deeper political integration following sometime after the initial successes of the
economic coming together.
The Federation collapsed in 1962 after four rocky years of anxiety filled
existence. By July 1963, Dr. Williams convened the first Heads of Government
conference in Trinidad & Tobago. The conference was attended by the leaders
of Barbados, British Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago, the so-called
"Big Four," former colonies of the United Kingdom.
Emerging from these yearly series of Heads of Governments conferences,
a number of decisions were reached on the critical question of regional
integration. On August 1, 1973, as fate would have it, the Caribbean Com-
munity and Common Market (CARICOM) was established by the Treaty of
Chaguaramas in Trinidad.' The treaty was signed by Barbados, Jamaica,
Guyana, and Trinidad & Tobago. It is the Treaty of Chaguaramas (hereinafter
"Treaty"), now amended and revised, which seeks to establish the Caribbean
Community, including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.'
The Right Honorable Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados and the Head
of Government, is charged with the lead responsibility of promoting the CSME.
Recently, he said, the CSME is "an exercise which will entail our taking the
fifteen participating economies stretching from Belize in the West to Suriname
in the East which have hitherto existed as separate, distinct economies and
reconstituting them as a single market and a single economy.' 6
positing that the abolition of slavery was due more to prevailing economic realities rather than to the efforts
of the abolitionists. Id. He left Oxford and became a Professor at Howard University in Washington, D.C.
before returning to the region. Id. Subsequently, he founded the People's National Movement, and became
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. Id. Dr. Williams also found time while Prime Minister to write the
history of Trinidad and Tobago and his autobiography. Id. A man of deep and sharp intellect, he died while
still holding office as Prime Minister. Id.
4. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033 [hereinafter
Chaguaramas Treaty]. The Treaty was so named after the American base located in the northern-part of the
island. Dr Williams may have held it at the base as a symbolic gesture to his colleagues and the region that
the Caribbean had to take charge of its destiny. Some years before, he had successfully negotiated the closure
of the base with the United States. This action was replicated some years later by the Barbados Government
in relation to a base maintained in the northern part of Barbados. Id.
5. Revised Chaguaramas Treaty, supra note 1.
6. Owen Arthur, Address at the Thirteenth Distinguished Anniversary Lecture of the Caribbean
Community (Apr. 23, 2004), http://www.caricom.org/speeches/30anniversarylecture8-arthur.pdf.
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He also cautioned that it will "unquestionably be the most complex, the most
ambitious and the most difficult enterprise ever contemplated in our region ...
substantially more difficult to attain than integration on the political plain.",
7
Mr. Arthur also reminded us that:
Our Caribbean Community has been conceived to be a community of
sovereign states. Each sovereign state, in such an arrangement,
retains exclusive powers in relation to the implementation of com-
munity decisions. There is also no provision for the transfer of
sovereignty to any supra-national regional institutions and there is no
body of community law that takes precedence over domestic legisla-
tion nor is automatically applied in domestic jurisdictions.8
And he continues:
The Caribbean has therefore chosen the most difficult political form
of integration by which to implement something that is as complex as
a Single Market and Economy. A community thus conceived must,
of course, depend for much of its formal structure on the legal pro-
visions embodied in its Treaties and Agreements and the formal
arrangements devised to support its systems of Governance.9
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AS AN IMPORTANT
COMPONENT OF THE CSME
One of the formal arrangements devised to support the system of
Governance within the Caribbean Single Market and Economy, and which has
received considerable attention in the regional press, on call-in programs and
amongst lawyers is the provision for a Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). I°
Earlier mention was made of the fact that the Caribbean Community is an
association or community of sovereign states." Such a state of affairs would
normally lead to the situation in which each sovereign state could, through its
courts, determine and interpret the extent and meaning of provisions of the
Revised Treaty. The potential for uncertainty, conflicting decisions, and general
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. A final Caribbean Court of Appeal, such as the CCJ, has a history predating the discussions on
the CSME. See DUKE E. POLLARD, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 1-18 (2004). Recently, considerable
debate on the CCJ arose because of the rulings by the Privy Council, which had the effect of suspending if
not judicially abolishing the death penalty.
11. See id.
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chaos concerning the legal platform upon which certain investment decisions
by business leaders would have to be made, apart from anything else, mandated
the creation of a body which would have the final and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the interpretation and applicability of the Revised Treaty. Hence,
Article 211 provides that the court shall have:
[C]ompulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty,
including:
a) Disputes between the member states parties to the agreement;
b) Disputes between the member states parties to the agreement
and the community;
c) Referrals from national courts of the member states parties to
the agreement;
d) Application by persons in accordance with Article 222
concerning the interpretation and application of this Treaty. 2
The conferment of compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction on the CCJ
would therefore seem to definitively rule out any national court seeking to
determine disputes which may arise within its jurisdiction. This will likely
remove a potent source of potential conflict in the interpretation of matters
relevant to the Revised Treaty.
Article 214 further underpins this denial of jurisdiction to the national
courts. It provides that where a national court is seized of an issue whose
resolution involves a question concerning the interpretation or application of the
Revised Treaty, the court or tribunal concerned shall refer the question to the
Court for determination before delivering judgment if the national court or
national tribunal considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable
that national court to deliver its judgment. 3 It would seem to follow that the
national court would regard itself as bound to act on the decision of the CCJ in
those circumstances.
The combined effect of Articles 211 and 214 not only solves the problem
of conflicting and competing decisions on interpretations of the Treaty but it
also enhances the ability of the Court to develop a coherent community law. As
one learned commentator put it in relation to the importance of a court such as
the CCJ:
[A] central judicial authority is vital to the progressive pursuit of the
aims and objectives of the Treaty. Without such an organ, the
community is faced with the competing competence of the courts of
12. Revised Chaguararnas Treaty, supra note 1, art. 211.
13. Id. art. 214.
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the individual member states in determining questions relating to
interpretation and application of the Treaty. This is quite an
untenable arrangement for the juridical viability of CARICOM. The
establishment of a central judicial organ of the community, endowed
with exclusive competence and authority to give rulings on matters
of community law, far from eroding the individual sovereignties of
member states, will be giving effect, severally and jointly, to these
individual sovereignties. For such a central organ, acting on behalf
and in the interest of the whole and the several parts of the
community, is indispensable for the sustenance of life of
CARICOM.
14
Another learned observer takes the view that:
On careful analysis of the role envisaged by the West Indian
Commission for the proposed CARICOM Supreme Court, it would
not be difficult to conclude that the West Indian Commission
perceived the Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction as the
institutional centerpiece of the proposed CARICOM Single Market
and Economy."
Such a description is not mere hyperbole, if hyperbole at all, because the
observer then goes on to aptly demonstrate why the role of the CCJ is so critical.
He writes:
The rights envisaged for community nationals in this expanded
economic space include the right of establishment, the right to pro-
vide services and the right to move capital. But in order to facilitate
the trans-border movement of these rights without unnecessary
restrictions, there is need for an institution to authoritatively and
definitively interpret and apply the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM
Single Market and Economy, in the absence of which rights would
tend to be illusory and the obligation correlative thereto, merely
vacuous commitments on the part of the Governments concerned.
14. See Joseph Cuthbert, Caribbean Economic Integration: Reflections on Some Legal and
Institutional Issues, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM G. DEMAS (Laurence Clarke & M.G. Zephrin eds.,
1997). The author commented on the case of D.S. Mahara Furniture & Appliances Ltd. v. Comptroller of
Customs and Excise (S-1499/93) (Trin. & Tobago) regarding the applicability of the Community Law. His
comments are pertinent on the indispensable need for an institution such as the CCJ in the context of the
Community.
15. POLLARD, supra note 10, at 89-90.
20041 Alleyne
54 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
And this is where the Caribbean Court of Justice, in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction is expected to play a critical role. 6
There is no doubt that it is now widely accepted that the CCJ, in its original
jurisdiction, does have a vitally critical role to play in the development of
Caribbean Community Law, especially in relation to the dispute settlement
procedures. Perhaps for this reason, there has developed the need for the CCJ
to be seen as free from political interference of any kind and for its indepen-
dence as a Court to be effectively guaranteed by its non-reliance for necessary
funding on any one or more of the regional Governments. For example, Article
5 of the Agreement to establish the CCJ provides for a Regional Judicial Legal
Services Commission on which no politicians can have a seat, and which
appoints the Judges of the Court except the President who, according to Article
4, Clause 6 shall be appointed or removed by the qualified majority vote of
three quarters of the Contracting parties on the recommendation of the Regional
Judicial Legal Services Commission. 7
Similar insulating or insulatory provisions were applied to the question of
funding for the Court. Consequently, an agreement was reached to establish a
trust fund in the amount of US $100 million, which would be used to fund the
capital and recurrent cost of the CCJ by the income produced from the
investment of that sum.
Recently it was announced that the Caribbean Development Bank had
successfully floated a US $150 million note on the international capital market
of which the sum of approximately US ninety-six million will be used to finance
the operations of the Caribbean Court of Justice.18 All that is required now,
according to this press release, is for the "expeditious completion of loan
preconditions by member Governments so that disbursement of the funds can
be made to the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund where the monies will be
managed and invested by a specially appointed Board of Trustees."' 9
Given the history of the region, the nature of the Revised Treaty, and the
importance of the CCJ to the Treaty, these arrangements that appear to be
unique are necessary. The arrangements speak to the creative ingenuity of the
people of the region. It also speaks to the good faith of the regional political
directorate in making the effort to ensure that the CCJ as a critical component
of the revised Treaty, is as free as possible, in its constituent judicial structures,
from any interference whatsoever from politicians.
16. Id. at 90.
17. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Feb. 14, 2001, art. 4-5,
http://www.caricom.org/archives/agreernent-ccj.htm [hereinafter CCJ Agreement].
18. Press release, CDB Successfully Floats USD 150 MN Borrowing (July 19, 2004).
19. Id.
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In fact, one author was driven, in my opinion quite accurately, to indicate
that:
[T]he Caribbean Court of Justice is the only regional judicial institu-
tion of its kind in the world whose judges will not be appointed,
directly or indirectly, by the political directorate of the states partici-
pating in the regime... financially, too, the CCJ is likely to be the
only regional judicial institution in the world which will be finan-
cially independent of the executive and, by compelling inference also
administratively independent of the central executives of participating
member states.20
Given all that has been done to insulate the CCJ from the vagaries of
politics, it is somewhat ironic that at one stage a raging and virulent regional
debate arose in which the accusation was made that the CCJ was conceptually
nothing more than a hanging Court. The accusation also maintained that the
CCJ was being devised in order to reverse some of the more interesting
decisions of the Privy Council in which the Privy Council was said:
[T]o have emasculated the hallowed common law doctrine of
precedent as it was generally understood in common law jurisdic-
tions, and by allegedly turning on their heads numerous decisions of
the judicial committee with the Privy Council of longstanding
introduced unacceptable levels of instability and uncertainty in the
administration of criminal justice in the sub-region.2
Sir David Simmons, the present Chief Justice of Barbados, and former
Attorney General of Barbados, chaired the Proprietary Committee set up to
implement the arrangements for the inauguration of the Caribbean Court of
Justice. He met this criticism head on when he delivered an address to the
Royal Commonwealth Society in London in 2003.2 Simmons stressed that the
development of the CCJ was not the result of a knee jerk reaction to any
particular decision of the British Privy Council, but that its establishment
became necessary as a dispute settlement mechanism under the Caribbean
Single Market and Economy.23 He was also reported to have said that the
arguments for and against the Court were carefully examined and that he wanted
20. POLLARD, supra note 10, at 37-38.
21. Id. at xiii.
22. Sir David Simmons, The End of Anachronism: The Establishment of the Caribbean Court of
Justice, Address Before the Royal Commonwealth Society in London, England (June 18, 2003)(transcript
available in the Royal Commonwealth Society).
23. Id.
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to dispel emphatically the notion that the Court was being established to
accelerate hangings in the region.24 Significantly, it is reported that Lord Hope
of Craighead, the Scottish Law Lord indicated at that very occasion that the
English Law Lords were very supportive of the idea of a Caribbean Court of
Justice and that he, as a Scottish Judge, appreciated the desire of the Caribbean
to chart its own course injurisprudence.2 s On another occasion, Lord Slynn was
moved to declare that, "[t]he arrangements for selecting judges and financing
the Caribbean Court of Justice offers useful precedents for the establishment of
regional judicial bodies."26
It would not be unreasonable to say that in the conceptualization and
establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice, the people of the region have
demonstrated their intellectual creativity, their ability to apply unique solutions
to old problems and that if any further proof was needed of the ability of
Caribbean people to find solutions for their own problems that the establishment
of the uniquely structured CCJ is ample proof thereof.
III. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Clearly the people of the region are important to the whole process of
integration, for in many respects it is the people who drive the need for
integration. Recognizing this important verity, the revised Treaty in Article 45
declares that, "[m]ember states commit themselves to the goal of free movement
of their nationals within the community."27
In a recent speech delivered in Bridgetown, Barbados, Mr. Steven
MacAndrew, Specialist, Movement of Skills and Labor, CARICOM Single
Market and Economy declared that:
The core task in creating the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
is the removal of restrictions to enable the free exercise of national
treatment rights, particularly the free movement of goods, the free
movement of services, the free movement of persons, the free move-
ment of capital, and the right of establishment. Especially critical are
the new areas which seek to transform the common market for goods
into a genuine single market and economy namely free movement of
services, persons, and capital and the right of establishment, since the
free movement of goods have been largely achieved.2"
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. POLLARD, supra note 10, at 39.
27. Revised Chaguaramas Treaty, supra note 1, art. 45.
28. Steven MacAndrew, Address Before the National Insurance Office on the Occasion of its 37th
Anniversary (June 8, 2004), http://www.caricom.org/archives/csme/csme-macandrew.htm.
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A study prepared for the Caribbean Policy Development Center by the
Caribbean Development Research Services goes even further. It argues that our
reliance on services requires a prioritization of the human element in
regionalism and therefore freedom of movement is a primary rather than a
secondary concern. 29 These observations underscore the importance of the
removal of existing restrictions on the free movement of services, capital, and
persons and on the right of establishment. The observations reinforce Steven
MacAndrew's view that the free movement of skills is one of the key pillars of
the CSME and thus a critical element of the economic and trade agenda as well
as the regional labor agenda.30
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas recognizes the critical importance of
the free movement of skills and this recognition is incorporated in Article 45
which states, "[m]ember states commit themselves to the goal of free movement
of their nationals within the community."'" So stated, Article 45 appears to give
some kind of legal flesh to the bare bones of statements made in the 1989 Grand
Anse Declaration in which the Heads of Government agreed to, among other
things, the elimination by December 1990 of the requirement for passports for
CARICOM nationals traveling to other countries and the elimination of the
requirement for work permits for CARICOM nationals beginning with the
visual and performing arts, sports, and the media traveling to CARICOM
countries for specific regional events.32
The idealism expressed in Article 45 is tempered by the realism of Article
46 which reads:
Without prejudice to the rights recognized and agreed to be accorded
by member states in Articles 32, 33, 37, 38, and 40 . .. [member
states] undertake as a first step toward achieving the goals set out in
Article 45, to accord to the following categories of community
nationals the right to seek employment in their jurisdictions. 33
29. PETER W. WICKHAM ET AL., CARIBBEAN POLICY DEVELOPMENT CENTER, FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT: THE CORNERSTONE OF THE CARIBBEAN SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY (CSME) (2004),
http://www.uwi.tt/salises/workshop/csme/people.html.
30. MacAndrew, supra note 28.
31. Revised Chaguaramas Treaty, supra note 1, art. 45.
32. Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of the Integration
Movement, July 1989, http://www.caricom.org/archives/grandanse.htm.
33. Revised Chaguaramas Treaty, supra note 1, art. 46.
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The categories so privileged are:
1) University graduates;
2) Media workers;
3) Sports persons;
4) Artists;
5) Musicians.
They are further recognized as such by the competent authorities of the
receiving member states.
This state of affairs has provoked comment from authoritative quarters. In
the opinion of Steven MacAndrew, "[t]his provision clearly indicates that
member states are aware that total free movement of labor is not yet achieved,
but merely a work in progress, which most likely would go beyond December31, 2005."3
The comments of Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados and the
Minister with lead responsibility for the creation of the CSME, were more
muscular. Speaking at the beginning of the Estimates Debate in the Barbados
Parliament in March 2003, he spoke of his efforts at "[t]rying to underscore the
ridiculousness of some aspects of the ways the Caribbean was approaching the
Single Market issue . . . [and that] the region had started by saying that
graduates, musicians, and sportsmen should move freely while ignoring the rest
of the region's human capital."35 According to him, this "has created a collision
with the historic experience of the Caribbean people."36 He went on to point out
"that those persons who do not have [u]niversity [d]egrees and other skills have
been moving and have effectively made this region their economic space."37 He
was also concerned that the CSME would not "resonate in the minds of the
ordinary Caribbean man and woman as a benefit to them if there was only pro-
vision for the movement of skilled graduates."38
Examined, either from a policy or technocratic perspective, this issue is one
that will not go away. However, it requires sensitive legal and political treat-
ment if the region's people, the intended beneficiaries of the removal of the
restrictions, are not to regard regional integration issues as matters which do not
concern them, thereby confirming the fears of the Barbadian Prime Minister.
In trying to develop the appropriate legal framework to remove the restric-
tions, while recognizing the different stages of development of the member
34. MacAndrew, supra note 28.
35. See BARBADOS DAILY NATION, MARCH 18, 2003, (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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states and catering to the fears that the nationals of those states which are less
well off, goods will flood into the common economic space of the more
developed countries. The policy makers and technocrats will need the wisdom
of a Solomon.
IV. REMOVAL OF BARRIER RESTRICTING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT REQUIRED
TO PROMOTE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSME
It is ironic that genuine freedom of movement appears to have existed in
the Caribbean while it was under colonial rule. But the clamor for indepen-
dence and the consequent creation of mini-states within the region means that
boundaries which did not exist before independence but were created on
independence, must now as a matter of economic necessity, be dismantled and
torn down.
The legal mechanism for tearing down these barriers to free movement of
the skilled community nationals is two fold. In the first place, an Act of the
respective domestic Parliaments must be passed incorporating the provisions of
Article 45.39 This legal formality must be accompanied by the appropriate
administrative and procedural framework for the free movement of university
graduates and persons of the other approved categories.
By May of this year, it appeared that:
[F]ree movement of graduates, artistes, musicians, media workers,
and sports persons was fully operational in all member states except
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, and Barbados.
At that time Barbados had the legal and administrative arrangements
in place for the free movement of graduates once they had secured a
job, all other categories still required a work permit if applicants
worked for more than three months.'
But the enactment of this legislation is not enough. There must also be the
appropriate administrative and procedural framework for the free movement of
university graduates and the other approved categories. While it appears that
the free movement of such persons "is currently fully operational in all but four
member states,"'' the question of regional integration and the matter of social
security will become an increasingly important issue as the integration move-
ment advances and it becomes necessary "to facilitate the movement of labor as
a key factor of production."'42
39. Revised Chaguaramas Treaty, supra note 1, art. 45.
40. MacAndrew, supra note 28.
41. Id.
42. Id.
2004]
60 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
So far, the Heads of Government have signed the CARICOM Agreement
on Social Security, an Agreement that protects the entitlement to benefits of
CARICOM nationals and seeks to give them equality of treatment when they
move from one member state to another.43 Speaking from a position of hands-
on experience in these matters, Steven MacAndrew, a specialist with the CSME
Unit is full of praise for the way in which the Agreement in Social Security has
worked. He says:
The CARICOM Agreement on Social Security for some time now has
been one of the best if not the best implemented CARICOM Single
Market and Economy related measure, since all member states with
an existing social security organization have fully operationalized the
Agreement, resulting in the fact that in most member states
CARICOM nationals are already enjoying benefits under the
Agreement."
The importance of proper and appropriate administrative arrangements is
most significantly demonstrated by this statement because the success (so far)
of the Agreement on social security has been reached not by the enactment of
legislation, but by an administrative and procedural framework which appears
to support the written agreement and has resulted in the fact that "[i]n most
member states CARICOM nationals are already enjoying benefits under the
Agreement." '  Perhaps the CSME in this respect at least is beginning to
"resonate in the minds of the ordinary Caribbean man and woman."'
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the continuing problems experienced by
some community nationals as they travel from island to island constitute
perhaps a more significant psychological barrier to the acceptance of the CSME
than some of us might think, notwithstanding the completion of the appropriate
legal framework for the freedom of movement.
Hassle-free movement is not yet, it would appear, the experience of the
Guyanese traveling to Barbados. In a debate in the Barbados Parliament
recently on the Freedom of Movement Legislation, the Barbadian Prime
Minister was moved to demand of his country's Immigration Officials that the
community nationals traveling from Guyana to Barbados should be treated in
a more humane manner.47 Clearly the enactment of legislation and the
43. CARICOM Agreement on Social Security, March 1, 1996,
http://www.caricom.org/archives/agreement-socialsecurity.htrn.
44. MacAndrew, supra note 28.
45. Id.
46. BARBADOS DAILY NATION, supra note 35.
47. Welcome Foreigners, Says PM, BARBADOs DAILY NATION, JULY 15, 2004.
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imposition of the most beneficial administrative arrangements will mean
nothing unless the people, whether they are Immigration Officers or ordinary
citizens, without any specific powers accept that they are all members of a
Caribbean nation.
During the debate on the Freedom of Movement Bill in the Barbados
Parliament, a comment was made that is no less alarming, because it may well
be true. Mr. Arthur himself declared that, "[t]here is no sense of Caribbean
nationhood, there is no sense of Caribbean citizenship. People in the Caribbean
are first and foremost Barbadians, Jamaicans, or Trinidadians but do not speak
of themselves as West Indians."'48
In my opinion, hassle-free movement can significantly breakdown this kind
of insularity. Continuing insularity is a matter which needs to be addressed
urgently if the legal framework for the development of the Caribbean com-
munity is to achieve its objectives. Especially with the current legislative
framework suggesting that there is a "them" and an "us" and that the vast
majority of Caribbean nationals who live the experience of integration should
be excluded from the formal legislative and administrative arrangements to
facilitate free movement of community nationals.
Integration at any level requires laws and regulations. But in the final
analysis, it is about the people of the states which are seeking to integrate their
markets and economy. Whether we like it or not-it is not only about politics,
economics, and law. People are the center of that intersection.
One of the earliest advocates of the political federation would have
understood the current problems only too well. Writing on the reasons for the
break up of the federation, Sir Hugh Springer 9 reminded us that:
Our common origins and associations have created and are in process
of molding a people. This is shown in our way of life, our food and
drink, our sport, our recreations, our arts. Our poets, novelists, play-
wrights, dancers, painters, and sculptors are recognizably West
Indian.... Our differences are real. But we are not dismayed by
them. Our provincial loyalties are not to be despised; loyalty must
begin somewhere. Difference and diversity can enrich and stimulate.
Federation is a challenge to move into a new dimension of life and
thought, and to achieve a fuller and freer life as members of a wider
community. It may well be that the historian of the future will look
back on the period of the next few years as being necessary to cure us
of some of our sentimentality and some of our immaturity, so that
when we next come together we shall do so with greater respect for
48. See Arthur: Let's Unite on Free Movement, BARBADOS DAILY NATION, July 14, 2004.
49. Sir Hugh Springer later held the position of Barbados's Governor General and also served as
a part time Registrar of the University of the West Indies.
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one another and a sounder understanding of what each and all of us
will be able to contribute to the common good. If this should come
about, as I hope and believe it will, the union we shall create will be
a healthier and more propitious one.5"
One hopes so, but at this stage our hopes must be qualified.
So far as the Caribbean Court of Justice is concerned, the initial steps have
been sure and the prospect for its development and seminal role within the
Community seems assured. On the other hand, so far as the Freedom of Move-
ment is concerned, even some well wishers are more than ordinarily concerned
that the community's leaders may simply have got it wrong. This sentiment was
recently echoed by Sir Roy Trotman,51 one of the region's most distinguished
labor leaders and legislator. As usual, his opinion was forthright. He said he
had never agreed to special treatment for university graduates, or for the
creation of an elitist community. 52 He continued, stating:
I'm of the view that starting from the position of the particular group,
we have less chance of integration for the Caribbean than if we start
elsewhere. I believe that it is those people who are able to treat one
another without the level of the formality of the training, those people
are better able to address the level of barriers that there are to
Caribbean integration than the sophisticated tertiary level people.53
Sir Trotman reminded the Senate that as far back as 1991, he had said that
the movement should start with the artisans, and perhaps there is something to
what he says. For if the Treaty represents the foundation of the community,
then there is still a great deal of work to be done to construct a genuine
Caribbean community on that foundation, for the Caribbean Single Market and
Economy is definitely a work in progress.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that much genuine effort and energy has been
exerted by the Caribbean leaders in order to bring the CSME into effect. It is
equally true that the CSME cannot succeed unless, as Prime Minister Owen
50. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 62-63.
51. Sir Roy Trotman is General Secretary of Barbados Workers' Union and a Governor General's
Appointee to the Senate of Barbados.
52. Sir Roy: Weed Out Bad Employers, BARBADOS DAILY NATION, July 22, 2004, available at
http://www.nationnews.com/index.cfm.
53. Id.
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Arthur of Barbados says, "it resonates with the man and woman in the street. 54
The plans and ideas conceptualized for the establishment of the Caribbean Court
of Justice are worthy of the highest commendation; indeed they have already
received it.
On the other hand, the practical difficulties notwithstanding, the provisions
relating to the freedom of movement are not guaranteed to catch the approval
of the man and woman in the street. At a basic level, these provisions appear
to be tilted in favor of the graduates of the University of the West Indies and
other professional of similar standing. This does not appear to be the best
engineered foundation, and a great deal of remedial work may have to be done
as the regional leaders continue to develop the framework of the CSME.
54. BARBADOS DAILY NATION, supra note 35,
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I. INTRODUCTION
What happens in the WTO is part of a broader pattern of
neocolonialism in the global economy. This has two strands. The
first is the self-interest of the major powers; their close ties with
multinational companies ... and their willingness to use their political
and economic strength to achieve their ends ...
The second strand is a combination of ideology, paternalism and
missionary zeal. The true believers in globalization and liberalization
feel sure that they know best-that markets work and globalization
benefits all-but that the poor benighted heathens of the South have
yet to realize this. The Enlightened Ones, armed with the Gospel
According to Adam Smith, therefore have a duty to spread the
Word-and to do whatever it takes to bring the unbelievers to the
Promised Land of the globalize economy for their own good, even if
they don't realize they want to be there.'
It is accurate to describe the manner in which the FTAA is being marketed
as reflective of a missionary zeal to convert the protectionists to the religion of
globalization. Since 1995 with the advent of the WTO, the religion of
globalization has spread in the Caribbean, converting the heathens of the closed
economies. Through the vehicle of international law in a multilateral trading
system, in which the invisible hand of the free market economy is the
undercurrent for trade and investment, the cloistered virtues of Caribbean
economies were slowly pried open. The workings of the free market economy
is not only espoused in such global instruments such as the World Treaty
Organization ("WTO"/GATT), but also in bilateral and regional free trade
arrangements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the subject
of this conference. These are the vehicles by which it is hoped we will all be
transported to the Promised Land of the globalize economy.
However, the landscape of the Promised Land is as yet unknown. Perhaps
those in the Caribbean rushing headlong to it may not yet realize whether they
want to be there at all, or may soon realize it was all a mirage. It is true that the
open embrace of these international instruments by our domestic institutions
have resulted in the creation of a landscape which is open and liberal, but for
small vulnerable territories the trading landscape is also being characterized by
increasing unemployment, local jobs being exported, closure of "globally
uncompetitive" industries, dependence on foreign supply and governments
slowly losing control over national economies. In the face of the drastic gaps
1. FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 269-70 (Zed Books 2003).
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in development and economic performance between future member states in the
FTAA, the words of Caribbean governments to its manufacturers to become
more competitive and to exploit market access opportunities will be hollow
words if there are no adequate mechanisms in this Agreement to guarantee to
the Caribbean equal access to markets, fair competition and equity in
international trade.
The approach by Latin America and the Caribbean ("LAC") to these
international treaties, however, is maturing over the years and is reflected in the
present state of negotiations for the FTAA. The LAC is now part of a
groundswell critically re-examining the treaties through which globalization is
being exported. This groundswell, which has gathered force since the Doha
Declaration and to a large degree was responsible for the collapse of the
Cancun Ministerial, is a demand by the developing world for equity in trading
laws and treaties that shape any regional Free Trade Area. It is difficult for
small, vulnerable economies to accept the invitation to participate in free trade.
It opens them to surges of imports or of dumped or subsidized imports, which
will destroy, impede, or retard its local production of goods, thereby destroying
that members' export capability or potential and stunting economic growth.
Moreover, the Caribbean must also focus on larger institutional efficiency
issues, which must be addressed if they are to realistically compete in an
environment such as the FTAA.
It is submitted that equity in international law can only be delivered
through adequate pressure valves and safety nets that will provide adequate
market defense mechanisms while providing the opportunity to exploit new
market access. By this means the gap in development between territories will
be minimized and there will be an effective leveling of the playing field. There
is a rare opportunity therefore to ensure that the final shape of the treaty caters
for this need of the Caribbean.
This paper will demonstrate that even in a Free Trade Area such as the
FTAA, the application of international trade remedy law of anti-dumping
("AD") actions, Countervailing Duty ("CD") actions and Safeguard actions, as
permitted in the WTO system, is necessary to maintain equity in liberalization
and enhance a country's competitiveness. This paper will examine the extent
to which this law has been utilized in the Caribbean and whether ultimately in
a regional Free Trade area these mechanisms provide an adequate framework
for protection in international trade or need to be abandoned altogether if we
are all to pass through the "pearly gates" of the Promised Land of the globalize
economy.
2004]
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II. THE OFFICIOUS PARENT-GATT/WTO:
The Marrakech Treaty establishing the WTO sets out the general structure
in which a multilateral system of trade and investment is expected to function.2
CARICOM was notified to GATT under Article XXIV as an interim agreement.
By 1995', almost all the members of CARICOM have ratified the WTO
agreements. Insofar as they are now members of the WTO, the GATT and the
various agreements have served as guides in their trading practices and trading
agreements and much of their legislation is being brought in line with the
international trade law. Because the world has become a trading playground,
the Caribbean recognizes that it must now play by a new set of rules and
principles.
The principles of the WTO, establishing the features of a new global
trading landscape, lay the foundation of an equitable trading system. The
preamble to the 1947 GATT sets out the ideology for this global trading
landscape:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of
2. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement];
Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTSOFTHEURUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
Final Act] (including the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitment in Financial Services, annexed thereto). Representatives (ministers) of the
"124 Governments and the European Communities participating in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations" declared that their "signature of the 'Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations' and their adoption of associated Ministerial Directions initiates the
transition from the Gatt to the WTO." Decision on Acceptance of and Accession to the Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 33 I.L.M. 1265 (1994). See also Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex
IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter GATT 1994]
(incorporating the provisions of the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1,
T.I.A.S. 700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] "(excluding the Protocol of Provisional Application), as
rectified, amended or modified by the terms of legal instruments which have entered into force before the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement").
3. The following members of CARICOM are also members of the WTO: Antigua and Barbuda,
Jan. 1, 1995; Barbados, Jan. 1, 1995; Belize, Jan. 1, 1995, Dominica, Jan. 1, 1995; Grenada, Feb. 22, 1996;
Guyana, Jan. 1, 1995; Haiti, Jan. 30, 1996; Jamaica, Mar. 9, 1995; St. Kitts & Nevis, Feb. 21, 1996; St.
Lucia, Jan. 1, 1995; St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Jan. 1, 1995; Trinidad & Tobago, Mar. 1, 1995. As of
April 2003, the Bahamas was listed as an Observer government. See Understanding the WTO: The
Organization, Members and Observers, at http://www.wto.org/englishlthewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm
(last modified Oct. 13, 2004).
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living ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use
of the resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods;
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering
into reciprocity and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international com-
merce4
The objective of the multilateral system for trade in goods created by the
WTO is to provide industries and business enterprises from different countries
a stable and predictable environment in which trade and investment can be
conducted under conditions of free and fair competition. This open and liberal
trading system is expected to promote, through increased trade, greater
investment, production and employment and thus facilitate the economic
development of all countries.
The most fundamental set of principles of the WTO which are expected
to dot the landscape of the globalize economy are transparency, equity and due
process. These principles are reflected in some basic tenets under the WTO:
1) The "MFN" rule: The Most Favoured Nation rule requires that
a product made in one member country is treated no less
favourable than a "like" (very similar) good that originates in
any other country.' This basic pillar allows for equity among
larger and smaller nations and theoretically puts them on the
same level.
2) Reciprocity: Reciprocal concessions are a feature of the
negotiating process. It ensures that the gain from negotiating is
greater than the gain available from liberalization. Hence a
reduction in import barriers will be matched, theoretically, with
sector specific export gains. Market access commitments are
implemented and maintained bytariffcommitments enumerated
in schedules of concessions establishing ceiling bindings where
the members concerned cannot raise tariffs above bound levels
without negotiating compensation with the principal suppliers
of the products concerned. Once tariff commitments are bound
a member ought not to resort to any other non-tariff measures
that have the effect of nullifying or impairing the value of the
tariff concession save for as provided in the GATT in trade
4. GATT, pmbl.
5. Id. arts. I-Il.
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remedy mechanisms such as anti-dumping and countervailing
duties.
3) Transparency: The multilateral system must come with the
assurance that there is a transparent system of enforcement of
the rules in which none can be discriminated against. If a
member State perceives that actions by other governments have
the effect of nullifying or impairing negotiated market access it
may commence bilateral discussions. Failing this it can invoke
the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO. This
involves the establishment of panel of experts charged with
determining whether a contested measure violates the WTO.
Dispute settlement procedures play a central and invaluable role
in ensuring that trade conflicts are settled fairly, in accordance
with the rule of law and on a timely basis.
Whether this treaty is binding on the Caribbean member states without it
being expressly incorporated into municipal law is not as important as the
political sanction for failure to play by the rules of international trade. To this
extent the Dispute Settlement Procedure established under the WTO is a power-
ful tool for compliance and can be a big stick wielded by the more powerful
nations more adept in utilising the dispute mechanisms in international trade.
The WTO administers the trade agreements negotiations by its members
principally the GATT6, the GATS ("General Agreement on Trade and
Services") and the TRIPS. However in spite of the rulings of the Dispute
Bodies the WTO can be characterized as typically an officious parent scolding
its children with the best of intentions but without the necessary legal efficacy
to adequately keep its members within the path to the Promised Land. In the
recent Panel report in "United States-Sunset Reviews of Anti-dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina,"7 the Panel reviewing
a sunset review undertaken by the USITC against imports of tubular oil from
Argentina concluded that, in certain aspects, the USITC breached the
obligations under the Agreement. The action taken by the USITC to extend the
imposition of an anti-dumping duty against imports of tubular oil from
Argentina was considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification of
impairment of benefits under that Act. It recommended that the DSP request
the United States to bring its measures into conformity with its obligations
under the WTO. However, it saw no reason to accede to Argentina's request
to revoke the anti-dumping order and repeal or amend its laws and regulations
6. Report of the Appellate Body, Argentina - Safeguard Measures on imports of Footwear,
WT/DS12 1/AB/R, at 26 (Dec. 14, 1999).
7. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-
Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods From Argentina, WT/DS268/R (July 16, 2004).
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at issue. As will be discussed below, the WTO is by and large a moral figure
in international trade where the sanctions for not playing by the rules may be
distortions in trade and investment through retaliatory action by other member
states rather than through orders or rulings from the Dispute bodies.
In the Report of the Panel in Guatemala, titled "Anti-dumping Investiga-
tion Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico' 8 the Panel noted that, pursuant
to the provisions of the DSU9 where measures taken by a member state are
inconsistent with the WTO agreement, the panel shall recommend that the
member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. In
addition to its recommendation the panel may suggest ways in which the
member concerned could implement the recommendations. The panel noted
that such suggestion is not part of the recommendations and not legally binding
on the affected member.
Recourse to a multilateral body is intended to minimize unilateral
retaliations and re-emphasize the credibility of a rules-based international
trading system. In reality, the application of these principles creates very little
confidence that the multilateral system is essentially free and fair. For the local
manufacturer, as a complainant of unfair international trade, in such a system
it is paradoxical that it is denied access to the highest tribunal where decisions,
rulings, concessions, and negotiations may be made which are prejudicial to the
complainant's interests. In this respect, it is assumed that the interests of the
member state and the local party are the same. When actually, in the mix of
policy and negotiations, it is not. The recent WTO rulings in Cotton Subsidies
and the Byrd Amendment illustrate the difficulty of enforceability and the "non-
binding" nature of these treaties. Where there is a different application of the
law to other members, an inequality in the system is set up.
The United States has clearly demonstrated that the WTO cannot assert
itself on that nation. WTO agreements have no direct effect on U.S. law.
Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act provides, "No provision of
any of the Uruguay Round Agreements nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstance that is inconsistent with any law of the
United States shall have legal effect."' In Hyundai Electronic Co. v. United
States, the United States Court of International Trade concluded that WTO
dispute settlement reports have no binding effect on a U.S. court. In our
8. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/R (June 19, 1998).
9. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 14,
1994, art. XIX, para. 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay round 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
10. 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (2004).
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jurisdiction, domestic legislation is necessary to determine whether a treaty
becoming part of municipal law is binding on the courts."
However it is debatable in our jurisdiction as to whether the rulings of the
Dispute Settlement Body and the organs of the WTO are to be followed by the
local courts. The true view may be that it will seldom do so where there is a
conflict with municipal law. More importantly however for smaller states it is
not so much a legal question as to whether the ruling is binding but a political
one. In Endo v Japan,12 the Court stated, "A violation of a provision of GATT
pressures the country in default to rectify the violation by being confronted with
a request from another member country for consultation and possible retaliatory
measures. However it cannot be interpreted to have more effect than this."'3
Therefore, it would seem that those with the political and economic
strength to withstand a finding by an international court of a violation of the
international obligations may be better off than those who cannot. Even though
territories such as the Caribbean may be right in the law not to follow or adopt
the findings of that Court it is impossible to imagine that in a real world of
economic dependency on trade and investment with the other litigants that it
would not.
To illustrate this example one need only to examine two cases: United
States safeguards on steel and Trinidad anti-dumping investigation into imports
of pasta and spaghetti. In the former, the WTO has clearly stated that the
measure is inconsistent with international law. This has prompted no change
in that country's desire to protect its local industry by maintaining the bar and
litigating it to the highest level. They certainly have the resources to do so. In
the latter case, an anti-dumping investigation was conducted by the authorities
of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago at the request of "Cereal Products
Limited" against imports of pasta from a Costa Rican company, "Roma Prince
Sociedad An6nima" of Costa Rica. A provisional measure was imposed against
the imports of pasta and spaghetti from Costa Rica. However, the Government
of Costa Rica requested consultations with the Government of Trinidad and
Tobago. 4 Costa Rica alleged that the measures were inconsistent with the
11. See generally Footwear Distributors and Retailers of Am. v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078,
1096 (Ct. Intl. Trade 1994) ("However cogent the reasoning of the GATT panels... it cannot and therefore
does not lead to the precise domestic judicial relief for which the plaintiff prays."); see also Canada v.
Attorney General 1937 A..C. 326, 347 (H.L.) ("Within the British empire there is a well established rule that
the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration
of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action.").
12. 530 Hanrei Taimuzu (Kyoto Dist. Ct. 1984).
13. Id.
14. DSU, supra note 9, art. IV; GATT art. XII, para. 1; See generally Agreement on Implementing
of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND TABLE, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/l 9-adp.pdf.
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obligations of Trinidad and Tobago under the Anti-dumping Agreement.
Although no official results of the consultation had been submitted to the Anti-
dumping Committee, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago appeared to have
retreated by removing the duties and eventually terminating that investigation
to the detriment of the local industry. Clearly the State did not have the
resources or political will to defend its action to the highest level under the
WTO system. Moreover it is reasonable to assume that the overall trading
relationship with Costa Rica was given priority over the need to protect one
manufacturing sector. This way many manufacturers for whose benefit this
trade remedy legislation were enacted may discover that ultimately they have
no or no effective voice in the final resolution of these disputes in the
international arena. In Development, Trade, and the WTO, the authors' state,
"no one can claim that the WTOs dispute settlement system compensates for an
unequal distribution of economic power in the world, but it must be emphasized
that this system gives small Members a fair chance they otherwise would not
have to defend their rights."' 5
This "better than nothing" approach inspires little confidence in the future
credibility of the multilateral system. To achieve equity in international trade
and investment, the rules must be applied across the board and with the same
legal effect. Fully recognized Institutions and Courts must be part of the ulti-
mate package of the Promised Land of a globalize economy that will adjudicate
finally on matters of international trade with binding effect on members. Until
then international law will be inequitably applied to members ascribing to the
same agreements.
I. THE FTAA OFFSPRING?
Within the WTO there have recently emerged several regional agreements
which also seek to spread the notion of free trade. Some commentators have
viewed the FTAA as a strategic dimension far beyond mere commercial and
regional aspects. 6 There is a view that its genesis lies in obtaining leverage in
a global world against other trading blocks and in the WTO system as well.
The FTAA certainly represents the rise of a new order being the largest
economic block on the world. It can also spark a new initiative by other
members in the WTO to realign their economic ties in other huge trading blocks
to counteract the impact of the FTAA.
The present stall in the FTAA negotiations has spawned even more bastard
offspring of bilateral trade agreements between the United States and other
15. Bernard Hoekman et al., Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook 71 (The World Bank
2002).
16. See generally, Paul Vizenini & Marianne Wiseebom, Free Trade for the Americas? The United
States' push for the FTAA Agreement, (Zed Books 2004).
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Latin America countries. It will perhaps be difficult to say that the WTO
fathered the FTAA. However, with the huge market capabilities and force of
the Far East in the form of China, Japan, Indonesia it is not stretching the
imagination to view the FTAA as an effective tool to counteract the juggernauts
of the East and mount some economic leverage here in the West in the WTO.
The GATT recognizes free trade areas within the multilateral trade system:
Article XXII (4) of the GATT provides the following:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements
of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties
to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a
customs union or of a free trade area should be to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to trade of
other contracting parties with such territories. 7
However, insofar as the FTAA has its members in a favourable position
in relation to non-FTAA members, it is not consistent with the MFN rule and
Article XXIV of the GATT. In the Appellate Body Report, "Turkey-
Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products"18, Turkey attempted
to use trade remedy action in the form of safeguards on textiles and clothing
and defended its use by reference to the development of a free trade area. The
Appellate Body held that Article XXIV can justify the application of such a
measure "only if it is introduced upon the formation of a customs union or free
trade area and only to the extent that the formation of the customs union would
be prevented if the introduction of the measure was not allowed." It was not
demonstrated that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if the
measure was not allowed and set strict guidance as to how issues of developing
free trade areas should be approached.
The FTAA must therefore, theoretically, be compatible with WTO rules
and it is difficult to imagine any properly documented regional agreement being
WTO inconsistent. This will certainly set up a strain between globalisation and
regionalism. The WTO imposes three basic obligations on member states if
they wish to enter into regional trade agreements such as the FTAA:
1) An obligation to notify the agreement to the WTO;
2) An obligation not to raise the overall level of protection and
make access to products of third parties not participating in the
FTAA more onerous (external trade requirement);
17. GATT art. XXII, para. 4.
18. Report of the Appellate Body, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999).
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3) An obligation to liberalise substantially all the trade among the
constituents of the agreement (internal trade requirement).
It is apparent from the Turkey case that the WTO will monitor the measure
implemented by a member of a Free Trade Area and the defence of the
existence of a FTA will lose currency. For this reason, the trade remedy actions
contemplated by the FTAA must be WTO compliant. Furthermore, where there
is need for reform of these safety measures, it should be advocated at both the
FTAA and WTO levels.
IV. GLOBAL TRADE REMEDY INSTRUMENTS
There are three trade protection instruments or trade remedies permitted
under WTO rules allowing for the adoption of import measures in specific
circumstances: 19
1) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Anti-dumping
Agreement, authorising the implementation of anti-dumping
duties or price undertakings in situations of discriminatory
pricing;2"
2) Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement, authorising countervailing
duties or price undertakings where countervailable subsidies are
found;
21
3) Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safe-
guards, authorising the adoption of safeguard measures where
there is a surge of imports. Measures can take the form of either
additional duties or quotas or both.22
Generally the objectives of these agreements are to provide relief to
affected industries against unfair trade and protect the indigenous supply of
goods on the local market and to prevent injury to the local industry from the
effects of dumping; to protect the establishment of a local industry from unfair
trade (section 3A and to ensure the integrity of the trade remedy process as
agreed by the AD Agreement).
19. GATIT, art. XXII, § 4.
20. GATT 1994, art. VI.
21. GATT 1994, art. Vl; Agreement on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994), available at www.wto.oag.org.
22. GAT 1994, art. XIX; Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994), available at www.wto.oag.otg.
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The triggering mechanism for each of these remedies is the concept of
injury caused to a local industry due to market distortions caused by exporters
and international traders. In the first two actions such distortions are caused by
price discrimination or price differentials in the latter, sheer volume of imports
creates an "unfair" or uncompetitive trading environment.
The provisions of the GATT and the Agreement on Anti-dumping
Subsidies and Safeguard exist as separate instruments and are to be given legal
effect. In examining these provisions, legal effect is to be given to all the
relevant terms of the WTO agreement consistent with the principle of effective-
ness "at rest magisvlaeat quam pereat" in the interpretation of treaties: In the
Report United States-Gasoline the panel stated:
One of the corollaries of the "general rule of interpretation" in the
Vienna convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect
to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a
reading that would result in reducing the clauses or paragraphs of a
treaty of redundancy or ignitibility.2 3
In those matters on which the agreement is silent, or ambiguous, or allows
room for flexibility in adopting a rule, liberalists argue that national authorities
should adopt a less restrictive rule or practice.24 This would permit local
legislators to capitalize on the ambiguity or uncertainty of some aspects of the
AD Agreement to provide further protection for the local industry without
contravening its WTO obligations.
These global laws are useful tools in a member's armoury to maintaining
equity in international trade, transparency in the trading process and reciprocity.
They are a formidable tool to restrict any unfair international trading practices.
In using the anti-dumping remedy for instance Vermulst observed the following
in E. C. Anti-dumping Law and Practice:
Nevertheless it must be recognized that while anti-dumping duties
have a marginal effect on international trade in general they can have
drastic consequences for individual suppliers (and for certain indus-
tries such as steel, chemicals, consumer electronics, office automation
equipment and... textiles) Imposition of an anti-dumping duty of say
40% to be paid by the importer will in most instances force the
importer to shift sources of supply and indirectly drive the foreign
23. World Trade Organization Report of the Appellate Body in United States, Standard for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996).
24. See generally Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Brown, Anti-Dumping and Retaliation Threats,
J. OF INT'L ECON. (forthcoming).
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exporter out of the importing country market. In this way the anti-
dumping law is effective.25
A. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Actions
Article VI maps out the broad criteria for the determination of the cir-
cumstances in which an additional tariff can be imposed against another
member who is found to be dumping or subsidising its exports. As this is an
exception to the MFN rule, the circumstances in which such a measure is to be
imposed will therefore be carefully monitored by the WTO.
Article VI, Paragraph One of the GATT (hereinafter referred to as "The
Anti-dumping Agreement") states:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping by which products of
one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at
less than the normal value of the products is to be condemned if it
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the
territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment
of a domestic industry ....
The critical feature of the anti-dumping remedy is that it prevents the price
discrimination of the exporter from threatening or effecting material injury on
local industries that produces like goods.
Dumping is broadly defined as the sale of a good at a price less than its
"normal value," the price for the good in the home market. In other words the
export price is below home market prices, fair market prices, normal values, or
its cost of production.2 6
Article VI, Paragraph Two also sets out the governing provision for
Countervailing Duty actions:
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of another con-
tracting party in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or
subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the
25. ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE (Sweet & Maxwell 1996).
26. Gary N. Horlick, How the GATT Became Protectionist: an Analysis of the Uruguay Round
Draft FinalAnti Dumping Code, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 5-17 (1993); Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note
19, art. 2.1. Article 2.1 defines dumping as:
a product is to be considered dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from
one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.
Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.1.
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manufacture, production or export of such product in the country of
origin or exportation including any special subsidy to the transporta-
tion of a particular product. The term "countervailing duty" shall be
understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting
any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon the
manufacture, production of export of any merchandise.27
This provision was incorporated into Part V of the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement ("SCM Agreement") and represents the
current WTO law on CD actions.28 A subsidy is broadly defined as a benefit
that is not earned. It is defined in the SCM Agreement. This subsidisation may
take different forms by a Government in the country of export such as the
subsidisation of productions costs or free grants of land. It is of note that
Article 14 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures do not
include government provision of equity capital as conferring a benefit unless
the investment decision can be regarded as inconsistent with the usual
investment practice or private investors in the territory.29 The loan from the
government to be considered as conferring a benefit must be preferable to that
obtainable on a comparable commercial loan. The Agreement does not set out
the methodology of calculating the subsidies and is left to members to work this
out in their various enactments.
The counteraction of subsidies in international trade to prevent subsidised
exports from threatening or effecting material injury on local industries, that
provide like or similar goods, is another form of preventing economic
"distortions" in international trade.
Under the Anti-dumping Agreement and SCM agreement an anti-dumping
or countervailing duty measure shall only be applied under the circumstances
provided for in the Agreement, and pursuant to an investigation initiated and
conducted in accordance with the provisions of those agreements.
There are several aspects of these international agreements that are beyond
the scope of this paper. In understanding these Agreements as setting an
international framework for protection, we should be familiar with the concept
of the entity entitled to protection, the triggering mechanism for invoking these
remedies, and the scope of the relief available. In doing so we appreciate that
the cornerstone of these Agreements is the elimination of injury to domestic
industries that may occur when trade barriers have been eliminated as a result
of globalisation.
The entity that is entitled to invoke these trade remedies is the domestic
industry, which is materially injured by the dumping or countervailing duty.
27. GAFF, art. VI(2).
28. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, supra note 21, at part V.
29. Id. art. 14.
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The domestic industry is defined as "domestic producers as a whole of the like
products or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes
a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products."3 °
The complainant however excludes producers that are related to, or
affiliated with, exporters of importers of the project in question or is itself an
importer of the product. Those entities are not deserving of relief under WTO
law. The complainant must also be a producer of "like products." Hence the
focus of the relief is to those industries that wish to participate in the global
economy and need protection from unfairly traded goods which are in direct
competition with its own products.
A finding of dumping or subsidies however is not determinative of the
issue as to whether an anti-dumping or countervailing duty would be imposed
on the exported product subject to the investigation. It is the dumping or
subsidisation of goods on the international market that causes injury to a local
industry in another market producing the same or like goods that is objection-
able under the global law. Indeed injurious dumping is inconsistent with the
principles on which the WTO was established which was that trade is to be
conducted with a view to "raising standards of living ensuring full employment
and growing volume of demand."' Such injury is also inconsistent with the
principles we observed that informed the signing of the GATT 1947 as
amended. The impact of dumping on many local industries in small or develop-
ing markets can be disastrous if left unchecked. This has been the experience
recently in the Caribbean.
A finding of injury is made based on an objective examination of positive
evidence of both price effects i.e. the effects the dumped goods has on the
prices on the local market, and financial effects, i.e. the effect on the economic
performance of the local industry.32 Price effects: An investigation or price
cuts analyzes whether the dumped products undercut the prices of like goods
on the local market, caused the suppression and/or depression of local prices of
30. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 41.
31. See WTO Agreement, pmbl., which indicates that the parties to the Agreement recognized
that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with The objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protected and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concurs at different
levels of economic development.
32. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 3.1. A determination of injury for purposes of
Article VI of GAIT VI of GAIT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective
examination of both (a) the evolve of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in
the domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers
of such products.
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like products on the local market.3" In examining economic effects, the
investigative authority would also examine the economic performance of the
local industry and in so far as a causal link can be made between the dumping
of the good and the poor economic performance of the local industry the anti-
dumping duty will be imposed. The examination of the impact of dumping on
the local industry would involve an analysis of several economic factors,
including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investment, cash flow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, and ability to raise capital or investments. Article 3.4 states that "this
list is not exhaustive nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give
decisive guidance."34
Indeed, in working out the principles to determine material injury the
Australian Customs Services has declared "an industry which at one point in
time is healthy and could shrug off the effects of the presence of dumped
products in its market could at another time, weakened by other events, suffer
material injury from the same amount and degree of dumping."3
The investigative authority may also find that, although the dumping may
not have caused material injury, it threatens to cause material injury to the local
industry. In making this assessment, the authority would consider principally
whether there was a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the
domestic market indicating the likelihood of substantially increased
importation, the sufficiently freely disposable or imminent substantial increase
in capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased
exports to the importing member's market, whether the imports are entering at
prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic
prices and likely to increase the demand for further imports. In the Final
Determination by the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Commission pursuant to
section 30 of the Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act 1999 in respect
of dumped cement originating from Thailand, dumped onto Jamaica, the
Commission held that although the dumped cement had not caused material
injury to the local industry it threatened to cause material injury on account of
the exporter's ability to potentially increase the supply of dumped imports into
the Jamaican market. The Commission concluded "there is a likelihood of
33. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 3.2. With regard to the effect of the dumped
import on prices the investigating authority shall consider whether there has been a significant price
undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing member
or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or print price
increases, which otherwise would have occurred to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors
can necessarily give decisive guidance.
34. Id. arts. 3, 4.
35. Customs Act, 1901, part XVB (Austl.),
http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/submission-summaryonel .pdf.
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substantially increased dumped imports from Indonesia to the Jamaican market
in the near future and that this will affect the domestic industry's ability to
supply its product to the market and consequently its viability."
Anti-dumping investigations are an important feature of this "global law."
The investigations are triggered only by a dumping margin that is more than
two percent (the de minmis rule) and a volume of dumping that is more than
three percent of the imports of the like product in the importing member (i.e.
dumping that is not negligible).36 The global law, therefore, permits the
dumping of goods into another member, even if it causes injury to the local
industry, in circumstances where the dumping margin is less than two percent
or the volume is less than three percent of the total imports of the good.
B. Relief Available
Both anti-dumping duties, to counteract injurious dumping, and counter-
vailing duties to counteract injurious subsidies, are imposed in addition to the
customs duties imposed on imports from the source regardless of the bound rate
of the tariff discussed above. Immediately one recognizes these measures as
tools to re-create barriers to trade pre-WTO.
The objective of the exercise from the part of the complainant, the local
industry, is to secure the imposition of a final anti-dumping or countervailing
duty to protect its market from dumping in any form whether it is by way of
predatory or long term dumping or subsidisation. It is imposed on a non
discriminatory basis on imports of the good from all sources found to be
dumped or subsidised and causing injury.37 For anti-dumping duties the actual
amount of the duty would not be more than the assessed dumping margin and
in some territories the "lesser duty rule" has been implemented which requires
the anti-dumping duty to be no more than is necessary to eliminate the margin
of injury.
C. Provisional Duties
This is perhaps the first objective of an anti-dumping investigation or
countervailing duty for a complainant. Within the first three months of an anti-
dumping or countervailing investigation, the authority is competent to impose
a duty based on its preliminary findings on the dumping margins or subsi-
disation and its assessment of injury. The purpose of this duty is to eliminate
any further injury during the course of the investigation.3"
36. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 5.8.
37. Id. art. 9.2.
38. Id. art. 5.8.
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Retroactive duties are rarely imposed. This is the most draconian of the
remedies available under the "global law" exposing "guilty" importer to duties
levied retroactively on dumped goods entering before the final determination
is made and after the date of initiation of the investigation.39
These laws are thus focused not on the motives of trade but on the effects
of certain strategies on domestic trade. In this way it is different from competi-
tion policy and fair-trading legislation.
D. Safeguard Actions
Unlike the actions examined above, the safeguard action is perhaps a
weapon of mass destruction sparingly used against competing traders in the
global market. A safeguard measure can take the form of either an increase in
import tariffs or quota restrictions on the good under investigation imported
from all sources. It is only to be applied if it is found than the good is imported
into a territory in such increased quantities absolute or relative to domestic
production and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to the domestic industry."0
The underlying principle of the safeguard measure is reflected in the
Report of the Appellate body in United States-Circular welded carbon quality
line pipe:
Safeguard measures are extraordinary remedies to be taken only in
emergency situations. Safeguard measures are remedies imposed in
the form of imports restrictions in the absence of any allegation of
unfair trade practice. Safeguard measure may be imposed on the fair
trade of other WTO members and, by restricting their imports, will
prevent those WTO members form enjoying the full befit of trade
concessions under the WTO agreement.41
These remedies are extremely flexible and timely instruments. Its provi-
sions can be broadly interpreted, and the extent of the protection depends in a
large degree on the policy of the government, such as whether it is committed
to protecting its manufacturers or to providing the consumers with wider and
cheaper alternatives and encouraging FDI. The interests of the developing
countries of the Caribbean are theoretically addressed in Article 15:
39. Id. art. 10.
40. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 22, art. 2.1.
41. World Trade Organization Appellate Body, United States, Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 2002).
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It is recognized that special regard must be given by enveloping
country members to the special situation of developing members
when considering the application of anti-dumping measures under this
agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this
Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties
where they would affect the essential interests of developing country
members.42
This, however, is of little practical assistance because it is vague and
ambiguous, and given little efficacy in the WTO. In EC-Bed Line the panel
ruled that EC violated Article 15 by failing to explore the possibility of
"constructive remedies" in the form of price undertakings. Much could be
done, however, to improve special and differential treatment such as re-
examining the de minimise test and the burden of proof on complainants to
prove a case of dumping or subsidization.
V. OPENING THE PANDORA'S Box
These trade remedy laws have given new life to the protectionists in the
WTO. There has been an increase in the use of trade remedy laws directly
proportional to the increasing levels of liberalisation of economies. It is now
widely recognized that the increased usage of these laws offers protection to
local industries but naturally restricts trade and foreign investment.
Since 1995 several WTO members have quickly implemented and updated
its trade remedy laws to maximize their use of the international framework of
protection set in the WTO. With regard to the anti-dumping remedy in 1995,
fifty-six WTO members had implemented and put into practice legislation in
conformity with the AD Agreement. By 2002, that number had risen to 94. In
fact China, a country the subject of numerous anti-dumping complaints,
recently implemented anti-dumping legislation.
The WTO Secretariat reported that in the period July 1 st to December 31 st
2001 nineteen members initiated 186 anti-dumping investigations against
exports from a total of fifty-five different countries or customs territories.
During the corresponding period of 2000, eighteen WTO members initiated 187
anti-dumping investigations.4 a During the first six months of 2002, there were
111 anti-dumping investigations initiated by member states. Chinese exports
are topping the list of the countries most subject to anti-dumping investigations.
In this survey, the good that is subjected to the most anti-dumping investiga-
42. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15.
43. See Press Release, WTO News, WTO Members Report on Anti-Dumping Activity (Apr. 22,
2002).
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tions was base metals followed by chemicals, and machinery, and electronics
sector.
TABLE 1
Anti-dumping investigations initiated globally"
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No of 156 221 242 232 339 251 348
cases
Safeguard investigation initiated globally45
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No of 2 5 3 10 15 26 53
cases
This trend suggests that increasingly trade remedy legislation is becoming
a fact of life in international trade. It is a natural corollary to the open market
economy and is now the most popular form of protecting local markets. Even
the Caribbean nations have signified their intention of not being left behind in
the implementation of trade remedy law. It must be noted that in the Western
Hemisphere the most active and effective users of trade remedy law are the
United States and Canada. In spite of the pillars of the WTO of the "MFN rule"
and reciprocity, the use of trade remedies is the newest form of "legitimate"
inter-trade warfare. The following chart demonstrates, at least in this region,
the nature of this warfare and confirms the view that the anti-dumping trade
remedy is viewed as one of the ways to equitably level the playing field among
trading nations.
44. R. CRYNBERG & E. TURNER, MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE ISSUES FOR DEVELOPING
CoUNTRIEs.
45. Id.
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ANTI-DUMPING ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
MEASURES INITIATIONS
MEASURES
USA
Argentina
Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Venezuela
Peru
Colombia
Chile
Trinidad and Tobago
Jamaica
Paraguay
Nicaragua
Guatemala
IMPLEMENTED AGAINST
192 115
120 14
67 22
55 68
55 29
24 6
17 2
11 6
6 21
5 3
3 ++
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY LAW IN THE
CARIBBEAN: BRIEF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
From this global perspective, one can analyze how, in terms of procedural
and substantive law, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica have implemented the
global trade remedy law into their local trading landscape and whether they
remain effective tools to promote equity in the international trading system.
Although Trinidad and Tobago is a more active user of trade remedy law,
Jamaica has been the more careful but creative user. In spite of this there are
WTO non-compliant provisions and gaps in both countries' legislation, which
should be addressed to make it a more viable and effective remedy.
A. Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty actions:
In Trinidad and Tobago the anti-dumping law is set out in the following
legal instruments: the Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties Act 1992, the
Amendment to the Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties Act 1995, the Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duty Regulations 1996. In Jamaica, the legal
46. WTO secretariat
1995-2001
COUNTRY
AGAINST
67
8
8
51
17
9
-+
2
11
3
2
++
-+-
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instruments are the Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act 1999 (CDDS
Act) 1999 and the Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) (Determination of
Fair Market Price, Material Injury and Margin of Dumping) Regulations 1999.
Unlike its Trinidad and Tobago counterpart the Jamaican legislation specifi-
cally incorporates certain aspects of the Anti-dumping Agreement and in
particular Annexure II of the Agreement.47 In both jurisdictions the legislation
repeals the previous customs legislation governing dumping and subsidies,
thereby taking the process of determining whether an anti-dumping or counter-
vailing duty is to be imposed away from the Comptroller of Customs.48
Instead, both countries vest a special tribunal with authority to determine
whether dumping or subsidisation exists and whether there is a causal link
between the material injury alleged to be suffered by or threatened to the local
industry producing like goods and the subsidisation or dumping. In Jamaica,
the tribunal is known as the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Commission (herein-
after referred to as "the Commission"). 9 It is an independent Commission. In
Trinidad and Tobago the authority is vested with the Minister of Trade and the
Anti-dumping Authority. The Anti-dumping Authority (the Authority) has the
power to initiate an investigation but thereafter its role is limited to making
preliminary and final recommendations to the Minister of Trade. The Minister
of Trade is then responsible for the making of the determinations as to the
imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. In Trinidad and Tobago,
the mix of politics in this legal process is evident. This might perhaps explain
the higher usage of the anti-dumping remedy in Trinidad and Tobago than in
Jamaica. However, an intricate and involved process such as dumping and
subsidy investigations may overwhelm the limited resources of a government
47. Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, 1999 (Jamaica),
http://www.mct.gov.jm/mcst-documents.htm. The long title of both laws is of particular interest: Jamaica
"An Act to repeal and replace the Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act to establish the Anti-
Dumping and Subsidies Commission and for the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade for connected matters." Id.
48. See id. § 36; Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Act No. 11 (1992),
www.sice.oas.org/antidumping/legislation/trinidad/ACTI .asp.
49. Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, 1999 (Jamaica). The Commission is comprised
of a chairman and four other members appointed by the Minister. It carries out its investigations indepen-
dently and makes independent determinations. The Commission is staffed with legal advisers and economic
consultants. The Anti-Dumping Authority of Trinidad and Tobago is not as independent. Pursuant to section
16 of the Anti Dumping and Countervailing Duties Act the Minister designates his Permanent Secretary or
such other person as he thinks fit "to be the Anita Dumping Authority." Republic of Trinidad and Tabago,
Act No. 11, c. 11 (1992). Although the functions of both the Authority and the Commission are essentially
the same ("to investigate into the existence, degree and effect of the alleged dumping or grant of subsidies
of any goods"), the Authority advised the Minister as to the margin of dumping or the nature of subsidies in
relation to goods. Id. at part 2. It is the Minister who by section 5 is charged with the responsibility of
imposing a duty based upon the recommendations of the Authority. In contrast it is the Commission which
makes the finding that the dumping and subsidising of goods has caused or is likely to cause material injury.
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Ministry. In any event, both jurisdictions have not gone the way of bifurcating
the process, like the United States has done. One body make its findings of
dumping as well as injury and causal link. Interestingly in Trinidad and Tobago
the anti-dumping or countervailing duty is expressly made a duty of customs for
which the Comptroller shall be responsible for the collection of duties whereas
an anomaly exists in the Jamaican legislation as no express power is given to
the Commission to impose the duty itself.
To date, neither jurisdiction has reported countervailing duty investiga-
tions. The comparison that follows, therefore, will focus on anti-dumping
investigations. The important phases of an anti-dumping investigation under
the respective legislation is the initiation of the investigation, the making of
preliminary findings on dumping and injury (the preliminary determination) and
the final determination as to whether final anti-dumping or countervailing
duties are to be imposed on the goods that are the subject to the investigation
(the final determination).
Both these bodies are to be regarded as having their own degree of skill
and expertise in trade remedy law. This is an important criterion, especially in
matters of appeal or judicial review of their decisions and deference will be
made to such a body's findings of fact and it is expected that the same standard
of review of specialist tribunal will apply. Article 13 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement states that:
Each Member whose national legislation contains provisions on anti-
dumping measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative
tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia of the prompt
review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and
reviews of determinations within the meaning of Article 11. Such
tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the authorities
responsible for the determination of review in question"
In Harricrete v Minister of Trade, Myers, J., was of the view that mere
"Wednesbury" unreasonableness of a decision of the Authority is not sufficient
to warrant an application forjudicial review of its decision without resort to the
appellate mechanisms set out in the Act. This is an important decision as it
recognizes the need to have issues of dumping and material injury to be
determined by a specialized tribunal. This highlights the unique nature of the
appeal provisions in the Jamaican legislation. It is submitted that the provisions
to review a final determination under Section 33 of the CDDS Act, although
described as an application for judicial review in fact confers more powers on
50. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 13.
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the Court and is almost appellate in nature.5 However insofar as both the Tax
Appeal Board in Trinidad and Tobago and the Supreme Court in Jamaica are
not staffed with the requisite expertise and specialist knowledge in trade
remedy and international law the timing may be right for recourse to specialized
trade courts such as the CCJ as a possible court of appeal for reviews of final
determinations.
B. The Triggering Mechanism
In both pieces of legislation, the onus is on the complainant to establish a
case of dumping, injury, and a causal link before triggering the investigative
functions of the Commission and Authority. Article 5.6 of the Agreement
provides that investigations are initiated on "sufficient evidence" of dumping
or subsidization, injury, and causal link. 52 This is in reality an "anti-
harassment" provision and is designed to prevent the notification of frivolous
and vexatious complaints. The ruling of the Panel in SoftwoodLumber sets the
standard of proof as "evidence that provides a reason to believe that dumping
exists and that the local industry is injured as a result of the dumped imports."53
It will appear that the standard of proof in Trinidad is higher than in
Jamaica. In Jamaica, the Commission must be "satisfied" that a complaint is
"properly documented," as defined in the Act. 4 There is evidence that the
goods are or have been dumped or subsidized, and it discloses "a reasonable
indication" that the dumping or subsidizing of the goods has caused is causing
or is likely to cause material injury.5 In Trinidad and Tobago, however, the
Authority must be satisfied that there is "sufficient primafacie evidence" of
dumping or the giving of a subsidy and of the quantum actionable injury, and
a causal link between such imports and the alleged actionable injury. It is
submitted that if the Authority is empowered to investigate the existence,
degree, and effect of dumping the standard of proof on a complainant cannot be
high at the initiation stage. In practice, the Authority applies the test liberally.
Also, there is no formal approach to the conduct of the investigation as pertains
in Jamaica. A clarification of this threshold test would open the doors to
expedited initiations and remedies being made available to the local industry.
Related to this evidential issue is the use of the information available to
make determinations where the exporters and producers in the country of export
fail to participate in the investigation or where there is conflicting evidence. In
51. See Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, 1999, c. 34(1) (Jamaica).
52. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 5.6.
53. World Trade Organization, Panel Reports, United States, Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 31, 2004).
54. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 5.5.
55. See Custom Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, § 22(l)(c) (Jamaica).
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these cases, the investigating authority is empowered to make adverse infer-
ences against those parties or rely on the information contained in the com-
plaint. To do otherwise would be to reward parties for their failure to comply
with the importing country's trade remedy laws. 6 Although Annexure II of the
AD agreement sets out in detail the manner in which an authority will rely upon
the facts available which is expressly incorporated in the Jamaican legislation.
However, the Authority in Trinidad and Tobago appears more willing to make
adverse inferences or rely on the complainant's information where exporter's
or foreign producers fail to participate in an anti-dumping investigation than the
Commission in Jamaica. One of the difficulties the Authority will frequently
encounter is the weight to be attached to the Customs invoices and declaration
of the exporter or importer in determining export prices. In Jamaica the AD
legislation dilutes the significance of invoices and underscores that the dumping
determination is an assessment of all the evidence available. 7 However the
Authority seems more prepared to ignore invoices than the Commission and act
on other evidence available where the exporters fail to corroborate the
importers assessment of the export price adequately or at all. The assessment
of evidence in a trade remedy case where foreign parties refuse or fail, as they
usually do, to participate will continue to be a source of great controversy in the
application of these laws in these jurisdictions.
C. The Scope of the ReliefAvailable
In anti-dumping and duty actions, the legislation provides relief to the
local industry by the imposition of provisional, final and retroactive duties. The
AD Agreement recognizes that there are circumstances in which injury may be
incurred by a local industry during an investigation and which would need
interim protection by means of a provisional duty.
The power to impose provisional measures is governed by Sections 24 and
25 of the Trinidad and Tobago Act and Section 15 of the CDDS Act.58 This is
as close to interlocutory relief as can be obtained under the legislation. It is an
attempt to preserve the status quo by imposing anti-dumping duties during the
investigation to prevent further injury to the local industry. It sanitizes the
trading environment to allow for further investigations to take place in a neutral
trading environment.
The imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties dramatically affects the
importer and exporter. Some importers have adopted the strategy of seeking
56. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 6.8.
57. See Custom Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, c. 19 ("The export price of goods sold to an
importer in Jamaica 'notwithstanding any invoice or affidavit to the contrary...").
58. See Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, c. 15; Republic of Trinidad and Tobago,
ActNo. 11, § 12.
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judicial review at that stage. In light of the Judicial Review Act 2002 (Trinidad
and Tobago) and the recent judgment in HCA 1042 of 2000 Harricrete Limited
v Minister of Trade to successfully challenge the Minister's decision at that
stage the applicant must show exceptional circumstances exist to resort to
judicial review rather than exhaust the alternative remedy allowing the
investigation ought not to run its course to a final determination.
The present power to impose a provisional duty is only exercisable within
60 days after an investigation has been initiated.59 However, the Commission
is more adept at maintaining this deadline than the Authority in Trinidad. In
Trinidad and Tobago all three applications for judicial review of the Minister's
preliminary determination in different anti-dumping investigations were
challenged. One of the grounds of challenge was the illegality of the Minister's
making of his determination beyond the 60-day deadline. In Trinidad and
Tobago the Authority has argued that the word "shall" in making its preliminary
determination is not mandatory but directory only. There is recent case law to
suggest that this view is correct but it has yet to be finally determined in those
courts.
It is submitted however that the legislators in both territories must explore
ways of providing more meaningful interim relief to the local industry such as
in the EC. In the EC there is an "immediate intervention" clause. 60 Through
this provision, beleaguered industries or industries comprising total production
can petition the investigative bodies to impose provisional duties immediately
upon initiating an investigation. These provisions must be exercised with care
so as not to expose the authorities to allegations of breaches of WTO obliga-
tions.
D. Retroactivity
Anti-dumping and countervailing duties are to be prospectively imposed
without discrimination. However, retroactive imposition of duties can occur
however where 1) there is a history of dumping causing injury and the importer
should or was aware goods dumped and dumping would cause injury; or 2)
there were substantial dumped imports in relatively short period of time pre-
clude it from recurring. It is to be imposed on goods entered for home con-
sumption ninety days prior to the preliminary determination. 6
In some scenarios this restriction blunts the effectiveness of the Act as a
trade remedy. Anti-dumping and in these scenarios for small market economies
ought to be made retroactive to capture shipments which injured the local
industry imported prior to the initiation of the investigation. In the Jamaican
59. See Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, c. 15(3).
60. See Article 7(5) of the EC; Herbicide from Romania [1979] O.J. L44/8.
61. See Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, c. 34(1)(c).
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legislation the 90-day period is not restricted by the date of initiation and it is
probable that duties may be applied retroactively before the date of initiation
of the investigation even though this may not be consistent with Article 10.8 of
the Anti-dumping Agreement.
E. Availability of Civil Remedies
There is no right to pursue civil remedies against importers who are found
to have dumped goods in circumstance where they knew the goods to have been
dumped and/or have a history of dumping in this territory. It is regarded as the
basic purpose of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties as not to com-
pensate for past injuries only to stop distortion of competition arising from
unfair commercial practices like dumping and subsidization. This premise
however is defeated by the very condition which satisfies a retroactive duty
assessment. In that scenario the commercial practices of the importer and
exporter have crossed the border of being merely unfair to being oppressive.
The criteria alone that the "importer was aware that the goods were dumped and
that the dumping would cause injury" to the local industry satisfies a tortuous
ingredient of conspiracy or trading with the intention to dump to cause injury
and thereby obtain a competitive advantage to the detriment of the local
producer. This may qualify as an economic tort.62 It can arguably qualify as a
"dishonest practice" under the Protection from Unfair Trade Act.
F. Qualifications
There are however two different qualifications to the relief available under
the respective jurisdiction in AD and CD. In Jamaica, Section 11 of the CDDS
Act incorporates the "lesser duty rule" stated in Article 9 of the Anti-dumping
Agreement.63 In Trinidad the amount of the anti-dumping duty is no more than
the dumping margin. In practice the dumping margin will represent the
dumping duty imposed. In Jamaica there is discretion to impose a lesser duty
"as is considered adequate to compensation for the injury."' It is difficult to
foresee a case where an industry, which is complaining of material injury
caused by goods dumped at a margin of 90%, will not expect such a duty to be
imposed to illuminate the benefits obtained by the importer of such huge price
62. Section 801 of the American Revenue Act of 1916 mandates the imposition of treble damages
if it could be proven that foreign producers sold their products in the United States with the intent to destroy
or injure a United States industry or retrain its development. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (2004).
63. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 9.1 (stating, interalia, that "[i]t is desirable
that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members and that the duty be less than the margin if
such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the local domestic industry") These provisions
are also incorporated in Article 7(2) and 9(4) of the EC.
64. See Custom Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act, c. I I(2)(b).
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differentials. To do otherwise will allow the margins enjoyed by the importer
to still unfairly compete with the local industry. The practice in Jamaica thus
far does not appear to be settled. In the four anti-dumping cases determined
since 1999, the lesser duty rule was discussed in one but not applied, as the
dumping margin was less than the margin of injury.65 In any event, there are no
binding rules in the AD agreement on how injury margins are to be calculated.
It is submitted that the power is discretionary and may not be invoked at all in
suitable cases.66
Secondly, unlike Jamaica, an anti-dumping or countervailing duty will be
imposed if it is in "the public interest" in Trinidad and Tobago. Interestingly
no express "public interest" requirement exists in the AD Agreement. Like the
EC, however, this is a manifestation of the requirement under the AD agree-
ment that duties be permissive even where there is dumping and resulting
injury. The practice in the EC is to assume that protective remedies are neces-
sary unless there are submissions made to the contrary. Some of the public
interest factors include user interest, importer's interest, maintaining competi-
tion on the local market and maintaining and developing technology. In
Fluorspar the Commission stated, "The Commission considered that the
purpose of anti- dumping duties is in general to stop distortion of competition
arising from unfair commercial practices and thus to re-establish open and fair
competition on the Community market, which is fundamentally in the Commun-
ity interest."67
To date, the public interest requirement has only been applied in one anti-
dumping investigation. However no reasons were provided to refuse to impose
a final anti-dumping duty in the public interest although there was a finding of
injury caused by dumping.68
G. Problems of Enforcement
Although other territories have made guidelines to deal with circumvention
of anti-dumping duties, similar guidelines are conspicuously absent in the
legislation ofboth jurisdictions. There is no definition of circumvention. How-
ever, the legislations of both jurisdictions describes the process or changes in
patterns of trade between one country and another country with the
65. See the Investigation into the Dumping of OPC from Indonesia, Ref. No. AD-01-2002 (July
2, 2002) [hereinafter Indonesia Duming Investigation],
http://www.jadsc.gov.jm/adsc/adsc.nsf/f821ed001c66976e85256e270009449e/a706a45d2539a9da05256
e5800762004/$FILE/ATr2T16C/FinaI%20SOR%20CCCL%2OFD.pdf. In the dissenting opinion of Mrs. B
Morgan the lesser duty analysis was applied. Id.
66. See The Investigation into the Dumping of OPC from China.
67. Commission Regulation (EEC), 1993 OJ L 226, Fluorspar from China (Sep. 1, 1993)
(provisional).
68. See the Investigation into the Dumping of Lead Acid Batteries from Thailand.
[Vol. 1 1:65
Kokaram
predominant or sole purpose by the exporter or importer to circumvent the
imposition of the duty and to undermine the remedial effects of the duty.
The review provisions in both Acts are clearly inadequate to deal with
issues of circumvention. One example is the 1989 imports of photocopiers for
the Ricoh plant in California. In spite of the American point of assembly, the
photocopiers were found not to have lost their Japanese origin of manufacture
and the Commission of the EC took a decision that photocopiers produced by
Ricoh in the United States should denied United States origin. The practical
effect was that those imports assembled in the United States were subject to a
thirty percent duty applicable to photocopiers originating from Japan. What is
noteworthy of this investigation is that it was done on the official initiative and
not on the receipt of any complaint form interested parties. This is the example
of protectionism at work in EC we too to be competitive must protect our
markets.
An important factor emerging from the final determination in the
investigation into ("OPC") from Indonesia is the Commission's disapproval of
"source switching.' ''The practice where an importer switches to a new source,
subsequently determined to be a dumped source, after anti-dumping measures
have been applied against its previous source, is a practice commonly termed
as 'source switching' and is not regarded in a positive light by this Com-
mission." Therefore, it is apparent that anti-dumping investigating bodies even
in the Caribbean are mindful of the realities of international trade and is com-
mitted to the prevention of injurious dumping and the circumvention of its
protective measures. With the increasing globalization of the world economy
anti circumvention cases would be an unavoidable aspect of investigations and
reviews and need to be incorporated in the local legislation.
VII. ENGAGING THE ENEMY: RECENT CASES
In the Caribbean there are several recent trade remedy cases, which raise
important issues in international trade:
A. Country of origin
In a globalize economy goods are transhipped and distributed from many
different sources as distinct from the country of manufacture. 69 The dispute
between prices in the country of origin and the country of export in reference
to the cement exports was recently examined in the AD 01 2000 Final
69. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 2.5 (providing for a comparison to the price
in the country of origin where the products are "merely transshipped through the country of export, or such
products are not produced in the country of export, or there is no comparable price for them in the country
of export").
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Determination by the Anti-dumping and Subsidies Commission under section
30 of the Customs Duties (Dumping and Subsidies) Act 1999 (June 11 2001).
This was an investigation into the Dumping of Ordinary Portland Grey cement
originating from Thailand into Jamaica over the period 1999 to 2000. In that
case the Anti-dumping Commission also investigated "indirect shipments" of
cement from Thailand which were routed to Jamaica via Trinidad. The Anti-
dumping Commission ruled however that the normal value to be utilised was
the price of the cement in Trinidad regardless of the country of origin of the
cement. The Commission ruled that the cement was "not merely transhipped
through Trinidad. The cement entered Trinidad in February 1999. It cleared
Trinidad customs and sat in Harricrete's warehouse for, in some cases seven
months before being shipped to Jamaica." No doubt the debate as to whether
goods are transhipped or exported from one territory to another will feature
prominently in future anti-dumping cases.
B. Self initiation- China
After years of experience in Jamaica, signs of a maturing investigation
system have been exhibited. The Commission self initiated its own anti-
dumping investigation into the dumping of OPC from China. Article 5.6 of the
Anti-dumping Agreement provides "[i]f in special circumstances the authorities
concerned decide to initiate an investigation (ex officio) they shall proceed only
if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link to justify
the initiation of an investigation., 70 This is a power sparingly used as there is
little authority on guidelines by the WTO.
Jamaica however recently successfully self initiated this investigation in
much the same manner in which a complainant is expected to prove its case.
The material that triggered the investigation appeared to have been obtained
while the Commission was conducting a safeguard investigation. Regardless
of source the Commission demonstrated an ability to act on credible
information in the interests of the local industry and in conformity with the
objectives of the CDDS Act.
C. Jamaican Safeguards
Jamaica created a new first in trade remedy law in initiating the only
safeguard action on imports of cement. At the time of writing this article, the
final determination was due to be published by the Commission.
70. Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 5.6.
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D. Inconsistent Approaches in the Caribbean
One can argue that the application of trade remedy law should produce the
same results in both territories. However in the most recent investigations
conducted and completed in 2002 into the dumping of cement originating from
Indonesia into the markets of Jamaica and Trinidad there have been inconsistent
results. The Anti-dumping Commission of Jamaica imposed an anti-dumping
duty of 9.98% on all cement originating from Indonesia imported into the
Jamaican market and on February 2003 the Minister imposed an anti-dumping
duty of fifty-four percent on all cement originating from Indonesia imported
into the Trinidad market. Both investigations were essentially conducted on
similar transactions. It would appear that the essential difference between the
two findings was the exercise of the discretion of both authorities to make
adverse inferences against non co-operating foreign parties. The decision in
Jamaica is presently subject to an application for judicial review by the local
industry before the Supreme Court of Jamaica.
The Authority in Trinidad and Tobago was of the view that the dumped
imports caused material injury. In Jamaica, the Commission determined that
there was a threat of material injury and no actual injury. Both bodies were
investigating similar local industries, markets, and similar systems of export.
The finding that there was a threat of material injury by the Commission was
made after a consideration of three factors. First, the exporter and importer's
ability to potentially increase the supply of dumped Indonesian imports into the
Jamaican market. The Commission also considered the Exporter and
Importer's ability to indirectly affect the local industry's ability to supply its
product to the Jamaican market and remain competitive. Finally, any other
factors that may be deemed relevant in the circumstances whether specific to
the firm's operations or economy wide are prevalent. In this aspect of the
investigation, it appears that the Commission has sent a signal to exporters that
the more exporters search or are perceived to be searching for new markets to
penetrate globally on indiscriminately the more likely will they be susceptible
to the imposition of anti-dumping duties (provided of course that the exporter
has been found to be dumping the product). It also confirms the international
view towards campaigns of long term or short term dumping of cement to other
territories as a means of "loading" excess stock.
VII. AREAS FOR REFORM
The TTMA represents many complainants who have utilized the Anti-
dumping legislation from 1996 to the present in Trinidad and Tobago. Their
complaints of material injury were made against the dumping of goods from
countries from as far as China to as close as Venezuela. The goods that were
the subject to anti-dumping investigations ranged from polyethylene bags, to
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pasta, to batteries, to biscuits, cheese, and cement. Many members however
have expressed some degree of exasperation in the use of this legislation. The
general concerns to be addressed are delay, enforceability, and scope of
remedy.
Key areas of reform that need to be urgently addressed are (1) the effective
and uniform use of the best information available; (2) reducing the standard of
proof to initiate an investigation; (3) implementing anti circumvention of
remedies; and (4) providing for immediate relief mechanisms and imposing
retroactive duty impositions beyond the date of initiation.
IX. THE FTAA TRADE REMEDY LAW
Having regard to the fact that some of the active users of trade remedy
action are in the West, it is no surprise to learn that trade remedy law is
preserved in the FTAA. It must be recognized at the outset that the FTAA
differs from the EC which dismantled all internal barriers to trade and
substituted trade remedy law in the internal market for competition policy to
regulate market forces. Trade remedy law in the EC therefore applies only to
non EC states. Dumping theoretically is impossible in a common market. The
Messina Conference Report states, "An enterprise can only practice dumping
on other markets to the extent to which its own national market is protected.
The simultaneous and reciprocal removal of obstacles to trade within the
Common Market will tend to eliminate the problem of intra Community
dumping automatically."'"
FTAA trade remedy law is of limited application. It also competes for its
viability with conflicting competition policy, which seeks to regulate the
internal market rather than restrict trade generally. It is submitted, however,
that the competition policy should have more credence in a customs union
rather than in a free trade area.
The trade remedy law preserved in the FTAA incorporates Anti-dumping
and Countervailing Duty measures and safeguards remedies. In the Draft
Chapter on Subsidies, Anti-dumping and Countervailing Measures it would
appear that the minimum set of rights under this chapter to enforce the trade
remedy is enshrined in the WTO. One version of Article 1.1 provides "[E]xcept
as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the Marrakech Agreement Establishing
the WTO and any successor agreements, shall govern the rights and obligations
of the parties in respect of subsidies and the application of anti-dumping and
countervailing duties."72
71. 1956 Messina Conference Report.
72. FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas, Draft Agreement, Chapter on Subsidies, Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties, Nov. 1, 2002, art. 1.1, FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.2.
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The trade remedies have been dramatically watered down in the FTAA and
if the Caribbean is looking towards these laws as viable means of protecting
their local industries either strong negotiation or re-thinking is needed.
(a) First, it is envisaged in the FTAA that anti-dumping and countervailing
duties will be phased out "when the free trade area is established and goods
circulate among countries of the FTAA fundamentally free of restrictions."
This is perhaps the Promised Land to which no one can set any definite time
frame.
(b) In the interim, the ability to trigger the anti-dumping or countervailing
duty has been made more arduous. This is seen in the material injury
determination. Article 3.5, as presently framed, states as follows:
In order to determine the existence of material injury there shall
normally be a requirement that the domestic industry incur losses
during the determined period. The determination of material injury
in the presence of positive earnings may be an exception provided
that it is justified in terms of special circumstances.73
This eliminates or makes it difficult for an industry, which distinguishes
declining profitability and making losses, to make a case that it is suffering
material injury. Their case will now be focused on proving threat of material
injury or will not be able to cross the bar at all.
Furthermore the onus of proof on the complainant before initiation is
greater than previously existed under the Agreement. Previously,
[i]In addition to the provisions of Article 3.5 of the WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement and Article 15.5 of the WTO agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures before anti-dumping or
countervailing duties can be imposed proof shall be submitted that the
dumped or subsidized imports constitute the principal or dominant
cause of the injury caused to the domestic industry.74
This is expressly stated to be a "WTO plus" requirement and eliminates
the "causal link" determination under the Agreement. Additionally, for a
positive injury determination to be made the exporter must be found to have a
substantial market power in the country of origin or receive a subsidy which
enables the practice of dumping. 75 This certainly eliminates the possibility of
73. Id. art. 3.5.
74. Id. art. 3.7.
75. Id.
The investigating authority shall determine that the dumped exports cause or threaten to cause injury
if the exporters under investigation as a whole have substantial market power in the country of origin or
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successfully bringing actions against rogue exporters, middlemen and distress
shipments.
The requirement to produce strong evidence before an authority initiates
is also expressed in the requirement to impose a provisional measure in Article
7.1:
With regard to article 7.1 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement a
preliminary affirmative determination shall be based on evidence
establishing a strong primafacie case and that there is a substantial
issue to be investigated. In principle preliminary measures shall not
be imposed unless authorities judge that the consequent injury to a
domestic industry is not adequately compensable unless interim relief
is granted and that the balance of interests favors the granting of the
relief sought. In exceptional cases where the threat of consequent
injury affect a critical growth industry in an FTAA small economy
special flexibility shall be accorded.76
(c) It is now made mandatory under Article 9.1 of the FTAA to apply the
"lesser duty rule." However, the exception for developing countries under
Article 12.1 appears to be illusory and of no practical effect.
(d) Article 5 sets firm time limits for the completion of an investigation of
eighteen months. This is consistent with the Anti-dumping Agreement.
However in Article 5.6 should these time limits be exceeded the investigation
will be automatically terminated. Trinidad and Tobago and any other country
with limited resources to conduct investigations will do well to take note of this
provision.
(e) Although the de minimis margin has been increased it is submitted that
some qualification should be made for the developing countries."
(f) It is noted that the FTAA provides for its own mechanisms for Dispute
Settlement. However, it is debatable whether these procedures will have any
binding effect. Article 14.11 provides that "[w]hen a dispute settlement
mechanism provided for under this Agreement determines that an anti-dumping
or countervailing measure is incompatible with this Chapter, it may recommend
to the importing Party the way and time in which it shall bring its measure into
conformity with the Agreement."
receive a subsidy which enables the practice of dumping. The exporters as a whole will be considered to have
substantial market power if they have the capacity to fix the sale price and displace their competitors in the
market of origin.
76. Id. art. 7.1
77. Id. art. 5.5; see id. art. 12.3.
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In such an environment it is still open to the more powerful economies to
resist rulings arrived through the dispute settlement procedure, an option which
has not to date been contemplated by smaller territories.
X. FINDING HARMONY WITH CSME:
The establishment of a single market and economy by the Revised Treaty
of Chaguaramas seeks, in terms of market integration, to incorporate the
previous arrangement of a common external tariff but with a move to eliminate
impediments to the free movement of goods in the region. Notwithstanding
this, it has preserved supporting mechanisms to protect the local industry in
laws in relation to subsidies and anti-dumping. Draft legislation is found in
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in Part 5 of the Treaty. It is very likely those Caribbean
legislators will face a tough task in harmonising these laws with FTAA
requirements in their present form. For instance the Anti-dumping Law of the
CSME already sets up obligations, which are inconsistent with FTAA require-
ments. It is interesting to note that Part 5 of the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas does not expressly recognize the Anti-dumping Agreement as
setting out the minimum bundle of rights in regional Anti-dumping Law. It is
difficult to imagine that the CSME will not be WTO complaint. However, its
provisions do walk a thin line between strict compliance with WTO and breach
of international obligations in certain aspects.
Part 5 sets up a different system altogether for the enforcement of this
trade remedy law by allowing investigations to be conducted by both the
investigating authority of a member state and COTED. The initiation of an
anti-dumping investigation will consist of two phases. First, the local investi-
gating authority may initiate a "preliminary investigation" to verify the
existence of dumped imports and injury caused or the existence of a serious
threat of injury as the case by a domestic industry.78 It is noted that in using the
term "preliminary investigation" the framers of this anti-dumping law must take
cognizance of Article 5.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement which states that
78. In Article 12, a member state may take action against dumped imports if such imports cause
injury or pose a serious threat of injury to a domestic industry. There is no definition of what constitutes a
"serious" threat of injury and it seems to create a higher threshold for the domestic industry in its complaint.
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the Caricom Single Market
and Economy, July 5, 2001, art. 125, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat [hereinafter Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas], http://www.caricom.org/archives/revisedtreaty.pdf However, Article 127 defines
"injury" to mean material injury to a domestic industry and "threat of material injury to a domestic industry"
or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry. Id. art. 127. This is the definition presently
used in the TT legislation. It would appear that the requirement to prove "serious" threat of injury is an
alternative requirement to imposing anti-dumping duties. It can be argued on a practical level to be an
unnecessary requirement unless there is a specific remedy to be imposed if a complainant demonstrates
"serious threat of injury."
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The Authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to
initiate an investigation, any publicizing of the application for the
initiation of an investigation. However after receipt of a properly
documented application and before proceeding to initiate an investi-
gation the authorities shall notify the government of the exporting
Member concerned.79
While this is a procedural requirement, a breach of this Article is deemed to be
a breach of the obligations under the WTO and canjeopardize an investigation.
In the Panel Report on Guatemala the serious nature of this Article was
examined and explained.
The use of the word "preliminary" must be a matter of semantics, not
meant to convey as a matter of substantive law that the Authority has not yet
decided to initiate a full investigation. The Authority would have at that time
already satisfied itself that there is a properly documented complaint and has
in fact initiated an investigation which is two pronged in nature. The first
prong, the preliminary investigation, leads to preliminary orders and findings.
The second prong, the "investigation," leads to the final order and findings.
This interpretation would explain Article 129.4 and 129.5. The decision
to initiate a preliminary investigation is made public by notice. If the investi-
gation provides sufficient evidence of dumping and serious injury or injury to
a domestic industry, the local authority may submit to the appropriate authority
of the exporting Member State a request for consultations. The request shall
be forwarded to COTED. The purpose of this request is to establish the fact
that dumping has occurred, and injury has been caused or threatened, and that
there is a causal link between the injury and the dumping. This is an innovative
step. It allows the local authority the ability to more effectively acquire infor-
mation on dumping such as normal values, export prices, and sales information.
The local authority is also able to acquire information to affect a better
comparison of sales, identity of the producer and their individual dumping
margins. The issue of a causal link should still be an issue to be determined in
the round, not solely with consultation with a member state. A member state
can only provide information, such as volume, and frequency of past and future
exports, plans for acquisition, and investment in the local market. Beyond this,
it cannot meaningfully add to the effect of dumping on the local industries'
prices and financial performance.
There must also be provision for the individual complainant to participate
in the consultations. At the very least, the complainant should be permitted to
respond to the submissions made by the member states. The request for
79. See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 14, art. 5.5.
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consultations provides the respondent member state to participate in the
investigation at an early stage, and assist the local authority in its deliberations.
The powerful motivating factor to do this is the local investigating body's
authority to impose provisional anti-dumping duties against the member states
and refer the request for investigation to COTED if the state fails to "make
satisfactory efforts to afford consultations, to provide requested information or
otherwise unreasonably impede an investigation."80
It is at this state that COTED assumes the responsibility for the further
conduct of the anti-dumping investigation and making final findings on injury
and the anti-dumping measure to be imposed against a member state. Unlike
the Anti Dumping agreement, the duration of the final anti dumping measure
is in the discretion of COTED. COTED also has the discretion to authorize the
imposition of anti-dumping measures if it is satisfied of the existence of
dumping and "if the parties alleged to be responsible for dumped imports refuse
to co-operate within the time specified so as to frustrate or otherwise impede
an investigation." This measure is to ensure compliance by exporters with the
anti-dumping investigation. The final measure itself will be "to the extent
necessary to eliminate the margin of dumping."8 Neither the lesser duty rule
nor public interest requirement is authorized in this regime.
The determination of whether injury exists is different from that
contemplated by the FTAA. In this regard, it is more in line with the WTO. It
remains to be seen whether the early involvement by a member state to actually
engage in consultations may have the effect of minimizing the desire of a
member state to take action regardless of the position of the local industry.
Indeed Article 133.3(f) will dampen the resolve of local authorities to take
action against a member state. Article 133.3(f) provides:
If however the investigations reveal that injury was not caused by
dumped imports as alleged, but the provisional measures have
materially retarded exports of the Member State complained against,
COTED shall, upon application by such State, assess the effects of the
provisionally applied duties and determine the nature and extent of
compensation which is warranted and require the Member State
applying provisional measures to withdraw the measure and pay
compensation in accordance with its assessment.82
There is a conflict to the extent that the FTAA is making it more onerous
on complainants to make a case for the imposition of anti-dumping duties, the
CSME is attempting to provide more powers to investigating authorities, and
80. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 78, art. 129.9.
81. Id. art. 133.3(a).
82. Id. art. 133.3(0.
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COTED to impose anti-dumping duties. Under the CSME, COTED will be the
body entrusted with the power to investigate allegations of dumping and injury
made by a member of CSME against a non-member state. This provides the
local industry in the CSME a more advantageous position against other FTAA
members. The advantage comes from having the technical expertise and
resources of COTED at its disposal rather than its own investigative body
established under its municipal laws to undertake the investigation. Further-
more, members of CSME, other than Jamaica and Trinidad, with no or little
experience in anti-dumping and trade remedy law will benefit from this
provision and provide an adequate interim safety net for market protection
against unfairly traded goods from the other FTAA members.
XI. FUTURE OF TRADE REMEDY LAW FOR THE CARIBBEAN IN
FTAA&CSME
Reactionary protective trade remedies form part of the framework of the
new trading landscape. The establishment of a Free Trade Area will not
necessarily decrease the level of trade remedy activity. A useful example is the
use of the trade remedy action in particular AD actions within Latin American
countries. The trade remedy action was frequently employed between
Argentina and Brazil within Mercusor. NAFTA also allows the continued use
of anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions by members against their free
trade partners. Although the principle behind a FTA is to integrate markets so
that domestic and foreign markets are considered one and the same with equal
treatment, unlike the European Free Association, the European Union and the
Australian New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade agreement, both the
FTAA and the CSME hold out the AD and CV actions perhaps as an olive
branch to those territories suspicious of the benefits of free trade.
Presently in the FTAA, Chile and the Andean Community are the only two
groups vocal on the issue of the interaction of trade and competition policy.
One of the compromises that may emerge is the inclusion of public interest
clauses to balance the competing interest of the consumer and the manufacturer.
For industries with multinational production experience the FTAA may
prove to be a stomping ground through tariff jumping FDI. The example of
Kodak is the often quoted example that demonstrates this. In August 1993
Eastman Kodak Company filed a US AD petition absent United States imports
of photographic paper originating form plants owned by Fuji Photo Film (Fuji)
in Japan and the Netherlands. By October 1993, a preliminary decision in the
case found dumping margins of over 300% against Fuji plants and ruled that the
imports were injuring the domestic industry. Fuji soon established a photo-
graphic paper manufacturing plant in the United States. The plan was
operational by March 1996. Less than a year after its United States plant
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opening, Fuji's share of the United States photographic paper market had
surpassed the market share of Fuji had enjoyed before the United States AD
petition was filed by Kodak.
The use of trade remedy law will therefore be the natural reflex of
countries entering the FTAA. It is anticipated that their use may decline with
the increased patronage of the concept of competition policy. The use of trade
remedies may also decline through FDI when members realize that an
overworked trade remedy agenda may ultimately cause the collapse of a FTA.
XII. CONCLUSION
Trade remedy laws may not be intended as a feature of the future FTAA
landscape. However, until we reach the "Promised Land" of completely free
trade, FTAA trade remedy mechanisms will feature prominently as one of the
useful tools of the Caribbean to regulate trade and investment. In stark contrast
to the EU, the FTAA and CSME cannot truly be seen as a common market by
maintaining this resort to protectionist measures against member states. It is
predicted that the initial reaction to the FTAA would be the creative use of the
existing trade remedies to protect existing markets for local industries to deal
with internal competitive forces and external competitors. Trade remedy
actions may spark friction among the trading partners in the region but this is
a small price to pay for maintaining equity in international trade.
Until we arrive at the "Promised Land," trade remedy law must remain a
tool in the Caribbean's competitive armory. Perhaps the globalization zealots
may even recognize the need to confer real benefits to smaller territories if they
are to participate in the FTAA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Kierkegaard's wish might be regarded as a prescient view of a new
European legal emphasis on persons with disabilities as human subjects rather
than as objects, persons who have the potential and the possibilities to contri-
bute to marketplace productivity. For lawyers representing clients engaging in
business in Europe, particularly clients actually establishing European branches,
keeping current on work setting discrimination laws is critical. Two major
European Commission (EC) Directives announced in 2000 fundamentally
expanded anti-discrimination protections for workers.
The first, the so-called Race Directive,' is the broader of the two in one
respect, since it applies across the spectrum. That is, its provisions address not
* Professor of Law, Virginia Commonwealth University; Fulbright Professor of Law, National
University of Ireland Galway, 2003-2004.
1. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 3(1), 2000 O.J. (L 180).
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only employment discrimination, but also discrimination in other areas, such as
housing, transportation, and education.
The second, the Framework Directive,2 although limited to employment
law, protects workers from discrimination based upon religion or belief,
disability, age, and/or sexual orientation.3 The year 2003 was the European
Year of the Disabled, probably a direct response to this second mandate from
the EC. Unarguably, revisions to workplace discrimination laws for persons
with disabilities are now on the agenda of domestic legislation in all European
Union countries.
This article focuses on developments in the area of discrimination on the
ground of disability. It is not a discourse on the Americans with Disabilities
Act; reference is made to that statute only in a comparative sense. The EC has
looked to the American statute as a beginning point, and its relevance when
analyzing the responses to the directive cannot be over-estimated.
II. SOME EUROPEAN LAW BASICS
There is frequent confusion among Americans with regard to the terms
"European Communities" or EC (originally "European Community") and
"European Union" (EU). Some legal professionals wrongly believe the EC to
be defunct and the EU to be the only correct term. "European Union" is the
goal pronounced in the Single Europe Act of 1987, but the European Com-
munity is the collective body with law-making powers. Thus, one might speak
of "EU law," designating law applicable to those countries in the European
Union, or "EC law," the more official term that refers to the actual source of
law. The EU, then, is a geographical entity, whereas, "EC" is the reference to
the body with law-making powers.
European law takes either of two forms: the regulation; or the directive.
A regulation is a primary source of law and is directly effective in all EU
member states, without any need for domestic legislation. The directive, on the
other hand, is a mandate from the EC that states an intended result. The means
by which each member state attains this result via the enactment of domestic
law is left to the individual member state. The directive has no counterpart in
American law. As a practical matter, the directive has been the more frequently
used form, particularly with regard to law relating to the establishment of a
single market.4
Currently, the adoption of a European Constitution is a topic of consider-
able controversy, although passage of the draft was actually anticipated for early
2. Council Directive 2000/78, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 303) [hereinafter Framework Directive].
3. Prior European Commission Directives have prohibited discrimination based on sex. See, e.g.,
Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39).
4. RALPH G. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 35 (3rd ed. 1999).
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2004. The purpose of the 1999 Cologne Council was to draft a Charter and
Constitution, and the dilemma of how a country once admitted to the EU might
later withdraw has finally been addressed in Article 59, Title IX, of the draft.
This Charter is incorporated into the proposed constitution as Part II of that
document.
Two lingering points of dissension remain: First, the proposed revamping
of voting weights;5 and second, the insistence of countries such as Ireland and
Italy that the document contain a reference to the Christian foundation of the
European Union.
A revised version was published in June 2004, shortly before the six-month
term of Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahem as President of the EU
expired. Thus, a European constitution is still in the "wait-and-see" stages.
The fifteen member states prior to May 1, 2004, were Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Italy (the charter members at the
adoption of the Treaty of Paris in 1952); Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom (added in 1973); Greece (1981); Portugal and Spain (1986); and
Austria, Finland, and Sweden (1995). As of May 1,2004, ten new countries are
now members of the EU: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (the Baltic states); the
Czech Republic and Slovakia (the former Czechoslovakia); Slovenia (part of
former Yugoslavia); Hungary, Poland, Malta, and Cyprus. Romania has been
approved for member status, and Bulgaria and Turkey are hopefuls. The sheer
size of the EU should be viewed as an entity with which any transnational
business must be prepared to reckon.
The original European Community (the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity) became the European Communities at the adoption of the 1957 Treaty
of Rome, which created the European Economic Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 6 Subsequent treaties include the
Single European Act of 1987, the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European
Union) of 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, and the Treaty of Nice of
2000.
Interestingly, the conceptual purpose of the EC was to create a geogra-
phical entity comprised of signatory member countries for economic consis-
tency and harmonization. Indeed, the goal of the Treaty of Rome was to extend
the Europa-wide communal regulation of the coal and steel industries effectu-
ated by the earlier Treaty of Paris to European economy as a whole. This
5. Currently, votes from those member states with the largest population, such as Germany, France,
and Italy, are more heavily weighted than are those from the less populated states, and this lessening of power
has not been acceptable to the larger members. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (providing the objective and goal of establishing a common European
market).
6. The latter was actually added via a separate treaty executed simultaneously with the Treaty of
Rome.
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economic basis has undergone a metamorphosis, or at the least, an augmenta-
tion. In recent years (particularly since the Amsterdam Treaty), an additional
aim of the EC has been human rights. The European Convention of Human
Rights has been incorporated into EC law; all fifteen of the pre-2004 enlarge-
ment member states have enacted the terms of that Convention into their
domestic laws. Professor Gerard Quinn of the law faculty at National Univer-
sity of Ireland Galway has called this human rights direction a "pragmatic goal
of interlinking the national economics into a common market so that armed
conflict in [post-World War II] Europe was unthinkable and energies were
instead diverted into peaceful economic competition."7 He has termed this a
recognition of the premise that "naked power is dangerous and requiring
taming" and an effort to "convert the [European] Union into more than just an
engine for economic growth and integration. ' This human rights orientation
has much significance for employment law, especially employment discrimina-
tion law.
Indeed, in 1969 the European Court of Justice held that European
Communities law incorporated through its "general principles" doctrine those
fundamental rights modeled on constitutions and common law of member
states.9 Five years later, in Nold Kohlen- und Baustoffsgrosshandung v. Com-
mission, ' the Court extended this view to include in the same general principles
international treaties and the European Convention of Human Rights."
The principal organs of the EC are the European Commission (the true
law-making body located in Brussels), 2 the Council of Ministers (Brussels), the
Parliament (Strasbourg), and the European Court of Justice (Luxembourg). The
function of the first three is legislative. It is somewhat of an anomaly to the
American jurist that, although only in the United Kingdom and Ireland among
member nations is the common law system used, applying the doctrine of
precedent (other members are civil law countries), the European Court of Justice
functions under common law principles.
7. Professor Gerard Quinn, Remarks at the National Forum on Europe, National University of
Ireland Galway (Jan. 21, 2004).
8. Id. Arguably, this linkage of market economics and human values has also been used on many
occasions by the U.S. Congress under its powers under the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. cl. 3.
One prime example is the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1990) (citing
the Commerce Clause as one of Congress' sources of power in this legislation).
9. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm - Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
10. Case 4/73, J. Nold v. Comm'n of the European Union, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
11. The author is grateful to Laurence Pech of the Law faculty at NUI Galway for assistance in
locating these sources.
12. The Commission is currently comprised of two members each from these five larger member
states, and one each for other member states.
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III. EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
This post-World War 11 (1950) treaty 13 created a legislative body, the
Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), both
located in Strasbourg, France. The forty original signatory countries later
adopted the 1961 European Social Charter, 14 which expanded the ECHR's
power into the areas of health and safety (including that in the workplace),
education and vocational training, protection of children and adolescents, and
right to social security.
The significance of the EC's official incorporation of the ECHR into
European law by approval of the Amsterdam Treaty in 199715 cannot be over-
emphasized. Additionally, in 2003, Ireland became the last member state in the
EU to have enacted the ECHR into domestic law. Such domestic statutes are
significant in that they empower the courts of each country to hear and
determine charges of breach. This inclusion in domestic law not only negates
the necessity for the charging party to travel to the ECHR court in Strasbourg,
but also subjects employers to an additional possible forum in which it must
respond to alleged breaches of these laws.
IV. THE FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE AND RIGHTS FOR THE DISABLED WORKER
The deadline for compliance with this directive for each country was
December 2, 2003,16 but few, if any, have satisfactorily implemented its provi-
sions. Failure to comply with a directive or regulation is a violation of EC law
for which the Commission might bring the member state before the Court in
Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the Commission has proved to be a patient parent,
so no sanctions have been imposed. Indeed, Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the
directive expressly provided for an extension of up to three years for compliance
with provisions addressing disability and age, and most member states have
taken advantage of this grace period.
The directive addresses the "need to take appropriate action for the social
and economic integration of elderly and disabled people."' 7 Although "person
13. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
14. See KNUT IPSEN & VOLKER EPPING, VOLKERRECHT 698 (C.H. Beck ed., 4d ed. 1999) for a
discussion of the underlying principles of this agreement, which encompasses workers' health and safety,
working conditions, vocational training, protection or children and adolescents, and rights to social security.
15. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1
(1997).
16. Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 18.
17. Id. art. 6. The Framework Directive has been referred to as the "Article 13 Directive," in
reference to the anti-discrimination provision in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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with a disability" is not defined, much of the language in the directive is drawn
from the Americans with Disabilities Act.' 8 The ADA's "reasonable accom-
modation" provision" is mirrored by the directive's call for the "provision of
measures to accommodate the needs of disabled people at the workplace" and
the "obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for people with dis-
abilities., 20 The ADA's "undue hardship" 2 ' defense is reflected by the direc-
tive's assurance that an employer need not assume a "disproportionate burden
' 22
in its accommodation for an applicant or worker's disability. The Framework
Directive takes into account costs, organizational resources and possibility of
public finding to make any necessary accommodation, and the ADA's "undue
hardship" section lists these same factors.23
Typical for EC directives, the language is broad rather than particularized,
leaving the specifics of implementation to the parliaments of each member state.
The method of tracking members' progress in implementation is through a panel
of experts, equal in number of member states, with each country having a
designated expert in the area of disability law. This panel was created by way
of a bidding process, with legal academic institutions' submission of proposals
to chair and form the panel. The law faculty at National University of Ireland
Galway prevailed, and its current dean, Professor Gerard Quinn, is chair of the
panel. After its proposal was selected, Professor Quinn and his assisting faculty
from the Galway law faculty then selected the persons to represent each member
state.24
Currently, there are similar panels on the grounds of gender, sexual
orientation, and religion, but none on age. Traditionally, EU member states
have not adopted statutory protections against age discrimination. One excep-
tion has been Ireland, which has legislation quite different from the United
States' Age Discrimination in Employment Act25 in which protection is afforded
to those aged forty and older, and there is no general maximum age for its
coverage. Ireland's 1998 Employment Discrimination Act is a comprehensive
statute that covers workplace discrimination on nine grounds, including age.
The age protection provisions in the Irish statute begin protection at age
18. Framework Directive, supra note 2, at pmbl. 6.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); Framework Directive, supra note 2, at pmbl. 16.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
22. Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 2.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211 1(10)(A)-(B); Framework Directive, supra note 2, at pmbl. 21.
24. The author is grateful to Shivaun Quinlivan, Lecturer in Law at NUI Galway, for this
explanation. Ms. Quinlivan, who has considerable expertise in the area of disability law, is a member of the
group that drafted the proposal selected by the EU to assemble the monitoring panel and a panel participant.
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
eighteen and end at age sixty-five.26 Thus, current EC plans are to disband
existing panels and replace them with a "super-panel" that will address
compliance on all grounds.
The disability panel's most recent meeting was held on November 14,
2003, in Brussels. Until reports from that conference have not yet been filed,
particulars will not be available to the general public. However, as an invited
guest at this session, the author is permitted to convey general information to
serve as some guidance to the American lawyer with business clients who must
adhere to domestic laws implementing the Framework Directive.
In general, European disability law experts have aspired to approval of a
model of the American statutes addressing legislation for the disabled from a
civil rights perspective, contrary to the typical European welfare approach.27
Generally, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam is credited with requiring that the
issue of improving opportunities for persons with disabilities be addressed from
a human rights, rather than a social law, perspective. The traditional American
approach has been advocated for non-discrimination European mandates in
general.28 Moreover, at the panel's November 2003, meeting, comments clearly
indicated that the experts viewed the ADA as a model statute. This was
primarily because legislation vested protected persons with enforceable rights,
as had the earlier Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly, Title VII, with its pro-
visions relevant to the employment setting.29 Notably, one of the invited
speakers at the November 2003, meeting was Robert Bergdorf, an American
legal academic who had participated in the drafting of the ADA.
A. Pre-Framework Directive Domestic Legislation
The panel of expert's most recently published report was its Baseline Study
of March 2003.3o One tangent of the EU plan that is common to the United
States Congress' approach is the remedial nature of proposed legislation,
stressing rights of the individual's merit, rather than following the prior social-
medical model based on a "handout" or compensation approach.
26. Employment Equality Act, No. 21, 1998, § (6)(3)(a)-(b) (Ir.).
27. See, e.g., Gesetz zur Bekmpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit Schwerbehinderter (SchwbBAG) (Law
Fighting Unemployment of the Handicapped], v. 29 Sept. 2003 (BGB1. I S. 1394) (F.R.G) (imposing a civil
penalty on a company for its failure to meet a statutory quota of workers who are disabled).
28. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, The Principles ofEqual Treatment in Article 119 EC and the Possibilities
for Reform, in THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT IN EC LAW 137-52 (Alan Dashwood & Siofra O'Leary
eds., Sweet & Maxwell 1997).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004).
30. EU NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, BASELINE STUDY,
SYNTHESIS REPORT, DRAFT #4 (March, 2003) fhereinafter BASELINE STUDY].
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Contrary to the United States, three EU countries, Austria,3 Germany,32
and Finland,33 have constitutional provisions that address protections for the
disabled. Additionally, several European constitutions insure general social
rights without specifying disadvantaged groups.34
As of 2003, five of the then fifteen EU countries had enacted civil legisla-
tion for disabled persons in the employment setting: Belgium,3 5 Germany,36
Ireland,37 Sweden, 38 and the United Kingdom.39 The Austrian Federal Legisla-
ture had considered a bill on Equal Treatment of People with Disabilities, but
it was rejected on second reading in July 2000. This bill was reintroduced on
November 1999; it has not passed the committee stage.4" Portugal's 1989 Basic
Law on Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Integration of People with Disabilities
Law4 is not regarded as anti-discrimination legislation because of the absence
of rights conferred on individuals. Rather, violators are subject to civil penal-
ties. The Netherlands' Bill on Equal Treatment on the Ground of Disability and
Chronic Disease42 has been introduced into the Dutch parliament, but has not
been enacted. Belgium's Legislature has taken the approach of deferring to the
major collective bargaining agreement. A collective agreement which evolved
31. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] art. 7(1) (Aus.).
32. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 3 (3) (F.R.G.).
33. SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] ch. 2 § 6(2) (1999) (Fin.).
34. See, e.g., CosTrruzloNE [Constitution] art. 3 (2) (1947) (Italy); CONSTITUI¢AO [Constitution]
art. 71 (1997) (Port.); STATUUT NED. [Constitution] ch. 1 art. 22 (2000) (Neth.). Similarly, article 21,
subsections 2 and 3, of the Greek Constitution insure that the state will "care for" disabled veterans.
SYNTAGMA (S TNTAGMA) [Constitution] art. 21(2), (3) (2001) (Greece).
35. Convention Collective de Travail No. 38 du 6 Decembre 1983 Concernant le Recrutement et
]a Selection de Travailleurs [Collective Agreement No. 38 of December 6, 1983 Concerning the Recruitment
and the Selection of Workers], ch. 3 (BeIg.) [hereinafter Collective Agreement].
36. Schwerbehindertengesetz (SchwbG) [Law Concerning the Handicapped], v. 9 June 2001 (BGBI.
I S. 1046) (F.R.G.), most recently amended by Gesetz zur Bekampfung der Arbeitslosigkeit Schwerbehinderter
(SchwbBAG) [Law Fighting Unemployment of the Handicapped],art. 3, v. 29 Sept. 2003 (BGBI.I S. 1394)
(F.R.G).
37. Employment Equality Act, supra note 26.
38. Lag om F6rbud mot Diskriminering i Arbetslivet p Grund av Personer Med Funktionshinder
[Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life of People with Disabilities Act], art. 132 (SFS 1999) (Swed.);
Lag om Handikappombudsmannen [The Disability Ombudsman Act], art. 749 (SFS 1994) (Swed.).
39. Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, c. 50 (Eng.).
40. Gleichstellungsgesetz [EQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABrLIEs] has been proposed
to amendthe law Behinderteneinstellungsgesetz (BeinstG) [Law Concerning the Employment of Handicapped
Workers], art. 2 § 8A (1969) (Aus.).
41. Lei Fundamental para a Prevenoo e Para a ReabilitagAo e Integrago das Pessoas com uma
Inaptidlo [Basic Law for the Prevention and for the Rehabilitation and Integration of People with a Disability],
Law No. 9/89 of May 2, 1989, (Port.).
42. Wet gelijke behandeling op ground van handicap of chronische ziekte [The Netherlands' Bill
on Equal Treatment on the Ground of Disability and Chronic Disease] (Neth.) (proposed) [herein-
after Disability & Chronic Disease Equal Treatment Bill].
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into statutory status 43 prohibits workplace discrimination, a manner often used
in Europe's smaller countries."
Different from the American approach is the enactment by several EU
states of criminal laws prohibiting discrimination on the ground of disability.
Finland,45 France,46 Luxembourg,47 and Spain48 are examples of this method.
It is submitted that the higher burden of proof, the absence of remedial measures
for the person who has sustained a loss, and the effect only upon intentional
discrimination would limit any utility of this approach.
Italian law does permit an employer to request governmental reimburse-
ment for costs incurred in making "adjustments," or "accommodations," for a
worker's disability.49 In Luxembourg, a judicial decision rather than statutory
law requires that a business make those alterations or accommodations which,
in a physician's opinion, are necessary for an individual to perform the duties
of a position.0 Dutch law imposes on an employer a duty to provide "reason-
able accommodations" unless it would result in a "disproportionate burden,"'"
a clause similar, but not identical, to the ADA's undue hardship" provision. The
Netherlands' "disproportionate burden" appears to weigh the interests of the
disabled worker against the monetary cost to the employer, while the "undue
hardship" concept imposes a significant burden of proof on the employer to
show that its hardship would be an "undue," or inequitable, one without regard
to the degree of the worker's disability.
Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and
Spain are several European countries that have comprehensive anti-discrimina-
tion legislation, but some do not expressly include disability among the
43. Collective Agreement, supra note 35.
44. A comment about Belgium's unique legal structure is instructive: Although smaller than the
American state of South Carolina, Belgium has two official languages, French and Dutch/Flemish, and four
distinct governmental regions, each with a different official language: Brussels (French and Dutch/Flemish),
Flanders (Dutch/Flemish), Wallonia (French), and eastern Belgium (German). B-2 WORLD BOOK
ENCYCLOPEDIA 227 (2003). Since much legislative authority is subordinated to the regional level, it will be
necessary for the federal law-making body in Belgium to enact a comprehensive statute in order to comply
with the Framework Directive. Baseline Study, supra note 30, at 28-31.
45. RIKOSLAKI [PENAL CODE] ch. 11, 9 § Syrjintal (578/1995) (Fin.). This is a criminal provision
for discrimination in general, with the underlying assumption that this includes the ground of disability. See
id.
46. CODE PtNAL [C. PtN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 225-1 (Fr).
47. CODE PtNAL [PENAL CODE] arts. 454, 455, 456, 457(l)-(2), (Lux.).
48. C6DIGO PENAL [C.P.] [PENAL CODE] (Spain).
49. Note that there is no positive obligation on the part of the employer to provide such
accommodation. See Baseline Study, supra note 30, at 53.
50. Loi du 12 novembre 1991 sur les travailleurs handicaps [Law of Nov. 12, 1991 on handicapped
workers], Recueil de Legislation Memorial A, Nov. 18, 1991, N' 76, p. 1444 (Lux.).
51. Disability & Chronic Disease Equal Treatment Bill, supra note 42, art. 2.
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prohibited grounds. This is the current status in Austria, 2 Finland,53 France,
54
Greece,"5 Italy, 6 the Netherlands, 7 and Spain. 8 Denmark has a Disability
Ombudsman, 9 but no statutory provision prohibiting discrimination on the
ground of disability.
B. Panel of Expert's Areas of Focus
The panel is focusing on three areas and how they intersect: 1) the
"reasonable accommodation" requirement, the express working of the ADA; 2)
pre-employment physical examinations, also addressed in the ADA;60 and, 3)
health and safety.6' The inclusion of this third area into anti-workplace
discrimination law is typical in Europe, contrary to the United States' separation
of such accident and/or disease preventive legislation into statutes such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.62
The Irish experience with the "reasonable accommodation" expectation is
of interest. The bill that preceded the current anti-discrimination law (the 1998
Employment Equality Act) was a 1996 bill. In parliamentary forms of govern-
ment, the prime minister is a member of the legislature. In order to become law,
after passage by the law-making body, a bill must be signed by the president,
in the case of Ireland or monarch, in the case of Denmark, Luxembourg,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Then President Mary Robinson, a former
barrister, had misgivings about the constitutionality of this provision of the bill
as possibly infringing upon employers' property rights in Articles 40.3.2 and 43.
In her referral action to the Supreme Court of Ireland, the Court agreed.63
Consequently, the bill ultimately adopted into law in 1998 requires the employer
52. See, e.g., BIJNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution) art. 7(1) (Aus.); see also
GLEICHSTELLUNGSGESETZ, supra note 40, and accompanying text (explaining Austria's general working rights
statute).
53. EsiintyA Model after sama Kesken NaisvAki ja Ihmiset [Act on Equality Between Women and
Men] (8.8.1986/609) (Fin.).
54. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. 122-45 (Fr.).
55. ASTIKOS KODIX (ASTIKOS KODIX) [CIVIL CODE] §§ 281/188 & 666 (Greece).
56. See COSTITUZIONE [Constitution] art. 3, § 2 (1947).
57. Algemeine Wet Geliijke Behandeling [General Equal Treatment Act] (1.9.94) (Neth.).
58. Estatuto de los Trabajadores [Spanish Statute on Workers' Rights, Royal Legislative Decree]
(B.O.E., 1995).
59. Deense Arbeidsongeschiktheid Politiek Geijke Behandelingen Door de Dialoog [Danish
Disability Policy Equal Opportunities through Dialogue] (April 2002) (Den.).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d)(3)(A)-(B).
61. Email from Olivier de Schutter, panel expert, Belgium, to panel participants (November 13,
2003) (on file with author).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
63. In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of the Employment Equality
Bill 1996, [1997] 2 I.R. 321 (Ir. S.C.).
to bear only a "nominal cost." 64 Note the distinction in this regard between
current Irish law and the ADA. Although the United States Supreme Court has
determined that the Title VII65 requirement for an employer to make "reasonable
accommodation" for a worker's religious practices and/or belief reaches on the
least extent necessary, i.e., de minimus, 66 the United States Congress expressly
rejected this lower standard when it enacted the ADA.67 This peculiarity in Irish
statutory law must change in order to comply with the Framework Directive, so
the necessary accommodation for a worker's or job applicant's disability will
approximate that required under the ADA.
Olivier De Schutter, the Belgian panel expert, is the overseer of researching
domestic laws that might address mandatory pre-employment medical examina-
tions. He has classified the purpose of such examinations as two-fold: first,
protective of the worker himself and of his colleagues similar to the ADA's
"direct-threat" defense; 68 and, second, "selective" rationale of using the exa-
mination results to void economic costs on the employer because of a job
applicant's impairment or condition. The ADA permits pre-employment
medical examinations provided they are carried out after a job offer has been
made, they are consistently required of all workers in the same job category, and
they relate to actual duties required by one in this position.69
The sense of the experts is that any permissible pre-employment medical
examinations must be limited to the first purpose and that any "selective" testing
is to be prohibited. This inquiry into the purpose is a distinction from the ADA,
provided only that the outward characteristics required by the statute are met.
V. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, HARASSMENT, AND DISPARATE
TREATMENT/IMPACT ENVIRONMENT
Many European Union countries have been particularly harsh on work-
place harassment. Although to date, with the exception of Sweden,7 ° legislative
64. Employment Equality Act, No. 21 § 16 (Ir.).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(1)-(4) (2004).
66. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
67. See Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act How Much Must One Do Before Hardship becomes Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1311, 1327 (1991).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(4), 12113(b) (2004). Interestingly, in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,
536 U.S. 73 (2002), the Supreme Court approved a regulation that extended such protection to the worker
himself, a more paternalistic stance than that reflected in the statutory language.
69. §§ 12112(d)(3)(A)-(B).
70. See, e.g., Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept.
3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force September 3, 1981) (The Convention provided sweeping
protection for women, and was signed by more than 100 countries, including most EU member states).
Interestingly, the United States is not a signatory to this U.N. treaty. Id. An example of a European domestic
statute protecting women from workplace discrimination and harassment is the Employment Equality Act,
No. 21 § 15 (Ir.). Similarly, section 32 of the Employment Equality Act prohibits racial harassment. Id.
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proscriptions against such activity have been on grounds of race and sex.71
Mention should be made of an employment setting tort being increasingly
recognized by courts in Europe--"mobbing." This concept makes unlawful
workplace harassment for any reason, whether or not related to the worker's
membership in any express group. 2 The Framework Directive expressly
forbids harassment, defined as "unwanted conduct.., with the purpose or effect
of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile,
degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment.""
Several of the federal appellate courts in the United States have extended
the principle that harassment is unlawful under the ADA. For example, the
Fourth Circuit held that hostile work environment harassment claims are
actionable under the ADA in Fox v. General Motors.74 The Fifth Circuit, in
Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services," and the Eighth Circuit, in
Shaver v. Independent Stave Co.76 have also held such claims are actionable.
American anti-discrimination legislation does not expressly refer to
disparate impact discrimination as unlawful-i.e., an employer's actions which,
although not intended to be discriminatory, nonetheless have that effect. The
United States Supreme Court first held disparate impact discrimination to be
unlawful under Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power" and by dictum has extended
this doctrine to ADA claims. 78 European terminology for disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims are, "direct" and "indirect" discrimination respec-
tively. The Framework Directive expressly states that both are unlawful.79 Pre-
sumably, the principles of "hostile environment" and "direct versus indirect"
discrimination are examples of the EU's following the lead of American federal
law that predated the European versions.
71. Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life of People with Disabilities Act, art. 132 (Swed.)
(Section 9 expressly prohibits harassment on the ground of disability).
72. See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Not Just in Sicily: "Mobbing" the European Workplace Tort, 36
BUS. L. REV. 173-95 (2003).
73. See Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 2 1 3. Cf. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
74. Fox v. General Motors Co., 247 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 2001).
75. Flowers v. Southern Regional Physicians, Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001).
76. Shaver v. Independent Shaver Co., 350 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2003).
77. Griggs et al. v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
78. See Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (holding that the lower court wrongfully
applied disparate impact analysis to a claim, which properly should have been decided under the disparate
treatment principle.) The Court inferred that both disparate treatment and disparate impact were appropriate
in ADA claims. Id.
79. Framework Directive, supra note 2, art. 2 ga 1, 3.
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VI. ASPECTS OF THE ADA THE PANEL OF EXPERTS
APPEARS DESIROUS OF AVOIDING
While looking to the ADA as the ideal statute, those concerned with com-
pliance with the Framework Directive want to avoid any legislative language
that might be an invitation to European courts to construe the laws similar to
some United States Supreme Court decisions which would restricting the
directive's rights-conferring purpose.
One example is the Sutton triad of decisions in 1999.8o The United States
Supreme Court held that one is not a "person with a disability" under the statute
if his impairment is correctable. 8' For example, the plaintiffs in Sutton were twin
sisters whose applications for positions as pilots with defendant airline were
rejected because of their eyesight. Although they both had 20/200 vision,
prescribed eyeglasses corrected both to 20/20. This resulted in the quixotic
situation in which they proved discrimination because of an alleged disability,
but they actually were not disabled. The Court did not accept the plaintiffs'
argument that they were "perceived" as persons with a disability, which would
have qualified them under the third prong of the statute.82 Interesting, while the
Framework Directive does not expressly require protection of persons because
they have a history of a disability or are regarded by others as being disabled,
or because of their association with a person with a disability,83 experts have
determined that such protection lies within its spirit.84
Another example of a result to be avoided is that in US. Airways v.
Barnett,85 in which the United States Supreme Court decided that an accom-
modation which encroached upon another worker's seniority rights would be
unreasonable. In Europe, seniority generally is viewed as vesting one with
retirement security from the state, although some countries, such as Germany,
give longer-serving workers priority in the event layoffs are necessary. 6
80. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527
U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
81. Sutton and Murphy were decided by like votes of 7-2 because of two distinguishing facts, which
Justices Breyer and Stevens viewed as material. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Murphy, 527
U.S. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Albertson was decided unanimously because of distinguishing facts.
Albertson's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 577.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
83. The ADA extends protection to persons who have been subjected to discrimination because of
their association with a person with a disability. § 12112(b)(4).
84. See the rationale in Baseline Study, supra note 30, at 46.
85. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
86. German law, for example, requires that workers' seniority (in addition to age and number of
dependents) be taken into account when layoffs become necessary. For a good discussion of this principle,
see Manfred Weiss, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Labor Disputes in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 339, 352 (1988).
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A final United States Supreme Court opinion repugnant to the intent of the
directive is Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams.87 Here, the Court
limited protection to those whose impairments limit their performance of tasks
of a central importance to the daily lives of most people. The plaintiff, who
suffered from carpel tunnel syndrome, was not a person with a disability under
this principle because her condition did not preclude her from performing a
wide range of activities.
This author has observed from several legal work assignments in Germany,
Austria, Northern Ireland, and Ireland that the general European concept of what
constitutes a disability is considerably broader than the American one, whether
in anti-discrimination or social security laws.88 The legal protection for disabled
workers and/or job applicants will affect the pre-EU enlargement estimation of
some thirty-seven million persons with disabilities, 89 a figure that is presumably
considerably greater after the addition of the ten new member states.
Finally, the American company doing business in Europe should be aware
of the usual absence of a legislative requirement that coverage requires a
minimum number of employees, such as the fifteen specified in Title VII and
the ADA. Generally, in Europe an employer is required to comply with
employment legislation regardless of the size of its work force.90
VII. CONCLUSION
The integration of social policies into the European Communities
originally founded on economic principles and the EC's express adoption of the
European Convention on Human Rights place additional burdens on companies
with regard to the employer-employee relationship. The European Com-
mission's emphasis on rights for the disabled has essentially viewed the ADA
as its basic model, but the greater focus on human rights relative to American
law and the social state reality of all EU member states predictably will impose
more particularized duties on the employer in Europe.
The paternalism of the Council of Europe has become an adopted sibling
to European Union law in general and more specifically, to legal obligations to
87. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
88. See, e.g., Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Who Hold the Employment Contract 'Trump Card'?
Comparing Labor Laws in Germany and the United States for the International Investor, 4 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 33 (1993), for discussion on the substantial social protections for workers in Germany, as an
example of similar legislation throughout the EU.
89. 1 EUROPEAN YEAR OF PERSONS WITH DISABLITIms (EYPD) NEWSLETTER (Summer, 2003).
90. Examples are Germany's Mutterschutzgesetz (MuSchG) [Law for the protection of working
mothers] (1968) (F.R.G.). Both Ireland's Employment Equality Act and the United Kingdom's Disability
Discrimination Act prohibit discrimination in the workplace on specified grounds, with no reference to any
minimum number of workers required for coverage. Employment Equality Act, No. 21, 1998 (Ir.); Disability
Discrimination Act, 1995, (Eng.).
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persons with disabilities. The words may be similar, indeed, often identical, to
American federal law, but the meanings to be inferred by the European
Commission and the courts is likely to have considerable more breadth.
The American company expanding into Europe must be cognizant of this
substantial human rights element in its dealings with employees. A seismic shift
can be expected in post-Framework Directive domestic law implementation
regarding the extent of protection required for the disabled in the workplace.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada are nations comprised predominately of
immigrants and their recent descendants. Many fled persecution in their
homelands and arrived in the United States and Canada with the hope of seeking
refuge. Unfortunately, in times of crisis, people in both countries have been
quick to forget that they or their recent ancestors were immigrants that were
fortunate enough to get inside one of the two countries' borders. Both nations
have repeatedly forbidden people attempting to seek protection within to enter.
For example, during World War Two, Canada and the United States largely
refused to admit Jewish refugees seeking protection within their borders.
Specifically, in Canada, the slogan regarding its Jewish refugee policy during
the period was, "None is Too Many." This was the answer given by a Canadian
official when asked how many Jewish refugees Canada would take.' Similarly,
when the S.S. St. Louis carrying Jewish emigrants fleeing Germany was not
allowed to land in Cuba, the U.S. government also refused to allow the vessel
to dock in the United States. 2 The S.S. St. Louis was forced to return to Europe.
There, Holland, France, Great Britain and Belgium accepted many of the
German-Jewish emigrants as refugees; unfortunately, many of the refugees' safe
havens soon became occupied by the Nazi regime.'
On August 30,2002, the United States and Canada completed and initialed
a final draft of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, a bilateral
agreement generally requiring asylum seekers to lodge their claims in their
"state of first arrival," and not allowing them to apply subsequently or
simultaneously in the second of the two states.' The two countries signed the
Agreement on December 5, 2002.5 The Agreement was drafted to promote
national security in the two countries, to defend the integrity of their asylum
systems, and to improve their ability to control immigration6
1. The Canadian Council for Refugees, 10 Reasons Why the US-Canada Refugee Deal is a Bad
Idea, July 2002, www.wb.net/-ccr/l0reasons.PDF [hereinafter 10 Reasons Why].
2. See GORDON THOMAS AND MAX MORGAN-W1TTS, VOYAGE OF THE DAMNED (1974); see also
Jennifer Rosenberg, The Tragedy of the S.S. St. Louis, The Jewish Virtual Libr. (1998), at
http://historyl 900s.about.com/holocaust/aa 1 1097.htm, reprinted in
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/stlouis/html.
3. See Rosenberg, supra note 2.
4. See Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, U.S. and Canada Complete Final Draft ofAsylum
Agreement, IMMIGR. Bus. NEWS & COMMENT, Nov. 1, 2002, available at
http://west.thomson.com/store/default.asp.
5. Laila Malik & Shree Mulay, No Room at the Inn: Our New Safe Third Country Agreement Will
Only Drive Desperate Asylum-Seekers to Take More Risks, Say Academics, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 24, 2002,
at A17.
6. The U.S.-Can. Safe Third Country Agreement: Hearing on H.R. 5005 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 107th Congress (2002)
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Unfortunately, as with the policies of the United States and Canada
towards Jewish refugees during the Second World War, if legislation imple-
menting the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement is approved by the
Parliament of Canada and the U.S. Congress, refugees will be put at an
increased risk.7 Refugees deserving of a grant of asylum under the laws of one
of the two countries but who first apply in the second country will be forced to
return to the persecuting country.8 This will happen most often if a refugee first
arrived in the United States, was required to apply for asylum in the United
States only, and then was forced to return to the persecuting country. This is so
because Canada's asylum laws are more asylee-friendly than those of the United
States.
This essay argues that the passage of implementation legislation fully
enacting the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement would result in the
violation of international legal obligations by the United States and Canada, the
violation of the two countries' moral obligations to refugees, and the ironic
effect of potentially harming national security in the United States and Canada.
Part II will provide an overview of the Agreement, including background on the
Agreement, its objectives, and its application. Part III suggests that the United
States and Canadian governments have international legal requirements, moral
obligations towards protecting people deservingly seeking asylum in their
countries, and obligations to their own people to protect national security that
will not be undermined by the implementation of the Agreement. This note will
conclude by arguing that ideally legislation implementing the Safe Third
Country Agreement should not be implemented at all, or in the more feasible
alternative, implementation legislation should include greater protections for
refugees' safety, and should also include a well-defined plan for bureaucrati-
cally administering the transition, in order to comply with international legal
and moral obligations, and to adequately meet the Agreement's own objective
of promoting national security.
(statement of Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center for Immigration Studies) [hereinafter Krikorian
Testimony].
7. Press Release, Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, "Safe Third Country"
Agreement puts Refugees at Risk, http://www.ocasi.org/sys/anno-articlejprint.asp?AnnolD=36 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2004).
8. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Issues to Be Considered in
the Context of Discussions Regarding a Responsibility-Sharing Agreement Between Canada and the United
States (Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.web.net/-.ccr/safethirdunhcr.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter
UNHCR Comments].
2004]
124 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:121
II. THE U.S.-CANADA SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT: A BILATERAL
MEANS OF SOLVING COMMON PROBLEMS?
On August 30, 2002, the final draft of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement, was initialed by the United States and Canada. The Agreement was
solidified on December 5, 2002, when both countries formally signed the final
draft. The main objectives of the Agreement are the improvement of national
security, the improvement of immigration control, and the preservation of the
integrity of the asylum systems of the United States and Canada.9 The
Agreement seeks to do this by establishing a "safe third country" relationship
between the United States and Canada for the adjudication of asylum claims.
A safe third country relationship provides that a refugee may only have a claim
for asylum adjudicated in the first country in which the person arrives, and
cannot have the claim adjudicated in the country of last presence. In other
words, if an asylum applicant were to pass through the United States and then
claim asylum in Canada, the responsibility for determining the refugee status
claim would lie with the United States and not Canada.
A. Background on the Agreement
The notion of a safe third country agreement is not new. A series of
western European nations signed the Schengen Convention, the first safe third
country agreement in 1985, and implemented it in 1990. Since then, the number
of nations party to safe third country agreements has increased. The possibility
of a safe third country agreement between the United States and Canada had
been discussed as early as 1995." ° The United States responded to such
discussions by implementing section 604(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, which, in general,
legalized the use of safe third country agreements in American law.1 At that
time, Canada was reluctant to legalize the use of safe third country agreements,
due to concerns that American and Canadian asylum law are incongruent,
brought to light in part by "vigorous objections" of scholars and bad publicity
from international human rights groups.' 2 In 1998, these talks ceased. In June
9. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
10. STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1030,1031 (3d ed. 2002).
On Feb. 24, 1995, the two countries announced a Memorandum of Agreement entitled "Canada-U.S. Accord
on Our Shared Border."; Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping For Ideas: A Critical Review of United
States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25
(1998).
11. See Bill Frelick, Who 's On First? The Canada-U.S. Memorandum ofAgreement on Asylum, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 217 (Feb. 26, 1996).
12. See Immigration Bills Pass House and Senate-Refugee Cap Dropped; Summary Exclusion in,
Then Out; Limits on Legal Family Immigration Dropped; Asylum Provisions Relaxed, Vol. XVII, No. 3
2002, however, as part of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Canada
implemented a statutory provision allowing for safe third country agreements. 3
The talks between the United States and Canada which resulted in the
signing of the Agreement on December 2, 2002 resumed largely in response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks mobilized a
movement within both countries for bilateral cooperation in improving immi-
gration control, in improving national security, and in preserving the integrity
of the asylum systems of the United States and Canada. 4 The Agreement was
signed as a result of the belief that such a document would direct politician's
efforts to satisfy the objectives of the recent bilateral cooperation between the
United States and Canada.
B. Purposes of the Agreement
1. For the Preservation of the Integrity of the Asylum Systems
of the U. S. and Canada
Proponents of the Agreement argue that its implementation is necessary for
preservation of the integrity of the asylum systems of the United States and
Canada. This argument is based on the idea that people who apply for asylum
in both countries are "usually illegal aliens [that] have broken the immigration
law and have no other reason [besides their eligibility for asylum] to be
admitted into the country."' 5 In other words, given the fact that many asylum-
seekers would not be allowed to remain in the United States but for a grant of
asylum, it is argued that grants of asylum to such people "represents a nation's
sacrifice of part of its sovereignty over immigration for humanitarian reasons." 6
It is further argued that, "if people who could have applied for protection
elsewhere are allowed to enter into the asylum system, the curbs on the nation's
sovereignty implicit in asylum can no longer be justified."' 7 Based on these
beliefs about the rationale behind the asylum systems in the United States and
Canada and limitations on these systems, it is believed that implementation of
the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement would allow the preservation
REFUGEE REP. (Mar./Apr. 1996); U.S., Canada Temporarily Suspend Asylum Agreement Negotiations, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 724 - 25 (May 24, 1996); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED
STATES 454 (3d ed. 1999).
13. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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of the integrity of the asylum systems of the two countries by reducing the abuse
of their respective asylum systems. 8
2. For National Security
Proponents of the Agreement argue that its implementation is necessary for
national security, in part because it will improve management of the vast U.S.-
Canada border.' 9 It is argued that, "[a] better-managed asylum system resulting
from the incorporation of the safe third country principle would also yield
security improvements., 20 As an example, it has been noted that, "[s]ix of the
48 foreign-born al Queda operatives who committed crimes in the United States
over the past decades were applicants for asylum at some point, three of them
at the time they took part in terrorism." 21
3. For Immigration Control
In addition to the goals of preserving the integrity of the asylum system
and improving national security, proponents of the Agreement further argue that
the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement would increase the control of
the American and Canadian governments over immigration. It is believed that,
"[o]nce the option of transiting the U.S. in order to apply for asylum in Canada
is eliminated, some significant number of those whose objective was Canada
will choose not to come to the U.S. in the first place, opting instead to apply for
asylum in an EU country., 22 Speculation exists that there is a good chance that
in the short run there will be an increase in the number of asylum claims made
in the United States but that the Agreement will still help to control immigration
in the long run as the Agreement can be "seen as a first step in reaching similar
deals with other safe countries transited by asylum seekers, notably the member
states of the European Union."23
18. Government Responds to the Safe Third Country Regulations Report of the Standing Committee
on Citizenship and Immigration, (Citizenship and Immigration Canada), May 1, 2003,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/03/0313-pre.html. (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Safe Third Party
Country Regulation Report].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
C. Application of the Agreement
1. The Provisions of the Agreement
The Agreement states that, "[t]he Party of the country of last presence shall
examine, in accordance with its refugee status determination system, the refugee
status claim of any person who arrives at a land border port of entry on or after
the effective date of this Agreement and makes a refugee status claim."24 There
are, however, exceptions to this rule. In five enumerated instances, the respon-
sibility for determining the "refugee status claim... shall rest with the Party of
the receiving country, and not the Party of the country of last presence."2 5
These instances are:
1) When the claimant "[has in the territory of the receiving Party at
least one family member who has had a refugee status claim granted
or has been granted lawful status, other than as a visitor, in the
receiving Party's territory";26
2) "Has in the territory of the receiving Party at least one family
member who is at least 18 years of age and is not ineligible to pursue
a refugee status claim in the receiving Party's refugee status
determination system and has such a claim pending";27
3) "Is an unaccompanied minor";28
4) "Arrived in the territory of the receiving Party: [w]ith a validly
issued visa or other valid admission document, other than for transit,
issued by the receiving Party";
29
6) Or "[airrived in the territory of the receiving Party [and was not]
required to obtain a visa by only the receiving Party."3
2. Scenarios In Which the Agreement Applies
From this, it is clear that the Agreement will "generally require asylum-
seekers to make their refugee claims in the first of the two countries entered,
24. The Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America for Cooperation in the
Examination of Refugee Asylum Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, Dec. 5, 2002, U.S.-Can., # U.S.T.
# [hereinafter U.S.-Can. Agreement].
25. Id. art. 4, § 2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. U.S.-Can. Agreement, supra note 24, art. 4 § 2.
30. Id.
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regardless of their desired destination."'" It is also clear that there are six
enumerated exceptions to this general rule. But, in what scenarios will the
Agreement, if implemented, actually have an effect?
First, the Agreement will result in people attempting to make claims at
American or Canadian land borders that do not fall into one of the five
enumerated instances of exception being refused entry.32 Second, the Agree-
ment only relates to people making claims at land borders, meaning the physical
geographical border of a country. Therefore, asylum-seekers that "manage to
cross the border (likely in an irregular manner) and make a claim inland will not
be affected."33 Asylum-seekers lodging claims inland are exempt from the
Agreement, as it only applies to land borders, and therefore can theoretically
apply in both countries.
Third, the Agreement will impact the large number of people who fly into
one country and then apply for asylum at the second country's land border,
having never attempted to apply for asylum in the first country. This is parti-
cularly common when asylum-seekers come from countries that do not offer
direct flights to Canada. These asylum-seekers fly to the United States, and then
travel to Canada by land and apply for asylum.34 Such people will now be
forced to apply for asylum only in their "country of first presence," which is
typically the United States.35 Lastly, the Agreement will not impact people
applying at airport ports of entry. Therefore, if traveling on a connecting flight
from one of the two countries to the other, the traveler will be able to apply for
asylum in the second country.36
II. CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTATION:
CAUSING MORE HARM THAN GOOD?
While the goals of the United States and Canada may include improving
national security and immigration control, and preserving the integrity of the
31. Press Release, Amnesty International, USA/Canada: Amnesty International Warns that New
Draft Asylum-Seeker Agreement Will Be Bad for Refugees, Bad for United States,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa08l62002.html. (last visited Aug. 16, 2002).
32. 'Safe Third Country'Agreement to be Signed This Week, CBC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2002, at
http://www.cbc.ca/stories/print/2002/12/03/refugee021202 (last visited Oct. 5, 2004); see also U.S.-Can.
Agreement supra note 24, art. 4.
33. See UNHCR Comments, supra note 8. See generally U.S.-Can. Agreement, at art. 4.
34. Art Babych, Federal 'Safe Third Country'Agreement Worries Bishops, CANADIAN CATHOLIC
NEWS,Mar. 17,2003, availableathttp://www.wcr.ab.ca/news2003/0317/federal 031703.shtml. (last updated
Mar. 12, 2003).
35. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6. See generally U.S.-Can. Agreement, at 4.
36. Posting of American Immigration Lawyers Association to AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 02122641
(Dec. 26, 2002) (copy on file with author).
asylum systems of the two countries, the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement has serious flaws. These flaws are so great that implementation of
the Agreement as it stands would result in violations of international law and
moral obligations, and would endanger the national security of both the United
States and Canada.
A. Violating Requirements of International Law
1. Asylum in International Law
In 1950, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Statute of the
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, which created the Office of
the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).3 7 The statute states
that the UNHCR has two primary functions; "the functions of UNHCR
encompass 'providing international protection' and 'seeking permanent solu-
tions' to the problems of refugees by way of voluntary repatriation or assimila-
tion in new national communities."38 In 1951, the United Nations adopted the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.3 9 The Convention deals with
protection of the rights of refugees within member countries, the Convention
does not, however, require any nation to admit overseas refugees.4"
The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United
Nations in 1967, mainly to remove a stipulation found in the 1951 Convention,
which "limited the definition of 'refugee' to those who had fled as a result of
events occurring before January 1, 1951 ."4' The United States acceded to the
1967 Protocol, and as a part of that decision, accepted the 1951 Convention.42
The Protocol mandates: "no Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler")
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of [one of the five enumerated
grounds], race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion."43 In other words, it requires that member countries do not
37. G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., at 120 (1950).
38. LEGOMSKY, supra note 10, at 858 (citing GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-31 (1983)).
39. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention]. Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545 [hereinafter Final Act].
40. LEGOMSKY, supra note 10, at 874.
41. ld. at 861.
42. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223. See I.N.S. Serv. v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984).
43. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 42, art. 33.
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expel or return a refugee to a place in which he or she will be persecuted. While
refoulment of a refugee claimant to a nation where his life or freedom will be
threatened based on one of the 1967 Protocol's five enumerated grounds
violates the Protocol, it remains unclear whether a country may remove an
applicant to a third country.
2. Can Safe Third Country Agreements Comply With International Law?
The Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol do not explicitly prohibit the
use of safe third country agreements. The only requirement under Article 33 of
the Refugee Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is
that a country not refouler, or return, a refugee to another country in which he
or she would be persecuted under one of the five grounds enumerated in the
1967 Protocol. Indeed, none of the numerous cases of the European Court of
Human Rights that discuss the use of safe third country agreements in Europe
or international obligations related to asylum, directly question the legality of
safe third country agreements. 4 This allows room for expelling an asylum-
seeker to any country other than one in which he would be persecuted on
account of one of the five enumerated grounds. Under such an argument, a
person could be expelled to any country in which the person would be "safe."
The problem with such an argument is determining when an asylum-seeker
would be safe. Can a country party to the 1967 Protocol assume that because
another country is also party to the 1967 Protocol, and has signed a safe third
country with the first country, that the second country is safe? Does this mean
that a country sharing a safe third country agreement with another country is
presumed to be a safe country for any asylum-seeker from any group, regardless
of differences in interpretation of the obligations arising from the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol between countries? Does this mean that no form
of adjudication in the country in which the asylum-seeker requests asylum is
required, so long as the asylum-seeker is returned to another country party to a
safe third country agreement?
The danger that arises from the use of safe third country agreements is that
by removing a refugee to a state party to a safe third country agreement, the
refugee may be ejected after returning to the safe country. This type of action
44. Chahal v. United Kingdom comes closest to questioning the legality of safe third country
agreements, by stating that "states are.. .bound... not to send a person to a country where he faces persecution
or to one from which he risks being sent to such a country." 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413,489 (1997). Still, Chahal,
does not address the question of whether safe third country agreements are international legal violations per
se. Id. On the contrary, the Chahal decision, goes on to explain that as a result of international legal
obligations, "European nations ... adopt the practice of returning asylum seekers either to a country through
which they have transited in order to travel to the country where they are seeking asylum or else to a 'safe
third country."' Id.
is clearly prohibited by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. A country is not
necessarily in compliance with the non-refoulement requirement of Article 33
merely because it abstains from returning an asylum-seeker to the country from
which he fled, and then allows that country to make the final decision regarding
the refugee's return to the country of alleged persecution. This process is also
known as indirect return.
The UNHCR has the "duty of supervising the application of' the Refugee
Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 45 The UNHCR
has criticized the use of safe third country agreements by Refugee Convention
and Protocol member states that violate the non-refoulement obligation of the
Convention. In its 1999 General Conclusion, the UNHCR Executive Com-
mittee stated that, "policies such as those initiated by the EU, based on notions
of 'safe country of origin' and 'safe third country' lack, in practice, the
necessary safeguards to ensure that individuals are not refouled."
In other words, indirect refoulement is prohibited by Article 33. As
defined previously, indirect refoulement occurs when a state returns a refugee
to a third state, which is not the state of origin, where the refugee would be at
risk of further persecution, or even at risk of being sent from that state to the
country of origin.47
Non-refoulement is "the cornerstone of asylum and international refugee
law."48 To ignore refoulement and the effects it may have on refugees is to defy
the core objectives of the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Nonrefoulement
"reflects: '[t]he concern and commitment of those in need of protection the
enjoyment of fundamental human rights including the rights to life, to freedom
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to
liberty and security of the person.'"49
The chance of non-refoulement becomes more likely where there is a safe
third country agreement. Under a safe third country agreement, an applicant can
be removed to a member state, typically "the country of last presence." Then,
the procedures of that country are followed in making a determination regarding
eligibility for asylum. Safe third country practices rely on the presumption that
the country to which the asylum-seeker is being returned is safe. The practices
45. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 42, art. 2 § 1; Refugee Convention, supra
note 39, art. 35 §1.
46. See Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature ofNon-Refoulement, 13 INTL. J. OF REFUGEE L., 533
n. 4 (2001); See also General Conclusion on International Protection, UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 87 (1999).
47. Id. at 478. In addition to being a treaty obligation, non-refoulement is also recognized as a norm
of customary international law andjus cogens. See id. at 480; see also Allain, supra note 46, at 548-59.
48. Gerald P. Hecknan, Unfinished Business: Baker and the Constitutionality of the Leave and
Certification Requirements Under the Immigration Act, 27 QUEEN'S L.J. 683, 715 (2002).
49. Id. at 683 (citing G.A. Res. #, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC 96/815 (1993)).
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also assume that the asylum-seeker has the ability to apply for asylum in the
third country. Unfortunately, returning an asylum-seeker to another state
participating in a safe third country agreement can result in indirect refoulment
when the receiving member returns an asylum-seeker to the country from which
he had fled persecution.
3. The Agreement as Written Violates International Law
Although the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement was signed after
the United States and Canada became party to the Protocol, the Agreement does
not lessen the American and Canadian obligations under the Convention and
Protocol. This is because the Agreement states that it reaffirms the two
countries' obligations under the Convention and Protocol to provide protection
for refugees.50 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that,
"when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty
prevail."'" Given the fact that the United States and Canada are still subject to
international legal obligations, the UNHCR has raised concerns about the
general difficulties of successfully abiding by international legal obligations
while also participating in a safe third country agreement, due to the potential
for refoulement. Moreover, the agreement at issue is particularly problematic
because the United States and Canada interpret their obligations under the
Refugee Convention and Protocol differently. As written, the Agreement pro-
vides no explicit exception to its application for situations in which an asylum-
seeker would be ineligible for asylum in one country but would be protected
from refoulement in the other country.52
UNHCR addresses concerns about the fact that under the U.S.-Canada Safe
Third Country Agreement an asylum-seeker may be ineligible in one of the two
countries but eligible in the other, apply in the country of ineligibility and
therefore be sent back to the country of alleged persecution.53 "As a result [such
asylum-seekers] may be subject to refoulement."54
UNHCR notes that one circumstance in which this issue may arise is in
relation to statutory bars on eligibility for asylum. The UNHCR has expressed
concern that such bars are contrary to international law. "Those at issue include
the U.S. bar for failure to meet a filing deadline and criminal and affiliation bars
50. U.S.-Can. Agreement § 1.
51. Id. art. 31, § 2.
52. Article 6 of the agreement allows some wiggle room, through its allowance of the use of
discretion. Id. art. 6.
53. UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
54. Id.
in both countries that are broad and automatic in nature."'55 UNHCR explains
that, "refugee claimants subject to a US statutory bar that has no equivalent
under Canadian law, and vice versa, may be required under the Agreement to
make a claim in ajurisdiction where they would be ineligible for refugee protec-
tion."56 As a result of these statutory bars, cases will arise under the Agreement
"where one country would bar an individual access to the asylum procedure or
protection from refoulement and the other country would not.,
57
UNHCR specifically criticizes elements of U.S. law that could result in
refoulement of asylum-seekers who may not be subject to refoulement in
Canada. UNHCR has raised concerns that such elements of U.S. law may be
contrary to international law. If the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agree-
ment is implemented, Canada's adherence to its international legal obligations
will effectively be gutted by default, due to cases in which the United States is
the "country of last presence" and decides cases in its jurisdiction under U.S.
laws that are contrary to international legal obligations. For example, UNHCR
explains that U.S. law may violate international law through its use of expedited
removal procedures. Under current U.S. law, 'arriving aliens' with improper
travel documents are placed in expedited removal proceedings. UNHCR has
expressed concerns about how this expedited removal process functions, given
the Office's view of the need for greater procedural guarantees to ensure that
bona fide refugees are not inadvertently removed to a country of feared
persecution (refoulement).58
B. Ignoring Moral Obligations
In addition to violating international law, the Agreement is contrary to the
moral obligations of Canada and the United States. In response to the mass
genocide of Jewish people who were denied refuge during World War Two,
"there has been a broad effort.. .to comply with the United Nations Convention
within their own domestic refugee law" by states party to the Refugee Conven-
tion and Protocol.59 Specifically, in the United States since 1947, "the basic
policy has remained the same with U.S. immigration law -- to provide a safe
haven for homeless refugees."60 This is particularly significant as the policy
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
59. Kristin E. Kandt, Note, United States Asylum Law; Recognizing Persecution Based on Gender
Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137, 140 (1995).
60. Id. (citing Stevic, 467 U.S. at 415).
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was implemented prior to the United Staes becoming party to any international
agreements regarding refugees. Rather, it arose out of moral obligation.
In Canada, in 1971, a "policy of multi-cultureness"' was implemented.
Additionally, through The Immigration Act of 1976, a priority system for
processing immigrant visas was implemented. The Immigration Act of 1976,
"explicitly affirmed the fundamental objectives of Canadian immigration laws,
including family reunification, non-discrimination, concern for refugees and the
promotion of Canada's demographic, economic and cultural goals. 62 Under the
priority system, along with applicants holding family-based visas, "Convention
Refugees and the displaced and persecuted (humanitarian category)" are in the
63first priority group.
C. Harming National Security
Although one of the primary goals of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement is to improve national security, it may, in fact, harm national
security. Relatedly, the Agreement could result in increased disorder at the
border and increased bureaucratic hassle.' Implementation by the United States
and Canada would result in a transition period, creating the potential for the
additional problem of having disorder during the transition. This could have the
ironic effect of harming national security in both nations. Amnesty Inter-
national has addressed this potential problem by stating that a likely ironic result
of implementation of the Agreement would be the undermining of, "orderly and
secure procedures at the border. When that door is closed, desperate refugees
will try to get across irregularly, putting themselves in the hands of traffickers
and becoming victimized yet again."65
61. Ronald G. Atkey, Canadian Immigration Law and Policy: A Study in Politics, Demographics
and Economics, 16 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 59, 60 (1990).
62. Id. (citing Immigration Act 1976, R.S.C., Ch. 1-2, § 3 (1985) (Can.)).
63. Id. at 61.
64. Law Committee for Hum. Rts., Comments of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights On the
Proposed Safe Third Country Agreement, (July 24, 2002), at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/comment safe-thirdfinal.pdf [hereinafter Lawyers Committee For
Human Rights].
65. Press Release, Amnesty International, Amnesty International Warns that new draft Asylum-
Seeker Agreement Will Be Bad for Refugees, Bad for United States (Aug. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa08l62002.html. (last visited Aug. 7, 2004). Interestingly, The
Federation for American Immigration Reform, a conservative, anti-immigration group, also opposes the
implementation of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement. Dan Stein, the organization's executive
director has predicted that, "'People would still be encouraged to try their luck in applying under Canada's
lax asylum laws, knowing that even if they were turned away, they would end up in the U.S., rather than
home. At that point, they could begin pressing claims to remain here. As in the past, terrorists would be
certain to take advantage of a system that is unable to cope with a growing caseload."; Press Release, The
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Support for Amnesty International's prediction that the U.S.-Canada Safe
Third Country Agreement would undermine national security at the U.S.-
Canada border can be found by turning to the recent exodus to Canada by
hundreds of Pakistanis due to a change in U.S. law. This law mandated that
Pakistanis over fifteen years of age who are in the United States on visitor,
student, or business visas must register with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service by March 21, 2003.66 Resulting from the implementation of this law,
the movement of hundreds of Pakistanis towards Canada led to what The New
York Times has categorized as a "chaotic exodus."67 This law, which only
impacts a small segment of immigrants, has resulted in "jammed land
crossings... overwhelming immigration officials and refugee aid groups on both
sides of the border. '68 Implementation of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement would clearly result in extreme disorder. This disorder would not
only bombard American and Canadian officials, but would also have a negative
impact on other aspects of American and Canadian society.
Rumors of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement began to
increase border traffic before the Agreement was even finalized, when many
immigrants thought the border would be closed.6 9 The result was a wave of over
1000 asylum seekers to the one Canadian border crossing alone, from a variety
of countries, over the course of just a few weeks.7° In 2001, the same border
crossing saw 5000 people file asylum applications; in June 2002 alone,
approximately 1200 claims were made there.71 The Canadian border point of
entry could not handle the June 2002 influx smoothly. This large increase in
numbers forced immigration officials to work overtime and also forced refugees
to camp out at the border crossing.
7 2
Federation for American Immigration Reform, U.S.-Canada Refugee and Asylum Agreement Could
Compound Security Risks, http://www.fairus.orghtml/07409208.htm. (last visited Aug. 7, 2004).
66. "In December [2002], the US government added Pakistan to a list of 25 mostly Muslim countries
whose men are required to register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Nat'l Public Radio:
All Things Considered (NPR Radio Broadcast Jan. 28, 2003) (transcript on file with ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L). The use of the Special Registration Program recently came to a close.
67. Susan Sachs, U.S. Crackdown Sets Off Chaotic Exodus to Canada: Hundreds ofPakistanis Take
Reluctant Flight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003.
68. Id.
69. Ingrid Peritz & Campbell Clark, Refugees Jam Border Fearing New Policy: Legislation Taking
Effect Today Generates Concern That Canada Plans to Shut Its Doors, GLOBE & MAIL, June 28, 2002, at A8.
Additionally, refugees also fled the United States for Canada in the weeks before June 28, 2002, the date on
which Canada's new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act went into effect. Id.
70. Sachs, supra note 67.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Full implementation of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement
would lead to great disorder at the U.S.-Canada border. It would require a
"whole new bureaucracy, 7 3 and during the transition to create such a
bureaucracy, increased disorder would result.74 Perhaps, some of the negative
ramifications for national security would lessen with time and increased
organization within the system, but the use of smugglers and traffickers would
continue even if an efficient bureaucracy were in existence.
IV. OFFERING A SOLUTION
A. Implementing Legislation Should Not be Passed
Legislation implementing the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement
should not be passed. Both the United States and Canada are obligated to
prevent refoulement under international law, specifically under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. Safe third country agreements do not guarantee that
this binding obligation will be upheld, as refoulement may still result, due to
differences in the interpretations of the Refugee Convention and Protocol by
each member state. Canada and the United States also should not pass imple-
mentation legislation as the two countries have moral obligations to refugees
that would be compromised by increasing chances of refoulement for asylum-
seekers. Additionally, if this implementing legislation is passed, it would lead
to increased threats to the national security of the United States and Canada.
This legislation, if passed, will lead to increased danger for asylum-seekers,
increased disorder at the border, and increased bureaucratic hassle.75
Canada's Parliament should be particularly reluctant to approve imple-
mentation legislation. Canada provides immigrants with greater protections
than the United States, and has affirmatively and consistently focused on
complying with international law and self-imposed moral obligations to
refugees. For example, Canada has taken a lead among nations by declaring
that people in danger of gender-based persecution constitute a social group, and
thus are eligible for protection under the Refugee Convention. According to
Canadian law, a "social group" is afforded protection under the Refugee Con-
vention. Legislation implementing the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agree-
73. Press Release, Amnesty International USA/Canada: Open Letter to U.S. and Canadian
Government Officials, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/ usa08152002.html.
(last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
74. The Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, for example, notes that the Agreement will "create
new inefficiencies, waste and bureaucracy as the U.S. and Canada each create, staff and maintain new
procedures to determine who is and is not barred by the agreement." Lawyers Committee For Human Rights,
supra note 64.
75. Id.
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ment would result in people with legitimate asylum claims being more likely to
be sent back to persecution, nullifying Canada's efforts.76 In addition, Canada
should be reluctant to implement the Agreement because such implementation
could begin a transgression up a slippery slope. If the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement is passed, the United States will likely attempt to make a
third safe country agreement with the European Union member-nations.77 This
would mean that after signing the agreement, Canada would be pressured to join
more third party agreements.78
Canada also should be reluctant to pass implementing legislation, as it will
result in Canada frequently having its own asylum laws gutted, and U.S. laws
control asylum by default, as U.S. asylum laws are narrower, when claims are
to be adjudicated in the United States under the Agreement.79 Implementing
76. The gross impact that implementation of the Agreement would have on Canada's stance on
gender-based asylum and its policy of multi-cultureless is indisputable. Even the Canadian government has
openly admitted that the negative treatment of certain groups of asylees would be an inevitable result if the
Agreement were to be implemented. The Canadian government has admitted this, despite the fact that such
a result is unpopular internationally and among many Canadians. "Even the Canadian Government itself
publicly acknowledged the unequal treatment given to refugee claimants in the U.S. In its 'Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement' contained in the Regulations to the Border Agreement, the government recognizes that
the Agreement will have discriminatory impact on certain categories of refugee claimants. The Statement
admits: 'the proposed regulations will likely have differential impacts by gender and with respect to diversity
considerations."' Canada-U.S. "Safe Third Country" Agreement is Signed but Not Yet Implemented,
KAIROS REFUGEE AND MIGRATION PROGRAMME (Mar. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.kairocanada.orge/refugees/safeCountry/index.asp. (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
77. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
78. In France and Germany, only persecution inflicted on the asylum-seeker by the government itself
entitles the applicant to asylum. Catherine Phuong, Persecution by Third Parties and European
Harmonization of Asylum Policies, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 81, 83 (2001). This means, "those fleeing
persecution by one of several rival groups, none of which controls the country, are not entitled to asylum
under German [and French] law... [Additionally, no] matter how credible the reports of persecution, if there
are multiple sources of persecution and the situation is too anarchic, German courts will conclude that state
authority has disintegrated and that, as a consequence, the asylum-seekers are ineligible for asylum."
Maryellen Fullerton, Failing the Test: Germany Leads Europe in Dismantling Refugee Protection, 36 TEx.
INT'L. L.J. 231,265 (2001). This interpretation has been criticized by the UNHCR, among others. Germany
interprets the Convention to an opposite extreme from Canada's interpretation; yet, if the two were a party
to a mutual safe third country agreement, Canada would send asylum-seekers who had first been in Germany
back there, due to its being deemed a "safe" country. Id.
79. Press Release, Amnesty International, USA/Canada: Open Letter to U.S. and Canadian
Government Officials (last visited Aug. 15, 2002), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa08152002.html.
Chris McGann, New Agreement May Reduce Number ofAsylum Seekers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May
24, 2003, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/123472_canada24.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004) [hereinafter
New Agreement].; For example, the U.S. requires asylees to demonstrate that they are applying for asylum
within one year of entry to the U.S., while Canada does not. In the past, this has meant that those with bona
fide asylum claims who have been in the U.S. for less than one year, but are without documents proving that
they have been in the U.S. for less than one year, have been unable to earn grants of asylum in the U.S.; they
have, however, then been able to go to Canada and successfully assert asylum claims there. If the Agreement
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legislation is currently being addressed by the Canadian Parliament.80 It is parti-
cularly important during this period for the UNHCR and NGOs to focus efforts
on encouraging Canada's Parliament not to pass such legislation. It is also
critical for the Canadian Parliament to consider the potential consequences of
such legislation on Canada's international and moral obligations, and national
security.
B. If Implementation Legislation Is Passed, It Should Be Passed With
Reservations
Despite all this, implementation legislation will likely be passed. Current-
ly, the issue of passing legislation implementing the goals of the Agreement is
being discussed in Canada's Parliament and the U.S. Congress.8 In regards to
the European Union's Conventions, "A representative of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees has stated that 'the safe third country rules are
here to stay, in one form or another. '''82 Additionally, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees states that it, "focuses its energies not
on eliminating the practice, but on providing guidelines for its improved
implementation."83 Such agreements are already prevalent in Europe.84 Less
as written is implemented, asylum applicants who lack documents proving that they entered the U.S. within
one year will, in most cases, no longer be able to receive a grant of asylum in the U.S. or Canada. Id.
80. It should be noted that while the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement has not yet been
implemented, the use of an informal system with a similar initial result has commenced. Due to the large
number of asylum applicants departing from the U.S. and presenting themselves at the Canadian border, in
February 2003 Canada began to require appointments with border officials in Canada prior to allowing asylees
to enter Canada. When they are told to go back to the U.S. and to come back at a later date, often the
following day, Homeland Security officials in the U.S. arrest them upon their return. Francis X. Donnelly,
Refugees Seek Safe Harbor in Canada, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2003. These asylum applicants are then
allowed to apply for asylum in the U.S., but are often detained until their asylum hearings before immigration
judges unless they come up with adequate bond money. While, unlike under the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement in theory these applicants may apply in asylum in Canada if they are denied asylum in
the U.S., as under the Agreement, they are not given the option to chose which country to apply in first and
thus if granted asylum in the first country must immigrate to that country. Also, if they are denied asylum and
are ordered removed from the U.S. not on their own recognizance (e.g., if they are denied voluntary
departure), the result is the same, and they will be returned to their country of citizenship. Id.
81. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
82. UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
83. Id.
84. Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments of
the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the
Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 LL.M. 84 [hereinafter Schengen
Convention]; see also Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum
Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 427 [hereinafter
Dublin Convention] Additionally, in 1992, the Resolution on a Harmonized Approach to Questions
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broad-reaching but similar agreements in other regions are also starting to
emerge that involve other regions.85
Still, legislation implementing the Agreement as written should not be
passed. Implementation would mean that persons seeking refugee status in the
United States prior to seeking it in Canada would be subject to the laws of the
United States, and those that first arrived in Canada would be subject to the laws
of the United States. For Canada, whose asylum laws are less stringent than
those of the United States, implementation of the Agreement would mean
modifying Canada's own laws to parallel those of the United States. In order
to preserve its own laws, Canada should impose exceptions to the instances in
which the Agreement would be implemented.
Canada should include an exception to the Agreement as it stands for
applicants who make gender-based persecution claims as members of a parti-
cular social group before passing implementation legislation. Canada has made
it a social obligation to recognize gender-based persecution under the
enumerated category of particular social group.86 If Canada the United States
on this issue it will likely be met with success, or even with the slight loosening
of U.S. asylum laws, as U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft is currently
"considering new gender-persecution regulations for asylum seekers," for use
in the United States.87 Second, Canada should demand an exception for cases
in which the United States would detain an asylum-seeker just as it would detain
Concerning Host Third Countries (The Resolution on Host Third Countries) was adopted. Due to the
introduction of The Resolution on Host Third Countries and increased European Union membership, the use
of safe country agreements has greatly expanded. In fact, "'expulsion to a third State is no longer the
exception but the rule."' Gretchen Borchelt, Note, The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union:
A MisguidedApproach to Asylum Law and a Violation ofInternational Human Rights Standards, 33 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 473, 498 (2002).
85. For example, in January 2003, Switzerland and Senegal signed an agreement allowing
"Switzerland to deport to Senegal any West African whose asylum application has been rejected and whose
country of origin is not clear... The Swiss say the agreement is a first step in combating human traffickers
operating in West Africa." Swiss Sign Pact to Curb the Rise of Political Asylum Requests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2003.
86. There are five enumerated categories under which an applicant is entitled to asylum under the
Protocol: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a particular social group. Refugee
Convention, supra note 39.
87. George Lardner, Jr., Ashcroft Reconsiders Asylum Granted to Abused Guatemalan: New
Regulations Could Affect Gender-Based Persecution, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2003, at A02. Attorney General
Ashcrofi is not only considering new gender-persecution regulations, but also reconsidering a Board of
Immigration Appeals case from 1999, In re R-A-, 22 1 & N Dec. 906 (1999) (vacated Jan. 19, 2001), in which
the Board found that the respondent, Rodi Alvarado, was credible but that the rape, beating, and vows to kill
Ms. Alvarado inflicted upon her by her husband did not "qualify" her for asylum. Id. While Attorney General
Ashcrofi did vacate the decision in R-A-, he has not yet approved any gender-based guidelines. The fact that
this issue is under consideration in the United States makes it an issue that Canada could pressure the United
States about prior to implementing the Agreement.
2004]
140 1LSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:121
a convicted criminal. Canada should also exert pressure onto the United States,
urging it to provide an exception to the Agreement for asylum-seekers who
would be detained and would not be guaranteed counsel, as it is frequently hard
for detained asylum-seekers to find counsel in the United States.88 Lastly, "the
applicant should be able to challenge-in an individual procedure-the pre-
sumption that he or she could find safety in the third country., 89 Such a safe-
guard should be an explicit part of any implementation legislation passed by
either country.
The United Kingdom's Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 contained a
provision allowing for the use of safe third country agreements. This provision
allowed:
a person who ha[d] made a claim for asylum [to be] removed from
the United Kingdom if, inter alia, the Secretary of States certifie[d]
that in his opinion 'the government of that country or territory would
not send him to another country or territory otherwise than in accor-
dance with the Convention.' 90
Clearly, the British Act lacked an explicit statutory provision addressing
whether an applicant could challenge the presumption that he or she could fmd
safety in a third country. In other words, the statute did not explicitly state
whether the third country's interpretation of the Refugee Convention or the
British interpretation of the Refugee Convention dominated such conflicts,
when the two countries interpreted their obligations under international law
differently. Thus, in the United Kingdom, a court case arose dealing with the
issue, Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Adan,
which was appealed up to the House of Lords.9" The House of Lords found that
in order to prevent the usurption of British asylum law, it was necessary to
allow asylum-seekers to challenge whether an asylum-seeker would be safe in
the third country.92 The House of Lords eventually came to a decision on this
88. 10 Reasons Why, supra note 1; see also UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
89. Borchelt, supra note 86, at 515.
90. Regina v. Sec "y of Slate for the Home Dep 't, Ex parte Adan, 40 A.C. 727, 728 (HL. 2001)
(citing The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 § 2(2)(c)(1996)).
91. Id.
92. In Adan, Lord Slynn stated that, "the sole or core question is therefore whether as a matter of
law it is open to the Secretary of State to certify that in his opinion that condition has been fulfilled... [or in
the case at hand, can] he as a matter of law say that the government of Germany and France would not send
Adan or Aitseguer back respectively to Somalia and Algeria 'otherwise than in accordance with the
Convention."' Id. at 728. Lord Slynn then found that, "the question is not whether the Secretary of State
thinks that the alternative view is reasonable or permissible or legitimate or arguable but whether the Secretary
of State is satisfied that the application of the other state's interpretation of the Convention would mean that
issue, but it did not impact the parties at issue. The asylum-applicants were sent
back to "safe" countries which would later return them to the potentially
persecuting countries before the case was heard by the House of Lords. In order
to avoid such errors, if legislation implementing the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement is implemented, Canada and the United States should each
include explicit statutory provisions allowing for an asylum-seeker to challenge
the presumption that he or she could find safety in the third country in their
respective implementation legislation. Currently, Article 6 of the Agreement
allows room for discretion, but what constitutes discretion is undefined.93
V. CONCLUSION
Now the United States and Canada have signed the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement, enacting a bilateral possibility that has been talked about
in North America since the mid-nineties. The Agreement, which has sparked
much debate among scholars, immigrants' rights activists and politicians, is
coming closer to being a reality. To comply with their international legal and
moral obligations, and for the sake of the preservation of national security, the
United States and Canada must not implement the Agreement.
While in the context of today's terrorism-fearing climate a safe third
country agreement appears rational on its face, the resulting negative ramifica-
tions outweigh the justifications for the Agreement. In Europe, there has been
an increase in the number of countries party to safe third country agreements.
Under these agreements, if a person from within a European member country
applies for asylum in another member country, the application will automati-
cally be denied as it will be assumed that all member countries adequately
promote human rights and their individual asylum systems. Additionally, if a
person from a non-member country, most commonly Eastern Europe, Asia or
Africa, enters from the east, the person must apply for asylum in one country
only, the first country the person enters. As more and more countries become
members of the agreements, less and less asylum-seekers will be able to have
their claims for asylum fully adjudicated in a manner consistent with the legal
obligations found in the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
the individual will still not be sent back otherwise than in accordance with the Convention." Id. Lord Slynn
also addressed the concern that such an interpretation of England's role within its safe third country
agreements, which included its relationship with Germany which was at issue, could negatively impact
relations between the two countries or any pair of countries. He stated, "If some other states interpret the
Convention differently in a way which he considers not to be in compliance with the Convention he must
carry out his obligations in the way in which he is advised or is told by the courts is right. To do so is not in
any way contrary to the comity of nations or offensive to other states who interpret it differently and it does
not begin to suggest malafides on their part." Id. at 729.
93. U.S.-Can. Agreement, supra note 24, art. §6.
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This dangerous trend is reminiscent of the trends that led to the failed
attempts by European Jews to enter other countries during World War Two, in
order to avoid persecution. Most countries, including the United States and
Canada, largely turned a blind eye to these people. As more and more countries
sign safe third country agreements, even if a country wishes to help asylum-
seekers, it will likely feel no obligation to.
The Canadian Council For Refugees has noted the similarity between the
denial of protection of Jews fleeing Nazi persecution and the U.S.-Canada
agreement by stating, "during the Second World War, Canada denied protection
to Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution. The slogan from that period was,
'None is Too Many!' the answer given by a Canadian official when asked how
many Jewish refugees Canada would take." The Canadian Council for
Refugees calls the U.S.-Canada agreement a "[n]one is too many Agreement"
because it is about keeping refugees out, "just as we closed the door on Jewish
refugees in the 30s and 40s." 4
If safe third country legislation is implemented by the United States and
Canada, the rights of asylum-seekers will be severely restrained. Though
Canadians have chosen to implement relatively liberal immigration and asylum
laws and practices, these laws and practices will become lost to asylum-seekers
who first enter the United States, and therefore become subject to the immigra-
tion and asylum laws and practices of the United States, particularly in the
context of specific claims, such as those of gender-based persecution. The
member countries of the European agreements have expanded, and it is likely
that with time these agreements in North America and Europe will continue to
expand. It is dangerous precedent to set up a system in which it is possible that
an asylee would have no safe country to turn to in a flight from persecution.
It is not surprising that in a time like this, when many Americans and
Canadians feel vulnerable to terrorism, that there is a desire to increase security
at our borders and to limit asylum. However, at what cost should these protec-
tions come? The United States and Canada are countries of immigrants, who
largely came to their respective countries to flee persecution and obtain free-
dom. It is no less important during these times than during other times that the
United States and Canada not inhibit legitimate asylum-seekers from seeking
refuge within their borders.
94. See 10 Reasons Why, supra note 1.
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ABSTRACT
The Nigerian criminal jurisprudence prohibits abortion in all instances
except when necessary to save the life of a woman. This has driven many
women and girls seeking abortions to non-physician providers. These non-
physician procedures turn out to be unhygienic and unsafe. Nigerian abortion
statistics reveal an unacceptable high rate of maternal mortality and morbidity.
This analysis undertakes a close contextual examination of the exceptions to
outright prohibition, pointing out that the couching of some of the words make
the attainment of the legislative aim a mirage or at least illusory. The analysis
equally points out the heuristic discretionary potentials of some of the clauses,
which the Nigerian medical community could creatively utilize to a woman's
advantage. This paper calls for fundamental rethinking of the abortion life-
saving provisions. Fortunately, towards the completion of writing of this paper,
a bill was introduced in the Nigerian National Assembly which has the
concomitant potential of amending the present abortion laws. The balance of
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this interplay is reflected in a postscript. The general thrust of this paper is to
generate the momentum that will lead to a liberalizing amendment to the present
over-restrictive abortion regime in Nigeria.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nigerian criminal jurisprudence prohibits abortion in all instances except
when necessary to save the life of a woman. Although there is no specific body
of laws known as "the Abortion Act" in Nigeria, the prohibitions and their
accompanying strict exceptions are embodied in the provisions of both the
Criminal and Penal Codes of Nigeria. This restrictive statutory formula has
driven many pregnant women and girls to non-physician providers in a bid to
avoid reluctant parenthood by accessing secretly illegal and septic abortions.
These procedures turn out to be unhygienic and unsafe. Moreover, abortions by
some physician providers equally result in risks to users. This medical
negligence is underpinned by the restrictive laws as well because the
inefficiency of physician providers appears to be strengthened by the ignorance
or general apathy of women seeking abortion. The effect is that most of these
women and girls pay the price either through their lives or complications to their
health. Abortion statistics in Nigeria reveal an unacceptable high rate of
maternal mortality and morbidity, with unsafe abortion constituting the highest
percentage within the myriad of contributory factors.
This analysis undertakes a close contextual examination of the exceptions,
pointing out that the couching of some of the words and clauses in the excep-
tions make the attainment of the legislative aim a mirage or at least illusory.
Some of the exceptions end up confounding and complicating the problems of
pregnant women and girls rather than providing a veritable haven for them.
Those confounding parts of the exceptions are so sweepingly drawn that they
appear to empower non-physician providers to procure abortion. Moreover, the
framing of the exceptions makes it difficult for medical practitioners to figure
out when to legally render abortion services in line with the legislative aim. The
analysis recognizing this quagmire points out the heuristic discretionary
potentials of some of the clauses, which the Nigerian medical community could
creatively utilize to the advantage of women.
On the whole, this paper calls for a fundamental rethinking of the abortion
life-saving provisions and concludes by calling for an amendment of some of
the exception clauses in order to incorporate the requisite life-saving devices in
line with the proper legislative aim of the drafters. The effects of these
restrictions on the reproductive and sexual health of Nigerian women once led
the Nigerian Society of Gynecology and Obstetrics to sponsor a Bill in the
Nigerian National Assembly called the Termination of Pregnancy Bill of 1981.
This Bill sought to legalize abortion where two registered doctors were
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convinced that the life of the pregnant woman was endangered, and where there
was a substantial risk that the child would be born with a physical or mental
handicap.' Although public opinion was in favor of the Bill, not surprisingly,
two small but powerful pressure groups, one of which was composed of conser-
vative women, vehemently opposed it. Ironically, that Bill was sponsored by
the Nigerian medical community due to "the increasing number of illegal
abortions carried out under inadequate health conditions which lead to high
death rates among [women and girls].' '2 The reaction of the women can easily
be explained. Nigerian women have always been subservient to their male
counterparts as a result of the paternalistic and androcentric bias that pervades
the entire sub-Saharan African society.
Fortunately, another opportunity has come in 2004. Towards the comple-
tion of the writing of this paper, Senator Stella Omu sponsored a bill in the
Nigerian National Assembly. The bill entitled "Maternal and Child Welfare,
Health Services (Procedure, etc) Bill [of] 2004" seeks a holistic reform of
Nigerian reproductive health care system. The provisions of the nine-section
bill are so embracing that it is not within the scope of this analysis to engage all
the sections. Of particular relevance to this paper are sections 5 and 6 which
impact abortion. The proposed bill, if passed, will provide the legal framework
for overhauling the present Nigerian abortion regime; it will concomitantly
repeal the present abortion laws as contained in the Criminal and Penal Codes.3
In response to this recent development, this analysis includes a postscript, which
charts the potentials of the proposed bill against the backdrop of a changing
legal climate. The balance of the complex interplay of the present abortion laws
and the proposed bill is dealt with accordingly.
The general thrust of this paper is to generate momentum that will lead to
a liberalizing amendment to the present over-restrictive abortion regime in
Nigeria. Structurally, the paper is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the
topic, lays down a compendium of abortion statistics in Nigeria, delineates the
statutory framework and gives an overview of the origin of dual criminal
jurisdiction in Nigeria. Part II undertakes a close contextual analysis of the
necessity test and carefully engages all the threshold matters that make up the
test. In this regard, the paper compares the present Nigerian abortion regime
with those of other advanced commonwealth jurisdictions, namely Britain and
Canada. Part III seeks to appraise the extent to which the proposed bill is a
1. For a detailed review of the Bill, see I.E. Adi, The Question of Abortion, July 1982 NIG.
CURRENT L. REV. 191.
2. See REBECCA J. COOK & BERNARD M. DICKENS, EMERGING ISSUES IN COMMONWEALTH
ABORTION LAWS (1983).
3. CODE CRIMINAL [C. CRIM.] ch. 21, § 228-30, 297 (1990) (Federation of Nig.); PENAL CODE
[PENAL C.] § 232-35 (1983) (N. Nig.).
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departure from its hopeful predecessor - the present abortion laws in Nigeria.
Finally, Part IV embodies recommendations and conclusion.
A. Abortion Statistics in Nigeria
Unsafe abortion is one of the most serious problems facing thousands of
Nigerian women and girls. As it turns out, non-physician abortion procedures
lead to greater percentage of complications and death for women. The first
survey of physician abortion providers' in Nigeria in 1998 reveals that each
year, Nigerian women and girls obtain approximately 610,000 abortions, which
is at the rate of twenty-five abortions in every one-thousand women and girls
between the reproductive ages of fifteen to forty-four; it also reveals that only
an estimate of 40 percent of these abortions are performed by physicians in
established health facilities while the remaining 60 percent are performed by
non-physician providers. In other words, 366,000 abortions are performed by
non-physician providers annually.' Moreover, abortions by physician providers
equally result in complications.' The survey equally estimates that annually
183,000 women and girls experience complications from abortions by non-
physician providers, and do not receive treatment.7 The 1998 survey was not
significantly different from an earlier study carried out in 1996, which happens
to be "the first comprehensive population-based study of unwanted pregnancy
and induced abortion ever undertaken in any part of Nigeria. '' 8 This 1996 study
categorically reveals that as a result of the restrictive stance of the law, "women
frequently resort to clandestine abortion performed by unskilled practitioners,
leading to high rates of maternal mortality and morbidity. Of the 50,000
maternal deaths that are estimated to occur in Nigeria annually, nearly 20,000
4. See Stanley K. Henshaw et al., The Incidence of Induced Abortion in Nigeria, 24 INT'L FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 156, 162 (1998).
5. See Id. (observing that "this is the first time a national survey of physician abortion providers
has been conducted in a developing country where abortion is largely illegal").
6. Id. at 161-62. The survey points out the percentage of complications emanating from different
classes of non-physician providers and physician providers:
Respondents considered pharmacists or chemists as one of the two most common providers of
abortions resulting in complications (mentioned by 50% of respondents), followed by paramedics (40%),
nurses or midwives (35%) and other doctors (22%).... "Quacks"--individuals with no formal training who
nonetheless provide medical treatment-were mentioned by 23% of respondents.
Id. The survey also noted that, "[a]ccording to a recent household survey of more than 3,700 women
in Edo and Lagos, 8.8% of women who had had an abortion performed by a doctor had experienced
complications that were treated in a private or government clinic." Id. at 159-60.
7. Id. at 159. The survey asserted that, "half of all women who have nonphysician abortions [that
is 183,000] experience complications requiring treatment by a physician." See Henshaw, supra note 4, at 160.
8. FRIDAY E. OKONOFUA ET AL., CRITIcAL ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH: WOMEN'S
EXPERIENCES OF UNWANTED PREGNANCY AND INDUCED ABORTION IN NIGERIA 20 (1996).
are attributable to complications of unsafe abortion."9 The study also reveals
that most abortions carried out by private doctors operating in private medical
clinics had attendant high rates of complications.'0 It is estimated that in
Nigeria, 1000 maternal deaths occur in every 100,000 live births, while in West
Africa, the World Health Organization estimates that 12,000 deaths occur
annually due to unsafe abortion."
There is growing concern over teenage pregnancies in Nigeria and other
African countries. Nearly two-thirds of cases of septic abortions come from
girls between the ages of fifteen to nineteen. 12 Notwithstanding this shocking
discovery, domestic African governments and their legal systems are still
reluctant to squarely address the abortion quandary. It has been observed that,
"the risk of maternal death for African women is 1 in 20 compared to 1 in
10,000 in developed countries. ' ' 13 What a shocking vacuum between two seem-
ingly intertwined worlds. It is evident that the wide vacuum in maternal death
rate between the developed and the developing world demonstrates that a large
proportion of these unexpected and premature deaths arising from unsafe
abortion are preventable.' 4
The above analysis reveals that the high rate of maternal mortality and
morbidity in Nigeria is mainly as a result of women's recourse to non-physician
providers, which in turn is due to the unduly restrictive abortion regime in
Nigeria. Moreover, notwithstanding that non-physician providers perform more
abortions in Nigeria than physicians, which leads to a high rate of complica-
tions, abortions by some private physician providers are equally shrouded with
complications. Invariably, no matter the angle from which one views maternal
mortality and morbidity in Nigeria, the law is always implicated. Complications
resulting from physician providers translate to some degree of inefficiency on
the part of medical practitioners in Nigeria. This inefficiency is underpinned by
the restrictive stance of abortion laws. It is submitted that a liberalized abortion
climate will make medical practitioners more responsible in the delivery of
abortion services for four main reasons:
9. Id. atl.
10. Id. at 25.
11. See UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 154-155 (1996);
See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNSAFE ABORTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF INCIDENCE OF
A MORTALITY DUE TO UNSAFE ABORTION WITH A LISTING OF AVAILABLE COUNTRY DATA (3d ed. 1998),
www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/MSM_97_16/MSM9716abstract.en.html.
12. See W.M. Kabira, et al., The Effect of Women's Role on Health: The Paradox, 58 INT'L. J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 23, 26 (1997).
13. Id.
14. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., COMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION 13 (1995).
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1) Reporting of the number of abortions performed will be improved and
the government would have better records for statistical purposes.
However, it should be cautioned that the names and personal details
of users need not be included in the reports since the record is only
needed for statistical purposes. This will help preserve the
confidential information of abortion-seekers;
1 5
2) Victims of medical negligence will be more willing to pursue their
tort claims against erring practitioners;
3) The regulatory body of medical practice in Nigeria will be alert to
discipline its members for breach of expected standard of practice;
4) The Nigerian Medical Council may be more willing to organize
continuous medical education aimed at retraining its members on the
use of current and safer procedures for the management of abortion
and post-abortion complications.'6
From an economic perspective, the reasons for the preference of non-
physician providers might not be far fetched. The basic truth is that most of the
women and girls seeking and accessing abortion are poor and lack the
professional fees that physician providers require.17 Besides, even when the
financial constraint is removed, societal moral and religious predilections to
abortion create substantial hindrance to the achievement of a safe reproductive
community for women and girls. Almost all women and girls seeking and
accessing abortion in Nigeria prefer having abortion in secret because of the
15. See OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 17. (stating that the 1996 study observes: "that a high
proportion of the women [interviewed] mentioned the lack of confidentiality attendant with the use of doctors
as an additional deterrent to the use of qualified doctors for the procurement of abortion."); See also M.K.
Jinadu, et al., Traditional Fertility Regulation Among the Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria I AFR. J. REPROD.
HEALTH 56, 61 (1997) (describing a study conducted in 1990 among Nigerian Yoruba women and traditional
healers, which aimed at identifying and describing the practice, preparation, and administration of traditional
contraceptives, that observed the following: "When [the women were] asked why they preferred the use of
traditional contraceptive methods to orthodox methods, approximately 85 percent of respondents mentioned
the easy accessibility of the TMPs [traditional medical practitioners] and the assurance of privacy during
consultation") (alteration not in original).
16. The 1996 study indicates that the most frequently used abortion procedure in Nigeria was
dilation and curettage (D & C) whereas the most current, safest and effective method of pregnancy termination
worldwide-manual vacuum aspiration (MVA)-was never mentioned. OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 18.
Moreover, RU was also not used. Id.
17. The 1996 study indicates that although most abortion costs are paid by the partners of the
women (husbands or boyfriends), some women pay for the abortions themselves. Id. at 14. The study went
on to observe that women "most frequently mentioned the high fees charged by doctors as the major deterrent
to the use of doctors." Id. at 17. It is submitted that abortion dilemmas are mainly suffered by poor women
in Nigeria because most rich women are financially capable of circumventing the restrictive domestic regime
by traveling to foreign countries to access safe legal abortion. See id.
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religious, cultural, and moral prejudices associated with it." Additional health
consequences that result from unsafe abortion are infertility, chronic disability,
transfusion-related infections, and lack of emergency care for complications. 9
B. Exemption Clauses
The full-prohibitive sections are sections 228,229, and 230 of the Criminal
Code,2" and sections 233 and 234 of the Penal Code.2' Abortion is totally
prohibited under these sections, except when it is necessary to save the life of
the mother. The relevant sections embodying the necessity test are section 297
of the Criminal Code and sections 232 and 235 of the Penal Code:
Section 297 of the Criminal Code:
A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good faith
and with reasonable care and skill a surgical operation upon any
person for his benefit, or upon an unborn child for the preservation of
the mother's life, if the performance of the operation is reasonable,
having regard to the patient's state at the time and to all the
circumstances of the case.22
Section 232 of the Penal Code:
WHOEVER VOLUNTARILY CAUSES A WOMAN WITH CHILD TO
MISCARRY shall, if such miscarriage be not caused IN GOOD FAITH FOR
THE PURPOSE OF SAVING THE LIFE OF THE WOMAN, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or with
fine or with both (emphasis added).23
Section 235 of the Penal Code:
WHOEVER before the birth of any child DOES ANY ACT WITH THE
INTENTION of thereby preventing that child from being born alive or
causing it to die after its birth and DOES BY SUCH ACT prevent that
child from being born alive or causes it to die after its birth, shall, IF
18. According to a 1990 study conducted in Nigeria, women preferred traditional contraceptive
methods to orthodox methods because of the easy accessibility of the traditional medical practitioners and the
assurance of privacy during consultation. Jinadu, supra note 15.
19. See COMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION, supra note 14, at 15; See also Henshaw, supra note 4, at 14-
15.
20. CODE CRIMINAL [C. CRiM.] ch. 21, § 228-30 (1990) (Federation of Nig.).
21. PENAL CODE [PENAL C.] § 233-34 (1963) (N. Nig.)
22. C. CRIM. ch. 21, § 297.
23. PENAL C. § 232.
150 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:143
SUCH ACT BE NOT CAUSED IN GOOD FAITH FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SAVING THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER, be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to fourteen years or with fine or with both
(emphasis added).24
These exceptions constituting the necessity test cover voluntary abortion and not
involuntary abortion that may occur as a consequence of prescriptions or
administration of medical procedures. Of course, if abortion occurs through
involuntary conduct, the mental element of the crime, intent, which is core to
most offenses, will be lacking. As such no offense will arise. The only excep-
tion to this intent requirement is in rare instances of strict liability offenses,
which do not require proof of mental elements.25
C. Origin of Dual Criminal Jurisdiction in Nigeria
All the sections of the Nigerian Criminal Code impacting abortion, in line
with the abortion laws of most African commonwealth jurisdictions, are
substantially adopted from the Offences Against the Person Act (Britain) of
1861,26 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act (Britain) of 1929,27 but do not
include the changes achieved in R v. Bourne28 and the subsequent Abortion Act
(Britain) of 1967, as amended, which reformed the 1861 Act. 29 These sections
form part of the 'received' English law.30 On the other hand, the Penal Code,
which operates in the Northern states of Nigeria only, is drawn from both the
24. § 235.
25. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an exhaustive exploration of strict responsibility.
For a comprehensive analysis of strict responsibility regime in the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, see Victor
N. Opara, An Appraisal of the Doctrine of Strict Responsibility under the Criminal Code, 5 JURIST 33 (1996).
26. Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24-25 Vict., c. 100, § 1 (Eng).
27. Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, §1(1) (Eng.).
28. The King v. Bourne, 1 K.B. 687 (Eng. C.C.A. 1939).
29. See Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 1 (1967) (Eng.). The Act does not apply to Northern Ireland.
On a more general note, the Nigerian Criminal Code was substantially based on the Queensland Criminal
Code of Australia which itself was based on a code drafted by Sir James Fitzpatrick in 1879 and aimed at
replacing the common law of crime in England, although the code was rejected by the British Parliament for
whom it was initially drafted. See generally James S. Read, Criminal Law in the Africa of Today and
Tomorrow, 7 J. AFR. L. 5 (1963).
30. The introduction of the main body of English law in Nigeria dates back to 1863 when the British
colonial authorities enacted Ordinance No. 3 of 1863 following the creation of the Colony of Lagos in 1862.
See generally A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAw 1-12 (1963). More than a century and four
decades after, the sources of law which the British colonial authorities established for the Colony of Lagos
has remained a standard for the whole of Nigeria without many substantial changes. Id. Historically Nigerian
law is derived from three sources, which are: (a) English Law-this comprises the general law of England
which was introduced into or received by Nigeria; (b) Nigerian domestic legislation and case law; and (c)
Nigerian customary law. Id. For a detailed historical analysis of the Nigerian legal system see id.
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Indian Penal Code and the Scottish laws which are based upon the customary
or common law of Scotland.31 The enforcement of two codes with criminal
liability content under one jurisdiction might appear strange to some legal
systems since criminal laws are to a greater extent regulated by federal or
central legislatures.
In 1954 there was a major regulatory shift in the Nigerian legal system.
Prior to 1954 Nigeria had a unified system of law, and there was only one
legislature for the entire country. Steps to decentralize the unified legislative
body started in 1952 with the establishment of regional legislatures. In 1954 a
full-fledged federal system of government with tripartite legislative
jurisdictional lists was born in Nigeria. As a result, Nigeria was divided initially
into three regions and a federal territory. The Northern region appointed a panel
of jurists in 1958 to act as an advisory body to its government. The main task
of the panel was to advise the Regional government on the application of both
Moslem and non-Moslem laws. 2 The panel came up with the recommendation
that a Penal Code Law and a Criminal Procedure Code Law be enacted and
made applicable throughout the Region and that these laws should replace the
Nigerian Criminal Code Ordinance33 and the Nigerian Criminal Procedure
Ordinance34 both of which were, prior to the panel's recommendations,
applicable throughout Nigeria. The adoption of the recommendations by the
Regional government led to the enactment of the Penal Code in 1963." 5
II. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE NECESSITY TEST
The issues raised by the exception clauses will be discussed in the course
of this analysis. Some recurrent thresholds are that performance of the abortion
be done "in good faith" through "surgical operation" with "reasonable care and
skill" by "a person/whoever" and for the purpose of "preserving the mother's
31. The Penal Code is substantially a replication of the Penal Code of Sudan, which in turn was
drawn from the Indian Penal Code drafted by Lord Macaulay in 1834. See generally ALAN GLEDHILL, THE
PENAL CODES OF NORTHERN NIGERIA AND THE SUDAN (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1963). Lord Macaulay
had used the common law of England and Scotland as the corner stones of his draft.
32. In the defunct Northern Region and the present Northern states of Nigeria, the major substantive
law that the courts administer is the Moslem Law of the Maliki School. See ASAF A. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF
MUHAMMADAN LAW 18-20 (3 ed., 1964).
33. Nigerian Laws, 1948, c. 42 (In 1958 this Ordinance became known as the Criminal Code); CODE
CRIMINAL ch. 42, § 228-30 (Federation of Nig.).
34. Nigerian Laws, 1948, c. 43. In the same vein in 1958, this Ordinance became known as the
Criminal Procedure Act. See Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1990, c. 43 (Criminal Procedure
Act).
35. See PENAL CODE [PENAL C.] (1963) (N. Nig.).
2004]
152 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:143
life" or "saving the life of the woman."36 These thresholds constitute core parts
of the necessity test.
A. Reasonable Care and Skill
One of the thresholds in section 297 of the Criminal Code is that the
abortion provider must exercise "reasonable care and skill." Moreover, the
performance of the abortion is required to be "reasonable" when viewed from
"the patient's state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case." These
thresholds indicate that the context under which an abortion is performed
invariably matters a lot, and that there are many areas of uncertainty that appear
to be left to the discretion of the abortion provider. Section 297 is substantially
adopted from subsection 1 (1) of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act (Britain) of
1929. 37 However, that subsection does not contain the "reasonable care and
skill," "reasonable performance," and "circumstantial" evidence requirements
of section 297, all of which appear to have been imported from the decision of
R. v. Bourne.35 With respect to the reasonable performance requirement, every
performance does not necessarily render abortion unreasonable. Where the
performance is illegal,39 then even objectively reasonable good faith cannot
transform such an illegal abortion into a reasonable one. Such abortion-without-
consent will amount to criminal battery. In that case, if the woman dies, the
physician will be liable, since death will be as a result of intended abortion. The
man equally may be punished as a criminal conspirator" or principal offender."
36. See CODE CRIMINAL [C. CRIM.] ch. 21, § 228-30 (1990) (Federation of Nig.).
37. See Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 1(1) (Eng.).
38. See Bourne, 1 K-B. at 690 & 694. ("A MAN OF THE HIGHEST SKILL, ... performs the operation
... ON REASONABLE GROUNDS AND WITH ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE, ... the jury are quite entitled to take the view
that the doctor who, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THAT HONEST BELIEF, operates, is operating for
the purpose of preserving the life of the mother") (emphasis added).
39. For example, this may occur where an abortion is intentionally performed on a woman without
her consent for the convenience of her husband or boyfriend and the physician. The man could instruct the
physician to cause his girlfriend to miscarry, probably because he is already married and does not want to
obstruct the harmony in his home or does not desire a polygamous marriage. This scenario was played out
in State v. Ade-Ojo, 12 CC.H.C.J. 27 (1972), where a man hired two medical practitioners to perform an
abortion on his girlfriend. The man was charged and convicted, but the practitioners were not charged since
they acted as prosecution witnesses. Id However, the fact that the practitioners were neither charged nor
convicted does not mean that their conduct was legally permissible. Id. Their escape route was simply a
question of legal technicality: the State needed independent evidence to prove its case which largely depended
on the evidence of the man or the practitioners. Id. The Court frowned at the conduct of the practitioners and
the presiding Judge expressed his disgust in Page 31 of his judgment by promising to send a copy of the
judgment to the Attorney General and the Nigerian Medical Council for appropriate disciplinary actions
against the practitioners. Id. Although the statutory reasonable-performance threshold was not under review
in this case, it appears the facts of the case fit nicely to the circumstances contemplated by this threshold.
40. See PENAL C. §§ 96 & 97, section 96 of which provides the following: "(1) When two or more
Opara
Moreover, as the Criminal Code does not define "skill," one is to conjecture
whether nurses, midwives and, paramedics are repositories of contemplated
abortion skill.
B. Surgical Operation
Abortion by purely medical procedures such as the administration of drugs
will appear not to be accommodated within the Criminal Code exemption. This
is because in medical parlance, surgery and medicine are considered to be some-
what different notwithstanding that they may appear inextricably intertwined in
some material particular. The words "surgeon," "surgery," and "medicine" have
been defined respectively as:
[surgeon is] one who applies the principles of the healing art to
external diseases or injuries, or to internal injuries or malformations,
requiring manual or instrumental intervention. [In other words, he is]
[olne who practices surgery.... The term surgery, comes from two
Greek words signifying the hand and work, meaning a manual
procedure by means of instruments.... The practice of medicine, in
contradistinction to the practice of surgery, denotes the treatment of
disease by the administration of drugs or other sanative substances.42
In R. v. Edgal,43 the now defunct West African Court of Appeal was of the
opinion that section 297 of the Criminal Code applied to surgical operations
only. This surgical operation requirement indicates that this threshold adds to
the risk of abortion users in Nigeria by unnecessarily exposing them to greater
danger. Surgery is a complicated procedure and Nigerian health facilities may
not boast of modem sophisticated surgical instruments and equipment which
would guarantee safety to a higher degree, unlike their counterparts in
persons agree to do or cause to be done--(a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not illegal by illegal means,
such an agreement is called a criminal conspiracy." Section 97 outlines the punishment for criminal
conspiracy. § 97.
41. C. CRiM. ch. 2, § 7. The man may equally be punished under the Criminal Code as a principal
offender. Id. Section 7 of the Criminal Code provides the following:
When an offence is committed, each of the following persons is deemed to have taken
part in committing the offence and to be guilty of the offence, and may be charged with
actually committing it, that is to say:--(a) every person who actually does the act or
makes the omission which constitutes the offence; (c) every person who aids another
person in committing the offence; (d) any person who counsels or procures any other
person to commit the offence.
Id.
42. Bouviers's Law Dictionary 3209 (8th ed. 1984).
43. R. v. Edgal, 3 W.A.C.A. 133 (W. Afr. Ct. App. 1938).
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developed countries that are technologically current. If the same result could
be achieved through a purely medical procedure, like administration of drugs,
why limit the woman's choice to surgery?
The health implications of this limitation would be highly appreciated
when viewed from the alarming increase in the spread of HIV infection
especially, in sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular." There are cases
where patients have contracted HIV infections through their surgeons.45
Surgeons equally stand the risk of infecting or being infected with HIV from
their patients. They are constantly exposed to patients' blood, and when their
equipment or surgical instruments are not adequately sterilized, their facilities
may be a disguised infection-transmitting channel. Improperly sterilized
surgical instruments are basic means of spreading HIV infections to women and
girls receiving abortions. Moreover, as a result of the possibility of hemorrhage
during surgical operations, women and girls accessing abortion stand the risk
of contracting HIV through transfusion of contaminated blood. 6 While it is
acknowledged that surgeons owe a professional duty of care and skill to
patients, abortion users may not have the moral support to bring up claims due
to societal predilections towards abortion.47 Moreover, even where such claims
are sought, prosecutions on grounds of failure to provide such duties are rare in
Nigeria.4" Although the risk of patients' exposure to surgeons' HIV-infected
44. According to the Federal Ministry of Health, reproductive health in Nigeria is highly
deteriorating. Draft of the National Reproductive Health Policy and Strategy 9-10 (Federal Ministry of Health
2000). One major national indicator of this is "the continual increase of HIV sero-positivity rate among
antenatal clinic clients from 1.4% in 1991/92 to 4.5% in 1995/96 and 5.4% in 1999." Id. The Ministry further
observed that "there are at least 2.7 million sexually active Nigerians infected with the AIDS virus. Eighty per
cent of HIV infections in Nigeria are contracted through sexual intercourse. Other causes of [HIV] infection
are through unsterile injections and the inadvertent transfusion of unsafe blood and body piercing,
scarification or cutting." Id. (emphasis added).
45. On risks associated with surgery, see Van Mol et al v. Ashmore, [1999] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637
(Can.). On the implications of HIV infection for women, see generally Karen.H. Rothenberg & Stephen J.
Paskey, The Risk ofDomestic Violence and Women with HIVlnfection: Implications for Partner Notification,
Public Policy, and the Law, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1569-74 (1995).
46. See Draft of the National Reproduction Health Policy, supra note 44.
47. Stigmatization can foster a climate of abandonment of one's rights. It may also mean that a
woman who has a claim may not pursue it for fear of being labeled. A great deal of discrimination faced by
abortion users is underpinned by social construct of morality and "normality."
48. To my knowledge, among the scant abortion cases in Nigeria, only two reported cases involved
the prosecution of medical practitioners. Comm'r of Police v. Modebe, 1980 (1) NCR 367; State v. Johnson
Oke, 9 C.C.H.C.J. 1305 (1975). Not surprisingly, the defendants were acquitted in both cases. See Isabella
Okagbue, Pregnancy Termination and the Law in Nigeria, Vol. 21 No.4 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 197, 199 (1990)
(observing that "[b]oth public prosecutors and the courts have traditionally been reluctant to prosecute and
convict members of the medical profession for acts performed as part of their professional functions. With
regard to abortions, in particular, the issue is compounded....").
body is so low that some commentators regard it as non-existent, 49 it has been
correctly observed that:
Surgeons or dentists may cut themselves through their protective
gloves particularly in undertaking procedures in which they do not
have sight of their hands, and they may then bleed into patients'
bodies before it is surgically or otherwise appropriate for them to
remove their hands.50
This observation is in line with current realities. Therefore, the exemption
clause in the Criminal Code is a flagrant exposure of abortion users in Nigeria
to greater risks of HIV infection to the extent that it permits abortion to save the
woman's life only when it is performed through surgical operation. Com-
paratively, the Penal Code exemption, which is silent in section 232 as to the
manner of achieving the life-saving objective and in section 235, which permits
the life-saving objective to be achieved by "any act" appears preferable.
C. Performance of the Act by a Person or Whoever
The Criminal Code and the Penal Code permit "a person" and "whoever"
respectively to carry out the necessary life-saving abortion. In other words,
provided abortion is carried out in good faith to save the life of the mother, it
appears the qualification of the person providing abortion is immaterial. These
words are so sweeping that non-physician providers appear empowered. To that
extent, the couching of the laws may be responsible for the high rate of maternal
mortality and morbidity in Nigeria resulting from non-physician abortions. It
must, however, be pointed out that in this regard, the Criminal Code exemption
seems better than that of the Penal Code in that it requires the exercise of
"reasonable care and skill" as seen above. But this comparison cannot be
stretched too far because although the Penal Code does not specifically use the
"reasonable care and skill" supplement, its definition of "good faith"51 accords
with the Criminal Code requirement of "reasonable care and skill." Deference
should be made for some non-physician providers such as nurses, midwives and
paramedics who may provide abortion services with reasonable care and skill
since they are professionally qualified health personnel and may have observed
49. See Susan L. DiMaggio, State Regulations and the HIV-Positive Health Care Professional: A
Response to a Problem that Does Not Exist, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 497-99 (1993).
50. See Bernard M. Dickens, Health Care Practitioners and HIV Rights, Duties and Liabilities in
HIV, LAW, ETHICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS-TExTs AND MATERIALS 66, 92 (D.C. Jayasuriya ed., 199H).
51. See the analysis on "good faith" infra section 1(E).
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physicians carry out such procedures. 2 However, the inability to manage
complications that may result occasionally is the more crucial point to note.
Due to the shortage of medical practitioners in most rural communities in
Nigeria and the high cost associated with accessing medical practitioners, which
most poor women and girls in Nigeria cannot afford, it is advisable that nurses,
midwives, and paramedics be permitted to perform abortion at early stages of
pregnancy. The international and African medical communities have endorsed
nurses, midwives, and paramedics in the providing of abortion in the early
stages of pregnancy, although with a requirement that they act under the super-
vision of a medical doctor who would intervene in case of potential emer-
gencies. 3 The necessity test raises a paradox in that while the "any person/
whoever" threshold permits any person to perform an abortion, another
threshold requires the use of reasonable care and skill, which has professional
underpinnings. While it could be argued that physicians, as well as nurses,
midwives, and paramedics, owe duty of care and skill to their patients, such
duty cannot be expected of laypersons. An herbalist who does not know the
medical composition of the herbs he administers to procure abortion cannot be
expected to owe duty of care and skill, nor will a hospital clerk. Such pro-
fessional duties are beyond laypersons. While such duties can be enforced
against professionals through license-withdrawal, it is difficult to enforce these
duties against people who have no license to protect.5 4 Accordingly, the law
52. It has been acknowledged that, "since some non-physician providers such as midwives, nurses
and paramedics have obtained medical training ...[they] should be able to perform abortions that do not result
in medical complications." See Henshaw, supra note 4, at 160.
53. On views of Africans see Fre' Le Poole-Griffiths, The Law ofAbortion in Ghana, 9 U. GHANA
L.J. 103, 123 (1972); Charles Ngwena, The History and Transformation of Abortion Law in South Africa,
30(3) ACTA ACAD. 32, 44-48 (1998) (observing that "[p]ermitting midwives to perform abortions in the first
trimester is a realistic way of meeting a dire need. Abortions during this trimester are safer and can be
performed medically without putting the patient unduly at risk."); On views of the international community
see Rebecca. J. Cook & Bernard M. Dickens, Abortion Laws in African Commonwealth Countries, 25 J. AFR.
L. 60,73 (1981) (citing JOHN M. PAXMAN, ET AL., THE USE OF PARAMEDIDALS FOR PRIMARY HEALTH CARE
IN THE COMMONWEALTH: A SURVEY OF MEDICAL-LEGAL ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (1979)); John
Guillebaud, Medical Termination of Pregnancy: Combined with Prostaglandin RU 486 is Effective, 30 BRIT.
MED. L.J. 352 (1990); Mary W. Rodger & David T. Baird, Introduction of Therapeutic Abortion in Early
Pregnancy with Mifeppristone in Combination with Prostaglandin, LANCET, Dec. 19, 1987.
54. It has been observed that
[tiraditional healers and, for instance, birth attendants significantly practice health care
in many areas. ... A legal distinction remains, however, between academically
qualified, professionally licensed health care practitioners such as physicians and
nurses, and practitioners who have received no training that complied with widely
recognized standards, who accept allegiance to no enforceable code of ethical practice,
and whom the law would not hold to higher standards of knowledge, proficiency and
care than are expected of a layperson. The legal rights, duties and liabilities of those
who deliver health care services differ, depending on their status and the expectations
should specifically mention the category of persons contemplated within the
necessity test as is the case with abortion laws of most commonwealth
jurisdictions. 55
D. Preserving/Saving the Woman's Life
This phrase appears to be central to the necessity test. An important issue
that arises from an analysis of this threshold is the contextual meaning of
"preservation of the mother's life" and "saving the life of the woman." These
sections do not provide any specific criteria that would serve as a barometer for
determining when abortion becomes necessary to save the life of the mother.
The inability of the law to lay down any tangible criteria for determining when
a pregnant woman's life deserves to be saved appears to be a welcome discre-
tionary tool. It gives wide discretion to a medical practitioner to address a
pregnant woman's circumstances based on his or her personal interpretation of
the situation. Moreover, the use of phrases such as "reasonable," "ground of
performance," "patient's state," and "all the circumstances of the case" reveal
that the determination of the life-saving/life-preserving context is essentially a
question of fact, and there is no absolute formula or bright line test. By per-
mitting the medical practitioner to act within his discretion, the fear of
inadequate evidence to prove reasonable grounds in the event of alleged illegal
inducement or criminal participation is removed, thereby making it possible for
medical practitioners to act when saving the life of the woman becomes
apparently necessary.
This appears to heighten the object and purpose of the legislature, which
is to create an exception to outright prohibition when saving the woman's life
becomes paramount. The English abortion precedent-setting case, R v.
Bourne,5 6 construed section 58 of the British Offenses Against the Person Act
of 1861, which is similar to the sections of the Nigerian Codes under review, as
impacting on a physician abortion provider. While considering the meaning of
the phrase "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother" the court opined:
In cases where the doctor anticipates, basing his opinion upon the
existence of the profession, that the child cannot be delivered without
the death of the mother, it is obvious that the sooner the operation is
they reasonably create of the availability and calibre of the services they offer.
Dickens, supra note 50, at 67-68.
55. See e.g., Abortion Act 1967, ch. 87, s. 1 (Eng.) (specifically using the words "registered medical
practitioner(s)" to refer to the class of persons permitted to "terminate pregnancy"); CODE CRIMINAL ch. 46,
§ 287(1) (Can.) (Specifically using the words "a qualified medical practitioner... in an accredited or approved
hospital" to label the persons eligible to "procure miscarriage").
56. Bourne, I K.B. 687.
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performed the better. The law does not require the doctor to wait
until the unfortunate woman is in peril of immediate death. In such
a case he is not only entitled, but it is his duty to perform the
operation with a view to saving her life ... I think those words ought
to be construed in a reasonable sense, and, if the doctor is of opinion,
on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the prob-
able consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make
the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to
take the view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in
that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving
the life of the mother.57
In other words, the threshold is not limited to danger to life, but covers danger
to therapeutic health as well. 58 A physician, who is of the opinion that a
woman's life or health is likely to be endangered by the continuation of
pregnancy, is protected by this phrase if he or she performs the abortion. The
opinion need not be based on full conviction, but rather any reasonable belief,
since the gathering of complete evidence might lead to the woman's death or
irreversible danger to her health. In other words, only primafacie evidence is
required if the object and purpose of the necessity test is to be achieved.
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Morgentaler, it is a basic
tenet of the criminal justice system that when a legislature creates a defense to
a criminal charge, the defense should not be illusory or so difficult to attain that
it is practically impossible. 9 Accordingly, the discretion given to the Nigerian
medical community in this life-preserving threshold is a welcome development
that aims to achieve the desired legislative aim of the drafters. The West
African Court of Appeal in the Nigerian case of R. v. Edgal,6° where four people
were charged with unlawfully supplying drugs to procure an unlawful abortion,
applied the thrust of the Bourne decision. The Court, in adopting the Bourne
analysis, held that no abortion is unlawful when performed to save the life of the
woman.
6 1
57. Id. at 693-94.
58. Unfortunately, it appears Nigerian courts are keeping sealed lips on this creative aspect of the
Bourne decision. Even in Edgal, where the reasoning in Bourne was applied, the West African Court of
Appeal steered away from engaging in this issue. I W.A.C.A. 133. However, at least one legal scholar is
optimistic that although this aspect of Bourne remains to be judicially explored in Nigeria, it is likely that the
courts will adopt the entire reasoning in Bourne because English decisions are persuasive authorities in
Nigeria. See Okagbue, supra, note 48, at 198.
59. R. v. Morgentaler, 44 [1988] D.L.R. (14th) 385, 386 (Can.).
60. See Edgal, 4 W.A.C.A. 133.
61. Id.
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Another issue that arises under this life-preserving theme is the legitimacy
of the invocation of conscientious objection by medical personnel under the
circumstances of a life-threatening pregnancy. Although Nigerian criminal
jurisprudence does not make provisions for right of conscientious objection in
abortion matters, the Nigerian Constitution does provide for such right.62 More-
over, it has become part of the criminal justice system of most commonwealth
jurisdictions to include such rights in abortion laws.63 The exercise of right of
conscientious objection is limited, however; it is not available to a medical
practitioner when a treatment is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman.6
Accordingly, the Nigerian medical community cannot validly invoke this right
as a mechanism for refusing to perform abortion when the life of a pregnant
woman is jeopardized. Apart from the fact that such a refusal will constitute an
element of criminal negligence under the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, it
would also go against medical ethics, which is founded on the saving of life.65
Besides, such a refusal to render life-saving abortion will serve no public
interest.
In addition, the life-preserving threshold plays an important role in deter-
mining the duties of medical practitioners when confronted with women
experiencing complications as a result of unsafe or incomplete abortion. It is
not uncommon to see instances where women who are experiencing complica-
tions are denied emergency care in hospitals as a result of either misinter-
pretation of the legal restrictions of abortion or the moral/religious inclination
of the medical practitioner. The bleak atmosphere is even more complicated
when a girl or unmarried woman is involved; most hospitals find it unreasonable
to provide such services. It has been argued that:
[C]omplications require emergency assessment and management.
These women need emergency care which must be provided even
62. See NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) ch. IV (Fundamental
Rights), § 38(1) ("Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion...").
63. See e.g., Termination of Pregnancy Act (Zambia) 1972 § 4; See also the Abortion Act, 1967,
§ 4 (Eng.).
64. This limitation of right to conscientious objection is embodied in abortion laws of most
commonwealth countries as follows: "Nothing shall affect any duty to participate in any treatment which is
necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant
woman." Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1972, § 4(2) (Zambia); see also The Adoption Act, 1967, §4(2)
(Eng.).
65. This argument is supported by the observation that "if a case arose where the life of the woman
could be saved by performing the operation and the doctor refused to perform it because of his religious
opinions and the woman died, he would be in grave peril of being brought before this Court on a charge of
manslaughter by negligence." Bourne, 1 K.B. 687.
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where there are legal restrictions on induced abortion. Assessment of
the woman's condition and provision of services must be available on
a 24-hours-a-day basis from the point at which the woman first
contacts the health care system to the point at which she receives the
care she requires.'
It is against health doctrines for women presenting with complications emanat-
ing from unsafe or incomplete abortion to be denied emergency assessment and
treatment. As the medical profession is founded on the saving of lives, and as
the overarching legislative aim of creating the exceptions to outright prohibitive
abortion in Nigeria is to save the life of pregnant women who are prejudiced by
the continuation of pregnancy, the Nigerian medical community must live up
to its expected professional standards, and must, as a matter of necessity,
provide adequate medical treatment to victims of unsafe or incomplete abortion.
E. Good Faith
While the Criminal Code is silent on the meaning of "good faith," the
Penal Code in section 37 defines "good faith" as "nothing is said to be done or
believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and
attention.' ,17 In 1979, the Federal Court of Appeal in Dr. D.I. Pam Tok v. The
State had the opportunity of construing the Penal Code "good faith" threshold
as it applies to abortion providers in Nigeria.68 Dr. Tok, a medical practitioner,
was charged with causing the death of a woman in the process of procuring
abortion contrary to section 232 of the Penal Code. The prosecution argued that
Dr. Tok performed an operation and thereby caused a secondary school student
to miscarry a "three month" old child.69 Dr. Tok's defense was that he
performed the operation when the student had a partial miscarriage, was
bleeding, and the operation was necessary to save the life of the student.7"
There was evidence that the deceased had unsuccessfully attempted to procure
her own abortion before consulting the practitioner.7" Although the surgical
operation was performed in a hospital, several irregularities surrounded Dr.
Tok's conduct including non-registration of the patient in the hospital roster.72
Dr. Tok's defense of treating for an incomplete abortion was rejected by both
66. See Complications of Abortion, supra note 14.
67. See Penal Code [Penal C.] § 233-34 (1963) (Northern Nig.)
68. Pam Tok v. The State FCA/K/84/78 (unreported decision) (Federal Court of Appeal 1979)
(Nasir, Uwais & Ademola JJ.F.C.A).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
the trial and appellate Courts because his general conduct did not portray "good
faith."73 Moreover, The Federal Court of Appeal held that the onus was on the
appellant practitioner to show that he acted in good faith for the purpose of
saving the life of the patient.74 He was accordingly convicted under section 232
of the Penal Code.
The combined effect of a purposive statutory interpretation and judicial
construction of good faith appears to be very clear; it restricts the procurement
of a life-saving abortion to any person who can prove that they exercised due
care and attention during delivery of the medical services. This is a question of
fact to be proved by the amount of evidence gathered by the abortion provider
and their general conduct during delivery of the services. While the legislative
aim of the drafters may have been well intended, the omnibus word "whoever,"
as analyzed in section C of this paper, renders the legislative intention a mere
formality. In other words, the diligence requirement is not restricted to qualified
medical personnel, but transcend all categories of people who can prove they
acted with "due care and attention" while providing abortion. To that extent,
"good faith" in its present form, irrespective of its statutory interpretation in the
Penal Code, appears devoid of procedural content. Of course, non-physician
providers can equally claim to have acted diligently in their services to women
and girls accessing abortion. The rest will be left for evidence to determine
whether due diligence was actually exhibited, which determination may not
require the exhibition of medical professionalism. However, this unfortunate
situation could be avoided if "whoever" and "a person" are replaced with the
proper professional class contemplated by the drafters. In that case, "good
faith" would have more effective procedural underpinning since the observance
of "due care and attention" will be restricted to only the permitted class of
medical personnel. As such, the due diligence requirement will transform to a
creative discretionary tool that most trained medical personnel sympathetic to
the course of women can effectively rely upon in making their services available
to women seeking abortion.
On the other hand, a broader construction of "good faith" might reveal
some hidden legislative intentions. The traditional notion of good faith is to
require a physician abortion provider to obtain an independent medical opinion
of his colleagues before undertaking any abortion procedure. This traditional
meaning is given content and expression in the British Abortion Act of 196771
which exempts a physician abortion provider from criminal responsibility if two
other registered medical practitioners concur that the continuation of pregnancy
73. Pam Tok v. The State FCA/K/84/78 (unreported decision) (Federal Court of Appeal 1979)
(Nasir, Uwais & Ademola JJ.F.C.A).
74. Id.
75. See Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § I (Eng.).
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would endanger the life of the pregnant woman, or cause injury to the physical
or mental health of the pregnant woman, or cause substantial physical or mental
handicap to the unborn child.76 However, this peer-concurrence requirement
does not apply where the physician abortion provider is unilaterally of the
opinion that abortion is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent
grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman. 77  Another commonwealth jurisdiction that de jure requires peer
concurrence is Canada. Section 287 of the Criminal Code of Canada 8 is the
abortion law in Canada de jure. This section exempts a physician abortion
provider from criminal responsibility only where he, among other requirements,
obtains the approval of a three-person therapeutic abortion committee. The
procedural technicalities required in obtaining this committee approval was
vehemently disapproved by the Supreme Court of Canada in the celebrated
abortion-liberalizing case of R. v. Morgentaler.79 The Court was of the opinion
that the interest in the life or health of a pregnant woman, which Parliament held
out to take precedence over the interest in prohibiting abortions when the
continuation of the pregnancy of the woman would be likely to endanger her
life or health, was entrenched at least as a minimum when the right to life,
liberty and security of the person was enshrined in section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedom.8° It noted that
[a]n aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is
founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state ... The decision of a woman to terminate
her pregnancy falls within this class of protected decisions. It is a
decision which has profound psychological, economic and social
consequences for the pregnant woman. Section 251 clearly violates
this right to liberty since it takes the decision away from the woman
and gives it to a committee.8'
Discussing the impact of this committee-approval requirement the Court argued
that the present legislative scheme in Canada not only subjects a pregnant
woman to considerable emotional stress as well as unnecessary physical risk but
that it leads to an even deeper flaw in asserting that a woman's capacity to
76. § 1(1).
77. § 1(4).
78. See CODE CRIMINAL ch. 46, § 287(1) (Can.).
79. See Morgentaler, 44 D.L.R. (14th) at 385-86.
80. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 7.
81. See Morgentaler, 44 D.L.R. (14th) at 388.
reproduce is not to be subject to her own control.82 The Morgentaler Case is the
defacto abortion law in Canada, having overruled the abortion provision of the
Criminal Code of Canada.
This extended construction of good faith operates as an access-limiting
factor. Apart from the delay associated with it, there is also the danger of
financial impediment on women accessing abortion. Accessing professional
medical opinion of the would-be committee may involve some cost to the
woman. In Nigeria, the overall cost of procuring abortion in most cases is borne
by the partners of the women accessing abortion. However, in some cases, the
women pay for the abortions themselves.83 This is unlike what occurs in some
advanced commonwealth jurisdictions where such costs are paid through
government health insurance plans. As such, the requirement of committee
approval will likely increase the overhead expenses of women and girls seeking
and accessing abortion. Therefore to require that a medical committee be
consulted before a pregnant woman or girl could access abortion indirectly
means denying the 'pregnancy victim' an opportunity of accessing abortion.
This creates a dichotomy between appearance and reality, between availability
and accessibility of abortion. In other words, a systemic inequality is triggered
by this extension in as much as poor women and girls will be unwittingly
excluded from accessing abortion. This obviously will run counter to inter-
nationally endorsed instruments of equal rights jurisprudence.84 As such, it is
thought that Nigerian society is not ripe for the extended traditional committee-
approval model of good faith.
The maintenance of the present statutory meaning appears to be a better
viable option. The failure of the traditional committee-approval model in
Canada, for instance, illustrates that the model only adds to the vulnerability of
women and girls. Hence this model will serve no public purpose in Nigeria.
Besides, it has the potential to defeat the overarching legislative aim of the
drafters in creating exception to outright prohibition of abortion when saving the
life of the woman becomes necessary. In addition, one of the reasons why
Nigerian women and girls patronize backstreet abortionists is because of the
secrecy associated with such clandestine services."
Invariably, an imposition of committee-approval requirement will amount
to more publicity which Nigerian women and girls are likely to shy away from.
This will have the negative effect of forcing them back to backstreet providers
at the detriment of their lives and health. Already abortion statistics have
82. Id.
83. See OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 14.
84. See e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman, opened
for signature Dec. 18, 1979, pt. 1, art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 16.
85. See Jinadu, supra note 15; see also OKONOFUA, supra note 8, at 17.
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revealed an enormous increase in the death as well as complications in the
health of women accessing abortion through backstreet abortionists; there is
therefore no public purpose served by a further complication of the bleak
atmosphere. Accordingly, the extended traditional committee-approval meaning
of good faith should be resisted in Nigeria since our present medical history
does not give room to that. Such extensions will only muffle and gag the
legislative intention. As the present statutory definition in section 37 of the
Penal Code is clear, no attempt should be made to undertake any further voyage
of discovery; at best that would only amount to a fishing expedition which may
not properly address present realities in Nigerian society.
III. POSTSCRIPT ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION: THE MATERNAL AND CHILD
WELFARE, HEALTH SERVICES BILL OF 2004
Nigeria has always been less poised than other Commonwealth jurisdic-
tions to pursue a holistic reform of abortion law. This reluctance may be due
to the fact that in a secular and constitutional democracy like Nigeria, the
sensitive issue of abortion generates pluralistic and dichotomous views, which
are played out in the moral, religious, ethical, cultural, political, and legal
perceptions of society. Our experience under the present abortion laws thus far
has not been entirely satisfactory and Nigerian case law has had a checkered
history with respect to the issue of abortion. In 1981, as a result of the toll of
abortion on the life and health of Nigerian women and girls, the Nigerian
Society for Gynecology and Obstetrics sponsored a Termination of Pregnancy
Bill86 Unfortunately, the National Assembly did not approve that benign
gesture. Fortunately another attempt has been made in 2004 to stamp an era of
emancipation of Nigerian women and girls from untold abortion hardship.
Senator Stella Omu, of the House of Senate recently introduced the Maternal
and Child Welfare, Health Services (Procedure, etc) Bill of 2004 ("the Bill") to
the National Assembly.87 The Bill will concomitantly provide a legal frame-
work for overhauling an abortion regime that has marginalized, oppressed and
killed thousands of women and girls; it will revolutionize abortion law in
Nigeria.88 The Bill avoids most of the confounding technicalities of the present
laws. Undoubtedly, it is resounding success for those scholars who have advo-
cated for a liberal abortion climate in Nigeria.89 This section does not aim at
86. See Adi, supra note 1.
87. Maternal & Child Welfare, Health Services Bill (2004).
88. Id.
89. J.B. Akingba & S.A. Gbajumo, ProcuredAbortion: Counting the Cost, 7(2) J. NIG. MED. ASS'N
17 (1970). For a sequential ordering of compendious scholarly papers on Nigerian abortion medico-legal
regime, see J.B. AKINGBA, THE PROBLEM OF UNWANTED PREGNANCIES IN NIGERIA TODAY (1972); J.B.
Akingba, Abortion, Maternity, and Other Health Problems in Nigeria, 7(4) NIG. MED. L.J. 465 (1977); Adi,
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considering the Bill in its entirety, but rather closely engages only the provisions
that either expressly, implicitly or potentially impact on abortion. These
provisions are charted in line with their concomitant effect of amending or
reforming the abortion provisions of the Nigerian Criminal Code and Penal
Code.
Section 5(1)(c) of the Bill makes it an offence for
any person who through any act of negligence or omission or
dereliction of his lawful duties causes or influences, however
remotely, the miscarriage or termination of the pregnancy of any
woman; provided [that] no medical doctor or nurse/midwife shall be
criminally liable for termination of a pregnancy to save the life of a
woman.
90
The punishment for this offence is "a fine of 350,000 naira or imprisonment for
a period not exceeding five years or both such fine and imprisonment" (section
6(2)).9' These two sections are the only sections that impact on abortion apart
from the interpretative section 9, which defines the terms as used in the Bill.
These sections will potentially repeal sections 228, 229, 230, and 297 of the
Criminal Code and sections 232, 233, 234, and 235 of the Penal Code all of
which presently govern abortion in Nigeria. Of more particular interest to this
paper are the balances of the complex interplay of the abortion sections of the
Bill and sections 297of the Criminal Code and 232 and 235 of the Penal Code.
These provisions in the present laws make up the necessity test.
At first blush, it is clear that the Bill has succeeded in eliminating most of
the confounding clauses of the necessity test such as "performance of abortion
by any person (or whoever). 92 The Bill expressly permits "medical doctor or
nurse/midwife" to perform abortion.93 This categorization will assist in
containing backstreet abortion providers. One shortcoming of this welcome
categorization formula is the elimination of paramedic personnel. Common
sense knowledge will reveal that paramedics are as competent as nurses or
midwives, and in some cases may be more qualified. This observation is due
to the fact that some paramedics are qualified doctors from foreign jurisdictions
who have not yet been licensed by their jurisdiction of residence. Accordingly,
shutting them out from the list of permitted abortion providers may not be the
supra note 1; T.B.E. Ogiamien, A Legal Framework to Liberalize Abortion in Nigeria, 1988-91 NIG. CURRENT
L. REV. 107; Okagbue, supra note 48, at 197; OKONOFUA. supra note 8; Henshaw, supra note 4, at 159;
WOMEN'S HEALTH ANDACTION RESEARCH CENTRE, ABORTION LAW IN NIGERIA: THE WAY FORWARD (2000).
90. Maternal & Child Welfare, Health Services Bill (2004).
91. Id.
92. See C. CRIM. ch. 21, § 297; PENAL C. §§ 232,235.
93. Supra, note 87, at § 5(l)(c).
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best option. In view of the somewhat high rate of maternal mortality and
morbidity resulting comparatively from Nigerian physician abortion providers,
nurses, midwives and paramedics,94 it is recommended that all classes of legal
abortion providers--medical practitioners, nurses, midwives, and hopefully
paramedics, be required to undergo some prescribed retraining. This goal can
easily be achieved through section 8 of the Bill, which grants the Federal
Minister of Health the "power and responsibility to oversee performance of the
instructions of this Act."95
The Bill has also succeeded in getting rid of "reasonable care and skill."96
This riddance is a welcome development in that the categorization of permitted
abortion providers invariably accomplishes this task. All registered medical
personnel are under statutory regulatory bodies. These bodies have rules of
professional responsibility that include duties of professional skill and
competence in service delivery to patients. The clause "surgical operation"97 is
not part of the Bill. This riddance is a good development because it leaves open
the suitable abortion procedure to the permitted abortion providers. A cursory
review of Nigerian abortion cases reveals that most abortions are achieved
through administration of drugs. 98 The Bill does not make any reference to
"good faith" which is one of the thresholds in the present law.99 This silence is
good because it avoids the potential danger of interpreting "good faith" broadly
to encompass medical peer-approval and consent, which will obviously pose a
lot of delays in abortion matters. °° The existing interpretation of this nebulous
concept has too much uncertainty and ambiguity for effective application within
the Nigerian criminal justice system.
More importantly the Bill reinforces the need to provide abortion "to save
the health and life of a woman" (emphasis added).' This is an extension of the
"preserving/saving the woman's life"' 2 threshold in the present laws and
appears to be the only footprint of the necessity test thresholds that is retained
by the Bill. The Bill, while recognizing the need to provide abortion to save the
94. See Henshaw, supra note 4, at 162.
95. See C. CRiM. ch. 21, § 297.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See State v. Njoku, E.C.S.L.R. 638 (1973); State v. Johnson Oke, 9 CC.H.C.J. 1305 (1975);
Commissioner of Police of Midwestern Region of Nigeria v Oruware, I All N.L.R. Par I 85 (1974); Modebe,
1 N.C.R. 367; R. v. Ejikeme, 10 W.A.C.A.. 252 (1944); Edgal, 4 W.A.C.A. 133 (1938); Ade-Ojo, 12 CC.H.C.J.
27; R. v. Idiong and Umo, 13 W.A.C.A. 30 (1950); and Tok, FCA/K/84/78.
99. See C. CRIM. ch. 21, § 297.
100. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, § 1 (Eng.); see also C. CRiM. ch. 46, § 287(1).
101. See C. CRIM. ch. 21, § 297; PENAL C. §§ 232, 235.
102. Id.
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life of the woman, goes beyond strictly saving the life of the woman, which is
the only permitted ground under the present laws, to include saving the health
of the woman, °3 which includes therapeutic health. This is a great achievement.
It literally codifies the Bourne decision. Moreover "health" is defined in section
9(1) of the Bill to mean "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."'0 4 This is in accord
with World Health Organization's meaning of health. As a result of this subtle
but fundamentally important shift in the life-saving analysis, it is possible for
much to be achieved theoretically through this medium. The heuristic potentials
of this provision, which advocates can harness, include demanding for abortion
for any of the following grounds:
a) Where the continued pregnancy would endanger the life of the
pregnant woman or constitute a serious risk to her physical
health;
b) Where the continuation of the pregnancy would constitute a
serious threat to the pregnant woman's mental health and create
a danger of permanent damage to her mental health;
c) Where there was a serious risk that the child to be born would
suffer a physical or mental defect of such a nature as to be
irreparably handicapped;
d) Where the pregnancy was a result of unlawful sexual inter-
course including rape, incest or intercourse with a minor or
mentally defective female unable to appreciate the conse-
quences of intercourse or bear parental responsibilities.
With respect to the last option, theoretically the expanded clause could be
axiomatic to advocacy in abortion for victims of rape and incest, however some
practical and technical difficulties may defeat this benign and rationally
connected objective. There is the need to reduce the trauma and emotional
distress of victims of rape and incest by broadening the grounds for legal
abortion to expressly include rape or incest, contrary to observations canvassed
elsewhere. 5  In the English case of R. v. Bourne'0 6 mentioned earlier, an
obstetric surgeon performed an abortion on a 15-year old girl who was raped on
the grounds that she would otherwise have become a mental wreck. This case
103. Maternal & Child Welfare, Health Services Bill (2004), § 5(1)(c).
104. Id.
105. See Okagbue, supra note 48, at 203 (observing that "[rlape and incest sometimes serve as
indications for abortion in various jurisdictions. As a separate indication, this ground may be somewhat
superfluous because it may be more properly subsumed under the medical indication of risk of injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.").
106. See Bourne, I K.B. 687.
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is very popular in most commonwealth jurisdictions mainly because of its
expansive defense of therapeutic abortion far beyond the necessity test to
encompass the protection of the physical or mental health of the woman.'07 An
express inclusion of rape or incest as permissible grounds for abortion will
create a more practical climate for victims to have recourse to abortion facilities
without much difficulty, and will also place the burden on the state to prove the
contrary. Otherwise, using the health definition of the Bill may not easily
achieve this objective for victims of rape or incest, as the burden of proving rape
or incest may be placed on them. The high cost of accessing expert evidence,
coupled with the general bureaucracy that surrounds most Nigerian facilities
may severely inhibit this worthwhile legislative intention." 8 It is disheartening
to prevent victims of rape from accessing abortion considering the general
circumstances surrounding their dilemma. Arguably, government is to blame
for the porous security in the country, which intensifies the vulnerability of
women. Failure to treat rape as an indication for abortion translates into
government insensitivity of national realities. This joining of the theoretical
concerns of rape and incest with their practical impact on abortion should be a
central concern of policy makers and advocates.
Overall, although the Bill may not achieve a veritable haven for those
seeking abortion, since abortions by physician providers have had some
consequences on women's reproductive health as well, the Bill's abandonment
of the confounding thresholds characterizing the present laws appears to have
107. Id.
108. From my experience in campus journalism as Senior Staff Writer, Editor, Associate Editor and
Editor in Chief of a Nigerian campus magazine-KAMPUSWATCH, University of Benin-from 1993
through 1998, there was hardly any week during academic sessions that at least one girl was not raped on
campus. Most of the victims chose not to report the violation because of a myriad number of factors,
including humiliations from colleagues and peers; rejection by friends; potential effects on the victim's future
chances of marriage; security concerns, and most, if not all, of the rape offenders were members of secret cults
who could go to the extent of killing to defend their selfish interests and lopsided anti-social cult values. A
rape victim who reported the incident would be subjecting herself to further risks, gang rape and possible
death; and finally, the university communities do not have enough programs that could enhance detection of
campus crimes or encourage victims to report their ordeals. Unfortunately, Nigerian campus magazines do
not report all the anomalies occurring on campus because of inadequate security measures to protect their
writers in the event of attacks from clandestine cults. These secret cult activities fly in the face of the clear
wording of section 38(4) of the Nigerian Constitution: "Nothing in this section [right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion] shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity or be a member of a secret
society." NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) ch. IV (Fundamental Rights),
§ 38(4). See Lambert Oghenerobo Jr., Cult War: Uniben Under Siege, 1(8) KAMPUSWATCH 9 (1996); Wo
Killed Williams Ubong? 1(9) KAMPUSWATCH 8 (1997). On the national scene, rape incidence is also high
especially during inter-ethnic riots or religious conflicts. Soldiers and police personnel deployed to quell those
riots and conflicts seize the opportunity to rape innocent women and girls. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
BACKGROUND REPORT: THE DESTRUCTION OF ODI AND RAPE IN CHOBA (1999),
http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/dec/nibgl299.htm.
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the potential of downplaying or reducing the consequences emanating from
physician providers. Medical practitioners will be more willing to provide
abortion services based on their subjective interpretation of "saving the health
and life of a woman."' 0 9 Abortion will be performed in a more secure
atmosphere; secrecy is bound to dwindle as a result of the Bill's openness. The
close supervision of the law will encourage users to pursue their claims in the
event of medical negligence, and will also have the effect of improving the
efficiency of physician providers. On the whole, the Bill will result in a win-
win situation. Another important accomplishment of the Bill will be the
creation of a uniform abortion law in Nigeria. By concomitantly repealing the
abortion provisions of the Criminal and Penal Codes, the Bill would achieve an
incremental harmonization of the somewhat divergent Codes.
IV. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
While the objective of the necessity test is to provide an escape route from
a fully prohibitive abortion regime, some of the means chosen to advance that
objective appear unsuitable. Some of the thresholds in their present state neither
present a veritable haven nor viable refuge for women and girls whose lives are
jeopardized by the continuation of pregnancy. The words "whoever" and "a
person" should be expunged from the exception clauses; in their place, words
capable of specifically identifying the contemplated class of persons permitted
to perform abortion should be substituted. This categorization is in order to
exclude backstreet abortionists. On the other hand, the present statutory
meaning of "good faith" should be maintained since an extended meaning will
trigger technicalities and procedural dangers.
It is advisable that qualified nurses, midwives, and paramedics be per-
mitted to perform abortions at early stages of pregnancy. This is for practical
accessibility purposes in view of the dearth of medical practitioners in most
Nigerian rural communities, coupled with the high cost of accessing medical
practitioners. This may bridge the gap between availability and accessibility.
In Nigeria, maternities are recognized birthing centers that are owned and run
by nurses and midwives. So far, the Nigerian public appears satisfied with their
services. Permitting them to diversify into abortion at early pregnancy will
presumably be acceptable too. However, they should be made to consult and
work with a medical practitioner in case of potential emergencies. The statutory
means of achieving life-saving abortion must be expanded to include purely
medical procedures, like administration of drugs. Unfortunately, the present
"surgical operation" channel is too restrictive and appears to permit only
109. Maternal & Child Welfare, Health Services Bill (2004).
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medical practitioners to perform abortion. This narrow channel should be
abandoned.
It is recommended that the National Assembly set up a law reform
commission with the aim of carrying out a program of research into abortion.
The commission should be given the task of conducting opinion polls aimed at
getting the perceptions of society towards abortion. The public opinion that
existed as at the time the laws were enacted might have shifted substantially.
As the current opinion of members of society help to determine what the law
should be, it is not jurisprudentially justifiable for laws enacted many decades
ago to remain in force without revision. It does not help our legal system to
have a jurisprudence that is static and rigid, undermining innovations, techno-
logy and modem realities. It does not improve our legal system to have a
jurisprudence that holds tenaciously to old time tradition and belief even when
it has dawned on us that the world is changing for the better. Accordingly, it
has been argued that:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind limitation of the past."'°
The text of the British Offences against the Person Act of 1861, which
substantially constitutes the abortion laws in Nigeria, is more than two centuries
old.i"' It therefore makes no practical sense nor serves any public purpose that
an antiquarian law should continue to exist without regard to social dynamics
and prevailing realities. There is no justifiable reason for Nigeria to continue
its tenacious loyalty to the outdated Act.
It is further recommended that the Nigerian Judiciary should bring
creativity to bear in abortion matters. As this paper has revealed, it was the
creative interpretation of Justice Macnaghten in R. v. Bourne that motivated the
British Parliament to amend and clarify the Offences Against the Person Act of
1861.12 This is embodied in the present Abortion Act of 1967. In a similar
vein, the Canadian example is equally illustrative ofjudicial creativity. It is the
creative judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morgentaler that is
presently the defacto abortion law in Canada. That case overruled the statutory
abortion provisions in Canada. Moreover, a look at three U.S. Supreme Court
110. Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 61 (1897).
111. See Bourne 1 K.B. at 690 (in which Macnaghten J. observed that: "The defendant is charged
with an offence against s. 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861. That section is a re-enactment
of earlier statutes, the fsrst of which was passed at the beginning of the last century in the reign of George
11.").
112. Id.
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cases: Griswold (1965); Eisenstadt (1972) and Roe v. Wade (1973) reveals that
although the U.S. Congress did not at anytime in between these cases change the
law, the Court brought about a fundamental change which virtually heightened
the jurisprudence of individual autonomy and to some reasonable extent
equality rights jurisprudence in the American legal system. Nothing prevents
Nigerian courts from flexing similar judicial creative muscles.
This analysis has shown that induced abortion is prevalent in Nigeria
notwithstanding the restrictions of the law. It would therefore be necessary for
Nigerian government to face present realities by developing policies that aim to
address this critical issue in order to reduce the high rate of maternal mortality
and morbidity arising from this practice. The present abortion laws, from all
indications, appear to have failed in that the aim of unduly restricting abortion
is to prevent women and girls from seeking and accessing abortion, notwith-
standing, the rate of abortion still continues to escalate daily. Invariably, the
end that the law was designed to achieve has been defeated. Justice Holmes
noted, "[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it
contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it sub-
serves.... ,13
Nigerian women and girls do not seem to be deterred by the legal
consequences of the "crime" of abortion. The aftermath, however, is that most
of the abortions are carried out in medically unsafe environments, thereby
endangering the lives of users. The law is responsible for this loss of life. It
therefore behooves the Nigerian National Assembly to amend the law in order
to make it conform to modern reality. A viable alternative mechanism would
be the adoption of a somewhat liberal approach. This anticipated liberal
formula can easily be achieved through the enactment of the abortion provisions
(section 5) of the Maternal and Child Welfare, Health Services Act of 2004,
with thorough amendments to some other parts of the Bill. It is hoped that this
second opportunity will not be wasted again.
113. Holmes, supra note 111.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Altmann family has tried for half a century to recover their valuable
paintings from the Austrian government.1 Their troubles began when Austria
was overthrown by Nazi Germany.2 The Altmann family had two choices - flee
the country or be transported to Nazi concentration camps and an uncertain
future. The Altmanns chose to flee and had to leave almost everything they
owned behind, including their cherished and valuable works of art.' After a
change of Austrian law in their favor, and several failed attempts to work things
out with the Austrian National Museum, litigation finally commenced in 1999.4
Originally, Maria Altmann intended to file and proceed with this lawsuit in
Austria.5 However, due to the extraordinarily high court costs of approximately
$200,000, Ms. Altmann was forced to voluntarily dismiss her suit in Austria and
re-file the action in United States federal court.6 In response, Austria filed a
Motion to Dismiss, arguing various defenses including a claim of sovereign
* B.A., Tulane University, 1999; M.M.C., cum laude, University of Georgia, 2000; J.D., Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, anticipated 2006. I would like to thank my wonderful
parents, who have given me their unqualified love and support for the past 27 years. I would also like to thank
the staff of the ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law for all of their hard work during the
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I. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2244 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002).
5. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2245.
6. Id.
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immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).7 The
United States District Court for the Central District of California denied
Austria's Motion to Dismiss and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.8
Austria applied to the United States Supreme Court for review on the sole
issue of whether the FSIA applied to claims that were based on conduct
occurring before the passage of the Act.9 On June 7, 2004, the Court concluded
that the FSIA could be applied retroactively to claims that occurred before the
passage of the Act, and before the official adoption of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in 1976.0 While this ruling does not determine whether
Ms. Altmann will win her original lawsuit, it does grant her a small
victory-she may proceed with her suit against Austria and attempt to reclaim
the paintings her family once cherished."
The pending cases of Joo v. Japan and Nationale Des Chemins De Fer
Francais v. Abrams share many similarities with Altmann. 2 In both cases,
which revolve around events occurring during WWII, the foreign sovereigns
claim immunity under the FSIA in order to escape any liability they may face
if forced to defend themselves in a lawsuit. 3 The United States Supreme Court
granted a review to both cases, Joo and Abrams.4 However, in light of the
Altmann decision, the Court vacated the decisions of the lower courts and
remanded the cases back to their respective courts of appeals. 5 Part I of this
paper will provide a recitation of the facts of Austria v. Altmann. Part II will
discuss the background, history, and confusion surrounding whether the FSIA
will be retroactively applied. Part III will analyze the Altmann decision and
examine the reasoning of the Supreme Court, which held that the FSIA should
be applied retroactively. Part IV will apply the analysis of Altmann to the Joo
and Abrams cases, and will speculate as to how the courts of appeals will decide
these cases in light of Altmann.
7. Id. at 2246.
8. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Altmann, 317
F.3d at 974.
9. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan Minister Yohei Kono, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 2834 (U.S. Jun. 9, 2004); Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v. Abrahams, 124 S. Ct. 2834-35
(U.S. June 14, 2004).
13. Joo, 332 F.3d at 679; Abrams, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003).
14. Id.
15. Hwang Guem Joo v. Japan, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004), vacated and remanded 332 F.3d 679 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Abrahams, 124 S. Ct. at 2834-35 (2004).
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H. BACKGROUND: AUSTRIA V. ALTMANN
Maria Altmann, the plaintiff in this case, seeks to recover six paintings by
the famous Austrian artist Gustav Klimt which were owned by her family before
the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany. 6 These paintings are currently
housed in the Austrian National Gallery, which is owned and operated by the
Republic of Austria. 7 The painings, valued at several million dollars, were
once owned by and displayed in the home of Altmann's uncle, Ferdinand
Bloch-Bauer, a wealthy sugar baron.'" Bloch-Bauer's wife, Adele, was the
subject of two of the paintings.' 9 Mrs. Bloch-Bauer died in 1925, and in her
will, asker her husband to bequeath the paintings to the Austrian National
Gallery after his death.2' Bloch-Bauer, who was the legal owner of the paint-
ings, never executed any documents transferring ownership to the Gallery. 2' His
will bequeathed his estate in its entirety to Ms. Altmann and two other family
members.22
In 1938 the Nazis invaded and annexed Austria. Ferdinand, a Jew, was
forced to flee the country and leave everything behind.24 The Nazis took over
his home in Vienna and divided up his artwork, which included several other
valuable paintings and a large porcelain collection.2' The Nazi lawyer in charge
of liquidating Mr. Bloch-Bauer's estate "donated" two of the paintings to the
Gallery in exchange for another painting." The "donation" included a note
claiming to deliver the paintings as per the request in Adele Bloch-Bauer's
will.27 The note was signed "Heil Hitler. ' 28 Two of the other Klimt paintings
were sold to museums, one to the Austrian National Museum and one to the
Museum of the City of Vienna. 9 The fifth painting was sold to a third party,
16. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2245.
17. Michael D. Murray, Stolen Art and Sovereign Immunity: The Case ofAltmann v. Austria, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 301, 303 (2004).
18. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2243-44.
21. Id. at 2244.
22. Id.
23. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2244.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Murray, supra note 17, at 304.
27. Altmann, 124 S Ct. at 2245.
28. Id.
29. Murray, supra note 17, at 304.
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who later donated it to the Gallery.3" The fate of the sixth painting is not
known."
In 1946, Austria passed a law declaring all transactions motivated by Nazi
ideology to be null and void. 2 The artwork, however, was not automatically
returned to the rightful owners.33 Austrian law required anyone wishing to
export seized art to gain permission from the Austrian Federal Monument
Agency.34 The agency usually required the original owners of the art to re-pay
the purchase price to the government or to trade other artworks in exchange for
the seized property.35 In response to this new law, Ms. Altmann's brother hired
an Austrian lawyer to recover the artwork stolen from their uncle by the Nazis.36
In 1948, the attorney contacted the gallery, requesting the paintings be
returned.37 The Gallery stated that the paintings were donated in accordance
with the will of Adele Bloch-Bauer and would not be returned.3"
Recently, Austria passed a new law under which individuals who had been
forced to donate art in exchange for export permits could reclaim their
"donated" art." This new law prompted Ms. Altmann to initiate a lawsuit
against the government in Austria.4" Unlike the United States court system,
court costs in Austria are proportional to the value of the damages or property
sought.4' In this case, the artwork is worth several million dollars, and for the
suit to proceed in Austria, Ms. Altmann would have been required to pay
approximately $200,000.42 Unable to pay this amount, Ms. Altmann voluntarily
dismissed her suit and re-filed it in the United States District Court for the
30. Id.
31. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2244.
32. Id.
33. Id. The Austrian Republic required the original owners of the property to re-pay the purchaser
of the property, seized and sold to them by the Nazis, the purchase price before the property was returned to
the original, rightful owner. Id
34. Id.
35. Id.; Murray, supra note 17, at 304.
36. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2244.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2245. The law provides restitution to those whose artwork had been donated to the gallery
in exchange for export permits to transport other works of art from the country. Id.
40. Id.
41. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2245. Austrian filing fees are determined by the amount in controversy.
Id.
42. Id.
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Central District of California.43 As previously stated, Austria moved to dismiss,
claiming foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 4
III. FSIA
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 codified the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity that was established in 1952.45 By enacting the
FSIA, Congress intended to clarify the circumstances in which federal courts
would have jurisdiction over foreign nations and transfer immunity decision-
making to the judiciary.4 6 The responsibility of sovereign immunity decision-
making had previously rested with the executive branch.47 The United States
Congress determined that because of the long, convoluted history of foreign
sovereign immunity, a statute was necessary to determine exactly which entity
had the power to decide the immunity of a country.4"
It is generally accepted that the concept of foreign sovereign immunity
originated from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon.49 In that case, the Chief Justice understood the concept of foreign
sovereign immunity to be a jurisdictional issue, not one of substantive law.50
Marshall reasoned that foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of comity, and
one in which the executive branch is best suited to make decisions.5' In accord
with that opinion, the Supreme Court generally deferred to the decisions of the
executive branch.52 Foreign states who were sued in the United States usually
requested sovereign immunity from the executive branch, and in most cases it
was granted.53 This all changed in 1952, with the Tate Letter.54
Before 1952, the United States adhered to the theory of absolute sovereign
immunity, and the executive branch requested immunity in actions against
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2246.
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2004); Alfred Dunham of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-
15(1976) (citing Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952)).
46. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 6605 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
47. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2247.
48. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
49. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 17, at 306; Altmann, S. Ct. at 2247.
50. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
51. Id. at 137.
52. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486-87 (1983); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943); Rep. of Mex. v. Hofman, 324 U.S. 30, 33-36 (1945).
53. Verlinden B. V, 461 U.S. at 486.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, CH. 5, pt. IV,
introductory note (1987);Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248.
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foreign sovereigns who were "friends" of the United States." Under this theory,
a sovereign could not be sued in the courts of another country without its
permission.16  However, in 1952, the State Department determined that
immunity should no longer be granted in all cases.57 In what is now known as
the "Tate Letter," Jack Tate, the Acting Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State,
announced to the Attorney General that the State Department would now apply
the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity.58 Under the restrictive theory,
the sovereign is immune from claims arising from governmental activity, but
not from activities stemming from commercial activities conducted by the
state.59
This policy change had little impact on the procedures used by sovereigns
who wanted to be granted immunity; the foreign state still asked the executive
branch for immunity.60  However, problems now arose from the executive
branch attempting to grant immunity to a sovereign under the new restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity. 6' The executive branch attempted to confer
sovereign immunity on countries that now had no right to it under the newly
adopted restrictive theory.62 In addition, if a sovereign did not request immunity
through the executive branch, the responsibility of resolving the question of
immunity was left to the courts to determine.63 Thus, decisions of whether to
grant foreign sovereign immunity were made by two different branches of
government, yielding non-uniform decisions.'
Congress attempted to rectify these problems by passing the FSIA.65
Generally, the Act grants immunity to foreign states. However, a certain
number of exceptions, including an commercial activity exception, may subject
foreign countries to lawsuits in the United States66 Generally, the commercial
activity exception disallows the granting of sovereign immunity to countries that
engage in commercial business transaction within the United States.67 The
Supreme Court recognized that the FSIA removed existing federal jurisdiction
55. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248.
56. Id.
57. AlfredDunham of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 711.
58. Id.
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS § 451 (1987).
60. Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 487.
61. Id. at 487-88.
62. Id. at 487.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 488.
65. Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 488.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2004).
67. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
over foreign sovereigns from a number of statutes and placed federal jurisdic-
tion exclusively in the FSIA.68 The statute simply reallocated jurisdictional
granting authority.69 The statute did not create jurisdiction where none existed
previously." This all seems pretty clear, and courts have not had problems with
this proposition.7 Courts have had problems, however, determining when to
apply the statute to certain cases.72
Confusion over which cases the FSIA is to be applied to stems from the
vague language of the statute.73 Section 1602, the preamble of the FSIA, states
"claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts
of the United States... in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter., 74 Courts have interpreted the use of the word "henceforth" in many
different ways.75 Unfortunately, the House Report on the FSIA provides no
clarity for the courts.76
In Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the use of the word
"henceforth" to mean that the FSIA should apply to all cases after its enactment,
regardless of when the cause of action accrued.7 In addition, that court found
that application of the FSIA to the case would only effect a change of
jurisdiction, not a change of substantive law, and applying it retroactively would
not prejudice either of the parties.78 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in its decision of Altmann agreed with the Princz court, and further stated that
Austria could not have had any expectation that foreign sovereign immunity
would have been extended to it for the wrongful appropriation of Jewish
property.79 In fact, the United States government made it clear in 1949 that it
would not condone any transactions in which property was wrongly
68. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428, 428-38 (1989).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997); Verlinden B. V 461
U.S. at 493-94.
72. See, e.g., Princz v. Federal Republic ofGermany, 26 F.3d 1166,1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994);Altmann,
317 F.3d at 963; Joo, 332 F.3d at 687; Abrams, 332 F.3d at 185.
73. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2004).
75. See, e.g., Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170;Altmann, 317 F.3d at 963;Joo, 332 F.3dat 686;Abrams, 332
F.3d at 185.
76. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 at (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
77. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.
78. Id.
79. Altmann, 317 F.3d at 965.
Adelman2004]
180 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 11:173
appropriated by the Nazis.8" It is well settled that the FSIA does not infringe on
any substantive rights held by a country at the time an act occurred; it only
affects the jurisdiction of the country when pertaining to its commercial
activities."
The District of Columbia circuit and the second circuit in per curium
opinions did not interpret the use of the word "henceforth" in the same
manner.82 These courts concluded that the word "henceforth" can support
several different meanings, and that Congress did not clearly express how to
apply the statute with respect to events occurring before the statute was passed.83
With that in mind, these courts have decided to apply a plain language
interpretation to the word, and simply apply the FSIA only to events occurring
after its enactment.84 Past decisions notwithstanding, it is clear that courts did
not agree on how the FSIA should be applied and were in need of some type of
direction from the Supreme Court. This direction fimally came in June of 2004
with the announcement of the ruling in Republic of Austria v. Altmann.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AUSTRIA V. ALTMANN
On June 7, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in the case of
Republic of Austria v. Altmann." The Court considered whether the FSIA
applied to claims that were based on conduct occurring before the passage of the
Act.86 The Court concluded that the FSIA does apply retroactively to claims
occurring before the passage of the Act, and before the official adoption of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 1976.87 The Altmann case was
granted review after the ninth circuit denied Austria's Motion to Dismiss.88
Austria raised an argument of foreign sovereign immunity in two ways. First,
it argued that as of 1948, when the alleged events occurred, Austria would have
been protected by absolute immunity.89 Second, it contended that the FSIA
cannot be applied retroactively, thereby maintaining its privilege of absolute
80. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to the attorneys for the
plaintiff in Civil Action No. 31-555 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Apr. 27,
1949) Jack Tate, Letter from the Acting Legal Advisor to the Attorney General, reprinted in 26 Dep't St. Bull.
984 (1952).
81. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 17, at 304; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 966; Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2246.
82. Joo, 332 F.3d at 686; Abrams, 332 F.3d at 184.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2256.
86. Id. at 2243.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2246.
89. Id.
Adelman
immunity.90 Specifically, Austria argued that it enjoyed the privilege of
absolute immunity in 1948, and that retroactive application of the FSIA would
strip it of this privilege, which would be impermissible. 9' Both the district court
and the court of appeals ruled that applying the FSIA retroactively to Austria's
alleged wrongdoing in 1948 was not impermissive because the United States
had made it well known to all nations that it would not condone any transactions
in which property was wrongly appropriated by the Nazis.92
The Court first clarified an assumption of the district court concerning
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, a case on which the district court relied
heavily.93 The default rule announced in Landgraf is as follows: if Congress
has made no clear expression of its intent, a court must then determine if
applying the statute retroactively would affect substantive or procedural rights.94
If the statute affects either of these rights, it may not be applied retroactively.95
However, when the Landgraf rule had been applied in the past, it did not yield
a uniform result.96 Due to the nature ofjurisdictional granting statutes, they can
be viewed as both substantive and procedural law. 97 As a result, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested that the decision of retroactive
application be made on a case-by-case basis.9
In Landgraf the Court considered whether Section 102 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 applied to an employment discrimination case that was pending on
appeal at the time the new law was passed: the law in effect at the time the
decision was rendered, or the law in effect at the time the incident occurred. 99
The Court recognized that "retroactivity is not favored in the law," and that
"congressional enactments ... will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result."'" The presumption against
retroactive application stems from considerations of fairness replete in
American law, that individuals should be able to know what the law is in order
90. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2246.
91. Id.
92. Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1199;Altmann, 317 F.3d at 965.
93. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2246.
94. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
95. Id.
96. Yonatan Lupu & Clay Risen, Retroactive Application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
LandgrafAnalysis and the Political Question Doctrine, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 251 (2003).
97. Lupu, supra note 96 at 250.
98. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 186; Lupu, supra at 252.
99. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 264.
100. Id.
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to conduct themselves accordingly.11 Generally, if Congress has not made its
intention clear, courts have declined to apply legislation retroactively.°
2
The Court recognized that retroactive application was extremely important
to statutes concerning substantive law, or rights that an individual or entity has,
but that it was not as important in statutes concerning jurisdiction. 1 3
Jurisdictional statutes merely change the court that is to hear the case, and do
not seek to change the substantive law on which the case will be decided."°
Thus, arguably to apply a statute of this type retroactively would neither grant
nor take away any substantive rights because it affects jurisdiction only. 0 5
However, the Supreme Court determined that the FSIA is not capable of
categorization; it is an amalgamation of both procedural and substantive law.0 6
Next, the Court examined the specific language of the FSIA.' °7 The Court
found it patently clear from the preamble of the Act that the FSIA would apply
to all post-enactment claims of immunity.' In doing so, it found convincing
evidence that Congress intended the Act to apply to pre-enactment conduct.109
The Court examined the language surrounding the word "henceforth."" 0
Specifically, the Act states "claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in
conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.""' The Court examined
the Congressional intent and determined that the purpose of the word
"henceforth" is for the statute to apply to all claims of immunity arising after the
Act was passed." 2 Therefore, all claims of immunity should be decided in
accordance with the FSIA regardless of when the events occurred.
Lastly, the Court looked at the congressional purpose behind the passage
of the FSIA. Congress sought to accomplish two main goals by enacting the
FSIA: to clarify the rules judges apply when dealing with claims of sovereign
immunity and to clarify separations of powers between the judiciary and
executive with respect to these claims, by affirmatively conferring this power
101. I.N.S v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,316 (2001) (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo,
494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. LNS, 533 U.S. at 325.
103. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 274.
104. Id. at 275.
105. Id. at 274.
106. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2257.
107. Id. at 2252.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2253.
110. Id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2004).
112. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at2253.
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on the judiciary." 3 To accomplish these goals, Congress crafted a statutory
framework around the concept of foreign sovereign immunity.114 Rebutting an
argument that the FSIA should not be applied to claims that pre-date its
enactment, the Court stated that if this were allowed, the entire jurisdictional
scheme of the statute would be frustrated.' Moreover, the Court determined
that applying the FSIA to all pending cases, regardless of when the events
occurred, is most consistent with the Act's two main purposes.'16
The structure of the FSIA supports this conclusion." 7 Many provisions of
the Act apply to events occurring before its passage.'18 There has never been
any doubt that the Act's procedural provisions relating to venue, service, or
removal apply to all cases, irrespective of when the event occurred. 119 The
Court held that the FSIA should apply at the time the suit is brought, not the law
in effect at the time the events originally occurred. 2 ° Based on this, the Court
reasoned that it would be "anomalous" to assume that the FSIA should only be
applied in a prospective manner with regard to jurisdiction.121
Consequently, the decisions of the district court and the court of appeals
were affirmed.'22 However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
executive branch was still free to file amicus briefs, asking for a country to be
granted immunity.'23 This acknowledgement seems to suggest an alternate
course of action for foreign sovereigns desiring immunity. Finally, the Court
cautioned that this holding was extremely narrow, only answering only the
question of whether the FSIA could be applied retroactively.'24 The Supreme
Court refused to address any of the other issues brought up in the opinions of
the lower courts.'25 Although the holding may be narrow, the consequences of
this case may have a profound effect on two other cases pending before the
Court.
113. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
114. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at2253.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 497.
120. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2253.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2256.
123. Id. at 2255.
124. Id. at 2254.
125. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2254.
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V. JOO AND ABRAMS: RAMIFICATIONS OF ALTMANN
This year, the United States Supreme Court granted review to two cases
where, like Altmann, foreign sovereigns rely on the FSIA in their Motions to
Dismiss. 126 Both sovereigns, Japan and France, raise the FSIA as a defense to
jurisdiction by arguing that the underlying events in their respective cases
occurred before the Act was passed, and thus, the FSIA cannot be applied to
them.127 However, instead of hearing oral arguments from all parties, the Court
vacated the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the cases back to their
respective courts of appeals in light of the Altmann decision.' 28 The following
two sections will apply the analysis employed by the Supreme Court in
Altmann, and will proffer an opinion as to how the courts of appeal will
eventually decide these two cases.
A. Joo v. Japan
Fifteen former Japanese "comfort women," have brought suit against Japan
seeking monetary damages for being victimized through sexual slavery and
torture by members of the Japanese Army during World War H. 129 The women
allege the government of Japan abducted and forced them to serve as "comfort
women" i.e. sex slaves, for the Japanese Army near the front lines of the war. 3°
The women, who were not citizens of the United States, were able to file suit
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allows foreign citizens to bring
claims against each other in American courts.' 31 Since 1991, comfort women
from several countries have attempted to seek redress in Japanese courts; all
have been unsuccessful. 3 2 The unfortunate legal situation in Japan may be
attributed to the fact that, unlike Germany or Austria, Japan has yet to pass
legislation requiring the government to compensate victims from its wars.' 33 In
addition, it may be difficult to render an impartial verdict in the courts of Japan
because women filing lawsuits of this type have been met with numerous
technical barriers as well as hostility from the courts.' Presumably, comfort
126. See cases cited supra note 12
127. Joo, 332 F.3d at 680; Abrams, 332 F.3d at 175-76.
128. See cases cited supra note 12.
129. Joo, 332 F.3d at 680.
130. Id. at 681.
131. 28U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
132. Barry A. Fisher, Japan's Postwar Compensation Litigation, 22 WHrrTIER L. REv. 35, 43-44
(2000).
133. Fisher, supra note 132, at 36.
134. Byoungwook Park, Comfort Women During World War I" Are U.S. Courts a Final Resort for
Justice?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 403, 408 (2002).
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women have been met with this response because the lawsuits are not supported
by concurring legislation or executive orders.1 35 These factors have rendered the
Japanese courts virtually impenetrable to the claims of comfort women, and
therefore, the group filed suit in the United States. 36
In 2000, the women filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. 37 Japan raised a defense of sovereign immunity
under FSIA in its Motion to Dismiss, and the motion was granted.138 The
district court failed to reach a conclusion on the issue of whether the FSIA
applies retroactively to events occurring before its enactment. 139 That court did,
however, conclude that the case presented a non-justiciable political question,
inappropriate for judicial review."4
The women appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit where the decision of the lower court was affirmed. 141 That
court held that the FSIA did not apply to events occurring before the Act's
passage.42 The court of appeals recognized that the FSIA provides the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court.'43 However,
the court declined to apply the statute retroactively because it would "upset the
settled expectations of foreign sovereigns."' 44 This proposition stems from the
fact that, in the 1940s, when these events occurred, the Unites States operated
under the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.1
45
In Altmann, the Supreme Court addressed these concerns directly by
stating that the main purpose behind the concept of foreign sovereign immunity
has not been to help foreign countries shape their action in reliance of immunity,
but to allow countries to avoid the inconvenience of a lawsuit in another country
as a matter of comity. 1"6 Japan's argument that its expectations of immunity
would be frustrated if the FSIA were applied retroactively must fail. Japan or
any other country for that matter, engaging in behavior of this type should not
be granted a protection of immunity simply because the country thought at the
time it was immune from lawsuits.
135. Park, supra note 134, at 409.
136. Park, supra note 134, at 413.
137. Joo, 332 F.3d at 681.
138. Joo, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
139. Id. at 58.
140. Id. at 67.
141. Joo, 332 F.3d at 687.
142. Id. at 681.
143. Id. at 682.
144. Id. at 683.
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, ch. 5, pt. IV, introductory note (1987).
146. Dole Foods Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003).
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Notably, the court of appeals in Joo argued that it can be distinguished
from Altmann because of the existence of the Treaty of Peace, signed by Japan
and the Allied Powers in 195 1.147 The Treaty waives "all claims of the Allied
Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its
nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war."'4 8 The Treaty explains
that any war-related claims would be resolved through inter-governmental
agreements. 4 9 The court of appeals reasoned that it was because of this treaty
that jurisdiction could not be exercised over Japan.1 51 In Austria there was no
similar treaty. 15' The court reasoned that in the absence of any specific direction
from Congress as to how the FSIA should be applied, it should interpret the
statute using its plain meaning, and not apply it retroactively.1
52
However, foreign sovereign immunity could be denied sovereign immunity
under the FSIA for two reasons. 153 First, Japan may have explicitly waived
immunity when it accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration concerning
war crimes committed during World War B."4 Second, Japan may have
executed an implied waiver of sovereign immunity when it violatedjus cogens
norms by violating the human rights of its citizens. 55 The FSIA states that a
foreign sovereign shall not be entitled to immunity if it has explicitly waived its
sovereign immunity.'56 Japan may have done so when it accepted the terms of
the Potsdam Declaration, acknowledging that it would be subject to war crime
litigation.157
Nonetheless, implicit waiver could be found in the second instance, where
a violation of a jus cogens norm has occurred. Jus cogens norms, which
developed out of the customs and common law of civilized nations, are so
fundamental to basic human rights that they cannot be affected by treaty or
otherwise. 158  Generally, jus cogens norms have included rules prohibiting
147. Joo, 332 F.3d at 684.
148. Treaty of Peace, Apr. 28, 1952, Republic of China-Japan, 138 U.N.T.S. 3.
149. Id.
150. Joo, 332 F.3d at 685.
151. Id.
152. Id.; I.N.S., 533 U.S. at 325.
153. Park, supra note 134, at 431.
154. Park, supra note 134, at 433. The Pottsdam declaration stated the terms under which the allied
powers would halt their war against Japan, Id.
155. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 331(2)(b) (1987).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2004).
157. Park, supra note 134, at 433. Although, there may be a problem with this agreement because
unless the agreement expressly states that the foreign sovereign is subject to lawsuits in the U.S., entering into
the agreement will not constitute an explicit waiver under the FSIA. Id.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 331, cmt. e (1987).
genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid, and other extreme violations of
human rights.'59 These norms prevail over all agreements and invalidate rules
of international law in conflict with them. 60 Therefore, if Japan is found to
have violated ajus cogens norm, its sovereign immunity should be stripped, and
it should be made to answer for its actions. However, one of the main problems
for the comfort women in Joo is that most human rights claims have not been
brought against foreign sovereigns, but individuals.' 61 Courts in the United
States have not yet allowed an exception to immunity under the FSIA for ajus
cogens violation. 62 If citizens of a foreign country are allowed to sue their
resident country in American courts, the fear is that the United States may
interfere too deeply into foreign relations, and courts will venture outside the
boundaries of the judiciary and interfere with the powers of another branch.1
63
In spite of this, the courts of the United States should consider an exception to
their past decisions maintaining sovereign immunity over countries that have
engaged in civil rights abuses.
There have been examples of waiving immunity as a result of ajus cogens
norm violation in other countries. In Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic
of Germany, a Greek court disallowed Germany to retain sovereign immunity
because it found the country had violated a jus cogens norm. 6" The court
determined that the actions of the Nazis were an "abuse of sovereign power,"
on which Germany was not entitled to raise an immunity defense.'65 United
States courts have not ruled in conformity with this idea, but that they have
addressed the issue in dicta. In the Princz decision, Judge Wald, in her dissent,
advocated the disallowance of sovereign immunity where ajus cogens violation
was found. 66 Thus, the violation of ajus cogens norm provides an alternate
means of disallowing sovereign immunity in this case. On remand, the court of
appeal should follow Judge Wald's urging and carve out an exception, since this
group of individuals would not be able to receive a fair and impartial verdict in
their own country.
Ultimately, since courts have determined that the FSIA does not affect the
substantive rights of a country, there seems to be no reason why the statute
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1987).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102, cmt. k (1987).
161. Stephen J. Schnably, International Decisions: Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 92 AM J. INT'L
L. 768, 770 (1998).
162. Schnably, supra note 161, at 770.
163. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
164. Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative
Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM J. INT'L L. 741, 752 (2003).
165. Caplan, supra note 164, at 14-15.
166. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1179 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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could not be applied retroactively in this case.'67 A country should not be able
to determine the type of activities it engages in based on an expectation of
immunity; that would be an unethical use of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
Nevertheless, it appears that is the situation the court is presented with here.
Japan should not have condoned this activity of its military knowing it was in
violation of its own laws, or even international law. This country should be
made to answer for the human rights abuses committed by its own soldiers. In
light of this, the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit should
deny the Motion to Dismiss. However, this case is distinguishable from
Altmann. There was no treaty to consider in Altmann, and here there is. The
Treaty of Peace effectively gives Japan immunity from suit in a legal forum. As
the Treaty of Peace is in place, the court will have to weigh the policy
considerations of conferring immunity on Japan and determine the best course
of action of all involved parties. If not for the Treaty, the court of appeals
would reverse the district court, allow the suit to go through, and rule in
accordance with Altmann.
B. Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais
The Abrams case is a class action against the French National Railroad
Company (FNRC) for the alleged deportation of Jews and others from France
to Nazi death camps during World War II.168 The twelve plaintiffs allege that
when the FNRC transported these individuals to the Nazi camps, it committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law. 169 The FNRC
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, maintaining that it had
sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 17 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granted the FNRCs Motion to Dismiss.'7 ' The
district court concluded that the claim did not fall within any of the FSIA
exceptions, and thus was not subject to jurisdiction in a United States court.17 1
In dicta, the court stated that the FSIA applies to all legal action initiated after
its enactment, regardless of when the underlying events occurred. 1
73
In the appeal at the circuit court level, the appellees (plaintiffs) argued that
the FSIA should not be applied retroactively, because it would affect the rights
167. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 17, at 305; Altmann, 317 F.3d at 967; Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2246.
168. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 174.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins de Fer Frances, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423,450 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
172. Id. at 428-29, 50.
173. Id. at 450.
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of the FNRC at the time the underlying events occurred, and render the
appellees powerless to pursue the claim (emphasis added).'74 The appellees
believe that questions of jurisdiction and immunity should be answered based
on the law in effect at the time the events occurred, the 1940s.1 75 In the 1940s,
the FNRC would not have been entitled to foreign sovereign immunity because
it was privately owned. 76 Now, the railroad is owned and operated by the
French government, thus raising sovereign immunity as a defense to jurisdiction
in United States courts.1 77 The circuit court wrestled with the question of
whether the FSIA can be applied to this case even though the events that
precipitated it occurred before the act was passed.1 78 The court agreed with the
appellees that there is no clear legislative intent directing how the statute should
be applied with respect to the timing of the events.
179
The court applied the Landgrafanalysis.8 ' It determined that there was no
clear guidance as to whether the statute should be applied retroactively."' The
court then considered whether applying the FSIA would upset settled
expectations, change, or take away certain vested rights.'82 The court
determined that if a new statute is phrased in jurisdictional terms, but also
deprives a plaintiff of a claim, applying it retroactively is impermissible.'83 The
court encounters the same situation in this case. If applied to the case today, the
FSIA would bar suit against the FNRC because it is now controlled by the
French government which is entitled to sovereign immunity.'84 Although it is
recognized that the FSIA does not infringe on any substantive rights held by a
country at the time an act occurred, if applied in this case, the FSIA will infringe
on the rights of the plaintiffs to bring suit. 8' Therefore, if applied retroactively
in Abrams, the FSIA would extinguish the claim altogether.
In Altmann, the Supreme Court recognized that retroactivity is not favored
in the law, but that retroactive application was permissible for jurisdiction-
conferring statutes."' The Court determined that if a statute only affects
174. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 175.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 176.
178. Id. at 180.
179. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 180.
180. Id. at 184.
181. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 185.
182. Id.
183. Id.; Lupu, supra note 96, at 245.
184. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 186.
185. Id. at 185.
186. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2250.
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procedure, it may be applied retroactively.1 87 In this case, however, retroactive
application of the statute will not just affect procedure, it will deny the claim
altogether. 88 In light of this, the court of appeals should reverse the decision of
the district court and allow the suit to proceed. If the court issues this ruling, it
will not affect the sovereign immunity of France. France will still retain
sovereign immunity, but it will be subject to litigation from the actions of the
railroad under its private ownership. The court, however, may elect to employ
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and refuse to hear the case. 89
This doctrine gives a court the discretion to dismiss a suit otherwise
properly before it.' 90 The first step in any forum non conveniens analysis,
before a court considers the public and private factors, is to determine whether
a suitable alternate forum exists to hear the dispute in another country. 19' If no
suitable alternative exists, then the analysis should end there and the court
should proceed with its adjudication. 192 The court must then balance public and
private interests to determine whether it is in the best interest of all involved
parties to move the case to another forum.' 93 Private considerations include
"relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses... and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive."' 94 Public factors to consider include judicial
economy, conflict of laws, or the application of foreign law.' 95 However, the
Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, stated that the plaintiff's initial
choice of forum deserves substantial weight and defendants should not be
allowed to engage in reverse forum shopping through the employ of forum non
conveniens. 96 What is most important to consider in this case is that if personal
jurisdiction may be exercised over the defendant, France, it should be. Since the
claim stems from atrocities of the Holocaust, the courts of the United States
187. Id.
188. Abrams, 332 F.3d at 185.
189. The court of appeals is unlikely to consider forum non convenience at this point in the litigation.
This section of the paper focuses on how the court of appeals will decide the Abrams case on remand, and the
sole issue of determination is whether the FSIA will be applied retroactively.
190. Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty-U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International Law, 52
DEPAUL L. REv. 627, 634 (2002).
191. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
192. Id.
193. Stephan, supra note 190 at 634.
194. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508.
195. Id. at 508-09.
196. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 244 (1981).
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should not shrink from this opportunity to force countries participating in these
events to answer for their crimes.
Abrams should be distinguished from Altmann. The Abrams case is
couched in a manner that explains the consequences for the plaintiff. Altmann
speaks to the harm that may or may not befall the defendant. The ruling of the
court of appeals will affect whether this group of individuals, whose family
members were transported to Nazi concentration camps by the French railroad
company in the 1940s, will be able to seek legal relief for their injuries. By
allowing an exception to retroactive application of the FSIA, and allowing this
class action to proceed, the court of appeals will act in compliance with the
Altmann decision. More importantly, the court of appeals must not forget that
this case arose from events occurring during the Holocaust, and in the interest
of public policy, the claims of the group must be addressed.'97 However, if the
court does not carve out an exception, and simply applies the statute retro-
actively, without regard to the underlying facts, the claim will be extinguished
altogether, and the parties who initiated the suit will never see justice done.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the legal system strives for equality and justice, it is hard to
please everyone, and many times, justice may not necessarily prevail. Even if
the ultimate goal of the courts is to avoid unfair prejudice to a party, it is
inevitable that one party will leave the courtroom unhappy. Suits involving
sovereign immunity are no exception. The concept of sovereign immunity
developed from a sense of comity between nations. Foreign nations,
recognizing that the cost of defending a lawsuit in a foreign country and
possible resulting damages could have dire economic consequences, came to an
understanding that they must protect themselves via sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity additionally preserves the concept of non-intervention in
international affairs. 198 The Altmann decision, which addresses these concepts,
has the potential for far reaching effects for victims of repressive regimes
throughout the world, and the effect that Altmann has over other cases has only
just begun with the two cases discussed here.
In Altmann, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of retroactive
application of the FSIA. Recognizing that sovereign immunity should not help
foreign countries shape their actions in reliance of immunity, but allow them to
avoid the inconvenience of a lawsuit in another country, the Court allowed
197. Svetlana Shirinova, Challenges to Establishing Jurisdiction Over Holocaust Era Claims in
Federal Court, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 159, 189 (2004).
198. Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person "? Does it Matter?: Personal Jurisdiction, Due
Process, andthe Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. INT'L. L. & POL. 115, 149 (2001).
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retroactive application of the FSIA.'99 Japan argued in Joo that the FSIA should
not apply retroactively, because this type of application would upset settled
expectations of immunity. Japan's argument must fail because it directly
opposes the purpose of sovereign immunity, allowing countries to avoid law-
suits as a matter of convenience, not helping to shape their actions in reliance
of it. Therefore, Japan, or any other country for that matter, engaging in
behavior of this type should not be granted a protection of immunity simply
because the country thought at the time it was immune from lawsuits. The
plaintiffs in Joo will have a strong argument by contending that a violation of
jus cogens norms waives any shield of immunity. United States courts have
been reluctant to rule in this manner in the past, and the argument will probably
prove unsuccessful. 2°° However, as the Treaty of Peace is in place, Japan is
immune from lawsuits, and the court of appeals will have no choice but to grant
Japan's Motion to Dismiss.
Recognizing that retroactivity is not favored in the law, the Supreme Court
supports retroactive application for jurisdiction-conferring statutes.20' The
Abrams decision shows that a United States citizen who brings suit against a
foreign sovereign could be prejudiced unfairly. In this case, retroactive appli-
cation of the statute affects procedure, but extinguishes a claim simultaneously.
That an entire country could be allowed immunity from a lawsuit for actions
that should have never occurred in the first place does not correlate.
To allow countries to retain sovereign immunity because of possibly
upsetting their settled expectations of immunity is a questionable practice.
Granting immunity based on this idea would allow countries to act however
they wish, without limits, and may even encourage illegal or immoral behavior.
Behavior of this type should never be condoned by the United States. This is
not to say that the United States should attempt to right every wrong in the
world. The concept of sovereign immunity also touches on the doctrine of non-
intervention, that each country has a realm of authority unto its own.2 °2 When
countries begin to venture outside of their realm into that of another, problems
arise.2"3 The Vietnam War or the War in Iraq stand as modem day examples of
this. Certainly, there are some instances in which the United States could use
its power in the judiciary to address concerns from foreign citizens, and not
delve too deeply into foreign affairs. The three cases discussed here are
illustrative of the limited circumstances in which the United States should step
199. Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 479.
200. Schnably supra note 161, at 770; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 102, cmt.
k (1987).
201. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2250.
202. Halverson, supra note 198, at 149; Caplan, supra note 164, at 752.
203. Caplan, supra note 164, at 753.
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in and take action. Human rights abuses are a violation ofjus cogens norms.
By allowing this type of behavior to escape legal consequences, the United
States is implicitly condoning it. Accordingly, the courts of the United States
should apply the FSIA in a retroactive fashion, as in Altmann, and address the
abuses committed by these countries. In doing so, courts will adhere to the
basic principles of Altmann, and still allow parties that bring suit to have a fair
chance at justice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2004, the United States introduced a Resolution to the United
Nations Security Council for a third year in a row, requesting it to exempt from
the International Criminal Court (ICC) all current and former troops and
personnel from non-International Criminal Court member states, like the United
States, who serve on United Nations' missions.' If approved this year, the
Resolution would have renewed Resolution 1487, which was adopted by the
Security Council on June 12, 2003 and which was itself a renewal of Resolution
1422, adopted by the Security Council on July 12, 2002.2 The vote for the
Resolution was scheduled for May 21 st, but was later postponed indefinitely
when the Security Council realized that the United States might not receive
enough support to secure the passage of the Resolution, given the recent
revelations of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.3 In order for the
Resolution to pass, nine out of the fifteen members of the Security Council had
* J.D. candidate 2006, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; Graduated
Magna Cum Laude from the University of Miami; ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law.
1. US. Renews Demand for ICC Exemption for UN Peacekeepers, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL
SOLUTIONS, June 22, 2004, at http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/news/unscrenewal.html.
2. CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC (June 30, 2004), at
http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/icc/resources/uspolicy.html.
3. U.S. Renews Demand for ICC Exemption for UN Peacekeepers, supra note 1.
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to vote in favor of it.4 However, seven member countries including Spain,
Brazil, France, Germany, Benin, Chile and China, had already made clear their
intentions to abstain during this round of votes, thus making it impossible for
the Resolution to attain the required votes. '
In light of the ubiquitous reports published around the world, revealing
United States soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners, and given the Security Council
members refusal to immunize from the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction United States troops and personnel, especially those responsible for
the prisoner abuses, the United States decided not to pursue the renewal of
Resolution 1487 any further.6 Finally on June 23rd, the United States withdrew
its request from the Security Council to renew Resolution 1487. 7 The decision
not to seek a renewal of Resolution 1487, which expired on June 30, 2004, did
not change, however, the position of the United States regarding the exemption
of United States troops from the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction.8
In fact, during a State Department's Press Briefing carried out on the same day
the United States announced its decision to withdraw the Resolution, the United
States spokesman, Richard Boucher, expressed the following:
[W]e believe that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
... can't be established over nationals of states that are not party to
the Rome [S]tatue and that, therefore, that Americans and others who
are not members of the Rome [S]tatute, who participate in United
Nations peacekeeping, need to be protected from some kind of
misguided prosecution because of actions they might undertake while
participating in those operations. 9
The question that arises then, is whether despite withdrawing the
Resolution, the United States was justified this year in seeking an exemption for
its troops and personnel from the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, in
light of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal?
This issue deserves some attention for various important reasons. Since the
International Criminal Court, which prosecutes criminals that have committed
war crimes, crimes of genocide, and crimes against humanity, 0 came into being
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See U.S. Withdraws Its Demands for Peacekeeping Exemption Renewal, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL
SOLUTIONS, June 23, 2004, at http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/news/nounscrenewal.html.
7. Id.
8. See Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State Spokesman, Press Briefing (June 23, 2004),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/33845.htm.
9. Id.
10. Makau Mutua, America and the International Criminal Court, NATION (Nairobi), Jan. 11, 2004,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2004/011 Iamerica.htm.
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on July 1, 2002, the United States has consistently opposed it and has expressed
its opposition by seeking exemptions for its troops from prosecution by the
International Criminal Court." The exemption the United States sought this
year was the third consecutive one. 2 The reason this exemption deserves atten-
tion, is that it was sought at a time when the United States was being criticized
for committing the same type of crimes it went to war with Iraq to prevent. 13
This issue deserves additional attention because although American troops
tortured the Abu Ghraib prisoners, they will not, however, be prosecuted for
these crimes by the International Criminal Court, given that the International
Criminal Court currently has no jurisdiction over the action of United States
soldiers in Iraq."4 This means that current United States war crimes committed
in Iraq will go unpunished by the International Criminal Court '" There is a
possibility in the future, however, that United States troops accused of engaging
in massive human rights violations in International Criminal Court member
states could be subject to prosecution by the International Criminal Court. 6 In
such cases, if the Security Council had granted the United States an exemption
for its troops from prosecution by the International Criminal Court, then it
would have placed the United States above international law and these crimes
would have once again gone unpunished by the International Criminal Court. 7
In light of the aforementioned facts, this article aims to establish that the
United States was not justified in seeking an exemption of its troops from
prosecution by the International Criminal Court, in light of the prisoner abuse
scandal. The first section of the article will provide the background history of
the International Criminal Court and the detailed reasons why the United States
has opposed the International Criminal Court in the past and continues to do so
today. The second section of the article will illustrate the past and current
efforts made by the United States to exempt its troops from the International
Criminal Court's jurisdiction. Lastly, this paper will analyze why the United
States was not justified in seeking the exemption for its troops from the
International Criminal Court this year.
11. See also U.S. Renews Demand for ICC Exemption for UN Peacekeepers, supra, note 1.
12. Id.
13. See Matua, supra note 10.
14. See Associated Press, U.S. Drops U.N. Bid for War Crime Shield, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004
(explaining that American troops in Iraq are currently not open to prosecution by the ICC, given that neither
Iraq nor the US are member states of the ICC).
15. See id.
16. See Colum Lynch, U.S. Alters Its Plan for Exemption at Court, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at
A13, (explaining that US troops that have committed human rights violations could be subject to prosecution
by the ICC if US courts refuse to try them).
17. See id.
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II. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE UNITED
STATES OPPOSITION
Attempts by the international community to create a permanent inter-
national war tribunal have is not a recent trend. The international community
had attempted numerous times in the past to establish an international tribunal
responsible for prosecuting egregious crimes against humanity. For example,
after the failed attempts to establish an International Tribunal after World War
I, the international community successfully established the Tribunals of
Nuremberg and Tokyo, and in so doing, laid the foundation for international
criminal justice. 8 A few decades later international justice was further pursued
when the ad hoc Tribunals of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia were also
established, and which have now been operating for nearly ten years. 9 Most
recently, in 1995, negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court began at the United Nations, based on a draft statute prepared and then
adopted by the International Law Commission in July 1994."° If ratified by
sixty states, the Rome Statute, which details the Courts jurisdiction, structure,
and function, would enter into force, thereby establishing the world's first
independent and permanent International Criminal Court.2
Finally, on July 7, 1998, the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court was adopted at an international conference in Rome by 120
states.22 Four years later, on July 1, 2002, after the sixtieth instrument of ratifi-
cation was delivered to the Secretary General, the Statute entered into force,
making the International Criminal Court the first permanent international
tribunal.23 As of May 2004, with the ratification of Congo, the International
Criminal Court currently has ninety-four state parties, those states that have
ratified the Rome Statute, and 137 signatories.24
Although the United States supported the creation of the International Cri-
minal Court back in 1994, it nevertheless, remained highly critical of the Court.25
18. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, CHRONOLOGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ataglance/whatistheicc/chronology.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION, at www.icc-
cpi.int/ataglance/whatistheicc/history.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, STATUS OF THE ICC AND U.S. POLICY, JANUARY-MAY 2004
(June 9, 2004), at http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/faqs/spring2004.html.
25. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, §517(a) - (b), 108
Stat. 382 (1994). The United States Senate expressed its full support for the establishment of the ICC in the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995. Id. In Section 517 titled Sense of the Senate
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the Senate expressed the following:
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In 2000 when President Clinton signed the Rome Statute,26 he brought to light
the concerns he had over the scope of the International Criminal Court's
expansive jurisdiction.27 In a statement made by President Clinton the same day
he signed the Rome Statute, he expressed that although he had signed the
statute, he did not support its ratification since significant flaws still remained
in the statute.28  His main concern was that when the Court would start
functioning, it would not only exercise jurisdiction over troops and personnel
of states that had ratified the Rome Statute, but would also claim jurisdiction
over troops and personnel of states that had not ratified the Statute. 29 Despite
his dissatisfaction with the scope of the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction, President Clinton acknowledged that he had approved the signing
of the Statute to "reaffirm the United States strong support for international
accountability." 30
The concerns articulated by President Clinton in 2000, were similar to
those shared by President Bush in 2002, when he decided to nullify the United
States signature of the Rome Statute.3' President Bush was concerned that aside
from having jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes, crimes of genocide and
aggression, and crimes against humanity, 32 the International Criminal Court
would have jurisdiction not only over crimes committed by officials and
personnel from states that are a party to it, but also over crimes committed on
The freedom and security of the international community rests on the sanctity of the
rule of law. The international community is increasingly threatened by unlawful acts
such as war crimes, genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity.. It is the sense of
the Senate that (1) the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction
over crimes of an international character would greatly strengthen the international rule
of law; (2) such court would thereby serve the interests of the United States and the
world community; and (3) the United States delegation should make every effort to
advance this proposal at the United Nations.
Id.
26. US. Signs Rome Treaty Establishing ICC, UNITED NATIONS ASS'N OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, Jan. 3, 2001, at http://www.unausa.org/newindex.asp?place=http://www.unausa.org/policy/News
ActionAlerts/info/dcOl0301 .asp (explaining that on December 31, 2000, the last day a country could sign the
Rome Statute without at the same time depositing an instrument of ratification, President Clinton signed the
Statute. In addition, he believed that "a properly constituted and structured ICC would make a profound
contribution in deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide.").
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See generally Issues Update: U.S. Has No Legal Obligation to the International Criminal Court,
CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, May 6, 2002 at http://globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/icc/
resources/prosper unsigning.html (explaining that President Bush decided not to become a party to the ICC
because he believed that the document "was flawed in many regards").
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, art. 5,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 92 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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the territory of a party state.33 In this way, citizens from countries that have not
joined the Court might still be subject to trial before it, if they are accused of
committing any of the crimes mentioned above in a country that is a member of
the International Criminal Court.34 In light of this, given that that the United
States has not ratified the Rome Statute and thus is not a member state of the
International Criminal Court, the only time that American soldiers or personnel
can be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court without the consent of the
American government, is if the crime was committed in a state other then the
United States and the other state is a state party of the International Criminal
Court.35 Due to this expansive jurisdiction of the Court and given that United
States military forces and civilian personnel are active in peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions in almost 100 countries at any given time,36 the United
States fears that International Criminal Court member states will use the Inter-
national Criminal Court to pursue politically motivated war crimes prosecutions
against American soldiers and personnel abroad.37  Ambassador John
Negroponte clearly articulated this concern in a United Nations Security
Council Press Release, when he stated "[w]e cannot accept a structure that may
transform the political criticism of America's world role into the basis for
criminal trials of Americans who have put their lives on the line for freedom."38
The international community, however, believes that United States fears
are greatly exaggerated, given that the Rome Statute contains numerous safe-
guards, which limit the possibility of the International Criminal Court pursuing
cases for political rather then legal motives against United States troops. 39 One
of the safeguards that the Rome Statute provides in order to preclude politically
motivated prosecutions, is that the crimes that fall under the International
Criminal Court's jurisdiction have been meticulously defined to exclude random
33. Anthony Dworkin, Introduction to The International Criminal Court: An End to Impunity?,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT: THE MAGAZINE, Dec. 2003, http://crimesofwar.org/icc magazine/icc-intro.html.
34. Id.
35. Johan D. Van der Vyver, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Case Western
Reserve School of Law, Frederick K. Cox Int'l Law Center War Crimes Research Portal, (Sept. 23, 2003),
at http:/law.case.edu/War-Crimes-Research-Portal/instant_analysis.asp?id=5.
36. Press Release, U.S. State Department, Under Secretary Calls It "Clearly Inconsistent With
American Standards" (Nov. 4, 2003), 2003 WL 64738615 (quoting John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (Nov. 3, 2004)).
37. Warren Hoge, U.S. Drops Plan to Exempt GI. 'sfrom U.N. Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004,
at Al.
38. Press Release, United States Mission to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote and Remarks
by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Following the Vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1422 on the International Criminal Court at the
Security Council Stake-Out, July 12,2002 (July 12, 2002), http://www.un.int/usa/02print_098.htm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2004).
39. See Dworkin, supra note 33.
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and isolated acts that a peacekeeper might conceivably commit. 4° For example,
according to Article five of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Criminal Court is limited only "to the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole," which include genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.4' The Statute further prevents the Inter-
national Criminal Court from pursuing politically motivated crimes by
restricting its jurisdiction to cover only acts that have been committed as part of
a "widespread or systematic attack" (crimes against humanity), or crimes that
have been committed "as a part of a plan or policy" (war crimes).42
The most important safeguard provided by the Statute is that the Inter-
national Criminal Court was created as a "complementary court system," which
means that its jurisdiction will not take precedence over a competent national
court.4 3 In other words, the Statute allows the International Criminal Court to
begin investigation and prosecution only "where a state that has jurisdiction
over the case shows itself unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the
prosecution." Thus, under Article Seventeen, the International Criminal Court
cannot take a case if a state is already investigating or prosecuting it or if a state
has investigated and then decided not to prosecute. 45 This principle, essentially,
makes the International Criminal Court a court of last resort.46
Despite these numerous safeguards, the United States still insists that it is
inappropriate to subject United States troops participating in United Nations
peacekeeping operations to the International Criminal Court, which cannot
provide adequate guarantees of due process.47 The United States further asserts
that United States courts and not the International Criminal Court should be
responsible for investigating and prosecuting its own citizens for committing
war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.48 Only this way will citizens
be afforded constitutional guarantees of due process. 49 As a result of these
concerns, the United States has launched an aggressive campaign to exempt its
troops from prosecution by the International Criminal Court.50
40. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (2002).
41. Rome Statute, supra note 32, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 92.
42. Id.
43. Alex lonides, Above the Law?, EGYPT TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, 2003 WL 60480647.
44. Dworkin, supra note 33.
45. The ICC is Unlikely to Try U.S. Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intemationaljustice/icc/us-role/us role 03.htm (lastvisited Sept. 25,2004).
46. Dworkin, supra note 33.
47. Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
Statement at the Security Council Stakeout (June 23, 2004), http://www.un.int/usa/04_1 1.htm.
48. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., supra note 40, at 9.
49. Hoge, supra note 37.
50. See U.S. POLICYON THE ICC, supra note 2 (explaining that not only has the United States sought
exemption for its troops from the ICC by introducing Resolution 1422 and 1487 to the Security Council, but
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III. UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EXEMPT ITS TROOPS
FROM ICC JURISDICTION
On July 12, 2002, just eleven days after the International Criminal Court
came into being, the United Nations Security Council adopted the first resolu-
tion, Resolution 1422, which provided troops and personnel from non-Inter-
national Criminal Court member states participating in United Nations
authorized missions, with one year exemption from the International Criminal
Court.51 The Resolution was adopted only after the United States/ United
Nations Ambassador, John Negroponte vetoed the extension of the Bosnian
peacekeeping mission,52 and other Bush Administration officials further
threatened to veto the renewal of all peacekeeping operations in the future, if
Council members did not adopt Resolution 1422.13 Eager to preserve peace-
keeping operations, the Security Council members had little choice, but to adopt
Resolution 1422 despite its serious flaws and despite the aggressive opposition
voiced by numerous countries during the Security Council meeting, just two
days before the adoption of the Resolution.54
At the July 10th meeting at the United Nations Security Council,
Ambassador Negroponte expressed on behalf of the United States, that the
United States veto of the resolution on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina did not in any way reflect its rejection of peacekeeping in
Bosnia.55 The veto did reflect, however, the United States frustration over its
inability to persuade Security Council members to seriously consider United
States concerns with regards to the legal exposure that United States peace-
keepers have under the Rome Statute.56 The United States further conveyed,
that while peacekeepers do act in a lawful manner, they still find themselves in
difficult and ambiguous situations.57 As a result, the United States stressed that
peacekeepers from states that are not parties to the Rome Statute should not face
additional unnecessary legal jeopardy, in addition to the hardships of deploy-
ment that they already face.58
it has also pursued bilateral agreements with countries around the world to prevent the surrender of U.S.
nationals to the ICC).
51. Id.
52. The ICC and Security Council: Res. 1422 Legal and Policy Analysis, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(May 2003), http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/crisis/0609hrwreport.htm [hereinafter Policy
Analysis].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., supra note 40, at 9.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 10.
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The countries that participated in the Security Council meeting did not,
however, agree with United States justifications for seeking a one year exemp-
tion for its troops.59 Instead, they saw United States insistence on receiving
immunity for its troops as an attempt by the United States to place its troops and
personnel above international law.6" As Mr. Heinbecker, the Canadian
representative who participated in the debate, put it: "[a]t stake today are ...
issues that raise questions about whether all people are equal and accountable
before the law...."61 At the end of his speech Mr. Heinbecker called for an end
to impunity from prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.62 Mr. MacKay from New Zealand, who also participated in the debate,
similarly saw no need for exemptions of peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of
the Court.63 Instead, he argued that the exemptions placed peacekeepers above
the law, in addition to placing the moral authority of the peacekeepers and the
United Nations in serious jeopardy. 64
All together, across the board, countries generally argued that Resolution
1422 was unnecessary, given the numerous safeguards imbedded within the
Statute, that it was outside the scope of the Security Council's authority, and
that it was inconsistent with the Rome Statute. 65 Even leading Non-Govern-
mental Organizations (NGOs) expressed similar views.66 In fact, Amnesty
International's eighty two page legal memorandum analyzing Resolution 1422,
is by far the most complete and thorough compilation of arguments expressed
against this Resolution.67 It stressed two main points already shared by the
international community.
First, Amnesty International stressed that Resolution 1422 is contrary to
the Rome Statute. 68 Resolution 1422 in part reads as follows:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1.
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, that the International Criminal Court, if a case arises
involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing
59. See id.
60. See U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., supra note 40.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
65. U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC, supra note 2.
66. See Policy Analysis, supra note 52; See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE UNLAWFUL ATTEMPT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE US CITIZENS PERMANENT IMPUNITY
FROM INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (May 2003), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/declrationsresolutions/
UN 1422_2003.html [hereinafter PERMANENT IMPUNITY].
67. See id
68. Id. at 36.
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State not a Party to the Rome Statue over acts or omissions relating
to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a
twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed
with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security
Council decides otherwise .... 69
Article sixteen of the Rome Statute, which the Resolution speaks of, allows
the Security Council to request the International Criminal Court, pursuant to
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and in the interest of peace and
security, to postpone an investigation or a prosecution for twelve months.70 The
drafting history of Article sixteen reveals that the Article was only intended to
be used in rare cases, such as when the Security Council considers that the peace
negotiations which it is overseeing with a government leader, would be impeded
by an investigation or prosecution.7'
Resolution 1422, however, sought to invoke Article sixteen contrary to the
drafter's intent. Article sixteen requires the Security Council to request the
International Criminal Court to grant a temporary deferral of investigation or
prosecution of a case, on a case by case basis." With each case the Security
Council has to determine, whether the deferral would be necessary to help it
maintain international peace and security.73 Resolution 1422, on the other hand,
was not adopted after an ad hoc determination. 74 Instead, the Resolution pro-
vided a general exception for a whole class of people before any case had arisen,
and the Security Council had not determined whether special circumstances
existed to make the deferral necessary to maintain peace and security.7 5 In
addition, the fact that the United States included in Resolution 1422 its intention
to "renew the request... under the same conditions each July for further 12-
month periods for as long as maybe necessary," makes this Resolution further
contrary to Article sixteen. 6 Article sixteen includes a specific twelve month
deferral, after which time the Security Council can renew the request under the
same conditions.77 However, considerations of any proposal for renewal have
69. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002).
70. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SECURITY COUNCIL MUST
REFUSE TO RENEW UNLAWFUL RESOLUTION 1422 (May 2003),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/1422/Amnesty1 422SumMay2003Eng.pdf [hereinafter
REFUSAL TO RENEW].
71. PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 42-43.
72. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 4.
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to be made on a case by case basis at the time the resolution is to be renewed.78
In light of the aforementioned facts, Amnesty International stressed that the
Security Council's intention to renew Resolution 1422 automatically, as
expressed in the Resolution, illustrates the Council's complete disregard for the
true purpose of Article sixteen and its intentions to provide perpetual impunity
to officials and personnel of non-International Criminal Court member states
from International Criminal Court's jurisdiction.79
The second point that Amnesty International stressed, also shared by the
international community, is that Resolution 1422 is contrary to the United
Nations Charter (UNC).8° The Security Council, which is a political organ of
the United Nations established pursuant to international law, can only exercise
those powers contained under the United Nations Charter.8" Like any other
political organization established under law, it cannot act beyond its own
powers.82 However, by adopting Resolution 1422, the Security Council
exceeded its powers set out in the United Nations Charter.83
In Resolution 1422, the Security Council purported to act under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.84 Chapter VII gives the Security Council
specific powers that it can use to take action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.85 However, the Security Council
cannot act under this Chapter unless it first complies with certain procedural
requirements of the United Nations Charter, by making the specific determina-
tions that Article thirty nine requires.86 Article thirty nine of the United Nations
Charter expressly provides that, "[t]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion.... ,87 Thus, any action, which the Security Council takes under Chapter
VII, must be based upon a determination of the existence of a threat, breach of
peace, or an act of aggression.88 The drafting history of Resolution 1422 illu-
strates, however, that for the first time in fifty seven years,89 the Security
Council failed to make such determination before acting under Chapter VH1. 90
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 51.
81. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 59.
87. Id. at 60.
88. Id.
89. REFUSAL TO RENEW, supra note 70, at 6.
90. PERMANENT IMPUNITY, supra note 66, at 60.
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The third major point stressed by the international community in
opposition of Resolution 1422 is best articulated by another NGO, the Human
Rights Watch. 9' Resolution 1422 exempted officials and personnel from non-
International Criminal Court member states participating in United Nations
peacekeeping missions from the International Criminal Court.92 However,
Human Rights Watch stressed that this Resolution is in clear violation of Article
twenty seven of the Rome Statute.93 Article twenty seven of the Rome Statute
which reads in part, "[t]his Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity ... ,,9' expressly prohibits any state or
international organization from making distinctions on the basis of official
capacity. 95 This provision, contained in the Rome Statute, was a crucial one
because it encompassed the fundamental purpose of the Statute, to ensure that
no person is placed above the law, including politicians, heads of state, and
United Nations peacekeepers.96 Contrary to this provision, Resolution 1422
exempted an entire class of individuals from prosecution by the International
Criminal Court and thus opened the door to impunity in cases where national
courts of non-International Criminal Court member states fail to carry out good
faith prosecutions of its own troops and personnel.97
Despite the visible opposition voiced by NGOs and countries around the
world against Resolution 1422, the exemption for United States troops and
personnel from International Criminal Court's jurisdiction was renewed for a
second year in a row on June 12, 2003.98 The second time around, however,
Security Council members, France, Germany, and Syria, abstained from the
vote.99 Kofi Annan, along with more then seventy countries, also expressed
their strong disapproval for Resolution 1487 during an open meeting at the
Security Council.'
In his opening speech, Kofi Annan conveyed the reasons why the Security
Council was compelled to renew the Resolution in spite of the strong opposi-
tion.' Although he felt that the request to renew Resolution 1422 was
unnecessary, due to the numerous safeguards provided by the Rome Statute, he
nevertheless understood that the Council members felt it necessary to renew the
91. See Policy Analysis, supra note 52.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Rome Statute, supra note 32, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 106.
95. Policy Analysis, supra note 52.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC, supra note 2.
99. Id.
100. See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4772 (2003).
101. Id. at 3.
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Resolution for another year, given that the "Court [was] still in its infancy and
no case [had] yet been brought before it.' 1 2 The main concern that Kofi Annan
and the other countries expressed at the debate, was over United States insis-
tence that the Security Council renew the Resolution as a "technical roll-
over."1 °3 Kofi Annan along with the other countries, have expressed the oppo-
site view, that this Resolution was never intended to be renewed indefinitely as
a technical roll-over.'04 As Kofi Annan pointed out, "allow me to express the
hope that this does not become an annual routine. If it did, I fear the world
would interpret it as meaning that the Council wished to claim absolute and
permanent immunity for people serving in the operations it establishes or
authorizes."'0' 5 Other countries expressed similar sentiments.1
0 6
The United States attempts to exempt its troops and personnel from the
International Criminal Court's jurisdiction did not stop, however, with the
adoption and renewal of Resolution 1422.107 The United States government
representatives have been seeking Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with
countries around the world to shield its citizens from prosecution by the
International Criminal Court.'08 These bilateral agreements provide that neither
country that is party to the agreement would transfer the other's government
officials, military and other personnel to the International Criminal Court's
jurisdiction.'0 9 Contrary to the assurance provided by high-level United States
officials that the United States would respect the rights of those countries that
support the International Criminal Court; the Bush Administration has used
coercive tactics to secure bilateral agreements with these countries."'0 The most
coercive of these tactics involves the American Servicemembers' Protection Act
(ASPA), which was signed into law by President Bush on August 2, 2002, and
102. Id.
103. Fact vs. Fiction: Security Council Members Never Intended Renewal to Become Automatic,
CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTION (June 22, 2004), at http://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/law_
justice/icc/unsc/2004/bouchervs reality.html [hereinafter Fact vs. Fiction].
104. Id.
105. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg., supra note 100, at 3.
106. See Fact vs. Fiction, supra note 103 (explaining that Sir Jeremy Greenstock from Great Britain
also expressed that, "[w]e regard Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002) as an exceptional measure. It is
not permanent; nor is it automatically renewable."). See also U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg., supra note
100, at 24 (explaining that Mr. Duclos, the French representative that abstained from the vote, also expressed
the following: "Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1422 (2002) did not contain a commitment to automatic
renewal... Such a renewal risks lending credence to the perception that such exemptions are permanent. That
appearance of permanency can only weaken the Court and harm its authority.").
107. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.S. BILATERAL IMMUNITY OR SO-
CALLED "ARTICLE 98" AGREEMENTS (2003), http://www.iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/FS-
BIAsSept2003.pdf [hereinafter U.S. BILATERAL IMMUNITY].
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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which allows him to cut off United States military assistance to International
Criminal Court member states that have not signed the Bilateral Immunity
Agreement's."'
This coercive law allows the Administration to pick and choose, which
countries should continue receiving United States military aid in spite of not
signing the Bilateral Immunity Agreement's with the United States. 12 Broad
waivers and exemptions included within the Act allow the President to continue
providing aid to countries that choose not to conclude these agreements and
which the President deems important for United States national security. 13 In
accordance with ASPA, major United States allies including the nineteen
members of NATO and other major non-NATO allies have been exempted from
it. 114 On July 1, 2003, the deadline set out in the ASPA for the cut off of United
States military assistance to International Criminal Court member states that had
not signed the Bilateral Immunity Agreement's, President Bush granted waivers
to twenty two International Criminal Court member states that receive United
States military aid and which had not signed agreements." 5 Since then, he has
issued additional waivers, covering a total of thirty two countries 1 6 According
to the most current figures, as of May 28, 2004, eighty nine countries had signed
a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the United States." 7 Of the International
Criminal Court member states, fifty eight out of the ninety four currently
existing member states refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement's with
the United States, leaving only thirty six International Criminal Court member
states which had signed these agreements with the United States under the threat
of loosing military aid." 8 Out of those International Criminal Court member
states that have refused to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreement's, over twenty
states to this day have been left without any military assistance from the United
States. "9
In addition to aggressively pursuing Bilateral Immunity Agreement's with
other countries, the United States requested the Security Council to renew
Resolution 1487 in May of this year for a third year in a row.' This year,
however, the circumstances were different than in the previous two years. This
111. U.S. POLICY ON THE ICC, supra note 2.
112. See WASHINGTON WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.S. IMPUNITY
AGREEMENTS: A SUMMARY, at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/article98/article98home.html (last visited July
1,2004).
113. Id.
114. U.S. BILATERAL IMMUNITY, supra note 107.
115. U.S. IMPUNITY AGREEMENTS: A SUMMARY, supra note 112.
116. Id.
117. STATUS OF THE ICC AND U.S. POLICY, JANUARY-MAY 2004, supra note 24.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.S. Renews Demand for ICC Exemption for UNPeacekeepers, supra note 1.
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year the United States was requesting from the Security Council an exemption
for troops of non-International Criminal Court member states, at a time when
the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal took a prominent place on the front page
covers of newspapers around the world. 2' The question that has remained
unanswered then, is whether the United States was justified this year in seeking
an exemption for its troops from prosecution by the International Criminal
Court, given that its own troops committed grievous war crimes against Iraqi
prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison?
IV. WAS THE UNITED STATES JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING THE EXEMPTION FOR ITS
TROOPS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT THIS YEAR?
The United States has always been an active advocate of international
justice.'22 Not only did it help establish the Nuremberg tribunals and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but it also
became a key signatory to numerous international humanitarian treaties, such
as the Geneva Convention.123 However, despite being at the forefront of inter-
national justice and despite its role as the world's policeman and as a major
contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world, the
United States demonstrated this year that it too is capable of committing heinous
war crimes, as the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal illustrated.'24
On April 28, 2004, the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse became public when the
first images depicting Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib being subjected to a
variety of abuses by United States soldiers, were broadcast on "60 Minutes
II., ' 125 Following this broadcast, other photographs depicting Iraqi prisoner
abuses became public.126 These photographs speak for themselves. One photo-
graph shows that an Iraqi prisoner is naked. 127 His hands are clasped behind his
neck and he is leaning against the cell door with great fear, as the dogs bark at
him a few feet away. 128 Another photograph depicts an Iraqi prisoner who is
121. See US. Tries to Get Off the Hook On War Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 20, 2004,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/20/usint8602_txt.htm.
122. President Bill Clinton, Statement on Signature of the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal
Court (Dec. 31, 2000), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON,
2000-2001 2816-17 (2002).
123. Id.
124. See CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, U.S. ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004), htpp://www.globalsolutions.org/programs/lawjustice/news/iraqi
prisoners.html.
125. Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004 [hereinafter Chain of
Command].
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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lying on the ground in great pain, with a soldier sitting on top of him, with his
knees pressed to his back and blood is streaming from this prisoner's leg.'29 In
yet another photograph, a naked prisoner from his waist to his ankles is
captured, lying on the floor, with a bite on his right thigh. 3 There is another
larger wound on his left leg, covered with blood. 3 '
These abuses were not uncommon, however, during Saddam Hussein's era.
During his regime, the Abu Ghraib prison was one of the world's most
notorious prisons for the weekly executions and the vile living conditions. 32
Torture was also a common practice at the Abu Ghraib, which included isola-
tion, beatings, rapes, attack dogs, electric shocks, and starvation. 33 Following
the collapse of Saddam's regime, the United States turned the Abu Ghraib into
a military prison. 134 Unlike in Saddam's times, most of the prisoners captured
by United States troops were civilians, including women and teenagers, many
of whom had been picked up randomly during the military sweeps and at
highway checkpoints. 35 The other prisoners fell into three distinct categories:
1) common criminals, 2) security detainees suspected of "crimes against the
coalition", and 3) a small number of suspected "high-value" leaders of the
insurgency against the coalition forces. 36 What stunned the world as the images
of United States soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners flooded newspapers and T.V.
news, was the United States was committing the same crimes it went to war
with Iraq to prevent. 37 Instead of ending the prisoner abuses and human rights
violations prevalent during Saddam's regime, the United States was contributing
to the abuses.'38
Before the pictures were released to the media, however, on January 31,
2004, Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC)
Lieutenant General David McKiernan, appointed Major General (MG) Antonio
Taguba to conduct an investigation under Article fifteen-six into the 800th
Military Police Brigade's detention and internment operations. 139 This investi-
gation came about as a result of the criminal investigation initiated by the
United States Army Criminal Investigation Command of the specific allegations
of detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd Military Police
129. Id.
130. Chain of Command, supra note 125.
131. Id.
132. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER May 10, 2004.
133. Remnick, David, Hearts and Minds, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004.
134. Hersh, supra note 132.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Matua, supra note 10.
138. Id.
139. Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade,
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Company, 320th Military Police Battalion in Iraq, all which are part of the
800th Military Police Brigade. 40 MG Taguba was specifically asked to inquire
into all the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations of detainee
abuse, especially over the allegations of the mistreatment of the Abut Ghraib
prisoners.141
Following his investigation, on February 26th, MG Taguba submitted his
report. 42 His report concluded that between October and December of 2003,
at the Abu Ghraib prison, numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant and wanton
criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. 143 He further concluded that
the systemic and illegal abuse of the detainees was intentionally perpetrated by
several members of the 372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police
Battalion, 800th Military Police Brigade. 44 The intentional abuse of detainees
by military police personnel included the following acts: "a) punching, slapping
and kicking detainees ... b) videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees, c) forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit
positions for photographing ... f) forcing groups of male detainees to mastur-
bate themselves while being photographed and videotaped ... k) a male MP
guard having sex with a female detainee....,,145 These allegations were substan-
tiated by detailed witness statements and the discovered graphic photographs.14 6
Several detainees also described the following acts of abuse performed on them:
"a) breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees ...
d) beating detainees with a broom handle and chair, e) threatening male
detainees with rape ... h) using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate
detainees with threats of attack.'
147
After learning about these abuses, the international community heavily
criticized the United States for having violated multiple international treaties,
which the United States had ratified and upheld in the past.'48 For instance, the
United States currently stands in violation of both the Third and the Fourth
Geneva Conventions of 1949.149 In time of war, every person in enemy hands
must have some kind of status under international law. 50 If the person caught
in enemy hands is a prisoner of war, then that person will protected by the Third
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id.
142. Chain of Command, supra note 125.
143. Investigation Report, supra note 139, at 16.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 17.
147. Id. at 17-18.
148. See U.S. ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 124.
149. See id.
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Geneva Convention.151 If, on the other hand, that person is a civilian, then he
will be protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention. 152 In this case, because
United States soldiers tortured both prisoners of war and civilians at Abu Ghraib
prison, they violated both Article thirteen of the Third Geneva Convention of
1949, 153 and Article twenty seven of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.154
The United States also violated Article seven of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1966,15' and Article two of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of
1984. 156
The inhumane treatment and the torture performed on Iraqi prisoners by
United States soldiers, is not only a grave breach of these international treaties,
but it is also considered a war crime under the International Criminal Court.'57
The International Criminal Court is based in part on the Geneva Conventions,
therefore some of the protections extended to prisoners of war and civilians
under the Conventions are also included under the definition of war crimes in
the Rome Statute.'58 Under Article eight, war crimes mean:
a) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely any of the following acts against persons ... under the provi-
sions of the relevant Geneva Convention ... ii) torture or inhuman
treatment ... iii) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health ... b) xxi) committing outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment .... 159
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. ("Prisoners of war must at all times
be humanely treated.... Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts
of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.").
154. Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
27, 6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] ("Civilians who are not classified
as POW's.. .shall at all times be humanly treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence
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155. G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) ("No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
156. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/39/46 (1984). ("No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.").
157. See Prisoner Abuse May Qualify As a War Crime, DECCAN HERALD, June 6, 2004,
http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/jun062004/f4.asp.
158. U.S. ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 124.
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If any one of these war crimes enumerated by the Rome Statute and
committed by United States soldiers is broken down into its elements, one will
find that every element of the crime has been met by the actions of United States
soldiers, thereby making them guilty of war crimes. 160 For instance, looking
closely to the war crime committed upon personal dignity under Article eight
(two)(b)(xxi), the elements of the crime are:
1. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the
dignity of one or more persons. 2. The severity of the humiliation,
degradation or other violation was of such degree as to be generally
recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity. 3. The conduct took
place in the context of and was associated with an international armed
conflict. 4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict. 161
As to the first two elements, both the graphic photographs and the Taguba
Report have confirmed, not only that United States soldiers did violate the
dignity of Iraqi prisoners by using torture and inhumane ways of extracting
information from them, but that these actions do rise to a level that could be
considered an outrage upon personal dignity. As to the last two elements, the
conduct of United States soldiers did take place in the context of and was
associated with an international armed conflict, the War in Iraq. Furthermore,
the perpetrators, in the case United States soldiers, were aware of the factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict, given that
they were fully aware that they had gone to Iraq to put an end to Saddam's
terror and human rights abuses. As a result, the International Criminal Court
currently does not have any jurisdiction over the actions of United States troops
in Iraq and cannot prosecute them.162 Therefore, the aforementioned evidence
clearly shows that United States troops are, nevertheless, guilty of committing
war crimes in violation of Article eight of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
Given that the United States breached international treaties and is guilty of
war crimes under the Rome Statute for torturing the Abu Ghraib prisoners, was
the United States justified this year in requesting impunity for its troops serving
on United Nations missions from prosecution by the International Criminal
Court? The answer to that question is of course, no. With this incident, the
United States has demonstrated that even its own troops are capable of com-
mitting heinous war crimes. The United States insists, however, that because
it is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, The United States courts instead of the
160. See U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Annex 1, addendum pt. 2, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2.
161. Id. at 33.
162. U.S. ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 124.
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International Criminal Court should prosecute its own troops guilty of
committing war crimes in another country.16 3 The United States objects to its
troops being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court not because it
refuses to bring to justice its own citizens, who have committed war crimes in
other countries, but because the Court does not provide adequate guarantees of
due process, which United States courts do provide. 64 In fact, the United States
maintains that the international community has nothing to fear because United
States citizens guilty of committing egregious war crimes will not go unpunish-
ed, especially since the United States already has a well-functioning system for
military justice that does ensure accountability. 65 The United States Constitu-
tion, for instance, gives Congress the power to order court-martials for war
crimes committed by United States troops. 166 The Uniform Code of Military
Justice, gives general court-martials jurisdiction over any person who by the law
of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal, including for crimes under inter-
national law. 167 Lastly, the War Crimes Act of 1996 gives United States courts
authority to try either troops or civilians for violations of the laws of war.1
68
If granting United States troops impunity from prosecution by the Inter-
national Criminal Court means not that they will escape criminal liability, but
that they will be prosecuted by United States courts with adequate guarantees
of due process, which the United States Constitution affords them, then has the
United States punished those responsible for the prisoner abuses? It has been
recently reported that seven American soldiers have been already charged.
169
The first soldier to face court martial proceedings went on trial in Iraq on May
19.0 But seeing that these charges were brought only against lower-level
soldiers, the Human Rights Watch has publicly criticized the United States for
not investigating the superiors of these soldiers to see whether they ordered or
knowingly tolerated these abuses.' In fact, recent press reports have
uncovered that the torture the United States soldiers submitted Iraqi prisoners
to at Abu Ghraib, was not an isolated act of a few deviant soldiers.'72 On the
163. See Statement of Ambassador Cunningham, supra note 47.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The ICC is Unlikely to Try U.S. Soldiers, supra note 45.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Q & A: Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal, BBC NEWS, June 21, 2004, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/
mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.ukl/hi/world/americas/3701941 .stm (last visited June 28, 2004).
170. Id.
171. Iraq: U.S. Prisoner Abuse Sparks Concerns Over War Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Apr.
30, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/30/iraq8521txt.htm.
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WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (May 18, 2004), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/may2004/tort-
ml 8_prn.shtml.
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contrary, interviews and government documents have brought to light, that true
responsibility for the torture at Abu Ghraib lies not within a few Army
reservists, but within the very highest levels of the Bush Administration. 1
73
It has been revealed and verified by numerous sources, that Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, assisted by his Undersecretary for Intelligence,
Stephen Cambone, set up a secret program in 2001 called Special Access
Program (SAP) to assassinate targeted individuals in the Bush Administration's
war on terror.174 This program was subsequently brought to Iraq in the summer
and fall of 2003 to remedy the growing insurgency United States forces faced
in Iraq. 175 The solution to stopping this growing insurgency, which Rumsfeld
endorsed and Combone carried out, was to get tough with the Iraqis in the Army
prisons who were suspected of being insurgents.'76 This entailed turning United
States prisons in Iraq into torture camps to extract information from the
prisoners about the resistance." 7 To achieve this, Cambone removed the
military intelligence officers carrying out the interrogations from the authority
of the normal military chain of command, and incorporated them into the
Special Access Program.'78 Rumsfeld and Cambone even went a step further
and expanded the scope of Special Access Program, by bringing unconventional
methods to Abu Ghraib, such as exposing the prisoners to sexual humiliation. 1
79
These operations did not go unnoticed, however, by both Condoleezza Rice, the
national-security advisor who approved the operations, and President Bush who
was informed of the existence of the programs.'
If United States courts fail to prosecute the top officials for the prisoner
abuse committed at Abu Ghraib, then these war crimes would go unpunished
here in the United States. The International Criminal Court, which normally
ensures accountability when national courts either fail or refuse to punish its
own nationals, would not be able to step in and prosecute these officials, given
that the International Criminal Court currently has no jurisdiction over United
States actions in Iraq. As a result, these heinous crimes committed at Abu
Ghraib will go unpunished. But what if United States soldiers and top officials
had committed war crimes in one of the fifty eight International Criminal Court
member states that did not sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the United
States, and which are member states of the International Criminal Court? In
such a case, even if United States courts failed to prosecute its own troops and
173. Id.
174. Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004,
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040524fafact.
175. Id.
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officials in order to protect them, the International Criminal Court would,
nevertheless, have jurisdiction to prosecute them in its tribunal. The Inter-
national Criminal Court in that case would ensure accountability for the
grievous war crimes committed by United States soldiers and officials. The
Resolution sought this year by the United States, however, would have
exempted those responsible for committing war crimes in International Criminal
Court member states from prosecution by the International Criminal Court, for
a period of one year. This means that, if in the future United States courts
decide not to prosecute its own troops and officials, once again the heinous war
crimes would go unpunished by both national United States courts and the
International Criminal Court. Given that United States troops are capable of
committing war crimes in any part of the world, the United States was not
justified in protecting its troops from the rule of law by seeking exemptions for
their actions from the International Criminal Court.
United States insistence this year on an exemption for its troops and
personnel from the International Criminal Court, in light of the prisoner abuses,
sent a powerful message throughout the world, that the United States is placing
itself above international law and does not have to abide by it. This is not a
good message for the United States to advocate if it wants to maintain the
support of the international community in the future. At the moment, the
ramifications of United States policy and practice in Iraq, in light of the prisoner
abuse scandal, have already been severe. Not only did the United States loose
credibility in Iraq, the very same country it was trying to rebuild, but it also hurt
America's prospects in the war on terror. 81 The United States further under-
mined its ability to demand humane treatment for its soldiers and civilians in the
hands of its enemies. 8 2 Given that the United States has already secured a bad
name for itself due to prisoner abuse, it does not need to alienate itself further
from the international community by attempting to place itself above the rule
of law. Doing so would further impair United States credibility.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States started out by demanding the Security Council to renew
Resolution 1487, which it was not justified to do. In the end, however, it did the
right thing by withdrawing the Resolution from the United Nations floor. Its
reasons for doing so are questionable. However, actions speak louder than
words, and for now the withdrawal of the Resolution could be the sign the
international community needs from the United States, to assure it that the
United States will not seek special treatment from international law any time
soon.
181. U.S. ABUSE OF PRISONERS AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW. supra note 124.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Kingdom of Arkam and the State of Randolfia have submitted, by
Special Agreement, their differences concerning the Rome Statute, and
transmitted a copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court pursuant to Article 40(1)
of the Statute. Therefore, both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute of
the Court.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1918, the monarch of the Duchy of Lengians and Arkamians abdicated,
resulting in the creation of three new states: Randolfia (Respondent); the
Kingdom of Arkam (Applicant); and the Kingdom of Leng. All are developing
states, each with a population of approximately one million. All states share
common borders. The populations of Arkam and Leng are made up of two
ethnic groups: Arkamians and Lengians. In Arkam, Arkamians constitute
nearly ninety percent of the population, while in Leng, Lengians constitute
slightly more than ninety percent. There have not been a significant number of
intermarriages between members of each ethnic group, and their relationship has
been highlighted by episodes of armed conflict. Randolfia has a multi-ethnic
population, with an equal number of Lengians and Arkamians. Arkam and
Leng are constitutional monarchies, with the thrones and legislative controls
held by the ethnic majorities. Randolfia is a democracy whose parliament has
been peacefully contested by several ethnic-based political parties, and the
Lengian party is currently in power. Randolfia's annual trade with Arkam
constitutes about 40% percent of Randolfia's worldwide commerce.
In January 2003, a trans-border armed conflict erupted between ethnic
Lengians and Arkamians in both Leng and Arkam, for which the United Nations
convened an international peace conference in the Randolfian capital. The
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conflict in Arkam ceased, but no accord was reached over the conflict in Leng.
Under the Peace Agreement signed on March 1, 2003, Arkam established a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) empowered to grant a full
amnesty for all crimes committed during the armed conflict between the two
ethnic groups. The TRC has been cited as "a shining example of how truth and
reconciliation can bring peace to a troubled region."
In Leng, sporadic small-scale fighting continued in the primarily Arkamian
province of Yuggott. This fighting was spurred by the Greater Arkamian
Liberation Army (GALA), a militia dedicated to the secession of Yuggott from
Leng and its unification with Arkam. On May 1, 2003 the Rome Statute entered
into force for Leng and Randolfia but not for Arkam. Although Randolfia has
enacted domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute, it lacks domestic
legislation criminalizing genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
committed by non-Randolfian nationals outside its borders.
Dr. Herbert West is a citizen of Arkam and a professor at a University in
Arkam, whose scholarship is recognized around the world. In April 2003, West
recorded an audiotape in Arkam, urging his Arkamians to achieve Arkam's
unity with Yuggott. West gave the only copy to his neighbor, also a member
of GALA, but nothing evidences that he gave any instructions as to what use,
if any, should be made of it. GALA members duplicated the recording, which
was then played on Radio Yuggott. On May 16th, bands of ethnic Arkamians
began to conduct nighttime raids, attacking ethnic Lengians in several towns in
Yuggott. By the end of May, a percentage of the Lengian population of
Yuggott had been killed. On June 20, 2003, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 2241, which created Multinational Force for Lengian relief created
by Security Council Resolution 2241, (IFLEN) a multinational force, with a
threefold mandate: to enter Yuggott, shut down Radio Yuggott, and put a stop
to the bloodshed. Resolution 2241 read, in part, "officials or personnel of con-
tributing states, not parties to the Rome Statute, shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of that contributing state for all alleged acts or omissions related to
... IFLEN, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that
contributing." The Resolution was adopted with ten votes in favor, and five
abstentions.
Lieutenant Joseph Curwen, a citizen and resident of Arkam, led one of
IFLEN's platoons. On June 28, 2003, GALA attacked Curwen's platoon,
killing twelve soldiers and injuring four others. As a response, Curwen ordered
his platoon to attack Exhamtown, a village which was a GALA stronghold. On
June 29, 2003, the platoon killed a number of ethnic Lengians and ethnic
Arkamians. On June 30th, GALA and the Lengian government agreed to a
United Nations-monitored cease-fire, which continues to this day. IFLEN
dismissed Curwen, and Arkam ordered him to return home. On July 3rd, the
Royal Arkamian Army (RAA) Commander in Chief (CIC) ordered him to
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resign, and to appear before the TRC within thirty days. Between July 20th and
22nd, Curwen and West, while in Randolfia for different reasons, were arrested
for minor offences. On July 23rd, Randolfia's press urged the government of
Randolfia to send these individuals to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Eliza Tillinghast, the Randolfian Minister of Justice, dispatched a communique
on July 25, 2003, informing the ICC's Registrar about Randolfia's holding in
custody of West and Curwen and requesting the Rome Statute to take
jurisdiction over these two men.
On July 26, 2003, the King of Arkam sent a diplomatic note to the Presi-
dent of Randolfia, indicating that Arkam would not appear before the ICC to
challenge admissibility in light of its well-publicized characterization of the ICC
as an illegal court. On July 29th, the Prosecutor of the ICC sent written notifi-
cations to Arkam, Leng and Randolfia, establishing that there was a reasonable
basis to commence investigations pursuant to the allegations contained in
Tillinghast's communiqud. In August 2003, the ICC's Prosecutor carried out
investigations and two Pre-Trial Chambers were constituted. On September 1,
2003, the ICC's Prosecutor charged West with incitement to genocide and
attempted genocide. Curwen was charged with war crimes and acts of violence
in Leng. The Pre-Trial Chambers issued arrest warrants for both individuals.
On the same day the arrest warrants were issued, the King of Arkam sent a
diplomatic note to Randolfia's President, indicating the possible adoption of
economic restrictions toward Randolfia in response to such Government's
decision to attempt the surrender of both Arkamian nationals to the ICC. As a
consequence, the two states entered into negotiations, agreeing to submit their
dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Leng declined to intervene
in this case.
III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. It is illegal under international law for Randolfia to surrender Curwen to
the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest.
Arkam has not waived its jurisdiction to try Curwen, as is expressly
required under Security Council Resolution 2241. Indeed, Security Council
Resolution 2241, adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (UN
Charter) for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in Leng, was adopted
in accordance with international law, as it complied with Security Council
voting procedures and was a perfectly justified measure in light of the wide
powers conferred upon the Security Council under the UN Charter, and as
evidenced from past practice of such United Nations body in similar situations.
In any case, the ICJ itself has recognized that it does not have the power of
judicial review over Security Council decisions. Hence, Randolfia must comply
with Security Council Resolution 2241 and must therefore abstain from
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surrendering Curwen to the ICC, as it would otherwise be acting contrary to its
international obligations under the UN Charter, which must prevail over all
other obligations it may have, including obligations under the Rome Statute
Statute.
B. The exercise ofjurisdiction by the Rome Statute over Curwen is in breach
ofArticle 34 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
Indeed, Arkam, Curwen's nationality, is not a party to the Rome Statute.
Article 34 provides that treaties cannot modify existing rights of third party
states. In this case, the Rome Statute is modifying Arkam's right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals. In addition, there is no customary rule
of international law which allows the delegation of criminal jurisdiction by
states to international tribunals. Thus Randolfia may not argue that Article 12
of the Rome Statute codifies customary international law. Should Article 12 of
the Rome Statute be deemed customary, Arkam is a persistent objector to said
rule.
C. Given the ongoing investigation by the Arkamian TRC into the acts of Mr.
Curwen, the exercise ofjurisdiction over him by the ICC would violate the
principle of complementarity, since Arkam has exclusive jurisdiction over
Curwen, and it is carrying out a genuine investigation through a TRC.
This cannot be mistaken for unwillingness to investigate or prosecute,
since TRCs have been supported by the United Nations as valid alternative
forms of justice. Moreover, the granting of amnesty by the TRC should not be
regarded as unwillingness because international law today does not support a
general duty to prosecute international crimes. Finally, the amnesty does not
shield Curwen from punishment, which has been delivered by ordering him to
resign his commission without benefits.
D. It is illegal under international law for Randolfia to surrender Herbert
West to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest.
Neither West nor his allegedly criminal conduct demonstrates the
necessary nexus with a state party to the Rome Statute. Indeed, West's alleged
crime was committed in Arkam. Since all of his actions took place in said state,
the result theory and the continued crime doctrine do not apply. Furthermore,
West's alleged complicity was perpetrated in Arkam. West's actions preceded
the date that the Rome Statute entered into force with respect to Leng and
Randolfia, and are thus barred from the ICC's consideration, as established
under the doctrine of Intertemporal Law and by the Rome Statute.
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West's alleged acts do not constitute a crime of the competence of the ICC.
Indeed, the evidence does not support a primafacie case of West's guilt, since
the physical and mental elements of the crime of incitement to genocide are not
fulfilled. Furthermore, West cannot be held responsible under the doctrine of
superior responsibility, nor as an accomplice. Additionally, there is no causal
link between West's acts and the actual commission of the crime. Finally, West
is not responsible for genocide or attempted genocide under the Nahimana
decision.
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether it would be illegal under international law for Randolfia to
surrender Joseph Curwen to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest given
that.
a) Arkam has not waived its exclusive jurisdiction to try Joseph Curwen,
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2241;
b) The exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICC over a national of a state,
not a party to the Rome Statute, violates the VCLT and Customary
International Law; and,
c) Given the ongoing investigation by the Arkamian TRC into the acts
of Mr. Curwen described in the indictment, the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over him by the ICC would violate the principle of comple-
mentarity.
2. Whether it would be illegal under international law for Randolfia to
surrender Herbert West to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest given
that
a) Neither Mr. West nor his allegedly criminal conduct demonstrates the
necessary nexus with a state Party to the Rome Statute;
b) Mr. West's actions preceded the date upon which the Rome Statute
entered into force with respect to Leng and Randolfia, and are thus
barred from the ICC's consideration; and,
c) Mr. West's alleged conduct does not constitute a crime within the
competence of the ICC.
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V. PLEADINGS
A. It Would Be Illegal Under International Law for Randolfia to Surrender
Joseph Curwen to the ICC Pursuant To the Warrant for His Arrest.
1. Arkam Has Not Waived Its Exclusive Jurisdiction To Try Joseph Curwen,
Pursuant To Resolution 2241 And Therefore The ICC Is Without Jurisdiction
To Try Him.
In June 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2241, Operative
Paragraph 7, which provides that states contributing with IFLEN that are non-
parties to the Rome Statute enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over their agents, unless
expressly waived. Arkam, a contributing state non-party to the Rome Statute,
has not waived its exclusive jurisdiction over Curwen, hence he may not be tried
by the ICC.
a. Resolution 2241 is in Accordance with and Justifiable
under International Law.
In the United Nations system, each organ is empowered to define its own
competence.' However, the UN Charter confers upon United Nations organs
the powers required to duly discharge their functions,2 including those which,
though not expressly provided, are conferred by necessary implication as being
essential to the performance of their duties.3 This holds true for the Security
Council,4 which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.5 In discharging this crucial duty, the Security Council
enjoys a wide margin of discretion,6 as it is empowered to take whatever
1. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Expenses
Case), 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20); Concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970) (Namibia Case), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 170 (June 21) (separate opinion of Judge De Castro).
2. Reparation for Injuries Suffered In The Service of The United Nations (Reparations Case), 1949
I.C.J. 174, 322 (Apr. 11).
3. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954
I.C.J. 47, 57 (July 13); Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66,
79 (July 8); Reparations Case, 1949 I.C.J at 322-23.
4. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 16.
5. U.N. CHARTER, art 24, para. 1.
6. Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the Montreal Convention Arising Out
of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lockerbie Case) (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 170 (Apr. 14)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry); DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER 190 (2001); Matthias J. Herdegen, The
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measures it deems necessary to fulfill its responsibility.7 In that context, its
actions enjoy a presumption of legality, as recognized by this Court. In
adopting Resolution 2241, the Security Council acted explicitly under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, hence it enjoyed the most ample discretion to decide
which measures were necessary in order to maintain peace and security.
Moreover, on previous occasions, United States pressure has led the
Security Council to include provisions similar to Operative Paragraph 7 in its
Resolutions in order to safeguard the continuity of United Nations missions.9
Such was the case of Resolution 1422, where the extension of the United
Nations mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina was threatened by a United States
veto, unless United Nations peacekeepers who were nationals of contributing
non-party states were exempted from ICC jurisdiction.'I Under such circum-
stances, Security Council members acceded to adopt the provision in order to
guarantee extension of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
mandate." Similarly, the United States successfully exercised this kind of
pressure in the Liberia affair.' 2 After twelve votes in favor and three
abstentions, France -who disagreed with Operative Paragraph 7- did not veto the
resolution, recognizing as did others, the urgent need to authorize deployment
of troops.'3  In the present case, the insistence of one permanent Security
Council member led it to include Operative Paragraph 7 in Resolution 2241 as
a necessary condition to authorize IFLEN operations in Yuggott. Hence the
adoption of Security Council Resolution 2241 is one more instance where states
Constitutionalization of the UN Security System, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 152 (1994); Bryan
McPherson, Authority of the Security Council to Exempt Peacekeepers from International Criminal Court
Proceedings (July 2002), ASIL INSIGHTS, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh89.htm.
7. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 16; Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 179; See Jost
Delbrflck, Article 24, in I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 403 (Bruno Simma ed.,
2d ed. 2002); SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 6, at 301.
8. Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
9. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1422 (2002); S.C. Res.
1487, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003); See generally U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., 4803rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
10. UN fights to save Bosnia Mission, BBC NEWS, July 1, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas; Edith M. Lederer, U.S. May Veto Bosnia Peace Mission,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 28, 2002, http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/june02/hed5055.html; Ewen
MacAskill & Richard Norton-Taylor, US Threat to Balkans Peace Force, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June 27,
2002, http://guardian.co.uk/interational.
11. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4573rd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. SiPV.4573 (2003); S.C. Res. 1487, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003).
12. Press Release, SC/7836, United Nations, Security Council Authorizes Multinational Force to
Support Ceasefire in Liberia (2003), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7836.doc.htm; See generally
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
13. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd ntg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4803 (2003).
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have confirmed the necessity of investing the Security Council with the power
to exclude certain agents from ICC jurisdiction.
Finally, to be deemed valid, Security Council resolutions must observe
Security Council rules of voting procedure. Voting procedures require resolu-
tions to be in accordance with the UN Charter. 4 This requires its adoption by
nine affirmative votes, including the concurring votes of permanent members.15
In this case, Resolution 2241 was approved with ten affirmative votes and five
abstentions. Further, the Security Council was validly exercising its wide
discretional powers under Chapter VII to maintain international peace and
security. Moreover, although not always necessary, 6 a possible third requisite,
as argued among scholars, consists in the prior determination of the existence
of a threat to the peace when the Security Council acts under Chapter VII.'7 In
this case, though the text of Resolution 2241 is not available, such determination
is inferable, since: no one contested the Resolution's validity, which has been
done before when such determination was omitted; 18 Yuggott's situation was a
threat to peace, since neither civil war nor internal strife are considered as
such; 9 and, the Security Council acted explicitly under Chapter VII, which
sufficiently implies such a threat. 20 Hence, Security Council Resolution 2241
was validly adopted.
14. U.N. CHARTER, art. 27, para. 3.
15. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 L C.J. at 16.
16. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 298 1st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); S.C. Res.
724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/724 (1991); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/819 (1993); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993);
S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); S.C. Res. 833, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3224th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/833 (1993); S.C. Res. 834, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3226th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/834 (1993).
17. BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 173-74 (2000);
SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 271 (3d ed. 1998);
FreudenschuB, Article 39 of the UN Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the
UN Security Council, 46 Aus. J. PUB. INT'L L. (page), 31 (1993); See Jochen Abr. Frowein & Wico Krisch,
Article 39, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 613 (2002).
18. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg. at 7-9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (2002); U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., 4772nd mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4772 (2003).
19. S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961); S.C. Res. 688,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/0688 (1991); S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3039th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/751 (1992); See generally S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1497 (2003).
20. CONFORTI, supra note 17, at 173.
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b. Alternatively, Resolution 2241 is not Subject to Judicial Review.
The Security Council has ample powers to determine the existence of
threats to peace,21 and such determination cannot be questioned.22 Indeed, no
procedures exist for determining the validity of acts of United Nations organs.23
Moreover, this Court has recognized the inherent limitations to its judicial
function,24 and that it lacks the power of judicial review of Security Council
decisions. In fact, neither the UN Charter nor the ICJ Statute nor their travaux
preparatoires indicate that such power was to be attributed to the Court.26 Even
those who argue that such power exists, limit its application to pronouncements
on the validity of Security Council determinations of legal responsibility.27 This
is not the case here. Hence, Resolution 2241 is not subject to judicial review.
c. Randolfa is Bound to Comply with Resolution 2241.
To ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security
Council enjoys a binding decision-making power,28 evidenced by a specific
provision imposing on United Nations members the obligation to accept and
carry out Security Council decisions.29 The binding nature of Security Council
resolutions depends on the wording and the UN Charter provisions invoked.3 °
In Resolution 2241, the Security Council acted explicitly under Chapter VII,
and imperative language, such as the word decides, was used. Hence, Resolu-
tion 2241 is binding upon Randolfia under Article 25 of the UN Charter. More-
over, states must comply with treaty obligations in good faith,31 including their
21. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94- I-A 154 (Oct. 2); Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, 1997
I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-96-15-T 20; Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 176; Id. at 9 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Jennings); Susan Lamb, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers, in THE REALITY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 375 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon
eds., 1999).
22. Libyav. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 171; Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law
219 (Routledge, 6th ed. 1992) (1970); Conforti, supra note 17, at 173-74; Frowein, supra note 17, at 610.
23. Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168; Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 176.
24. Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 30 (Dec. 2).
25. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 1.C.J. at 16.
26. UN Doc. 664, IV/2/33, 13 UNCIO Docs. 633, 1945; Lamb, supra note 21, at 363; Vera
Gowland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in
Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643, 664 (1994)
27. Derek Bowett, The Impact of Security Council Decisions and Dispute Settlement Procedures,
5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 89, 94 (1994).
28. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 16; SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 6, at 49; See Delbrilck,
supra note 7, at 413.
29. U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.
30. See generally Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 114.
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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obligations under the Charter,3 2 including compliance with Security Council
decisions directly and through their action in international agencies,3 3 including
United Nations specialized agencies and other international organizations,34
such as the ICC. Curwen's surrender to the ICC would subject him to a
jurisdiction other than Arkam's, which is contrary to Resolution 2241. Hence,
by executing the ICC arrest warrant, Randolfia would breach its obligation
under the Charter to accept and carry out Resolution 2241.
Finally, Randolfia may argue that its obligation under the Rome Statute to
surrender Curwen collides with Resolution 2241. However, in the event of
conflict, obligations under the Charter prevail over those assumed by virtue of
other agreements.35 Indeed, measures deriving from binding Security Council
decisions give rise to obligations that members must fulfill irrespective of any
other commitments.36 Thus, obligations deriving from Resolution 2241 prevail
over any other obligation binding upon Randolfia, including its obligation to
surrender Curwen to the ICC.
d. Arkam has Exclusive Jurisdiction over Curwen, Which it has not
Expressly Waived.
Under Resolution 2241, Arkam has exclusive jurisdiction over its IFLEN
agents, unless expressly waived. This entails that Arkam would have to make
a clear and unambiguous statement to that effect, and no inference of action
would establish an implicit waiver. The Compromis shows no evidence of such
waiver by Arkam; rather, it has asserted jurisdiction over Curwen by taking
disciplinary measures and serving upon him a subpoena. Moreover, the
granting of amnesty by the TRC does not represent an implicit waiver, since
TRCs are recognized as legitimate exercises of jurisdiction, constituting an
alternative form of justice.37 Hence, in the absence of an express waiver by
Arkam, Randolfia may not surrender Curwen to the ICC.
32. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 2; See Jorg P. Miller & Robert Kolb, Article 2(2), in I THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 91 (2002).
33. U.N. CHARTER, art. 48, para. 2.
34. See Brun-Otto Bryde & August Reinisch, Article 48, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 775 (2002).
35. U.N. CHARTER, art. 103; Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 30(1).
36. Libya v. U.S., 1992 I.C.J. at 126; See Rudolf Bernhardt, Article 103, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 1292 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002); Thomas M. Franck, The Powers
of Appreciation: Who is the Ultimate Guardian of the UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 521 (1992).
37. Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 870 (2002); Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and
Propriety of a Truth Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833, 840
(1998); Jennifer J. Llewellyn, A Comment on the Complementarity Jurisdiction of the Court: Adding Insult
to Injury in Transitional Contexts, 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 192, 194 (2001).
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2. The Exercise of Jurisdiction by the ICC over a National of a State not
Party to the Rome Statute Violates the VCLT and Customary
International Law.
Under Article 12 of its Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes:
committed in the territory of a state party, regardless of the nationality of the
offender; or committed by a national of a state party. In this case, Randolfia
intends to surrender Curwen, an Arkamian, to the jurisdiction of the ICC for
crimes committed in Leng, a party to the Rome Statute. However, this exercise
of ICC jurisdiction would breach international law, as proven below.
a. The Exercise of Jurisdiction over Curwen Would Breach
Article 34 of the VCLT.
Under Article 34 of the VCLT, ratified by both parties to the present case,
treaties cannot create obligations or rights for third non-party states.38 This rule
is considered a codification of customary law,39 and has been acknowledged by
this court and its predecessor.40  The ILC and international tribunals have
interpreted this rule to mean that treaties cannot modify legal rights of states not
parties to them.4' One of such customary rights of states that derives from state
sovereignty is the right to exercise jurisdiction over nationals.42 This implies
that states must expressly consent to their nationals being tried by other
jurisdictions either by ratifying a treaty creating such jurisdiction or by giving
ad hoc consent. Accordingly, the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over nationals of
third parties, such as Curwen, abrogates pre-existing rights of such states, and
thus breaches Article 34 of the VCLT.43
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 34.
39. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (2000); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 561 (3d ed. 1995) (1991); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 69 (1991); ANToNIo CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (2001).
40. Columbian-Peruvian Asylum (Colom. v. Per6i), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 273-76 (Nov. 20); Free Zones
of Upper Savoy and the District ofGex (Fr. v. Swed.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 28, at 96 (June 7); Status
of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 27 (July 23) (Advisory Opinion); Territorial Jurisdiction
of the River Oder Commission, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 29, at 19 (Sept. 10); Concerning the Aerial Incident
of July 27 1955 (U.S. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 270 (Sept. 9).
41. 2 Sm ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998 698 (1999); Island
of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
42. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 § 136 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, eds.,
9th ed. 1996); REBECCA WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW Ill (3d ed. 1997); SHAW, supra note 39, at 403.
43. A. Diane Holcombe, Comment: The United States Becomes a Signatory to the Rome Treaty
Establishing the International Criminal Court: Why are so any Concerned by this Action?, 61 MONT. L. REV.
301, 314 (2001); Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26-27 (2001); Damir Arnaut, When in Rome... ? The International Criminal Court
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b. The Exercise of Jurisdiction over Curwen Cannot be
Accepted under Custom.
The provisions of a treaty that has not been ratified by a state will only
bind it through international custom." In order to justify ICC jurisdiction,
Randolfia will argue that Article 12 of the Rome Statute codifies customary law,
based on the theories of delegated universal jurisdiction or delegated territorial
jurisdiction.45 However, no customary rule binds states to delegate their
criminal jurisdiction to international tribunals.
Randolfia may argue that the exercise ofjurisdiction over nationals of non-
parties is based on the theory that the signatory states have delegated their
customary right to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crimes prescribed in
the Rome Statute.46 However, this argument is not accepted under international
law for three reasons. First, Article 12 of the Statute was not drafted with the
intention of establishing universal jurisdiction.4" In fact, Germany's universal
jurisdiction proposal was expressly rejected by the majority of states, e.g.,
Colombia, Indonesia, India, Russia, France, Brazil, Uruguay, Sweden, Norway,
Israel, Iraq, Iran, Qatar. Secondly, no precedent under international law
supports the delegation of universal jurisdiction by treaty.48 Indeed, delegation
of jurisdiction on previous international tribunals was based on states' consent,
i.e. Germany and Japan consented to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals,49 and
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were created by Security
and Venues of U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 525, 550 (2003).
44. CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1993); REUTER,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 140 (Kegan Paul International 1995); CASSESE, supra note 39, at
119.
45. David Scheffer, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(March 26, 1999), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/DavidSchefferAddressChICC.doc; Michael
P. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals
of Non- Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 76 (2001).
46. Seth Harris, The United States and the International Criminal Court: Legal Potential for Non-
Party State Jurisdiction, 23 HAWAII L. REV. 277, 302 (2000); Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection
to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of "Operation Enduring Freedom ", 9 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 19, 36 (2003); Arnaut, supra note 43, at 552.
47. G. Haffner et al, A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood, 5 EUR.
J.INT'L L. 108, 116-17 (1999); Nicolaos Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the International Criminal
Court, 29 MAN. L.J. 1, 30 (2002); Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 855, 874 (1998-1999).
48. Brown, supra note 47, at 874; Morris, supra note 43, at 37; Haffner et al, supra note 47, at 116-
17.
49. Scheffer, supra note 45; Morris, supra note 43, at 37.
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Council resolutions." Finally, some crimes of the Rome Statute are not subject
to universal jurisdiction." Moreover, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is
questionably a customary rule,52 as recognized by most justices of this Court. 3
Randolfia may also argue that state parties to the Rome Statute have
delegated their territorial jurisdiction to the ICC in the same way that a state can
delegate its territorial jurisdiction to another state. However, delegation of
territorial jurisdiction from one state to another is only possible with the consent
of the defendant's national state. 4 Thus, the same should apply to the
delegation of territorial jurisdiction to an international court. Hence, said
argument would be unreasonable in the absence of state practice to that effect.
Any effort to argue the customary status of the ICC's power to exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties is futile, since state practice is clearly
against it. Indeed, several states have not ratified the Rome Statute precisely for
this reason, and numerous contracting parties at the Rome conference con-
sidered this rule excessive, e.g., India, Russia, France, Libya, Japan, Colombia,
Sudan, Indonesia, Brazil, Sweden and Spain. Accordingly, many contracting
parties have executed treaties with non-parties to the Rome Statute, specifically
the United States, to exclude its jurisdiction over their nationals, e.g., Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Cameroon, Egypt, Georgia, Honduras, Israel,
Ireland, Thailand, Uganda. Furthermore, Security Council resolutions have
excluded ICC jurisdiction over United Nations peacekeeping personnel who are
nationals of non-party states, not only in the case of Yuggott, but also in the
cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Liberia." State practice shows that Article 12
50. See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rdmtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994);
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
51. See generally Statement by Judge Eli Nathan, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of and International Criminal Court 9th Plenary Meeting (July 17,
1998), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/govermnents/IsraelatPrepCom 17July1998.pdf; Morris, supra note
43, at 28; Scheffer, supra note 45.
52. Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Application of
Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 227,373 (2001);
Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise ofJurisdiction, in 1 CASSESE ET AL, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 587 (Oxford 2002); Mark A. Summers, The International Court Of
Justice's Decision In Congo V Belgium: How Has It Affected The Development Of A Principle Of Universal
Jurisdiction That Would Obligate All States To Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 63, 98 (2003);
Regina v. Bartle ex parte Pinochet, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1305 (1998).
53. Concerning the Arrest Warrant of April 11 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 8 (Feb. 14)
(separate opinion of Judge Guillaume); Concerning the Arrest Warrant of April 11 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.),
2002 I.C.J. 1, 11 (Feb. 14) (separate opinions of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, & Buergenthal).
54. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matter, ETS No. 073 (entered
into force Mar. 30, 1978); Morris, supra note 43, at 43-47; Ariel Zemach, Fairness and Moral Judgments in
International Criminal Law: The Settlement Provision in the Rome Statute, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 895,
907 (2003); Scheffer, supra note 45.
55. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002); See
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of the Rome Statute establishes a jurisdictional regime that many states unequi-
vocally reject, thus, it is not a codification of customary jurisdictional principles.
c. Arkam is a Persistent Objector to the ICC's Jurisdictional Regime.
As often recognized by this Court,56 the persistent objector is a state that
constantly objects to a customary rule during its development, and is thus not
bound by it." In this case, Arkam has rejected the existence of the ICC since
its developing stages and thus neither signed nor ratified its Statute. Therefore,
arguments suggesting that the Rome Statute has created instant customary law
must be dismissed, since Arkam is unquestionably a persistent objector. Hence,
Randolfia's surrendering of Joseph Curwen to ICC jurisdiction would violate
the VCLT and customary international law.
3. Given the Ongoing Investigation by the Arkamian TRC into the Acts of
Mr. Curwen Described in the Indictment, the Exercise of Jurisdiction over
him by the ICC Would Violate the Principle of Complementarity.
The principle of Complementarity-the governing principle upon which
the operation of the ICC is based- 58 implies that in the presence of an
international and national criminal justice system, only if the former fails shall
the latter intervene. 9 Hence, ICC jurisdiction may not be invoked if a national
court with jurisdiction over a certain matter is willing and able genuinely to
investigate or prosecute.6" In this case, there is a state with jurisdiction which
is able and willing to investigate the matter of Curwen's alleged crimes.
Consequently, the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over him.
generally U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
56. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. &
Den. v. Ger. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 26-27 (Feb. 20); Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 277-
78 (Nov. 20).
57. Ted L. Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector
in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985); CASSESE, supra note 39, at 123-24; LAN BROWNLEE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (5th ed. 2002) (1998).
58. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl. & art. I, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.183/9
(2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 870.
59. El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 870.
60. Johan D. van der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 66 (2000); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67 (2001); Llewellyn, supra note 37, at 194.
Distinguished Brief
a. Arkam has Jurisdiction over Curwen.
Generally, adjudicatory jurisdiction-the jurisdiction to subject persons to
the process of the courts of a state- 61 is based on territoriality or nationality.62
Under the nationality principle, a state may exercise jurisdiction over its
nationals wherever they may be and in respect of offences committed abroad.63
In this case, although Curwen has allegedly committed a crime in Leng, said
state, which would have jurisdiction under the territoriality principle, has chosen
not to intervene in Curwen's prosecution. Therefore, Arkam, Curwen's national
state, has uncontested jurisdiction over Curwen and his conduct.
b. Arkam is Carrying out a Genuine Investigation.
Under the Rome Statute, a case shall be inadmissible if a state with juris-
diction over said case is carrying out or has carried out an investigation or
prosecution, unless said state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution.64 The use of the conjunction "or" in this rule
reflects that the primacy of national process is preserved through either
investigation or prosecution, hence an investigation, regardless of its nature,
suffices.65
As has been done in numerous previous cases,66 Arkam has created a TRC
to investigate crimes committed during and in furtherance of the ethnic conflict.
Indeed, following Argentina's example, at least twenty-five states have imple-
mented TRCs to facilitate transitions to a public order of human dignity.67
States such as Chile, Argentina, South Africa, and Guatemala have created
panels to investigate human rights abuses of prior regimes or resolve civil
61. SCHACHTER, supra note 39, at 255; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW at 462 § 138; WALLACE,
supra note 42, at 114; SCHABAS, supra note 60, at 59.
62. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (2ded. 2001); Strapatsas, supra note 47, at 1; SCHACHTER, supra note 39, at 255.
63. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 306; WALLACE, supra note 42, at 114; OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW at 462 § 138; CASSESE, supra note 39, at 288.
64. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 17(1).
65. Llewellyn, supra note 37, at 203.
66. Gregory Jowdy, Truth Commission in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Proposal for Truth in
Guatemala, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285,300 (1997); Truth Commissions Digital Collection, United States
Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html; See Alan Lax, A Culture of reconciliation in Africa:
Transformative Justice, the Restoration of Dignity and Reconciliation, http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/lax.pdf.
67. Mark Vasallo, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: General Considerations and a Critical
Comparison of the Commissions of Chile and El Salvador, 33 MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 153, 156 (2002);
Dugard, Possible Conflicts ofJurisdiction with Truth Commissions, in I CASSESE ET AL, THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 694 (Oxford, 2002); Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew
Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World
Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 330-31 (1999).
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conflict emerged from political agreements.68 The validity of these TRCs as
investigative bodies has been supported by the United Nations. In El Salvador,
a TRC was appointed and administered by the United Nations to investigate the
abuses of a twelve-year civil war.6 9 Another example of a successful TRC is
South Africa's TRC, a unique United Nations supported and Non-Government
Organization (NGO) praised tripartite institution with powers to prepare a
record of the apartheid era, recommend reparations, and grant amnesty on the
basis of individual application.70 Arkam's TRC is modeled after South Africa's,
hence it constitutes a genuine form of investigation established to perform as a
psychological balm for victims of human rights violations and their families,"
and in the interest of the legitimate goals of peace and national healing,72 which
the Court should not mistake for unwillingness.
c. The Granting ofAmnesty should not be Regarded as
Unwillingness to Prosecute.
Unwillingness to prosecute exists when proceedings are undertaken for the
purpose of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility.73 However,
TRCs do not fit this description, since they are deemed alternative forms of
justice.74 Moreover, the granting of amnesty within the context of a recognized
TRC has been accepted as a form of achieving peacekeeping, nation-building
and reconciliation. 75  Although some question the validity of amnesties, as
international law stands today, a general duty to prosecute international crimes
is not supported by state practice.76 In fact, modem history is replete with cases
68. See generally Heather S. McHugh, The Truth About Truth Commissions (1996),
http://www.dec.org/pdf.docs/pnabyl77.pdf; Priscilla Hayner, Truth Commissions: Exhuming the Past,
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, Vol. 32 Issue 2, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 30, available at
http://www.bard.edu/hrp/Hayner.htm; AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE "POLITICS OF
AGREEMENT": CHILE DURING PRESIDENT AYLwIN'S FIRST YEAR (1991); Albie Sachs, Truth and
Reconciliation, 52 SMU L. REV. 1563 (1999).
69. Hayner, supra note 68, at 30-32.
70. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRUTH AND JUSTICE: UNFINISHED
BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (2003) http//:www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/truthandjustice.htm.
71. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 62, at 229-38; El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 943.
72. SCHABAS, supra note 60, at 69.
73. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 17(2).
74. El Zeidy, supra note 37, at 943; Klosterman, supra note 37, at 840; Llewellyn, supra note 37,
at 198.
75. Gwen K. Young, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 427, 434 (2002); Emily
W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commissions and the Duty to Punish Human
Rights Offences, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1999).
76. Dugard, supra note 67, at 698; Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy ofAmnesties under International
Law and General Principles ofAnglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 48 VA. L. REV. 174,
182-83 (2002).
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where amnesty has been granted for serious international crimes,77 such as in
Guatemala, Uruguay, Cambodia, El Salvador, South Africa, Haiti, and more
recently Colombia.78 Furthermore, the United Nations encouraged and helped
negotiate amnesties in several cases as a means of restoring peace.7 9 Accord-
ingly, the granting of amnesty to Curwen and other individuals in the context
of the Arkamian TRC constitutes a valid alternative form of justice and should
not be regarded as unwillingness to prosecute on the part of Arkam.
Finally, Randolfia may argue that an amnesty would shield Curwen from
punishment. However, punishment can take many non-criminal forms, includ-
ing removal from office and reduction of ranks.80 In this case, Curwen was
ordered to resign his commission without benefits. Hence, even the TRC's
amnesty would not shield him from punishment. Consequently, the Arkamian
TRC is a valid and effective assertion ofjurisdiction over Curwen that precludes
the complementary intervention of the ICC.
B. It Would be Illegal under International law for Randolfia to Surrender
Herbert West to the ICC Pursuant to the Warrant for his Arrest.
West has been charged with incitement to genocide under Article 25(3)(e)
of the Rome Statute and attempted genocide under Articles 6(a) and 25(3)(f).
Such charges are based on Article 28 (responsibility of superiors), and Article
25(3)(b) (responsibility for ordering, soliciting or inducing). Noting that under
Article 28 responsibility only derives from omissions," Arkam will refer to
West's conduct, rather than merely his actions or acts, to establish that the facts
do not support aprimafacie case, i.e. evidence amounting to an overwhelming
body of proof of potential guilt82 of his criminal responsibility for said charges.
77. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS, CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY
app. 1(2001); Dugard, supra note 67, at 694; CASSESE, supra note 39, at 302.
78. Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnestyfor Peace: Was there a Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 15-16 (1996); Naomi Rhot-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 449,458-61 (1990); Roman
Boed, The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators
of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 297,298 (2000); Col. Decree 128, Decreto sobre
Reincorporaci6n a la Vida Civil, 2003, art. 11(5).
79. Dugard, supra note 67, at 694; Scharf, supra note 78, at 5-7.
80. Scharf, supra note 78, at 18; Velisquez Rodriguez Case, I/ACt.HR, Series C, No. 4, 29 Jul.
1988; See generally Gary Hermositla et al v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 36/96, OEA/Ser.IV/H.95,
doc. 7 rev. 156 (1997).
81. Prosecutorv. Delalic etal, 1998 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-96-21-Tj 333 (Nov. 16); Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
2000 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-14-T 339 (Mar. 3).
82. MUELLER & BESHAROV, Evolution and Enforcement of International Criminal Law; 1 M.
CHEREJ BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 278 (2d ed. 1999).
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1. Neither West nor his Allegedly Criminal Conduct Demonstrate The
Necessary Nexus with a State party to the Rome Statute.
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if the crime is committed in the
territory of a state party to the Rome Statute, or the perpetrator is a national of
a state party to said Statute.83 Randolfia will argue that the ICC has jurisdiction
since West's alleged crime took place in Leng, a party to the Rome Statute.
However, as proven below, should West's conduct be considered as criminal,
it occurred in Arkam, excluding the ICC's jurisdiction.
a. West's Alleged Crime of Incitement to Genocide was
Committed in Arkam.
Under the principle of territoriality, a crime is deemed to have been
committed in the territory of the state where it is consummated." West's
alleged responsibility must be established by determining the territoriality of his
conduct, such as where the conduct took place,85 noting that the conduct under
analysis is the recording of a tape and its delivery to a neighbor. This is done
by adopting the reasoning of the Quebec Superior Court in United States v.
Novick. In that case the Court restricted the territoriality of the crime to the
place where the act was executed. In United States v. Novak the crime was mail
fraud. The Court reasoned that the crime took place where the letter was
posted.86 As with mail fraud, incitement to commit genocide is an inchoate
crime,87 meaning that the act alone is punishable,88 irrespective of its results. 89
83. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 12(2).
84. Osakeyhti6 v. Commission (In re Wood Pulp Cartel), 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 96 I.L.R. 148, 174
19 (1988); Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War
Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 164 (1996); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction
in International Law, in JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (Michael Reisman ed., 1999); ANTOLISEI,
MANUAL DE DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL, Utcha Argentina, 105.
85. METZGER, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL 331-32, Madrid, (1955).
86. U.S. v. Novick, 1960 CarswellQue 6 61 (Quebec Sup. Ct. 1960).
87. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 2000 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-97-32-I 16; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, 2003
I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-98-44A-T 855; Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, 2003 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-96-14-T 431;
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 2003 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-99-52-T 1013; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. No.
ICTR-96-4-T 562; William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 MCGILL L.J.
141, 149 (2000); Joshua Wallenstein, Punishing Words: an Analysis of the Necessity of the Element of
Causation in Prosecutions for Incitement to Genocide, 54 STAN. L. REV. 351, 388 (2001).
88. Fillipo Grispigni, L Evento Come Elemento Costitutivo del Reato, in 3 ANNALI DI DIRITrO E
PROCEDURA PENALE 858 (1934); 1 MAGGIORE, DERECHO PENAL, TEMIS 294 (2d ed. 1982); Soler, Derecho
Penal Argentino, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Tipogrfica Editora Argentina, 1953, 279; David L. Nersessian, The
Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 231, 256 (2002).
89. Pierre Spitrri, L Infraction Formelle, in REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PtNAL
COMPAR 497 (1966); Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: the Politics and
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Such crimes are consummated instantaneously when the criminal conduct is
performed.9" Additionally, criminal responsibility is individual9' and a person
can only be liable for conducts performed voluntarily.92 Thus, West will only
be responsible for conduct in which he voluntarily engaged, even though the
crime might have been committed in Leng, since conduct in Leng was
performed by others, as proven in Section C. Notwithstanding, Randolfia may
argue that the locus commissi delicti must be determined according to the result
theory. The result theory considers the crime as committed where its result
takes place (Leng). 93 Since an incitement is an inchoate crime, it is not subject
to this doctrine. Accordingly, Randolfia may try to further argue that, under the
effects doctrine the crime was consummated in Leng. The effects theory deter-
mines the territoriality of crimes by the place where their effects occur.94 How-
ever, this doctrine is highly controversial. It implies the extraterritorial
application of the law, 95 which is not contemplated in the Rome Statute.
Finally, Randolfia may argue that incitement is a continuous crime, perpe-
tuated in time and space into Leng. Such assertion is incorrect, since a
continuous crime only exists when all of its elements are present throughout itsduration,96 while incitement, as indicated above, is consummated instantan-
eously. Consequently, West's conduct was performed entirely in Arkam, repre-
senting no nexus with a state party to the Rome Statute.
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 506 (1996); Schabas, Principios Generales del Derecho
Penal, in EL ESTATUTO DE ROMA DE LA CORTE PENAL INTERNACIONAL 290 (Ambos & Guerrero eds.,
Universidad Extemado de Colombia, 1999).
90. ARTEAGA, DERECHO PENAL VENEZOLANO 135 (McGraw Hill 9th ed. 2001); SOSA, TEORIA
GENERAL DE LA LEY PENAL 248 (Ediciones Liber 2d ed. 2000); Maggiore, supra note 88, 295.
91. 91. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1999 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-l -A 186 (July 15); Prosecutor v. Kordic &
Cerkez, 2001 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14/2-T 364 (Feb. 26).
92. Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in 1 CASSESE ET AL, THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONALCRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 774 (Oxford, 2002); ANTONiOCASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 137 (2003); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REv. 323, 330 (1985).
93. SOSA, TEORiA GENERAL DE LA LEY PENAL 282-83 (2000); ARTEAGA, DERECHO PENAL
VENEZOLANO 87-88 (2001).
94. PAUST ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 125 (Carolina Academic Press, 1996); CASSESE,
supra note 92, at 280; SCHABAS, supra note 60, at 63.
95. SHAW, supra note 39, at 423; BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 310; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW at 472 §136.
96. Regina v. Treacy, 55 I.L.R. 110, 116, (H.L. 1970); ARTEAGA, supra note 90, at 136; Jack
Balderson, Jr., Temporal Units of Prosecution and Continuous Acts: Judicial and Constitutional Limitations,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 195, 199 (1999).
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b. West's Alleged Complicity was Perpetrated in Arkam
The conduct of the accomplice is subject to the jurisdiction of the state in
the territory of which it takes place.97 Should West be found responsible for
participating in the commission of incitement to genocide and genocide, only,
Arkam would have jurisdiction because West's conduct took place entirely in
Arkam, hence there would be no territorial nexus. Consequently, West's
conduct-whether considered as constituting an inchoate crime, or an act of
participation-was entirely executed in Arkam, which excludes ICC jurisdic-
tion, since the necessary nexus is not fulfilled.
2. West's Actions Preceded the Date on which the Rome Statute Entered
into Force with Respect to Leng and Randolfia and are Thus Barred from the
ICC's Consideration.
Under the principle of intertemporal law, when dealing with different legal
systems prevailing at successive periods of time, a "jurisdictional fact must be
appreciated in light of the law contemporary."9 This principle is embraced by
the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute provides that no one shall be criminally
responsible for conduct prior to its entry into force.99 Accordingly, even if
West's acts of recording a tape and delivering it to his neighbor were considered
crimes within the competence of the ICC, such acts, which took place April
2003, are not contemporary with the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC.
This statute was entered into force for Leng and Randolfia on May 1 2003;
therefore, a breach of international law would occur if Randolfia surrendered
West to the ICC.
3. West's Alleged Acts do not Constitute a Crime of the
Competence of the ICC.
In order to justify West's surrender to the ICC under international law,
Randolfia must establish that there is a prima facie case of West's respon-
sibility. However, the evidence does not support the construction of a prima
facie case against West. An analysis of his actions in relation to the killings in
Leng does not prove his guilt beyond the reasonable doubt required by inter-
national tribunals.' 00
97. 3 JIMENEZ DE ASUA, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL 846-47 (3d ed., Losada, 1964).
98. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 28-31 (1963). See also
Islands ofPalmas, Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17);
T.O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 285, 286 (1980).
99. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 11.
100. Rome Statute, supra note 58, art. 66(3); ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc fT/32,
2002, Rule 87(a); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); S.C. Res.
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a. West is not Responsible for the Crime of Incitement to Commit Genocide.
As stated above, West has been charged with incitement to genocide and
attempted genocide. These charges are based on two forms of participation:
responsibility of superiors and participation by order, solicitation, or induction.
Although Arkam will not rebut the commission of the crime of incitement to
commit genocide, it is submitted that West cannot be held responsible for said
crime under either form of participation, as proven below.
i. West cannot be held responsible under the doctrine of superior
responsibility.
The superior responsibility doctrine requires proof of three elements: 1)
a superior-subordinate relationship; 2) knowledge by the superior of his
subordinates' actions; and, 3) failure by the superior to exercise due control over
his subordinates or inform of their illegal actions.' However, at least two of
these elements are not fulfilled.
A superior-subordinate relationship implies that the perpetrator of the
underlying offence is under a superior's effective control and authority,' which
entails that the latter be in position-political or military-to order the
commission of a crime or punish the perpetrators thereof.0 3 However, mere
leadership does not imply that a person has such authority or can exercise
effective control and authority over others." 4 Moreover, in the specific case of
non-military leadership, the civilian superior's degree of control must be similar
to that of a military commander,' 5 and the "material ability" to intervene to
prevent or punish offences is required. 6 In the Musema case, the ICTR set
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at Art. 18(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y.
601.
101. Kajelieli, 2003 I.C.T.R. 1773; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, 1999 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-12/1-T 69
(June 25); Prosecutor v. Galic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-98-29-T 173 (Dec. 5); Greg R. Vetter, Command
Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 89,
97-98 (2000); UNSC, Letterfrom the UNSG to the President of the SC, U.N. Doc. S/1994/673, at 16-17 (May
24, 1994).
102. Cecile Aptel & Jamie A. Williamson, Commentary on the Musema Judgment Rendered by the
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certain parameters to the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility applied to
civilians, finding that Musema, as director of the Gisovu Tea Factory, had "legal
and financial control over [his] employees, particularly through his power to
appoint and remove these employees from their positions in the tea factory,' 0 7
and used his authority and power to order his employees to kill Tutsis in the
surrounding communities. The ICTR used these facts to determine that
Musema had the "material ability" to order crimes as well to prevent them. In
this case, West's abilities and competencies are not sufficiently demonstrated
to establish that he had such a control over GALA members. Indeed, the facts
show that West's leadership was more ideological than military. Consequently,
he cannot be deemed guilty under the superior responsibility doctrine.
In order to be held responsible for the actions of subordinates, the superior
must also know or disregard information indicating that the subordinates are
committing or about to commit a crime. 1 8 Knowledge implies awareness that
a circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events.' 9 Further, although it can be established through circumstantial
evidence, knowledge cannot be presumed."0 In this case, nothing evidences
that West had actual knowledge of the actions of other GALA members, and the
recording of the tape and subsequent delivery to his neighbor do not prove that,
in the normal course of events, it would have been broadcast through Radio
Yugott, much less incited Arkamians to conduct killing raids. Consequently,
West cannot be said to have known that such criminal actions would be
committed. Hence he is not guilty under the superior responsibility doctrine.
ii. West was not an accomplice of the GALA members who incited genocide.
International Tribunals have considered instigation as a form of consum-
mating the actus reus of complicity."' Instigation is defined as the prompting
of a person to commit an offence." 2 Ordering, soliciting, and inducing are
23/1-T 1 396 (Feb. 22); Prosecutor v. Naletilic & Martinovic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-98-34-T 76 (Mar. 31);
Galic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. 176; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, 1999 I.C.T.R. No. ICTR-95-1-T 511;
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107. Musema, 2000 I.C.T.R. 880.
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111. Bagilishema,2001I.C.T.R. 70;Akayesu,1998I.C.T.R. 533-37;Kajelijeli,2003.C.T.R.9
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forms of instigation." 3 When a person orders, solicits or induces the commis-
sion of a crime that is in fact perpetrated or attempted,1 4 he is an accomplice to
such crime. However, ordering implies a superior-subordinate relationship," 5
and, as established above, there is no evidence of such relationship. Soliciting
or inducing also implies commanding, authorizing, urging or affecting, causing
or influencing a course of conduct by persuasion or reasoning. " 6 There is also
no evidence that West engaged in such conduct. Indeed, the ICTR in its
Kayishema and Ruzindanda decision, found instigating conduct in the promises
of money or food, giving weapons to the perpetrators, taking them to the places
where they would commit the crimes, or being physically present while the
crimes were committed." 7 There is no evidence whatsoever that West ordered
or otherwise caused by means of persuasion or reasoning the subsequent
conduct of GALA members. Hence, West cannot be held responsible as an
accomplice to such a crime.
Additionally, the accomplice's conduct entails individual criminal respon-
sibility only when it presents a direct causal link to a crime which is indeed
perpetrated or attempted."' Indeed, under the principle of novus actus
interveniens, in a sequence of a person's action, the intervention of another bars
the causal responsibility of the first person."9 In this case, the existence of a
causal link between West's actions and those of the broadcasters of the tape is
highly questionable, given the intervention of other GALA members in the
sequence of events (copying, distributing, and broadcasting) and the lack of
evidence of West's actual instructions. Therefore, West is not an accomplice
to incitement to genocide.
b. West is not Responsible for Genocide nor Attempted Genocide.
Randolfia may try to use the ICTR's Nahimana decision to argue that there
is a primafacie case of West's responsibility. In said case, the Trial Chamber
113. Eser, supra note 92, at 796; Kai Ambos, Article 25, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 480 (Otto Triffierer ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-
Baden, 1999).
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117. Kayishema & Ruzindana, 1999 I.C.T.R. 1 419, 421, 463.
118. ENRIQUEGIMBERNAT, AUTORYCOMPLICEENDERECHOPENAL 168-74(1966); Mufioz, Teoria
General del Delito, EDITORIAL TEMIS, 1990, at 207-09.
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evaluated a series of contextual factors that presented a strong case against
Nahimana and Barayagwiza. The first factor was based on their role as
directors of Radio Television de Miles Colines (RTLM) and the Coalition pour
la Defence de la Republic (CDR), a radio station and a political party with
militias. They set course over the purposes and actions of those organizations.
The second factor found was that they exercised de facto control over RTLM
and the CDR. Finally, their organizations were aimed at creating ethnic vio-
lence and hatred. 2 Unlike the Nahimana case, it is not sufficiently clear
whether West was in a position to set course over its member's purposes or
actions. In fact, there is no evidence that West exercised authority or control
over GALA members or Radio Yuggott. Moreover, GALA's purpose is the
secession of Yuggott from Leng to create a "Greater Arkam," not the generation
of ethnic hatred or violence. The facts that were crucial to determine respon-
sibility in Nahimana cannot be proven in this case, especially since the evidence
provided here derives from local press, which has little evidentiary value in
criminal law. 2' Consequently, a prima facie case of West's responsibility
cannot be elaborated on that basis.
VI. REMEDIES SOUGHT BY ARKAM
States are liable for the wrongful acts attributable to them in violation of
international law.'22 Indeed, violations of international obligations give rise to
state responsibility and to the state's correlative duty of reparation,'23 which
must reestablish the situation to the conditions that would have existed if the
wrongful act had not been committed.'24 In this case, Randolfia intends to
surrender two Arkamian citizens to the jurisdiction of the ICC, wrongfully
intervening in Arkam's internal affairs and abrogating its right to exercise
jurisdiction over its nationals. Declaratory judgements provide satisfaction for
certain breaches of international obligations. 125 This Court and its predecessor
have willingly granted declarations as a form of satisfaction. 26 Accordingly,
120. Nahimana, 2003 .C.T.R. 949, 951, 972.
121. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 62, at 256.
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Claims, (U.K. v. Spain), 2 RIAA, 615,2 ILR, 1928, 157; Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J.
9 (July 6).
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based on all that has been sufficiently proven above, Arkam requests this Court
declare that it would be illegal for Randolfia to surrender Joseph Curwen and
Dr. Herbert West to the ICC pursuant to the warrants for their arrest.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Based on the foregoing reasons, Arkam respectfully requests that this Court
DECLARE that it would be illegal under international law for Randolfia to
surrender Joseph Curwen to the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest; and
DECLARE that it would be illegal for Randolfia to surrender Herbert West to
the ICC pursuant to the warrant for his arrest.
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Kingdom of Arkam and the State of Randolfia have agreed to submit
their dispute to the International Court of Justice. The Court has jurisdiction to
decide the case pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Randolfia's decision to surrender Lieutenant Joseph
Curwen to the custody of the International Criminal Court would be
consistent with international law?
2. Whether Randolfia's decision to surrender Dr Herbert West to the
custody of the International Criminal Court would be consistent
with international law?
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In January 2003, a trans-border conflict erupted in the Kingdom of Arkam
and the Kingdom of Leng. There have been centuries of tension and periodic
conflict between ethnic Arkamians and ethnic Lengians. Following the out-
break of conflict in 2003, high-level delegations from both States attended an
international peace conference, convened by the United Nations, in the
Randolfian capital of Cimmeria. Randolfia shares a common border with both
States. The Cimmeria Peace Agreement was brokered on 14 February and
concluded the conflict in Arkam. The conflict in Leng continued.
In accordance with the terms of the Peace Agreement, the government of
Arkam established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which
commenced operation on April 15, 2003. The TRC was modelled on the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. There are however, differences
between the Arkamian and South African Commissions.
During the early months of 2003, sporadic fighting continued in the
ethnically-mixed Lengian province of Yuggott. The conflict was spurred by the
Greater Arkamian Liberation Army (GALA), a militia dedicated to the
secession of Yuggott from Leng and its unification with Arkam.
On May 1, 2003, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Rome Statute) entered into force for Leng and Randolfia. Arkam is not a party
to the Statute.
Dr Herbert West, an Arkamian national, is a leader of GALA. In April
2003, West recorded an audiotape in Arkam, in which he urged his "Arkamian
brothers and sisters to rid Yuggott ... of its Lengian occupiers. Eliminate them
all: men, women and children. Eliminate them all!" West passed the audiotape
to another member of GALA. The recording was subsequently duplicated and
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circulated. Between May 15 and May 25, 2003, the recording was broadcast
repeatedly on Radio Yuggott, a private radio station controlled by members of
GALA which has supported GALA's goals in its broadcasts.
On May 16, 2003, bands of ethnic Arkamians began to conduct a series
of raids in Yuggott. By the end of May, nearly ten percent of the Lengian
population of Yuggott had been massacred. Local newspapers surmised that the
raids were inspired by West. West then subsequently traveled to Randolfia.
On June 17, 2003, the Lengian ambassador to the United Nations formally
requested that the UN Security Council authorise the deployment of troops to
Yuggott. On June 20, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2241 which
provided for the IFLEN multilateral peacekeeping force. Operative Paragraph
7 of Resolution 2241 included provisions concerning the jurisdiction of the ICC.
The paragraph granted exclusive jurisdiction to contributing States over their
nationals, if those contributing States were not party to the Rome Statute.
Several states expressed concerns about this paragraph. Five members of the
Security Council abstained from the vote on Resolution 2241.
Lieutenant Joseph Curwen, an Arkamian national, was a member of the
IFLEN peacekeeping mission. On June 28, 2003, GALA forces attacked the
IFLEN platoon under Curwen's command. Curwen ordered the remaining
members of his platoon to attack and destroy Exhamtown, which was purported
to be a GALA stronghold. During the attack, which later became known as the
"Massacre at Exhamtown", 200 unarmed civilians were killed. On June 30,
GALA and the Lengian government agreed to a UN monitored cease-fire.
As a result of his involvement in the massacre, Curwen was dismissed
from IFLEN, and subsequently ordered to return home to Arkam. On July 3,
Curwen was subpoenaed to appear before the Arkamian TRC and promptly left
Arkam to visit family in Randolfia. His departure from Arkam was not
forbidden by the subpoena or by Arkamian law generally.
Both West and Curwen were arrested in Randolfia for minor offences and
were indicted in accordance with Randolfian law. Randolfia has not enacted
municipal laws criminalising genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes
committed by non-Randolfian nationals outside of its borders. Thus on July 25,
2003, the Randolfian Minister of Justice dispatched a communiqu6 to the
Registrar of the ICC, requesting that the Court exercise jurisdiction over
Curwen and West to the custody of the ICC.
Arrest warrants for West and Curwen were issued by the ICC on
September 9, 2003. Curwen has been charged under Articles 8(2)(a), 8(2)(b),
8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute. West has been charged under Articles
6(a), 25(3)(b), 25(3)(e), 25(3)(f), and 28 of the Rome Statute. On the same day,
the King of Arkam warned the President of Randolfia that the surrender of West
and Curwen to the custody of the ICC would result in an immediate disruption
of economic and diplomatic relations between the two States.
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The potentially crippling economic consequences of this disruption
precipitated diplomatic negotiations between the foreign ministers of Arkam and
Randolfia. These negotiations concluded with an agreement to submit the
dispute to the International Court of Justice. Leng has declined to intervene in
the matter.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review the
operation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The
exercise of power by the Security Council is limited by the
principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and general
international law. Randolfia has no obligation to comply with
Resolutions 1487 or 2241. The assertion of exclusive jurisdiction
by Arkam through its TRC would undermine the jus cogens
prohibition of war crimes. Therefore, Resolution 2241 is not
binding upon Randolfia. Resolution 1487, which invokes the Rome
Statute, is not binding upon Randolfia due to its inconsistency with
that Statute.
B. The surrender of Curwen to the ICC is consistent with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law.
The Rome Statute does not create obligations for Arkam. The
surrender of Curwen to the ICC does not abrogate Arkam's rights.
Accordingly, the surrender of Curwen does not violate of the
principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.
C. The surrender of Curwen to the ICC would not violate the principle
of complementarity. An investigation of Curwen by the Arkamian
TRC is incompatible with a genuine willingness to investigate or
prosecute. Furthermore, a Randolfian surrender of Curwen to the
ICC would not give rise to State responsibility.
D. The issue ofjurisdiction of the ICC is distinct from the merits of any
claim of criminal responsibility before the ICC. Consequently, it is
only necessary for the International Court of Justice to be satisfied
that there is a sufficiently plausible case of ICC jurisdiction in order
to justify the surrender of West to the ICC. There is a sufficiently
plausible case that the crimes for which West is responsible
occurred within the territory of Leng. This satisfies the nexus
requirement.
E. There is a sufficiently plausible case that West's acts fall within the
temporal jurisdiction of the ICC. He is charged with responsibility
for the genocide, which occurred in Yuggott after the entry into
force of the Rome Statute for Leng. Furthermore, West's conduct
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constitutes continuing crimes, which fall within the temporal
jurisdiction of the ICC.
F. In order to justify the surrender of West to the ICC, it is only
necessary to establish a sufficiently plausible case that a crime
within the jurisdiction of the ICC has occurred. Genocide has
occurred in Yuggott. While it is not necessary for this Court to
establish West's individual criminal responsibility, there is sufficient
evidence to support each of the charges against West under Articles
25 and 28 of the Rome Statute.
V. PLEADINGS
A. Randolfia's Decision to Surrender Joseph Curwen to the Custody of the
International Criminal Court is Consistent with International Law.
1. Arkam Does Not Have Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Curwen.
Randolfia has no obligation under United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1487 or 2241 to recognise Arkam's claim to exclusive jurisdiction
over Curwen. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review
Security Council resolutions in order to determine the nature of obligations
created therein. Curwen has been charged by the International Criminal Court
(ICC) with war crimes. The prohibition of war crimes is a rule ofjus cogens.
States are obliged under international law to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere
autludicare) persons accused of war crimes. The granting of an amnesty to
Curwen by the Arkamian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) would
violate these obligations. Recognition by this Court of Arkam's claim to
exclusive jurisdiction would therefore undermine the obligations to prohibit war
crimes and to extradite or prosecute persons accused of such crimes.
Resolutions 1487 and 2241 are not binding upon Randolfia to the extent that
they conflict with these obligations.
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a. The International Court of Justice has Jurisdiction to Review the
Operation of Security Council Resolutions.
Security Council resolutions are subject to international law.' Obligations
created by the Security Council are limited by the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and rules of general international law.2 The obligations
under Article 25' to carry out decisions of the Security Council are limited to
those decisions made in accordance with the Charter.4 The International Court
of Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has jurisdiction
to review obligations created under the Charter.5
1. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U. S.), 1998 I.C.J. No. 89 4 (Feb. 27), http://icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ilus/ilusjudgement/ilus ijudgement_980227.htm (Rezek, J. separate opinion);
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U. K.), 1992 1.C.J. No. 88 H 24-26 (April 14), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ilukiorder_9204 14.html (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting); Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U. K.,
1992 I.C.J. at 171, 174-75 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); Legal Consequences for State of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Aft.) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 294, 340 (June 21) (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting; Gros, J., dissenting); See Conditions of Admissions
of a State to Membership of the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 64 (May 28) (advisory opinion); Decision on
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic), 1995 I.C.T.Y. No.
IT-94-1-AR72 (H 32-34 (Oct. 2), http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm; Lauterpacht, E.,
The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD McNAIR 89 (Stevens & Sons ed., 1965); See Thomas M. Franck, The
Security Council and "Threats to The Peace:" Some Remarks on Remarkable Developments, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING: WORKSHOP,
84 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed. 1993); See John Dugard, Judicial Review of Sanctions, in UNITED NATIONS
SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 83, 85-6 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed. 2001); Michael Bothe, Les
Limites des Pouvoirs du Conseil de Sdcuriti, in LE DEVELOPMENT DU ROLE DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE,
PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING 67, 69 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed. 1993); Secretary-General's Statement
to the Security Council, in Security Council Official Record Second Year, No.3, Ninety-First Meeting, 44-45.
2. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2 7, 24 1 2; See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. No. 91 91 100-01 (Sept. 13),
http://www.icj-icj.org/icjwww/idocketlibhy/ibhyorders/iBHY-iorder 19930913.htm (Lauterpacht, J. separate
opinion).
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 25; Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs; Extracts Relating to
Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations Practice, Supp. 5, Vol. 2, 34, 38 15 (1970- 78); South West
Afr., 1971 I.C.J. at 53; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U. K., 1992 I.C.J. 1 28; See LELAND M. GOODRICH &
EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 209 (George W.
Keeton, et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1949).
4. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 $ 155 (Jun. 30) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. U. S., 1998 I.C.J. at 175 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 92; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U. S., 1998 I.C.J. at 152, 154,913 (Rezek, J.,
separate opinion); See Bos. & Herz. v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. at 439 199 (Lauterpact, J., separate opinion); South
West Aft., 1971 I.C.J. at 303-304, 143-145 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting; Onyeama, J., separate opinion); East
Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 1251 (Jun. 30) (Skubiszewski, J., dissenting).
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b. Grounds of Review -Purposes and Principles of the United Nations
Charter and Rules of General International law
The third preambular paragraph of the United Nations Charter refers to the
determination "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained.",6 Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter address the purposes of the UN,
and require that organs and members of the UN act "in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law ... in the settlement of international
disputes."'
Principles of justice and international law require that States prohibit the
commission of war crimes, and extradite or prosecute those accused of war
crimes.8 Randolfia and Arkam, as parties to the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Compromis 30), are
obliged to extradite or prosecute those accused of war crimes.9 In particular,
such an obligation exists in relation to the crime of intentionally directing
attacks against a civilian population.'0 Furthermore, under general international
law there is a duty to extradite or prosecute individuals accused of war crimes
committed in both international" and non-international 2 armed conflicts.
6. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. I 1 1.
8. Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment
of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess.,
pmbl. (1973); Question of the Punishment of War Criminals andPersons who have committed Crimes Against
Humanity, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., 2025th mtg. at 88, U.N. Doc. A/2840 (1971); U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 57th Sess., 56th mtg. II, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200 (2002),
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/cd893dbd5bbded7cl 256bab0051565d?Opendo
cument.htm; See Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72,
77 (Louis Henkin ed. 1981); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 113 (June 27); M. CHERIF BASSiOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE
DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (1995); See generally Thomas Buergenthal,
Inter-American Court of Human Rights:Judgement in Velasquez Rodriguez Case (ForcedDisappearance and
Death of Individual in Honduras) 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989); The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction,
Princ. 7, PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, 2001,
http://www.law.uc.edu/morgan/newsdir/univjuris.htm; South West Aft., 1971 I.C.J. at 143-45 (Onyeama J.,
separate opinion).
9. Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August
12, 1949, art. 146, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
10. ROME STATUTE, art. 8(2)(b)(i); See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text.; Illegality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8).
11. See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Oct. 21, 1950, art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. 970; Geneva Convention for the
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Resolution 2241 purports to confer exclusive jurisdiction on States not
party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)
in relation to crimes committed by their nationals whilst serving in the IFLEN
peacekeeping mission. The prohibition of war crimes is a peremptory norm (jus
cogens) of international law. 3 Article 103,14 which addresses conflicts between
the Charter and other treaty obligations, does not apply to conflicts involving
rules of general international law.'5 A fortiori, Article 103 has no application
in relation to peremptory norms.16
The Arkamian TRC was established on March 1, 2003 (Compromis 7).
Curwen ordered the destruction of Exhamtown on June 29, 2003 (Compromis
17). This assertion of jurisdiction in a prospective manner by the Arkamian
TRC in relation to Curwen is contrary to Arkam's obligation to prohibit war
crimes. Thus, Resolution 2241 effectively obliges member States having
custody of an accused to become "supporters"' 7 of Arkam's non-fulfilment of
its jus cogens obligation to prohibit war crimes. Notwithstanding Articles 25
and 103 of the United Nations Charter, "in strict logic"' 8 Resolution 2241 is not
binding on Randolfia.
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 2, 50, 75 U.N.T.S. 971, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/qgenev2.htm; See Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 75 U.N.T.S. 972,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm; See Case Concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. No. 121 U 59, 61-62 (Feb. 14) (Van Den Wyngaert,
J. dissenting); Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind 1996, I.L.C. art. 9, 20 (1996),
http:/www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcode.htm; See BASSIOUNI, supra note 8, at 20.
12. John Dugard, Dealing With Crimes of a Past Regime, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L., 1001, 1003 (1999);
See G.A. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); Dusko Tadic, 1995 I.C.T.Y. 1 32-
34; Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind 1996, I.L.C. art. 20 14.
13. See Illegality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. at 273,
496, 574 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting; Koroma, J., dissenting); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., 2000 I.C.T.Y.
No. IT-95-16-T 520 (Jan. 14) (Judgment); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Normative Framework of International
Humanitarian Law, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMPOR. PROBS., 199, 201 (1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Crime: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, at 68
(1996) (citing U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) & U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993)); LAuRi HANNKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 621-22 (1988).
14. U.N. Charter art. 103.
15. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U. S., 1998 I.C.J. at 152 912 (Rezek, J. separate opinion).
16. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. at 440 100 (Lauterpacht, J. separate opinion).
17. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo., 1993 I.C.J. at 441 102 (Lauterpacht, J. separate opinion).
18. See id. 1103.
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c. Resolution 1487 is Not Applicable
The Security Council, in paragraph one of Resolution 1487, adopted in
purported reliance on Article 16 of the Rome Statute, "requests" that the ICC
not commence investigations or prosecutions of members of UN peacekeeping
missions for a renewable period of twelve months, commencing July 1, 2003.19
The Security Council in paragraph three of the same Resolution decided that
member States take no action inconsistent with such a Security Council request,
or with their international obligations. As paragraph one explicitly envisages
consistency with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the scope of any obligation
imposed by paragraph three of the resolution is dependent on such consistency.
It is inconsistent with the intention of the drafters of Article 16 of the Rome
Statute to allow a broad, prospective deferral of ICC jurisdiction in respect of
a general class of conflicts.20 Article 16 only envisages a Security Council
request for deferral of investigation or prosecution on a case-by-case basis."
The request contained in Resolution 1487 is inconsistent with Article 16.
Therefore, Randolfia's surrender of Curwen to the ICC would not be
inconsistent with paragraph three of the Resolution. Furthermore, Randolfia has
an obligation under international law to surrender Curwen to the ICC [Rome
Statute, Article 89(1)].
2. The surrender of Curwen to the ICC is Consistent with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and Customary International Law.
It is a general rule of customary international law that a treaty cannot
impose obligations or confer rights on States not party to the treaty without their
consent (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt).22 Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) embodies this principle. For the
purposes ofthepacta tertiis rule, however, non-party States have no grounds of
19. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772d mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1487 (2003).
20. The Unlawful Attempt By The Security Council to Give U.S. Citizens Permanent Impunity from
International Justice 47, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A.I. Index: I.O.R.
40/006/2003 (May 2003).
21. See U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg. at 6, 7, 9, U.N. Doc S/PV.4568 (2002); See U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772nd mtg. at 2, 5-7, 9, 15, 18, 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV4772 (2003) (concerning the renewal
by the Security Counsel. of Sess. 1422 (2002), art. 16 of the Rome Statute).
22. German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Judgment No. 7) 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No. 7, at 29
(May 25); See Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Judgments, Orders and Advisory Opinions)
1932 P.C.I.J (ser.A/B) No.46, at 141 (Jun. 7); See Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of
the River Oder (Judgment No. 16) 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.23, at 20-22 (Sept. 10); Island of Palmas Case,
HIR.I.A.A. 831, 842, 850, 870 (1925).
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complaint" regarding "incidentally unfavourable effects of lawful and valid
,,24treaties.
The Rome Statute does not create obligations for Arkam. The obligations
created by the Rome Statute are expressly limited to State parties.2 ' The
principle of complementarity recognizes Arkam's entitlement to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over Curwen, but does not impose any obligations on
Arkam.26 To the extent that Arkam is obliged to extradite or prosecute persons
accused of war crimes, this is a pre-existing obligation under general
international law.
The surrender of a national of a non-party State to the ICC does not violate
the pacta tertiis rule. States are entitled under customary international law to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals without the consent of the State of
nationality.27 States are entitled to delegate this jurisdiction to an international
tribunal.28 States are also entitled to extradite foreign nationals to third States
without the consent of the State of nationality of an accused. 29 The incidental
and potentially unfavorable effect of a Randolfian surrender of Curwen to the
ICC is consistent with international law.
A foreign visiting military force does not enjoy immunity from the
jurisdiction of the receiving state.30 This means that Arkam is unable to claim
that the Rome Statute abrogates its rights under the rules of sovereign immunity.
23. FrrZMAURICE, G, 1960 YBILC 11, 84; See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES 98-100 (Manchester University Press, 2d ed, 1984) (1973).
24. FITZMAURICE, id. at 100-101.
25. See generally ROME STATUTE, pt 9.
26. See id. at art. 17, 18.
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-23 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Yunis, 724 F.2d 1086, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Oct. 14, 1971, art. 4, 860
U.N.T.S. 105, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/haguel970.html; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, art. 5-7, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, arts. 6-7, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., arts. 2,4-5,
U.N. Doc. A/34/146 (1979); G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., arts. 2,4-5, U.N. Doc. A/39/46 (1984),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm; Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971,
arts. 2(7)(b)(vi), 2(7)(c)(v), 2(7)(d)(iii), 21-22,1019 U.N.T.S. 174; G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess.,
arts. 3, 4, 6, U.N. Doc. A/52/164 (1997), http://www.un.org/ga/documents/gares52/res521164.htm.
28. See JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS, NUREMBERG, 30 SEPTEMBER AND I OCTOBER, 1946, 38 (London His Majesty's Stationery
Office 1946); See Michael P. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal Court Articles: The
ICC 's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States 64 WTR L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 67, 103-104 (2001).
29. I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (1971).
30. ROBERT JENNINGS, & ARTHUR WATTS,. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1157 (9th ed.
1992).
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Arkam is also unable to claim that the surrender of Curwen undermines a right
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction under Security Council Resolution 2241. To
the extent that any right was created by Resolution 2241, Arkam, by its
initiation of an inappropriate TRC process, has relinquished any such right.
3. The Exercise of Jurisdiction over Curwen Does Not Violate the Principle
of Complementarity.
Arkam contends, in the alternative, that "given the ongoing investigation
by the Arkamian TRC into the acts of Mr. Curwen, ... the exercise of
jurisdiction over him by the ICC would violate the principle of
complementarity" (Compromis 31), and that therefore any prosecution by the
ICC is inadmissible. In order to succeed on the issue of admissibility, Arkam
must establish that the case against Curwen is inadmissible under the Rome
Statute, and that the surrender of an accused in relation to an inadmissible case
would give rise to State responsibility. The obligation to surrender and the issue
of admissibility are distinct legal questions.
The issue of admissibility raised by Arkam is addressed in the Rome
Statute in Article 17. ' Article 17(l)(a) provides that a case is inadmissible
before the ICC where the case is being "investigated or prosecuted" by a State
having jurisdiction over the matter.12 A case is admissible, where a State is
"unwilling or unable genuinely"3 3 to carry out an investigation or prosecution.
In order to determine whether there is an unwillingness to investigate or
prosecute for the purposes of the Rome Statute, the ICC is required to consider
several factors. These include: whether national proceedings have been taken
for the purpose of shielding the accused from criminal responsibility and
whether the proceedings are being conducted independently or impartially, and
consistently with an intent to bring the accused to justice.34
a. Investigations by Truth and Reconciliation Commissions Do Not Preclude
Admissibility of Cases Before the ICC.
For the purposes of Article 17, an investigation by a TRC is not sufficient
to render a case inadmissible before the ICC.35 An "investigation" within the
terms of Article 17(1)(a) must be undertaken with a view to subjecting an
31. ROME STATUTE, art. 17(l)(a).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. ROME STATUTE, at art. 17(2).
35. See John Dugard, Possible Conflicts ofJurisdiction with Truth Commissions, in VOLUME I THE
ROME STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 701-2 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds.
2002).
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accused to criminal prosecution.36 The preamble to the Rome Statute affirms
the need for effective prosecution of international crimes, and recalls the duty
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction. 7 If Curwen makes full
disclosure to the TRC31 then he will be granted amnesty in respect of his alleged
war crimes (Compromis 7). The preclusion of the possibility of prosecution
is incompatible with a genuine willingness to investigate.
b. Investigation of Curwen by the Arkamian TRC Does Not Preclude
Admissibility of his Case Before the ICC.
Furthermore, in relation to the Arkamian TRC, the following factors
evince an unwillingness to investigate or prosecute. First, unlike the South
African 39 and other TRCs,' which have only been able to investigate crimes that
have occurred prior to their establishment, the jurisdiction of the Arkamian TRC
is prospective (Clarification 6). The TRC was established on March 1, 2003
(Compromis 7). Curwen ordered the destruction of Exhamtown on June 29,
2003 (Compromis 17). The prospective jurisdiction of the Arkamian TRC
creates carte blanche to commit war crimes.
Secondly, the purported exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the
Arkamian TRC in respect of crimes committed against Lengian nationals, and
the evidentiary difficulties created thereby,4 demonstrate the inappropriateness
of an exercise of TRC jurisdiction in these circumstances. Granting amnesty to
Curwen is not conducive to the national healing and reconciliation for which the
Arkamian TRC was established. The determination of the Arkamian authorities
to proceed with the TRC process notwithstanding these considerations
demonstrates an unwillingness genuinely to investigate or prosecute.
36. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., art. 20; See John T. Holmes, The
Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41, 77 (Roy S. Lee, ed. 1999); Darryl Robinson, Serving the
Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 481, 499-500 (2003).
37. See DUGARD, supra note 34 at 701; Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 522, (1999); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, pmbl.
38. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 34 § 20(1)(c) (South Africa)
(1995), http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm.
39. Id. § 20(2).
40. Law on General Amnesty for Consolidation of Peace Decree, No. 486 1993, art. I (El Sal.);
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone, July 7, 1999, art. 26, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierraleone_07071999_toc.html; The
Commissions of Inquiry Act Legal Notice No.5 (May 16 1986) (Uganda); U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 13-14,
U.N. Doc. A/48/954-S/1994751 (1994); L'arrtd pr~sidentiel du 28 Mars 1995 (Haiti) art.2.
41. ROBINSON, supra note 35, at 501-02; See HOLMES, supra note 35, at 49.
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c. The Surrender of Curwen to the ICC Does Not Give Rise to State
Responsibility
The applicant claims that surrender of Curwen to the ICC would be illegal
under international law. As noted above, admissibility and surrender are
discrete legal issues. Even if Curwen's case is inadmissible before the ICC, a
Randolfian surrender of Curwen would not be wrongful under international law.
Therefore, it does not give rise to State responsibility.
B. Randolfia's Decision to Surrender Dr. Herbert West to the Custody of the
International Criminal Court Would Be Consistent With International Law.
The ICC is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over West, as the following
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. First, the conduct in question occurred
on the territory of Leng, demonstrating a territorial nexus to a party to the Rome
Statute (ratione loci). Secondly, the crimes for which West is accused occurred
after the entry into force of the Rome Statute for Leng (ratione temporis).
Finally, West has been charged with responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC (ratione materiae). However, before addressing these
jurisdictional issues in more detail, it is necessary to consider, as a preliminary
matter, the role of this Court in examining the jurisdiction of the ICC.
The issue of the ICC's jurisdiction is distinct from the merits of any claim
of criminal responsibility before the ICC. This means Randolfia is not required
to establish before this Court that it has an "unassailable legal basis"'2 for its
arguments regarding ICC jurisdiction. Furthermore, the International Court of
Justice has drawn a distinction between the determination of its own
jurisdiction, and the determination of the jurisdiction of another body.43 This
Court considered the jurisdiction of an arbitral body in the Ambatielos44 case
and effectively concluded that a claim of a "sufficiently plausible character" '5
would establish that body's jurisdiction. Therefore, Randolfia need only
establish a sufficiently plausible basis for ICC jurisdiction over West in order
to justify his surrender.
42. Ambatielos Case, Merits: Obligation to Arbitrate (Greece v. U.K. 1953 I.C.J. 10, 18 (May 19).
43. See Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 10-35.
45. Id. at 18; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.) 1996 I.C.J. 803 H 824, 833,869 (Dec.
12) (Preliminary Objection) (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion; Rigaux, J., separate opinion); Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.) (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility
of the Application) 1984 I.C.J. 392 637 (Nov. 26) (Judge Schwebel, dissenting).
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1. West's Conduct Demonstrates the Necessary Nexus With a
State Party to the Rome Statute.
The ICC is entitled to exercise jurisdiction where there is a sufficiently
plausible claim that the requirements of Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute have
been satisfied. Pursuant to Article 12(2)(a), jurisdiction arises when conduct
proscribed under the Rome Statute has occurred on the "territory" 46 of a State
party to the Statute. This requirement of a territorial nexus is based47 on the
principle of territorial jurisdiction under general international law.48 In
accordance with the territorial principle, States have jurisdiction to prescribe
laws, adjudicate and enforce in relation to crimes committed "in whole or in
part" within their territory.49 A crime is committed in part within the territory
of a State if a constituent element of the crime occurs, or if the crime is
consummated, within the State's territory.5°
The massacres which occurred in the Lengian province of Yuggott
(Compromis 12) constitute genocide within the terms of Article 6(a) of the
Rome Statute. This issue is discussed in further detail below. Leng is a party
to the Rome Statute (Compromis 30).
West has been charged (Corrections 2) with ordering, inducing or
soliciting genocide5 as well as command responsibility for genocide. 2 These
offences were all consummated within the territory of Leng when the killing of
ethnic Lengians occurred. West has also been charged with direct and public
46. ROME STATUTE, art. 12(2)(a).
47. Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in THE ROME STATUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 583, 607-08 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds. 2002).
48. See North Atlantic Fisheries Case, Sept. 7, 1910, 11 R.I.A.A. 167, 180; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1)(b) (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701 (1987); JENNINGS, supra note 29, 458; Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Introductory Comment & Territorial Jurisdiction art. 3, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L., 435,443-45,480 (Supp. 1935), http:/0-heiononline.org.novacat.nova. edu/HOLPage?handle=hein.j ournals/
aj ils29&id= 1231 &collection=j ournals&id.htm.
49. See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Introductory Comment &
Territorial Jurisdiction, supra note 48, art. 3,480, 495; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(a) (1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 701 (1987).
50. S.S. "Lotus" (Fra. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23 (Sept. 7); See Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Introductory Comment & Territorial Jurisdiction, supra note 48, art.
3, 495; JENNINGS, supra note 29, at 459-60; F.A. Mann, Recueil Des Cours, in VOLUME 11I THE DOCTRINE
OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-85 (A.W. Sijthoff, Leyde ed. 1964).
51. See ROME STATUTE, art. 25(3)(b).
52. Id. at art. 28.
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incitement to genocide53 and attempted genocide. 4 The consummation of these
offences occurred in Leng when the audiotape was broadcast on Radio Yuggott
(Compromis 11). There is a sufficiently plausible case that West has directed
the broadcast in Leng, and that he is responsible for conduct that occurred in
Leng.
2. West's Actions Fall Within the Temporal Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court.
In order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction, there must be a sufficiently
plausible claim that the crimes alleged fall within the Court's temporal
jurisdiction. Article 11(2) of the Rome Statute provides that "[i]f a State
becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force
of this Statute for that State."55 This Article should be read in conjunction with
the general principle of law embodied in Article 24, which prohibits the Rome
Statute from having retrospective effect. Article 24 is inapplicable in this case
because it only restricts the Statute from having retrospective effect prior to July
1, 2002, the day on which the Statute came into force generally. All the relevant
acts of West occurred in 2003.
In April 2003, West recorded the relevant audiotape (Compromis 10).
The Rome Statute entered into force for Leng on May 1, 2003 (Compromis [
9). Radio Yuggott began broadcasting West's audiotape on May 15, 2003
(Compromis 11). The massacres in Yuggott commenced on May 16, 2003
(Compromis 12). Notwithstanding the date of the recording, West is charged
with responsibility for genocide, which occurred after the entry into force of the
Rome Statute with respect to Leng. The ICC's temporal jurisdiction is therefore
established.
a. The Charges of Command or Superior Responsibility Are Within the
Temporal Jurisdiction of the ICC.
Article 28 of the Rome Statute addresses criminal responsibility of
superiors for crimes committed by their subordinates.56 West is charged with
command or superior responsibility for the massacre of ethnic Lengians, which
occurred after the entry into force of the Rome Statute with respect to Leng.
Therefore, the ICC has temporal jurisdiction over this charge.
53. Id. at art. 25(3)(e).
54. Id. at art. 25(3)(f.
55. Id. at art. 11(2).
56. RoME STATUTE, art. 28.
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b. The Continuing Crimes of Inciting, Ordering, Soliciting, Inducing and
Attempted Genocide Are Within the Temporal Jurisdiction of the ICC.
Certain crimes are, by their very nature, continuing.5" The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), in considering its temporal jurisdiction,
has accepted that the crime of conspiracy to commit genocide constitutes a
continuing crime.58 The Trial Chamber of the ICTR has endorsed 9 the
following passage from a decision of the English House of Lords:
When the conspiratorial agreement has been made, the offence of
conspiracy is complete, ... But [that] ... does not mean that the
conspiratorial agreement is finished with. It is not dead. If it is being
performed, it is very much alive. So long as the performance
continues, it is operating, it is being carried out by the conspirators,
and it is governing or at any rate influencing their conduct. The
conspiratorial agreement continues in operation and therefore in
existence until it is discharged... 6o
The ICTR has applied this reasoning to the crime of incitement to genocide.6'
By parity of reasoning, a similar approach should apply in relation to the crimes
of ordering, soliciting or inducing genocide. These crimes continue "to the time
of the commission ' 62 of the genocide. The ICC is therefore not precluded from
exercising jurisdiction over West as his acts constitute continuing crimes, which
resulted in the commission of genocide after the entry into force of the Rome
Statute.
57. See Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and Others Ex Parte Pincohet Ugarte No.3, 1
A.C. 147, 153 (2000); See Stephane Bourgon, Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, in THE ROME STATUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 543, 550 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds. 2002); See Raul
C. Pangalangan, Non-Retroactivity Ratione Personae Art. 24, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 467, 471-72 (Otto
Triffterer ed. 1999).
58. Hassan Ngeze and Ferdinand Nahimana v. Prosecutor, I.C.T.R. No. 97-27-AR72, No. I.C.T.R.
96-11-AR72, ICTR App. Ch. (2000), 11 13-15 (Shahabudeen, J., separate opinion) (Decision on the
Interlocutory Appeals); Decision on the Defense Motions Objecting to a Lack of Jurisdiction and Seeking to
Declare the Indictment Void AB Initio (Prosecutor v. Kabiligi and Ntabakuze), 2000 I.C.T.R. No. 96-34-I
39 (April 13), file://C:\DOCUME-l\LOCALS-\Temp\PDD2413T.htm; Decision on the Defense Motions
Objecting to the Jurisdiction of the Trial Chamber on the Amended Indictment (Prosecutor v. Nsengiyeumva),
2000 I.C.T.R. No. 96-12-I 28 (April 13), http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Nsengiyumva/decisions/
dcs20000413.htm.
59. Ntabakuze, 2000 I.C.T.R. 41; Nsengiyeumva, 2000 I.C.T.R. 30.
60. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, 1973 A.C. 807, 827.
61. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 2003 I.C.T.R No. 99-52-T 104 (Dec. 3) (Judgment and Sentence).
62. Id.
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Furthermore, the charge of attempted genocide also falls within the
temporal jurisdiction of the ICC. The broadcast of the audiotape occurred after
the Rome Statute came into force for Leng. This broadcast forms a basis for the
charge that West is responsible for attempted genocide. The determination of
West's role in the broadcast is a matter to be determined on the merits before the
ICC. As the charge of attempted genocide is sufficiently plausible, the ICC
therefore has temporal jurisdiction.
3. The ICC Has Jurisdiction Over West.
a. The Role of the International Court of Justice in Determining the
Jurisdiction of the ICC
This Court was established to adjudicate upon disputes between States,
and to provide advisory opinions to certain international organisations. 63 It is
not empowered to determine individual guilt or innocence. Accordingly, the
Respondent need not make submissions on the merits of West's individual
criminal responsibility. It is only required to establish a sufficiently plausible
case that a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC has occurred. On this basis,
the case against West may then be submitted to the ICC for a determination on
its merits. Arguments set out below that appear to relate to the merits "are
clearly designed as measures of defence" 6 which it would be necessary to
examine only in the alternative that the Court adopts a standard of proof other
then that submitted by the Respondent.
b. ICC Jurisdiction Over the Crime That Occurred in Yuggott.
In order for the ICC to have subject-matter jurisdiction over West, there
must be a sufficiently plausible case that a covered crime under Article 5 of the
Rome Statute has occurred. Under Article 5, the ICC has jurisdiction with
respect to the most serious international crimes, including the crime of genocide.
There is ample evidence to establish a sufficiently plausible case that the crime
of genocide has occurred in Yuggott.
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes 5 assists
the ICC in the interpretation and application of the crime of genocide. The
63. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 34, at 64.
64. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran) 1952 I.C.J. 93 114 (July 22)
(Preliminary Objection).
65. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Finalized Draft
Text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter Elements of Crime].
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Elements of Crimes elaborates upon Article 6(a) of the Rome Statute, and sets
out the following requirements for the crime of genocide:
66
I) The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
II) Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.
III) The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
IV) The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that
could itself effect such destruction.
(i) The Perpetrator Killed One or More Persons
On May 16, 2003, ethnic Arkamians began to conduct a series of
nighttime raids, massacring ethnic Lengians in Yuggott. By the end of May,
nearly ten percent of the Lengian population of the province had been killed by
the end of May (Compromis 12). Such killings are sufficient to satisfy this
element.
(ii) Such Person or Persons Belonged to a Particular National, Ethnical,
Racial or Religious Group.
The massacred Lengians were part of a particular ethnical, racial, and
religious group.67  Lengians share a common culture, distinctive physical
characteristics, and religious beliefs (Compromis 2, 3; Clarification 1).
(iii) The Perpetrator Intended to Destroy, in Whole or in Part, That
National, Ethnical, Racial or Religious Group.
The ethnic Arkamians who carried out the massacres intended to destroy,
in part, the group of ethnic Lengians. There is evidence that they possessed the
special intent (dolus specialis) required for genocide, "which demands that the
66. Elements of Crimes, art 6(a).
67. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. No. 96-4-T 170, 512-15 (Sept. 2) (Judgment),
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001 .htm.
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perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged".68 Intent may be inferred69
from their "words or deeds.,
71
Intent can be inferred from the fact that the Arkamians conducted a series
of night-time raids in several towns in which ethnic Lengians were targeted and
massacred.7' Within three weeks, nearly ten percent of the Lengian population
of the province had been killed (Compromis 12). Intent can also be inferred
from evidence that the perpetrators were chanting "Eliminate them all!" while
carrying out the massacres.
(iv) The Conduct Took Place in the Context of a Manifest Pattern of Similar
Conduct Directed Against That Group or Was Conduct That Could Itself
Effect Such Destruction.
This element contains two alternative limbs. The second appear to be
satisfied in the present case. Approximately ten percent of the Lengian popula-
tion of Yuggott was killed within a three week period by ethnic Arkamians.
(Compromis 12). These killings, in themselves, effected the destruction
required to constitute genocide.72
4. West's Criminal Responsibility For Genocide
As noted above, this Court is not empowered to determine individual guilt
or innocence. Therefore, for the purposes of determining whether the ICC has
subject-matter jurisdiction, it is not for this Court to determine that West is
criminally responsible for genocide. It is only necessary to consider whether
genocide has occurred. However, should this Court find that West's individual
criminal responsibility under Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute is relevant
to the determination of ICC jurisdiction, there is a sufficiently plausible case in
support of each of the charges against West.
68. Id. 1498.
69. Elements of Crimes: General Introduction, supra note 65, 3; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, 2001
I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-10-A, 47 (July 5) (Judgment); The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-
97-24-T, 526 (July 31) (Judgment); Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica, 2001 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-8 61 (Sept. 3)
(Judgment on the Defense Motions to Acquit); See Nahimana, 2003 I.C.T.R No. 99-52-T 957; Prosecutor
v. Semanza, 2003 I.C.T.R. No. 97-20-T 313 (May 15) (Judgment and Sentence); Prosecutor v. Musema,
2000 I.C.T.R. No. 96-13-A 167 (Jan. 27), http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/
index.htm (Judgment and Sentence); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 1999 I.C.T.R. No. 96-3 63 (Judgment and
Sentence), http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Rutaganda/index.htm; Prosecutor v. Kayishema and
Ruzindana, 1999 I.C.T.R. No. 95-1-T 93 (May 21), http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHIcases/KayRuz/
jugdement/index.htm (Judgement); Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. No. 96-4-T 523.
70. Kayishema, 1999 I.C.T.R. 3.
71. See id. 93.
72. See Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2001 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-98-33, 1 80-84 (Aug. 2) (Judgment).
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West has been charged with responsibility for the crime of genocide that
has occurred in Yuggott. A critical requirement of any criminal responsibility
for genocide under Article 25 of the Rome Statute is that West possessed the
necessary genocidal intent (dolus specialis).13 However special intent is not
necessary, for the charge of command/superior responsibility under Article 28
of the Rome Statute.
a. Genocidal Intent
There is evidence that West intended to destroy, in part, the distinct group
of ethnic Lengians. He possessed the dolus specialis required for genocide,
"which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged., 74
In the absence of a confession, the intent of an accused may be inferred from his
"words or deeds." There are two key inferences that may be drawn from West's
actions and words. First, the language in the audiotape evinces an intent to
destroy the ethnic Lengians. Secondly, West's intention to destroy can also be
evidenced by the fact that he intended that the audiotape be disseminated.
The language on the audiotape clearly evinces an intention to destroy
ethnic Lengians. Ethnic Lengians were deliberately targeted by West's language
by virtue of their membership of a specific group. West urged Arkamians to rid
Yuggott of its "Lengian occupiers," and directed them to "[e]liminate them all:
men, women, and children. Eliminate them all!" (Compromis 10).
Furthermore, West's intention to destroy may be evidenced by the fact that
he has "frequently recorded audiotapes with messages denouncing ethnic
Lengians and supporting GALA." (Clarification 4). The repetition of
destructive or discriminatory acts is a fact from which intention to destroy may
be inferred.75
West's intention to disseminate his audiotape can be inferred from his
language and from his actions. West specifically addressed his audio recording
to "my Arkamian brothers and sisters" (Compromis 10). By necessary impli-
cation, his intention was that the recorded message be communicated to a wider
audience than the GALA member to whom he handed the audiotape. The
medium through which West communicated his message further demonstrates
an intention that the message be widely disseminated. An audio recording can
be readily re-produced and re-played.
73. Id. (H 544, 569-580; Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. U 498-99, 517, 540; Prosecutor v. Ignace
Bagilishema, 2001 I.C.T.R. No. 95-1A-T [ 60-62 (Jun. 7),
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Bagilishema/judgement/index.htm (Judgement); Musema, 2000 I.C.T.R.
U 164-166; Rutaganda, 1999 I.C.T.R. 59-61; Kayishema, 1999 I.C.T.R. 91.
74. Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. 498.
75. Id. [524.
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West, a GALA leader, passed his audiotape to a fellow member of GALA
(Compromis 10). The tape was played on Radio Yuggott, a station controlled
by members of GALA, repeatedly for a ten day period (Compromis 11).
GALA is "organized in a formal hierarchy with corresponding command
structures." (Clarification 2). These facts are relevant in establishing an
intention to disseminate, from which an intention to destroy may be inferred.
b. Charges Pursuant to Article 25 and Article 28 of the Rome Statute
West has been charged with 4 crimes:
1) Ordering, soliciting or inducing genocide;
2) Directly and publicly inciting genocide;
3) Attempted genocide;
4) Command responsibility for genocide.
In relation to each of these individual charges, the Elements of Crimes will be
modified "mutatis mutandis" as necessary.76 That is, the elements that define
the crime of genocide in relation to Article 6(a) of the Rome Statute vary
according to the type of criminal responsibility charged.
c. Ordering, Soliciting or Inducing Genocide.
Pursuant to Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute, West has been charged
with ordering, soliciting or inducing genocide. In the context of Article 6(a),
this charge does not require that West actually killed any Lengians. The Ele-
ments of Crimes, as modified mutatis mutandis, to address criminal respon-
sibility under Article 25(3)(b) requires that West ordered, solicited or induced
the killing of ethnic Lengians. It also requires that West possessed the requisite
intent to destroy Lengians, as a distinct group, which has been dealt with above.
Ordering implies a superior-subordinate relationship," in which "the
person in a position of authority uses it to convince another to commit the
offence".78 West is a leader of GALA, which has a "formal hierarchy with
corresponding command structures" (Compromis 10, Clarification 2).
West's employment of imperative language reflects his position of authority,
and constitutes an order.
76. Elements of Crimes, General Introduction, supra note 65, 8.
77. Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. 483; Musema, 2000 I.C.T.R. 121; Rutaganda, 1999 I.C.T.R. 39;
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, 2000 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14 281-82 (Mar. 3) (Judgement) (citing Akayesu,
1998 I.C.T.R 483); Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 796-97 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds. 2002); Kai
Ambos, Article 25:Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 475, 480 (Otto Trifflterer ed.
1999).
78. Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. 483.
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Soliciting means to "command, authorise, urge, incite, request or advise ' 79
another to commit a crime.8" Inducing is broader and encompasses solicitation
as well as any other behaviour that would influence another person to commit
a crime." There is evidence that West solicited and induced genocide, by
urging Arkamians to rid Yuggott of its "Lengian occupiers." His precise words
were "[elliminate them all: men, women, and children. Eliminate them all!"
(Compromis 10). West provided a justification for a potential genocide. In
doing so, influenced the ethnic Arkamians to carry out the killings in Yuggott.
Contemporaneous media reports surmised that the killings in Yuggott were
influenced by West (Compromis 12).
To be responsible for ordering, soliciting or inducing the commission of
genocide, Article 25(3)(b) also requires that genocide either be committed or
attempted. As previously established, the massacres which occurred in Yuggott
constitute genocide.
d Directly and Publicly Inciting Genocide
Pursuant to Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute, West has been charged
with directly and publicly inciting genocide. In the context of Article 6(a), the
Elements of Crimes, as modified mutatis mutandis for this charge, does not
require that West actually killed any Lengians, nor that genocide occurred or
was attempted.82 The Elements of Crimes requires that West possessed the
requisite intent to destroy Lengians, as a distinct group, which has been dealt
with above.
The element of direct incitement requires "specifically urging another
individual to take immediate criminal action rather than merely making a vague
or indirect suggestion."83 West's language constitutes a direct incitement. He
calls for the elimination of Lengians living in Yuggott. His words were
"Eliminate them all-men, women and children" (Compromis 10). He urged
the commission of genocide against a specific group in a specific area. This is
not a vague or indirect suggestion. It was acted upon immediately.
79. See ESER, supra note 76, at 796.
80. See Bagilishema, 2001 I.C.T.R. 30.
81. See ESER, supra note 76, at 796; AMBOS, supra note 76, at 480-81.
82. SeeAkayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. 1562; Nahimana, 2003 I.C.T.R. 1029; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 2000
I.C.T.R. No. 97-32-I 16 (Jun. 1) (Judgment and Sentence); Musema, 2000 I.C.T.R. 120; Rutaganda, 1999
I.C.T.R. 38; ESER, supra note 76, at 803-5.
83. Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind 1996, I.L.C. at art. 2 16.
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Euphemistic language can satisfy the directness requirement. 84 However,
in inciting the "elimination" of Lengians, West did not appear to have relied
upon euphemism.
Public incitement "requires communicating the call for criminal action to
a number of individuals in a public place or to members of the general public
at large."85 The employment of technological means of mass communication
such as radio constitutes a public incitement.86 Indeed, "this public appeal for
criminal action ... encourages the kind of mob violence in which a number of
individuals engage in criminal conduct.,
87
West handed his audiotape to a GALA member who then distributed this
to Radio Yuggott, a private radio station controlled by members of GALA,
which has supported GALA's goals in its broadcasts (Compromis 11). The
recording was repeatedly played on Radio Yuggott between May 15 and 25.
The massacres commenced on May 16 and approximately ten percent of the
Lengian population of Yuggott was killed by the end of the month.
Contemporaneous media reports acknowledged the likely impact of West's
broadcasted message on the massacres (Compromis 12).
e. Attempted genocide
Pursuant to Article 25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute, West has been charged
with attempted genocide. This charge only becomes applicable if the ICC finds,
on the facts that no genocide occurred in Leng. Thus, in the context of Article
6(a), the Elements of Crimes, as modified mutatis mutandis for this particular
charge, requires only that West, with dolus specialis, attempted the genocide of
ethnic Lengians and failed to effect the commission of that genocide.
Article 25 (3)(f) provides for criminal responsibility where a person "forms
the intent to commit a crime, commits an act to carry out this intention and fails
to successfully complete the crime only because of some independent factor."8
As previously established, West had the intention to destroy, in part, the
relevant group. West committed acts to carry out this intention through his
involvement in the recording and dissemination of his message. West's actions
84. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Sess. 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/71 (1995); See
Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, 1998 I.CT.R. No. 97-23-S I 39(x) (Sept. 4),
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Kambanda/judgement/kambanda.html (Judgment and Sentence); See
Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. $ 557; Mugesera v. Can., (The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 F.C.A.
325, 17 (Sept. 8); ESER, supra note 76, at 805; See AMBOS, supra note 76 at 487.
85. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996, I.L.C. art. 2, 16.
86. Id.; Nahimana, 2003 I.C.T.R. 1031; Akayesu, 1998 I.C.T.R. 1556; See Ruggiu, 2000 I.C.T.R.
17; ESER, supra note 76, at 805.
87. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2, 1 16.
88. Id. 17.
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thus constitute "a substantial step"89 in relation to the crime of genocide and the
non-occurrence of that genocide could only conceivably be "for reasons that are
independent of [West's] intentions." 90
f Command/Superior Responsibility
Pursuant to Article 28 of the Rome Statute, West has been charged with
command/superior responsibility. The Elements of Crimes, as modified mutatis
mutandis for this particular charge, does not require that the commander/
superior possessed an intention to destroy. Both Article 28(a) and Article 28(b)
are potentially applicable.
Pursuant to Article 28(a), there is evidence that West effectively acted as
a military commander. While GALA has no clear distinction between its
military and political organs (Clarification 2), this lack of distinction implies
an indivisibility of the two functions. Regardless of what official title West
holds, his order to attack Yuggott, eliminate the Lengians within the territory of
Yuggott and subsume the territory into Arkam, is a statement of a military
nature. Furthermore, the perpetrators of the genocide appear to have acted in
response to GALA commands and in a manner consistent with GALA objec-
tives. This is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the forces were under the
effective command and control of West.9
There is evidence that West knew, or should have known,9" of the
massacres in Leng. Radio Yuggott is a radio station controlled by members of
GALA. It is a reasonable inference that West, as a leader of GALA, knew of
the broadcasts which were played repeatedly for a ten day period (Compromis
11). There is no evidence that West took any action to prevent or repress the
commission of the massacres.
If the ICC finds that West is not a military commander, he may still be
liable as a non-military superior under Article 28(b) of the Rome Statute. Non-
military superiors can include political leaders, business leaders, and senior civil
servants.93 West clearly falls within the category of a non-military superior.
89. ROME STATUTE, art. 25(3)(f).
90. Id.
91. Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of Proof In Romagoza v Garcia, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1214, 1236, 1257-58 (2003).
92. See Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, 1999 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-14/1-T 9 79-80 (June 25)
(Judgement); See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-96-21 91 386-93 (Nov. 16) (Judgement);
See William J. Fenrick, Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors Article 28 in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT, OBSERVER'S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 515,519 n.57 (Otto
Triffterter ed. 1999); Yamashita, 13 I.L.R. at 256; Kirsten M.F. Keith, The Mens Rea of Superior
Responsibility as Developed by ICTYJurisprudence 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 617 (2001).
93. Delalic, 1998 I.C.T.Y. 1 377; Ruzindana, 1999 I.C.T.R. 214.
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The Arkamians who committed the massacres in Yuggott were
subordinates acting under West's "effective authority and control." 94 This is
evidenced by the fact that his instructions to "eliminate" Lengians were acted
upon immediately. West's recording was first broadcast on May 15. The
massacres began the next day.
West's recording was repeatedly broadcast over a period of ten days on
Radio Yuggott. Furthermore, there was media coverage of the massacres being
committed in Yuggott (Compromis 12). Therefore, it may reasonably be
inferred that West "consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated"95 that the massacres were occurring and failed to take "all necessary
and reasonable measures" to "prevent or repress" '96 the commission of the
massacres.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Respondent respectfully requests that the International Court of
Justice:
(a) Determine that Randolfia's decision to surrender Mr. Joseph
Curwen to the custody of the International Criminal Court would be
consistent with international law, and on that basis reject
Applicant's request for relief concerning Mr. Curwen; and
(b) Determine that Randolfia's decision to surrender Mr. Herbert West
to the custody of the International Criminal Court would be consis-
tent with international law, and on that basis reject Applicant's
request for relief concerning Mr. West.
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